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Against the World: International Protestantism and the Ecumenical Movement 
between Secularization and Politics, 1900-1952 
Justin Reynolds 
 
The ecumenical movement was the major international expression of organized Protestantism in 
the first half of the twentieth-century. This dissertation reconstructs the intellectual origins of the 
movement and its principal institutions, showing how ecumenical ideas and practices were 
transformed in response to geopolitical cataclysms, such as World War I, the collapse of 
European order in the 1930s, the Cold War, and decolonization, that divided international 
Protestant and Orthodox elites in the North Atlantic and Asia. Focusing on church leaders and 
lay intellectuals like John Mott, Joseph Oldham, Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, Willem A. Visser’t 
Hooft, John Foster Dulles, and M. M. Thomas, the project shows how a new relation between 
Christian faith and politics emerged from Protestant-led efforts to internationalize religious 
authority. 
 
Seeking to manifest world unity through common faith, ecumenists successively redefined the 
meaning of Christianity in their efforts to secure international consensus on the public role of the 
church among a politically polyglot constituency that included liberals, conservatives, 
communists, and fascists. This dissertation argues that the ecumenical movement went through 
three stages between 1900 and 1952: the first oriented around building the Kingdom of God on 
earth (1900-1925), the second seeking the realize the worldwide church as the basis of universal 
community (1930-1950), and the third mobilizing Christians for political revolution (1946-
 
1952). The focus of the dissertation – chapters 2 through 5 – concerns the rise and decline of the 
ecumenical project to realize the church, which I argue was the first systematic and 
internationally successfully effort to articulate “ecumenicity” as a form of Christian pluralism. I 
show how this project was grounded in a missionary theology of anti-secularism that attributed a 
breakdown of social and international order to modern civilization’s repudiation of God. First 
defined at a conference of the International Missionary Conference in 1928 as a new “system of 
life and thought” that had displaced other religions as Christianity’s chief global rival, 
“secularism” identified an enemy that Allied and German Protestants, estranged since World 
War I, could unite in opposing. Mobilizing dialectical theology against the “totalitarian” claims 
of the state and the cogito alike, ecumenical anti-secularists jettisoned the historicist theological 
liberalism on which earlier forms of Protestant internationalism was based. In the 1930s, 
organizations like the Universal Christian Council of Life and Work and the World Council of 
Churches institutionalized theological dialogue as a mode of submission to God’s sovereignty; 
for the architects of these bodies, Christian faith was the only possible basis of community life in 
an age of global fracture. A strategy of international consolidation that ascribed political 
polarization to spiritual alienation, the ascendant anti-secularism of the 1930s did not 
anathematize the Nazi-sympathizing Reich church but sought to incorporate it into a world 
Christian community prioritizing the subordination of “political” to religious loyalties. 
 
After 1948, however, the ecumenical program to realize the church collapsed as its leaders 
struggled to surmount the ideological divisions of the Cold War. While Eastern European church 
leaders attacked the World Council as a mask for Western imperialism, critics in the West 
attacked the Council as an agent or stooge of world Communism. To escape the ideological 
 
impasse of East and West, the movement turned to the Third World in search of a new basis of 
global Christian unity. Reinventing the ecumenical project in the postwar world, a younger 
generation of theologians from the global South argued that the universal fellowship of the 
church would be actualized not by overcoming politics, but by specifying political commitments 
in solidarity with the liberation struggles of the poor, the non-white, and the colonized. In this 
paradoxical denouement, those struggling to surmount internal political divisions embraced 
political action as the essential expression of religious faith, and Christianity, long declared to be 
the basis of social order, came to be seen as its revolutionary solvent. By locating the ecumenical 
movement within a history of the ideas that made its institutional functioning possible, this 
project breaks from common narratives that lodge the movement within trajectories of 
secularization that rely on problematic attempts to adjudicate the boundaries between theological 
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It is more than conventionally appropriate that the writing of this dissertation should conclude 
with an occasion for gratitude. I have found the effort to write an original piece of scholarship an 
experience of dependence on others in the best senses, and friends, family, and colleagues have 
sustained me in countless ways over the course of research and writing. It is hard to know where 
to begin or where to end these acknowledgments. 
 
My first thanks go to Samuel Moyn. The thrill of reading his scholarship has powered my 
attempts at intellectual production since before I entered graduate school at Columbia. From that 
time onward he has been unfailingly generous with his support, assistance, and criticisms; 
whatever I sent him he read with stunning speed, his feedback always fastening on the essential 
points, as a rule before I saw them. He has shown me how the profession of the mind and the life 
of the mind might include one another; he models both. Susan Pedersen joined my committee at 
a late stage; I hope she did not come to regret the decision. Her criticisms of an earlier collection 
of chapters pushed me to chart a new and better course for the project. In the final months, her 
trenchant feedback was a brace and an inspiration at once, and from her I am still learning how 
to think about international history. Casey Blake has supported my work since the beginning of 
graduate school and modeled a style of careful, penetrating thought that always made ideas more 
than the grip I had on them. I have benefited greatly from Wayne Proudfoot’s wide and deep 
knowledge of the history of Protestant thought, and his responses to the project opened up ways 
of thinking about its claims I had not suspected. Andrew Preston has been the project’s most 
incisively critical reader; liberal with his encouragement and support, he has been still more so in 




I could not have completed this project without generous material support from numerous 
institutions, including, most importantly, Columbia University. The Berlin Program for 
Advanced German and European Studies funded me for an important year, during which I 
changed dissertation topics as a result of conversations with Program colleagues and mentors and 
prolonged stays in European archives. The Social Science Research Council’s Dissertation 
Proposal Development Fellowship, the Jerrold Siegel Summer Research Fellowship, and the 
Institute for Religion, Culture and Public Life enabled me to conduct summer research in 
European, North American, and Indian archives, and the Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral 
Dissertation Fellowship supported me as I wrote up the dissertation in 2015-6.  
 
Librarians and archivists have made my research possible and sometimes delightful. In the first 
place I must thank the staff at the World Council of Churches Archives in Geneva, especially 
Anne-Emmanuelle Tankam-Tene and Hans von Rütte, who provided companionship, 
bibliographical insight, and assistance in tracking down elusive documents, both during my visits 
and while I was away from Geneva. The staff of Burke Library at the Union Theological 
Seminary has been endlessly patient with my requests, and Matthew Baker in particular has been 
a valued conversation partner on the subject of ecumenism over the years. Thanks too to the 
archivists at the Presbyterian Historical Society, the Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton 
University, the Edinburgh University New College Library, the Evangelisches Missions-Werk in 
Hamburg, the Evangelisches Ländeskirchliches Archiv in Berlin, and the Yale Divinity School 
Library. Special thanks to the librarian at the United Theological College in Bangalore and to Dr. 
George Zachariah, Dr. R. Sahayadhas, and Rev. Dr. John Samuel Raj for extending remarkable 
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hospitality and sharing their insights into M. M. Thomas’s theology and legacy during my stay in 
India.  
 
Friends and colleagues have shaped this project and the person that produced it (though they are 
not responsible for the flaws of either). Before I came to Columbia, Hanna Gray, Fredrik 
Albritton Jonsson, and Richard Serjeantson held up for me the historian’s virtues and stuck with 
me as I primitively tried to imitate them. David Abshire upheld the virtues of the active life and 
taught me that no decent contemplative life was possible without them: I am still immensely 
grateful for his encouragement and support. Stefanos Geroulanos had no obligation to engage 
with my work but did so prodigally, reading drafts and talking through ideas, expanding them 
and cutting them to size. I have been thinking with the ideas of James Kennedy, Mark Edwards, 
Udi Greenberg, Linde Lindkvist, Terrance Renaud, and David Hollinger in ways footnotes can 
only suggest; I am thankful for all they’ve taught me. My collaborator in things ecumenical, 
Elisabeth Engel, kept the project interesting to me and kept it on course; the influence of 
discussions with her are present everywhere in the project, and she has made me feel as though 
the struggle has been worthwhile. As organizers of the SSRC’s Dissertation Proposal 
Development Fellowship on the theme “After Secularization,” Vincent Pecora and Jonathan 
Sheehan brought to life a uniquely stimulating environment for collective thought; I thank them 
and other program participants for discussions that enabled me to work out the dissertation’s 
central questions. Gene Zubovich gave learned and always sharp comments on chapters of this 
dissertation and has encouraged me throughout. Samuel Biagetti, Jude Webre, Asheesh Siddique, 
James Chappel, Louisa Thomas, and Joe Blankholm all listened and responded as I tried to 
explain my improbable ideas. I am thankful to participants in the Intellectual and Cultural 
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History Workshop at Columbia University for suggestions and comments on early versions of 
chapters 2 and 3. A conversation with Isabel Gabel always brought me to the point; her 
comments brought one chapter and many stray thoughts to form, and her constant friendship has 
helped bring me to the finish. Stephen Wertheim has watched this project unfold as a friend, 
confidant, and critic; no one pushed harder on my words till they found a thought. Since I met 
him years ago, Tom Meaney has made ideas the stuff of friendship; from him I’ve learned the 
better part of what I know about both.   
 
I would like to thank my grandfather, George T. Reynolds, who many years ago explained to me 
what a “scholar” was. Bobbie Keilson has given me understanding and care and an eye for birds. 
This project has been with my parents, Robert and Kristine Reynolds, for a long time; their 
inexhaustible love has sustained me, and they have given me a refuge to write and to break from 
writing. They’ve probably wished they could do more to assist me at times, not knowing how 
very much they do. To give my thanks to Ana Keilson, my partner of the mind and heart, no 
words will do. She always believed I could find them when I despaired, and without her this 















When delegates from 147 Protestant and Orthodox churches gathered for the first Assembly of 
the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948, Time magazine called it the “greatest 
church meeting since the Reformation.”1 According to its General Secretary, the Dutch 
theologian W. A. Visser’t Hooft, the Council would furnish churches not only in the West but 
also in Asia, Africa, and South America with an organ for proclaiming “the mind of Christ with 
regard to the great spiritual, social, and political problems of our time.”2 Today, the World 
Council is largely forgotten, and its architects’ vision of an “ecumenical” fellowship, uniting 
Christians throughout “inhabitable earth” (oikoumene), has been marginalized in a global 
landscape of disaggregated and competing Christianities. Drawing on archival research in the 
United States, Europe, and India, this dissertation reconstructs three phases of the Protestant-led 
ecumenical movement between 1900 and 1952. This history illuminates a transformation in the 
relation between religion and politics that occurred within one of the 20th century’s least 
understood utopian projects: the transformation of Christianity from a western religion to a 
global faith that would unite humanity across loyalties of nation, race, empire, and sect. 
 
The chapters that follow will reintroduce an international cast of characters – including 
American Protestants such as Reinhold Niebuhr and John Foster Dulles and Europeans such as 
the Anglican Archbishop William Temple, the missionary statesman Joseph Oldham, and the 
                                                
1 “No Pentecost.” Time, no. 11 (September 13, 1948), 52. 
2 Willem A. Visser’t Hooft, “The Significance of the World Council of Churches,” in Man’s Disorder and God’s 
Design: The Amsterdam Assembly Series, v. 1 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 178-9. 
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Swiss dialectical theologian Emil Brunner – that have generally been treated from the 
perspectives of national or transatlantic historiographies. They also introduce a group of 
ecumenists from Eastern Europe – such as the Czech theologian Josef Hromadka and the 
Reformed Hungarian Bishop Alfred Bereczky – and Asia – including the Indian Mar Thomite 
theologian M. M. Thomas, and the Chinese pastor and church leader T.C. Chao – who will be 
less familiar to scholars of North Atlantic Protestantism. Viewed as participants in the 
ecumenical movement, this ensemble helps us to develop a new understanding of the relation 
between Christianity and modernity, accessible only once we assume the global perspective the 
ecumenical movement demands. 
 
In this dissertation we will recover the oikoumene – a global discursive space defined by 
concepts of Christian mission, organized by international institutions, and peopled by the greater 
portion of the intellectual and clerical leadership of non-Roman Christendom – as the site of one 
of Christianity’s most significant 20th-century trajectories. A Greek term originally used to 
denote the extent of the “habitable earth,” oikoumene acquired a significance within the ambit of 
Christianity’s universalizing imagination during the 1st century CE.3 According to the Gospel of 
Matthew, Jesus left his disciples with the command that “this gospel of the kingdom shall be 
preached in all the world [oikoumene] for a witness to the nations.” The “Ecumenical Councils” 
of Nicaea (325 CE), Constantinople (381 CE), Ephesus (431 CE), and Chalcedon (451) assumed 
the name because they convened bishops throughout the oikoumene (at the time connoting the 
Mediterranean world) to define heresies and establish orthodox doctrine concerning the nature of 
                                                
3 See W. A. Visser’t Hooft, The Meaning of Ecumenical (London: SCM Press, 1953); “Ecumene” and “Ecumenical 
Movement” in Religion Past and Present: Encyclopedia of Theology and Religions, vol. 6, eds Hans Dieter Betz et 
al. (Boston: Brill, 2008), 286-304. 
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Christ, the relations of the Trinity, and the other matters dividing the early church. These two 
meanings – one secular, denoting a geographical space, the other ecclesiastical, pertaining to the 
church as a whole – established a semantic field that Protestants, from the Reformation to the 
late 19th century, had very little use for. It was only with the late 19th century emergence of what 
historians Michael Geyer and Charles Bright have called the “global condition” – characterized 
by an acceleration of social, economic, cultural, and political processes shaping the world into a 
materially integrated totality – that Protestants first began to seek “ecumenical unity” as an 
expression of religious belief and a manifestation of religious practice.4 The history of their 
efforts is the subject of this dissertation. 
 
If global integration made the modern ecumenical project conceivable, global disintegration – 
evinced in the rise of nationalism, world war, the Russian Revolution, and struggles between 
colonizers and colonized – made it imperative. We will see that, notwithstanding a few furtive 
appearances of the term ecumenical in the late 19th century, it was only following World War I, 
in an interwar a period of “deglobalization” characterized by convulsive wars to secure national 
or ethnic autonomy in the face of global integration, that programs to realize the “ecumenical” 
unity of the church first mobilized wide constituencies.5 Official historiographies of the 
movement, examined in more detail below, narrate its course in this period as a story of Christian 
                                                
4 Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, “World History in a Global Age” The American Historical Review, vol 100, 4 
(1995), 1034-1060. Here I am drawing on a broader literature that identifies the mid- to late 19th century as a period 
that witnessed the emergence of a new kind of global consciousness and material integration. See also Jürgen 
Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the 19th Century (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014); Christopher Bayly, Birth of the Modern World: Global Connections and Comparisons 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Press, 2004); Vanessa Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2015). 
5 For the phenomenon of deglobalization in this period, see Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson, Globalization: 
A Short History trns Dona Geyer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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fellowship overcoming the centrifugal pulls of nationalism, racial chauvinism, and class division. 
In fact, the ecumenical movement did not triumph over these fracturing dynamics but was 
transformed by them. In particular, the two crises of World War I (1914-1918) and the early 
Cold War (1946-1950) so bitterly divided the advocates of world Christian unity that they were 
compelled to dramatically re-define the meaning and practices of Christianity in their efforts to 
reconstitute coherence shattered by internecine conflict. For ecumenism’s architects, the 
universal truth of the Christian faith could only be apprehended through a consensus of churches 
representing “all nations, races, and classes.” Ecumenical Christianity was an effort to 
comprehend and embody that consensus as it was worked out by a constituency including 
Christians from colonized and colonizer nations whose political allegiances ran the gamut from 
liberalism to conservatism and from fascism to communism. While most research programs have 
drawn the fault lines of twentieth-century history around such political groups, our concern is 
with the religious project that sought to define a common faith shared by these groups and the 
enemies against which such a solidarity – capacious and unstable as it was – could cohere. 
 
This dissertation argues that efforts to realize the “ecumenical” unity of the church went through 
three stages between 1900 and 1952. Before 1914, Protestants mobilized internationally around a 
campaign to realize the “Kingdom of God” on earth. This vision, rooted in a tradition of liberal 
theology that emphasized the imminence of God, sought to “Christianize” the social order at 
home and extend Christianity abroad through missionary activities. But this program collapsed 
as a result of World War I, when Allied and German Protestants clashed over the practical 
initiatives necessary to bring it about: while Allied church leaders saw Wilsonian 
internationalism and the League of Nations as the first fruits of the Kingdom, German 
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Protestants perceived these institutions as fronts of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. Reconstituting 
Christian unity in a period of international reconciliation between 1928 and 1933, church leaders 
identified “secularism,” a world-wide “system of life and thought” constituted by man’s efforts 
to secure his autonomy from God’s rule, as a new common enemy against which Christians 
could mobilize. In the 1930s and 1940s, anti-secularism furnished the foundation of the first self-
consciously ecumenical movement, which sought to realize not the Kingdom but the “church,” a 
global public constituted by God’s address and man’s obedient response. Inspired by dialectical 
theology, this ecumenical project was institutionalized in bodies such as the World Council of 
Churches and organized around theological dialogue, a practice seeking to disrupt the doctrinal 
formulations that had imprisoned the Gospel in national and confessional traditions in order to 
make it speak with persuasive power to a wider world – one globally interconnected but, due to 
its lack of a common spiritual basis, in a state of permanent crisis. After 1948, the ecumenical 
program to realize the church collapsed as its leaders struggled to surmount the ideological 
divisions of the Cold War. While Eastern European church leaders attacked the World Council 
as a mask for Western imperialism, critics in the West attacked the Council as an agent or stooge 
of world Communism. To escape the ideological impasse of East and West, the movement 
turned to the Third World in search of a new basis of global Christian unity. A third ecumenical 
project was born when a younger generation of movement activists – led by theologians from the 
global South – argued that the universal fellowship of the church could be actualized, not by 
overcoming politics, but by specifying political commitments in solidarity with the liberation 
struggles of the poor, the non-white, and the colonized. In this paradoxical denouement, a long 
struggle to surmount internal political divisions embraced political action as its essential 
 
 6 
expression, and Christianity, long declared to be the basis of social order, came to be seen as its 
revolutionary solvent. 
 
I suggest in the remainder of this introduction that this narrative offers an account of 
Christianity’s relation with twentieth-century politics that challenges dominant historiographies 
in both the secular academy and church scholarship. Ecumenical history does not fit into the 
paradigm, common in recent studies of the movement, that sees ecumenism as a last gasp of 
Protestant establishment in the West, awaiting on the onset of a process of secularization that 
would overtake it even while appropriating concepts and ideals from originally theological 
contexts. Nor does it fit into existing research programs that challenge secularization, stressing 
the resilience of religion in the modern world and, in the case of Christianity, its remarkable 
proliferation in non-Western societies. Rather, ecumenical history recounts transformations in 
the ideas and practices of a community imbricated in the politics its vision of collective life 
sought to overcome. My narrative highlights how ecumenical leaders and organizations 
responded to the problem of internal conflict generated by their very success in mobilizing a 
global constituency that included clerics, lay leaders, and theologians on opposites sides of the 
early 20th century’s major political struggles. Neither a movement of the political right nor the 
left, ecumenism was constituted on a global level by its efforts to evade political identification in 
the name of transcendent truth. The understanding of politics that emerged from this effort by the 
1950s suggests a new way of conceiving Christianity’s relation to the discursive space of the 






For many years, insiders, church historians and theologians with some affiliation to ecumenical 
institutions, wrote the history of the ecumenical movement. This body of literature has tended to 
offer a “milestone” approach to the past, chronicling a long story of unfolding unity reaching 
back to the early 19th century – or in some cases, such as the World Council’s three-volume 
official history of the movement – to the Reformation.6 Such accounts focus on the 
accomplishments of magnetic visionaries and hard-working organizers and tend to see 
conferences – large “representative” gatherings of international Protestant and Orthodox leaders 
– as the markers of epochs in church history. Serving the imperative of institutional 
consolidation, this historiography fails to engage with the key narratives that scholars in the 
wider academy have used to interpret the history of western modernity, including 
industrialization, the rise of nation states, the ideological confrontation of left and right, the rise 
and crisis of European colonialism – or the dominant narrative applied to religion’s fate in the 
modern age, secularization.7 The production of teleological institutional histories has thus 
ensured the compartmentalization and irrelevance of the ecumenical project to the larger visions 
of European, American, and imperial history. 
 
In recent years, this isolation has been eroded. Driven by a resurgent interest in religion as a field 
of historical inquiry, ecumenical ideas, institutions, and personalities have been the subject of an 
                                                
6 A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1571-1948 vol. 1 eds. Ruth Rouse and Stephen Neill (Geneva: World 
Council of Churches, 1948). The literature produced by ecumenical advocates is vast. Some examples further 
examples include William Richey. Ecumenical Foundations; a History of the International Missionary Council and 
Its Nineteenth Century Background (New York: Harper and Bros, 1952) and Thomas Fitzgerald, The Ecumenical 
Movement: An Introductory History (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). 
7 For an overview of these dominant narratives of 20th-century history, see Charles Maier, “Consigning the 
Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” The American Historical Review, vol 
105, 3 (200) 807-831, 808.  
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expanding literature, especially among scholars of Atlantic and international history. Rather than 
constituting a scholarly eco-system unto itself, the ecumenical movement is at the center of 
contemporary debates over a range of questions concerning the meaning of the secular, revisions 
and criticisms of the secularization thesis, and the place of religion in the modern world; such 
debates cut across disciplinary boundaries with ramifications in the wider public. The 
significance of the movement – the greatest global projection of Christianity in the first half of 
the 20th century – could not have higher stakes. And yet, most current accounts fold the 
movement into one of two competing narratives, both of which fail to reckon with the meanings 
that ecumenists themselves invested in the concept of the ecumenical. Here I will describe these 
two narratives before outlining my own historiographical orientation, which locates the 
movement’s emergence within a story of Christian encounters with “politics” shaped by 
Protestant-led efforts to cultivate international and interdenominational global unity. While this 
approach is necessary to understand the aims and aspirations that forged the oikoumene, it also 
suggests a larger analytical program for how scholars might approach “religion” as a historical 
phenomenon that unsettles the categories of historical analysis itself. 
 
Most contemporary scholars in the secular academy use the term “ecumenical” interchangeably 
with “liberal” as a grab bag for various impulses that pushed Protestants down the road to 
secularization: an enlightened (if patronizing) respect for other religions, an “accommodation” 
with modern science, including Darwinian evolution, and a dominating concern with the 
practical, worldly application of Christian teaching as opposed to the individual’s personal 
relationship with God. Characteristic of this approach is the most ambitious attempt to date to 
reckon with the legacy of ecumenical Protestantism, David Hollinger’s After Cloven Tongues of 
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Fire. Though it focuses on American Protestants, Hollinger’s account expresses common 
assumptions about the basic intellectual orientation of the international ecumenical movement as 
a whole.8 His Protestants “put more and more energy into transdenominational projects and 
shifted the emphasis of their foreign missions from conversion to social service, welcoming 
syncretistic religions into the Body of Christ.” If evangelical Protestants were “focused 
vertically, one might say, on the individual believer’s relation to the Divine,” ecumenists 
oriented their faith “horizontally,” and “[h]ence… became great organizers, institution builders, 
and social reformers, searching for ways to enact what they understood to be Christian ideals 
within worldly affiliations and through their instrumentality.”9 In this view, ecumenists walked 
the road to Weberian disenchantment; their movement was “a commodious half-way house to 
what for lack of a better term we may call post-Protestant secularism.”10 Sometimes, the 
narrative is presented as a case of Christianity succumbing to its internal contradictions. Andrew 
Preston, for instance, has argued that there was a “fatal flaw embedded within the [ecumenical] 
Protestant worldview: the contradiction between ecumenical tolerance and Christian 
evangelism.”11 But it’s as easy to see the secularization of Protestant values as the fulfillment of 
                                                
8 For approaches to the ecumenical movement in general that see it as an expression of “liberal Protestantism,” see 
David Hollinger, After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013); Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War 
and Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012); William Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 
1945-1960: The Soul of Containment. (New York: Cambridge University Press 2008); and John Stuart, “Empire, 
Mission, Ecumenism, and Human Rights,” Church History 83.1 (March 2014) 110-134. Mark T. Edwards’ The 
Right of the Protestant Left: God’s Totalitarianism (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2012) emphasizes the 
“conservative” elements of the “participator democratic” strains in ecumenical social thought, but generally 
characterizes ecumenist’s as political and theological “liberals.” 
9 David Hollinger, After Cloven Tongues, xi. 
10 Hollinger, After Cloven Tongues, 46. 
11 Andrew Preston, “Peripheral Visions: American mainline Protestants and the global Cold War” Cold War History 
13:1 (2013), Cold War History 13:1 (2013): 109-130. DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2012.707648. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2012.707648, 10.  
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Christ’s world-redeeming promise, a view more amicable to scholars like John Nurser, author of 
a celebratory work on the role of the World Council of Churches, in securing the passage of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.12 Both variations on the story have the air of 
inevitability. Ecumenists in their openness to Enlightenment and progress were bound to become 
“post-Protestants,” concealing or naturalizing theological ethics in philosophical liberalism or in 
campaigns for world peace, international justice, and universal human rights.13 
 
In contrast to the secularization narrative embraced by many professional historians, scholars 
focused on the phenomenon of “global Christianity” offer a different perspective. This literature, 
which highlights the proliferation of Christian communities and identities especially in the non-
western world, has been dominated by church historians, but many of its core concerns resonate 
with the work of critical theorists and anthropologists focused on exposing the imperial 
implications of secularization theory.14 A common point is to recover the irreducible particularity 
of religious practice and its resistance to Western models of modernization predicting its decline. 
While the secular critics of secularization have not yet examined ecumenism in much detail, their 
Christian counterparts in this area have presented the ecumenical movement as a stage in 
                                                
12 John Nurser, For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005). 
13 Mackenzie Bok’s recent work (“To the Mountaintop Again: The Early Rawls and Post-Protestant Ethics in 
Postwar America” Modern Intellectual History (August 2015), 1-33) has placed the political philosopher John 
Rawls in this Post-Protestant tradition. I address Bok’s work in detail in the Conclusion. 
14 Leading critical theorists of the secular, such as Talal Asad (Formations of the Secular  : Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003)), and Tomoko Masuzawa (The Invention of World 
Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005)), and Gil Anidjar (“Secularism” Critical Inquiry 33, 1 (2006), 52-77) have mostly stressed the 
Christian theological origins of secularism as a technology of state power and secularization theory as scientific 
auxiliary of western colonialism. To this extent they belong too to the tradition of secularization theorists discussed 
in the section above. Their attention to religions’ resistance to secular reason focuses on non-Christian cases, 




Christianity’s extrication from European imperialism – a liberation they celebrate. In these 
works, the ecumenical movement’s early promotion of “indigenous” Christianities in Africa, 
Asia, and South America was a harbinger of things to come. The declining influence of the 
establishment or mainline Protestant elites who pioneered ecumenical project is secondary; what 
is important is the miraculous adaptability Christianity has shown as a cultural program in non-
western contexts.15 In the 1990s, for instance, Anton Wessels introduced the term “inculturation” 
to describe the process by which Christianity has both reshaped itself and other societies as it has 
moved across cultural and political boundaries.16 Working in vein similar to Wessels, the 
Scottish historian Andrew Walls has argued that the very concept of territorial Christianity 
(found in constructs of “Christendom” or the “Christian nation”) owes nothing to Christianity as 
such but should be viewed as the result of the way in which tribal peoples of northern Europe in 
the first centuries CE jiggered the faith to fit with their own homogenous, highly militarized 
societies.17 Much of this work has been closely linked with the movement of contextual 
theology18 and, more generally, theological orientations that have celebrated cultural pluralism 
among Christians and dialogue between Christianity and other faiths. From such points of view, 
the demise of “Christendom” and Euro-centrism has opened up onto a bright era of global 
                                                
15 The major statement of this point of view is Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global 
Christianity. 2nd Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). See also the work of Andrew Walls, particularly 
the essays in The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History: Studies in the Transmission and Appropriation of 
Faith. (New York: Orbis Books, 2002) and David Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of 
Mission (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991).  
16 Anton Wessels, Europe: Was It Ever Really Christian? The Interaction between Gospel and Culture. Trns. John 
Bowdon (London: SCM Press, 1994). 
17 Walls, “Christianity in the Non-Christian World” in The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History, 27-48. 
18 S. B. Bevans, Contextual Theology (New York: Orbis Books, 2002) offers a good description of the approach. He 
defines contextual theology as "A way of doing theology in which one takes into account: the spirit and message of 
the gospel; the tradition of the Christian people; the culture in which one is theologising; and social change in that 
culture." (Bevans, 1). 
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Christianity. As these scholars contend, a world where Christianity is no longer a predominately 
Western religion marks the progress of a form of Christian universalism, premised not on the 
proselytization of non-Christian others or the spread of “Christian civilization,” but on the 
creative processes of appropriation and transformation of the faith that ecumenists were the first 
to attempt to realize. 
 
Whether it focuses on the failure or success of Christianity as a cultural program, scholarship on 
the ecumenical movement overlooks what the term “ecumenical” meant to those Protestants and 
Orthodox missionaries, clerics, lay activists, and theologians who invested it which such 
significance in the mid-20th century. To them, as we will see, ecumenism was not a path to 
“secularism” but a strategy for opposing it. But nor does the ecumenical movement accord with 
the story of Christianity’s robust global proliferation. The “centers of the church’s universality,” 
as the Kenyan scholar John Mbiti has put it, may now be in “Kinshasa, Buenos Aires, Addis 
Ababa, and Manila,” but the faith practiced there is not the one that ecumenists envisioned or 
wanted.19 Today, indeed, the World Council of Churches, once non-Roman Christendom’s 
center of spiritual and institutional gravity, fails to attract attention from the leaders of growing 
churches in Africa, the energetically evangelistic Presbyterian Church of Korea, or Pentecostals 
in North and South America. The dominance of “global Christianity” – characterized as a field of 
de-centered religious identities for which the vision of a unified world expression of the faith 
conspicuously fails to mobilize – marks how dramatically the ecumenical movement in the 
postwar period has lost control over the cultural capital of Christianity.  
 
                                                
19 Quoted in Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (New York: Oxford 




To recover ecumenical history requires turning our attention to the problem that simultaneously 
inspired and threatened 20th-century efforts to realize world Christian unity: the problem of 
negotiating, within a polyglot global constituency that included figures on opposite sides of most 
of the century’s cataclysmic conflicts, the distinction between “authentic” Christian faith and 
ideology. 
 
For Protestants between 1900 and 1952, “politics” became legible to the international leadership 
of organizations promoting world Christian unity not as a sphere of state power or governance, 
but as a source of division within the community they hoped to unite. To see how this new 
consciousness of politics came about, we need to place ecumenism within a longer history of 
Protestantism’s propulsions into the distinctively modern space of civil society. Abigail Greene 
and Vincent Viaene have recently drawn attention to the phenomenon of “religious 
internationalism” as a transformation of religious identities that took place in the 
“communicative space between the private sphere and the state.”20 The “Protestant International” 
was one of many religious internationals that Greene and Viaene define as “a cluster of 
transnational organizations and representations crystallizing around international issues, in which 
both ‘ordinary’ believers and religious specialists could serve as protagonists.”21 Entering the 
public sphere, religious internationals mobilized bodies of opinion, rather than belief, and 
cultivated a culture of voluntarism that fostered institutions outside of traditional loci of religious 
authorities such as churches, synagogues, and mosques. In the case of Protestantism, the 
                                                
20 Abigail Greene and Vincent Viaene, Introduction, Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globalization 
and Faith Communities since 1750 eds. Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2012), 2. 
21 Ibid, 2. 
 
 14 
evangelical revivals of the late18th and early 19th centuries provided the original matrix of these 
public expressions of faith.22 The reforming impulses of these revivals brought into existence 
abolition campaigns, foreign missionary societies, initiatives for the moral regeneration of the 
working classes, as well as associations devoted to promoting international peace. Mobilizing 
across hardening national boundaries in the 19th century, these efforts centered 
interdenominational unity and cooperation around issues “not affected by doctrinal 
disagreement.”23  
 
The formation of the Protestant International gave a specifically modern form to the long-
standing tension between religious and political authority in the Christian West. From its origins, 
Christianity has been constituted, in a sense, by debates over the jurisdiction of Christ and 
Caesar, the City of God and the City of Man. But with the emergence of the Protestant 
International, these debates took shape as attempts to generate public consensus around the 
meaning of authentically Christian – as opposed to worldly – practice. Insofar as politics refers to 
specific, partisan commitments to social programs, to governing bodies (such as states or 
international institutions), or to parties, Protestants denied that their common aims were political 
at all. Indeed, for the Protestants who led efforts to organize Christians across national and 
denominational divisions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the universal truth of their faith 
generated two, conflicting mandates: on the one hand, faith needed to assert itself in the world – 
                                                
22 Christopher Clark and Michael Ledger-Lomas, “The Protestant International” Religious Internationals in the 
Modern World, esp 24-37. 
23 The phrase is taken from a founding document of the International Missionary Council (whose history is 
discussed in more detail in chapters 1-2), but is reflective of general approach voluntary Protestant-led associations 
promoting international and interdenominational cooperation on social issues and in missionary work. Resolution on 
Missionary Cooperation in View of Doctrinal Differences, adopted by the International Missionary Council in 1923, 




through mission work abroad and through social reform at home – and on the other, all such 
activism had to be “above parties,” expressing faith as the adhesive of “Christian” societies. 
Protestant mobilization in civil society thus sought to embody a form of anti-political public 
engagement. 
 
In the years leading up to World War I, the project of building the Kingdom of God furnished 
this anti-political ethos. A necessarily indistinct vision of a redeemed humanity, the goal of the 
Kingdom justified Protestants’ entry into the public sphere through the promise of an end to 
partisan conflict via the progressive realization of social order based on universal love and 
brotherhood. In the aftermath of World War I, however, the Kingdom became politicized. While 
Allied nations saw the approach of God’s reign in a vision of internationalism that championed 
the League of Nations, imperial reform, and the growth of “indigenous” churches in the non-
western world, Germans assailed all of these aims as “politics” in disguise. Those on both sides 
of the divide who, after the War, sought to reconstitute Christian unity confronted a question: 
how was it possible to mobilize in the public realm – asserting the relevance of their faith to 
broader social problems – and yet sustain a consensus that the aims pursued there were 
authentically Christian and not political?  
 
The answer lay in the construction of a new common enemy. In the spring of 1928, as relations 
between German and Allied blocs began to improve, the International Missionary Council – a 
body of missionary societies from North America and Europe, as well as representatives from 
“younger churches” in Asia and Africa – convened in Jerusalem for its first meeting. 
Fundamentally reframing their world mission, delegates declared that “secularism,” the dominant 
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“worldview” of modern industrial civilization, had displaced other religions as the faith’s chief 
rival in the East as well as the West. The genius of the concept of secularism lay in its translation 
of the international conflicts that threatened Christian unity into a religious problem: man’s 
search for self-sufficiency and denial of his responsibility to God. Secularism described a scene 
of modern social and spiritual chaos, a disorder of life rooted in original sin, but radicalized to 
the point of catastrophe by modern man’s denial of his true nature and destiny. Secularism was, 
in the words of Joseph Oldham, one of its major architects of anti-secularism, “the demonic 
attempt to put the world or the self in the place of God.”24 
 
In contrast to non-Christian religions, “secularism” was endogenous to Christian civilization in 
the West. Its growth and worldwide proliferation was the result, ecumenists declared, of the 
failure of Christians realize in practice the universal fellowship declared in scriptural revelation. 
The movement thus mobilized in the 1930s to achieve a vision of ecumenical community as the 
“Una Sancta, the fellowship of Christians who acknowledge the one Lord” across all nations.25 
Dialectical theologians like Emil Brunner, Karl Heim, Visser’t Hooft, Oldham and others 
furnished the intellectual foundations of this program in the early 1930s, and their early 
diagnoses of secularism and its challenge to Christianity shaped the discourse of the oikoumene 
throughout the decade. A new rallying call – the unofficial motto of the movement’s major event 
of the decade, the Conference on “Church, Community, and State” held by the Universal 
Christian Council of Life and Work held in Oxford in 1937 – was “Let the Church be the 
                                                
24 Joseph Oldham, “The Christianizing and Unchristianizing of the World,” [unpublished address to the Dutch 
Missionary Conference, 1930] (Joseph Oldham Papers, 15/2/8) 
25 “Report on the Universal Church and the World of Nations,” The Churches Survey Their Task: The Report of the 
Conference at Oxford, Jul 1937, on Church, Community, and State (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), 169. 
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Church!” As these ecumenists conceived it, the “church” was not an introverted body, aloof from 
the public sphere, but a new global public, constituted through a communal ethics of 
responsiveness to God’s “Word” that – through conferences, theological dialogue, and prayer – 
would enact the subordination of human wills to God’s sovereignty. This public was constituted 
not by rational deliberation over common goods but by God’s address to humanity, and the 
common life built from collective reflection on its significance to economic, political, social, and 
international question. Secularism’s corrosive effects could thus be contained only within the 
church – a community in search of obedience to God. 
 
It was from the foundation of anti-secularism that ecumenists made their most significant 
interventions in mid-century North Atlantic social thought. In a remarkable elision of seemingly 
opposed programs, ecumenists declared that liberalism, Nazism, and Communism were all 
manifestations of the “secular and pagan tendencies of our time.”26 While liberal humanism 
repudiated the Christian God in its search for rational autonomy of the will, “totalitarian” 
movements of Nazism and Communism arrived at the same end by “ascribing absolute value” to 
the “pagan idols” of race or class. This blanket condemnation of the major ideologies vying for 
power in 1930s Europe was the converse of an unsettling strategy of inclusion: if ecumenists 
assailed Nazism at the moment it became a “counter-church,” a source of “total” allegiance, 
membership in – even enthusiasm for – the Nazi Party was acceptable throughout the 1930s, so 
long as it remained “on the level of politics.” The same was true mutates mutandis for other 
                                                
26 As Joseph Oldham described the purpose of the extensive study preparations for the 1937 Oxford Conference of 
the Universal Christian Council of Life and Work, it was “to understand the true nature of the vital conflict between 
the Christian Faith and the secular and pagan tendencies of our time.” These tendencies, as we will see in chapters 3 




possibilities. As Joseph Oldham explained in 1937, “[a] man may be a National Socialist because 
he believes government by the party to be in the best interests of the nation or a member of the 
Communist Party because he regards its aims as leading most directly the emancipation of the 
laboring classes, or a supporter of capitalism out of a sincere conviction that under conditions the 
sum of human misery would be increased and not diminished if any other system were 
substituted for it – and in all these cases he can still hold fast to his ultimate Christian belief.”27 
Anti-secularism was a campaign to put politics in its place by abstracting political difference into 
a symptom of modernity’s spiritual crisis. 
 
As we will see, anti-secularism proved surprisingly capable of crossing over shifting ideological 
boundaries in the 1930s and the 1940s. The oikoumene of the 1930s was shaped both by 
vigorous anti-Nazis, such as the Anglican Bishop George Bell, W. A. Visser’t Hooft, and 
American church leaders, as well as enthusiastic supporters of Hitler, including Karl Heim – a 
critical early theorist of secularism – and the pastor and economist Hans Schoenfeld, Director of 
the Study Department of the Universal Council of Life and Work, and later of the World Council 
in formation between 1938 and 1946. A delegation of German churches, including both the 
establishment Reich Church and the dissenting Confessing Church, was invited to the Oxford 
Conference of 1937 – and did not attend only because its request for passports was denied 
shortly before the event. In the years following 1945, a similar ideological ambiguity was critical 
to the World Council’s efforts to recruit both vigorous anti-Communists, such as John Foster 
Dulles, and committed supporters of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, such as the 
Hungarian Reformed Bishop Albert Bereczky, a member of the World Council’s Executive 
                                                
27 Joseph Oldham, “The Function of the Church in Society,” in Oldham and W. A. Visser’t Hooft, The Church and 
Its Function in Society (New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 1937), 212. 
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Committee from 1946 to 1952. It was precisely in this capacious inclusion that ecumenists 
witnessed the world-reconciling work of Christ. None of this is to say that the efforts to 
constitute a supra-political community were not themselves political: the oikoumene was 
governed, as we will see in chapter 4, by its own institutional structures and authorities, which 
vested in an international elite of churchmen and laypersons extensive power to determine who 
would be included in public of God’s address. This dissertation, however, takes the ambiguity of 
ecumenical politics vis-à-vis conventional determinations of right and left as a point of departure 




The question of the “politics” of the ecumenical movement takes us to the heart of a wider 
problem confronting scholars attempting to treat religion historically. At stake in these debates is 
the coherence of a “secular” approach to history. Are religious utterances to be translated into a 
language of power, demystified of their transcendent, supra-historical points of reference? Doing 
so threatens to efface the contextual specificity of the actors’ categories the historian purportedly 
sets out to recover. At the same time, taking the religious utterances of these actors “on their own 
terms” courts, as the historian James Chappel has recently argued, “adopt[ing] the transcendental 
claims they make for themselves.”28 Historians thus confront a dilemma: take religion “too 
seriously” and veer from the discipline’s properly critical function into the remit of religious 
apologetics, or take it not seriously enough and risk erasing the alterity of the past. The latter 
                                                
28 James Chappel, “Beyond Tocqueville: A Plea to Stop ‘Taking Religion Seriously’,” Modern Intellectual History, 
vol. 10, 3 (2013), 697-708, 700. 
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course has the potential to turn towards an apologetics of its own that asserts, with the very 
epistemic certainty it assails in religion, the transhistorical category of “power.”29 
 
The most important recent scholarship on ecumenical Protestantism grapples with this dilemma 
by attending closely the political salience of Christian actions and utterances in specific regional 
and temporal contexts. One such work is Samuel Moyn’s Christian Human Rights, which 
identifies Christian intellectuals as the primary vehicles of the transwar propulsion of human 
rights into public discourse. Moyn highlights the role of Catholics as well as ecumenical 
Protestants in an account of how the theological concept of the person – originally opposed to the 
Enlightenment tradition of rights – appropriated rights as its vehicle in the late 1930s and 1940s. 
One virtue of the analysis is a clear statement of how intellectual historians committed to 
genealogical method can make sense of religious discourse: 
 
Religion is never merely politics, and one of the deepest aspirations of many of those 
reinterpreting Christianity across the 1930s and 1940s was to put the ‘established 
disorder’ of the world… in its place for the sake of suprapolitical truth. Often, the goal 
was not move rightwards (or, for that matter, leftwards) as upwards – and thus 
orthogonally to politics as a whole. And yet such aspirations had inevitably this-worldly 
implications, especially when they found their ways into such documents as national 
constitutions and international declarations, or came to be mobilized by parties and 
publicists pursuing agendas with definite implications for the terms of collective life. 
There are thus two equal and opposite errors to be avoided: if the first is to treat the 
spiritual as just the ideological mystifications of the political, the second is to forget that 
the most otherworldly claims are ultimately significant – certainly for the secular 
historian – for how they affect this world.30 
 
                                                
29 For a discussion of this historiographical problematic, see Sarah Shorthall, “Lost in Translation: Religion and the 
Writing of History” Modern Intellectual History 13.1 (2016), 273-286. 
30 Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 20. 
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Such an approach is clear in recognizing that its own terms of analysis do a certain violence to 
those of the actors it examines. But here is no crude reduction of religion to ideology: Moyn’s 
point about the theology of personalism is that from the beginning it was intended to upend the 
dichotomy between collectivist options of Communism and fascism in their various forms and 
the individualism of liberal democracy. And yet Moyn’s own “ultimate” priorities are clear: the 
goal of the historian is to recover the political valence of a discourse that, as a rule, understood 
itself outside the categories of left and right. Christian human rights were “an epochmaking 
reinvention of conservatism,” necessitated by the implosion of fascist and Nazi regimes that, 
until the late 1930s, seemed amenable to most Christians. In their dominant transwar iterations, 
human rights were “part and parcel of a reformulation of conservatism in the name of a vision of 
moral constraint, not human emancipation or individual liberation.”31 Indeed, Moyn’s account 
seems to argue for the impossibility that Christianity could be anything but conservative, given 
the nature of its understanding of freedom. “Jesus’s truth had been intended to set men free, but 
not for the sake of their creative autonomy or the satisfaction of their preferences. This liberation 
was for the sake of subjugation: so that men (and perhaps most especially) women could 
conform to God’s will and moral order.”32 
 
Moyn is not alone in situating ecumenical Protestants on the political right. Indeed, Christian 
Human Rights belongs to a larger literature that emphasizes the conservative purposes that 
galvanized Christian actors in the mid-20th century. One of the most fertile veins of 20th-century 
research on religion and international politics has examined the role of religion and, in particular, 
                                                
31 Ibid, 11. 
32 Ibid, 11. 
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Christian publicists, in the consolidation of ideological anti-Communism in the United States and 
Western Europe. Scholars such as Diane Kirby, Jonathan Herzog, Philip Coupland, and Jason 
Stevens have stressed how figures as diverse as Reinhold Niebuhr, the German Bishop Otto 
Dibelius, and the Lebanese philosopher and ecumenical enthusiast Charles Malik, along with 
Catholic and evangelical Protestant counterparts in Europe and the US, all helped to frame the 
stakes of the Cold War as a struggle between Christian civilization and godless atheism.33 Most 
important for these scholars is to recover how Christian concepts such as “totalitarianism” were 
deployed by statesmen, policy-makers, and propagandists to justify imperial exertions of US and 
Western power across the globe in the name of protecting freedom from its Soviet nemesis.  
 
In contrast, other scholars have argued that ecumenists were internationally minded, 
cosmopolitan avatars of the liberal left. Without denying ecumenists’ opposition to Communism, 
these scholars draw attention to various points that complicate the picture of ecumenists as Cold 
Warriors. Andrew Preston, for instance, has underscored how American figures like John 
Bennett, John MacKay, and Samuel McCrea Cavert – all active in the World Council and 
officers of what became in the 1930s its US satellite, the Federal Council of Churches – resisted 
“blind” anti-Communism and “called for decolonization, nuclear and conventional disarmament, 
and unconditional dialogue with the Soviets and recognition of China.”34 More recently, Gene 
                                                
33 See the contributions to Religion and the Cold War ed. Diane Kirby (New York: Palgrave, 2003), Jeremy Gunn, 
T., Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National Religion (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 2009); Philip M. Coupland, Britannia, Europa and Christendom  : British Christians and European 
Integration (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jonathan P. Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: 
America’s Religious Battle Against Communism in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
Jason Stevens, God-Fearing and Free: A Spiritual History of America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010). 
34 Preston, “Peripheral Visions,” 1. Indeed, prominent ecumenists like the Methodist Bishop Bromley Oxnam were 
among the targets of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s investigations in the early 1950s.  
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Zubovich has authored the most complete attempt to claim American ecumenical Protestants for 
the tradition of American liberalism. Mining the confluence of theological and political 
liberalism mapped by David Hollinger, Zubovich demonstrates that ecumenical Protestants from 
1940 to 1960 were vigorous critics of racial segregation, social inequality, and western 
imperialism.35 Likewise, Michael Thompson has placed the ecumenical movement within a 
Protestant internationalist tradition congenitally resistant to the identification of religious and 
national interests.36 While most accounts of ecumenists as liberals have focused on the American 
context, recent work by Lucian Leustean on the ecumenical movement and the formation of the 
European Union suggests how such an approach might be applied to European ecumenists as 
well.37 And a study of ecumenical opinion outside of the West – barely yet undertaken, with a 
few exceptions, outside of church historiographies – reveals a bloc of opinion still further to the 
left than anything found in the West, including Chinese communists who embraced the 
Communist regime in 1949, an assortment of Marxists and Third Worldists who championed 
anti-colonialism and national liberation across Asia and Africa.38  
 
                                                
35 Gene Zubovich, The Global Gospel: Protestant Internationalism and American Liberalism, 1940-1960 (PhD 
Dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2014) 
36 Michael Thompson, For God and Globe: Christian Internationalism in the United States between the Great War 
and the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015) 
37 Lucian Leustean, The Ecumenical Movement & the Making of the European Community (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
38 See for instance Albert Wu,  “German Missionaries, Chinese Christians, and the Globalization of Christianity, 
1860-1950” (PhD dissertation, UC Berkeley) and Annegreth Schilling, Revolution, Exil und Befreiung. Der Boom 
des lateinamerikanischen Protestantismus in der internationalen Ökumene in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren 




Historians are bound, as Moyn claims, to uncover the political, this-worldly significance of 
Christian utterance. But where do ecumenists belong – on the left or on the right? If the divergent 
appraisals of Hollinger, Zubovich, Preston, on the one hand, and Moyn and the chroniclers of 
Christian anti-Communism, on the other, suggest anything, it is that the answer to this question 
depends on the specific regional and temporal context one chooses to focus on. Here, however, 
the concern is to analyze what made Christians of various political orientations, in diverse 
regional contexts and over the longue durée of the first half of the 20th century, participants in a 
single configuration, characterized by continuity of institutions and personnel, as well as abiding 
theological commitments to and conceptions of Christian universalism. Recovering this history 
draws into relief how studies of ecumenical Christians within both American and European 
historiographies project political valences particular to regional contexts onto the movement as a 
whole. A more global viewpoint is needed to understand a movement whose participants 
themselves understood their scope of action as specifically worldwide. 
 
This dissertation, therefore, does not locate the ecumenical movement on a political spectrum of 
the right and left, but rather recovers the interplay between ecumenists’ experience of the 20th-
century’s political upheavals – in particular, the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, 
and decolonization – and the theologies of church and mission that emerged within the 
movement. As we will see, this perspective allows us to get purchase on a transformative 
moment between 1948 and 1952, when movement leaders first advanced self-consciously 
“political” action as a form of ecumenical praxis, viewing resistance to colonial structures as the 
very “language” in which the Gospel was to be understood and communicated in the modern 
world. To illuminate this shift, I focus on the Indian Marxist theologian M. M. Thomas and the 
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institutionalization of his ideas in the movement’s youth wing, the World Student Christian 
Federation. For Thomas and his colleagues, the church could only become a universal 
community through its activation in partisan struggle. Combating the recalcitrant human will to 
domination could never be exclusively moral or theological; it entailed a struggle for power on 
the part of the powerless. This idea succeeded in its time in uniting a global Christian solidarity – 
propelling Thomas and later other Third World theologians to positions of power in the World 
Council of Churches and helped orient postwar ecumenism around radical “revolutionary” 
programs to combat racism and address global inequality. Its triumph, however, increasingly cost 
ecumenists their cultural clout in the West, where ordinary churchgoers fell out of the fold or 
turned to evangelical Protestantism, especially in the United States. But the success of 
“revolutionary” ecumenism in the postwar movement marked in no way a capitulation to the 
secularism that ecumenists had so vigorously assailed in the 1930s. Rather, it represented a way 
of relating Christianity to political thought and action with relevance today to the question of 
religion’s role in the public sphere. 
 
For generations of commentators, the Protestant church leaders who formed the backbone of the 
ecumenical movement were reinterpreting their faith merely to prepare the way for its demise. 
Since Weber, these clerical and lay elites have been cast as the protagonists (or victims, or both) 
of secularization in its various meanings, including the decline of belief, the privatization of 
religion, the separation of social, economic, and political spheres from religious institutions and 
norms, or the translation of theological into political concepts.39 The apparently inevitable 
                                                
39 For overviews of major variants of the secularization thesis, see José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern 
World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) and the introduction of Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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endgame of “accommodation” looms large over recent treatments of the ecumenism as well: as if 
the movement’s champions were simply awaiting their chance to trouble the conscience of 
liberal cosmopolitans in the West with stories about the “theological origins” of their 
commitments. A new picture comes into view, however, when we consider the movement from 
the standpoint of the problems and institutions that constituted its coherence and mobilizing 
appeal. The postwar revolutionary ecumenism that galvanized the movement after 1945 did not 
make peace with a private expression of religion; it did not renounce its claims that Christ ruled 
over all social, economic, and political spheres of life. Its identification with the marginalized 
was not a translation of Christian ethics into secular terms: it was an effort to ground Christian 
practice on acts of reciprocal translation, from politics to theology and back again. Only the 
Gospel, Thomas and his colleagues and successors insisted, could illuminate the meaning of 
political struggles for justice and liberation; conversely, only as a political ethic could the Gospel 
be understood. His call for a faith that realized itself exactly in becoming conscious of its 
political effect offers an alternative to common viewpoints: it dissents from Christian 
commentators demanding a more robust public role for their religion on the grounds of its 
allegedly salubrious social effects, and it departs from secular commentators who tolerate public 
religion on sufferance and request its expositors perform a one-way translation from their 
comprehensive doctrines into the language of communicative rationality. Attending to 
ecumenism’s 20th-century reinventions, in other words, opens an unconsidered option in 





This dissertation has two parts, focused on tracing the rise and crisis of the principal iteration of 
the ecumenical movement in the period between 1900 and 1952. Part I (chapters 1-3) traces the 
origins of the program to realize the ecumenical church from the late 19th century until 1939 and 
argues that this goal became the recognized objective of international Christian cooperation only 
in response to the threat of secularism conceived in 1928. Part II (chapters 4-6), examines how 
this ecumenical project was institutionalized from 1930 through 1952. It demonstrates that this 
institutionalization produced divisions within the movement during the Cold War that led to a 
new understanding of the relation between Christianity and politics.  
 
Chapter 1 offers a history of Protestant internationalism from the 19th century to 1925. In this 
period, all Protestant-led attempts to cultivate international and interdenominational cooperation 
in missionary work, social and humanitarian reform, and theological dialogue sought their end in 
the realization of the “Kingdom of God” on earth, a utopian vision entailing the 
“Christianization” of social, economic, and political relations, as well as the conversion of souls 
at home and abroad. Periodic attempts to designate conferences, or councils, of churches as 
“ecumenical” evinced Protestants’ ambivalence toward the term, which was associated with 
efforts to define doctrinal orthodoxy opposed to the public and interdenominational orientation 
of Protestant internationalism. A minimum condition for ecumenism’s later rise was the collapse 
of the campaign to realize the Kingdom, whose political implications sharply divided 
belligerents during World War I and after. I trace this fractious fallout by examining relations 
between Allied and German missionaries and the efforts of the Swedish Lutheran Archbishop 
Nathan Soederblom to found the Universal Christian Council of Life and Work as a body to 
mediate between estranged international blocs. Chapters 2 and 3 examine how the modern 
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ecumenical project was born in the decade following 1928, and in response to a new enemy: 
worldwide secularism. Chapter 2 reconstructs the origins of the concept as it was first formulated 
by missionaries at the Jerusalem Conference in 1928. Not merely another word for atheism or 
religious indifference, secularism denoted the dominant “worldview” of modern industrial 
civilization based on scientific experiment and technological application. The chapter concludes 
with an account of how missionaries mobilized an international campaign to recruit church 
intellectuals to re-formulate the Gospel in a language that would “speak” to modern – secularized 
– man. Chapter 3 shows how the interwar ecumenical project emerged from the diagnosis of 
secularism furnished by dialectical theologians working within the existential categories forged 
by Continental theologians, such Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Karl Heim, and others. Abandoning 
the historicist orientation of liberal theology – previously dominant in international Protestantism 
– these thinkers conceived secularism as modern man’s rebellion against God – articulated in 
both Enlightenment pursuit of rational autonomy and the “pagan religions” of Nazism, 
Communism, and nationalism. To combat secularism in its various forms, they argued that the 
church must recover its true ground not in Christian activism striving after the Kingdom of God, 
but in a responsive obedience to God’s Word. Chapter 3 shows how it was this project that 
galvanized intellectual and clerical elites in Protestant and Orthodox churches in the 1930s. 
 
Part II of the dissertation examines how the ecumenical project conceived in response to 
secularism was institutionalized from the 1930s to the 1950s. Chapter 4 shows how the practice 
of ecumenical anti-secularism, which took the form of theological conversation organized in 
small, informal groups or large gatherings like the Oxford Conference of the Universal Council 
on Life and Work in 1937, sought a common understanding of God’s “message” to humankind. 
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In these conversations, the church was envisioned as a “public,” constituted by God’s address to 
man and the “personal” responses of Christians from various confessional traditions and nations. 
The theology of “personalism” – which grounded social existence on ethical responsibility to 
others as a form of obedience to God – furnished the ideological basis of the World Council of 
Churches as well as various wartime campaigns to formulate a postwar order based on human 
rights. But even as ecumenists succeeded in enshrining personalism in the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the disruption of international communication during 
the war attenuated the ecumenical public of the 1930s. After 1945, efforts to reconstitute this 
public ran aground as Cold War divisions among Protestants and Orthodox Christians in the 
West and Communist societies eclipsed a theological consensus around anti-secularism. Chapter 
5 examines how the World Council of Churches alienated both external critics and erstwhile 
supporters by attempting to define Christianity as a “third way” between competing ideologies of 
communism and capitalism. As the program to realize the Kingdom of God became “politicized” 
after 1914, so, too, was the project to realize the church assailed by Eastern European leaders and 
the Russian Orthodox Church as a front of Western imperialism and by conservative anti-
Communists at home as a vehicle of world socialism. While the World Council remained 
intractably divided between 1948 and 1952, a younger generation of ecumenists in the World 
Student Christian Federation articulated in anti-colonial activism a new basis for global Christian 
unity. Chapter 6, focusing on M. M. Thomas and his colleagues in the Federation, shows how the 
emergence of “revolutionary” ecumenism in the late 1940s and early 1950s achieved a reversal 
in the ecumenical conception of politics: no longer a domain to be conquered by Christian unity, 














































The Ecumenical Projects that Failed: World War I and the Politicization of the 
Kingdom of God 
 
 
Published on the occasion of the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1954, A 
History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948, consolidated a revolution in church 
historiography. Since the first centuries CE, claimed the German theologian and ecumenical 
leader Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff in his Forward to the volume, histories of Christianity had 
focused overwhelmingly on the divisions among Christian churches. This new volume promised 
an approach “from the opposite point of view:” its goal would be to recover an account “of the 
earnest unitive efforts” among Christians “by which almost every century has been marked.”1 In 
focusing on the years between 1517 and 1948 – the year of the World Council’s official 
foundation – the volume advanced a bold claim. Protestantism, apparently the embodiment of 
Christianity’s fissiparous tendencies, a movement that had shattered the unity of Roman 
Christendom and proceeded to divide itself into innumerable national and sectarian bodies over 
the succeeding centuries, had a secret history, populated by irenic and “ecumenically” minded 
advocates who struggled against the forces of sectarianism, nationalist politics, European racism, 
and world war for the cause of uniting, not only their own churches but Catholic and Orthodox 
bodies as well. Numerous theologians and scholars associated with the World Council produced 
essays describing these efforts to promote Christian unity, cataloguing a “growing 
consciousness” of the unity of all Christians evinced in missions work, interchurch dialogue over 
doctrinal differences, and cooperation in social activism and reform over the 19th and early 20th 
                                                
1 Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff, Forward, A History of the Ecumenical Movement Vol 1. Ed. Ruth Rouse and 
Stephen Neill (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1954), xxi. 
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centuries. With the official establishment of the World Council, these Protestant efforts to 
promote world Christian unity had reached a culminating moment. The formation of the Council 
was “something so new in the history of the Churches, and summed up so much that had gone 
before, that it seemed to mark a reasonable conclusion for this study,” von Thadden-Trieglaff 
wrote.2 The volume was an effort to furnish a usable past for contemporary ecumenical efforts, 
as well as an exercise in apologetic history: the ecumenical movement was on the march, and 
history was behind it. 
 
Novel at the time, the approach advanced in A History of Ecumenical Movement has now 
become standard among scholars of the movement. The dominance of its historiographical 
framework is most obviously visible within the scholarly eco-system of institutional histories of 
ecumenism, which, fed by the contributions of church historians and theologians, continues to 
thrive largely in isolation from more recent work on the topic in the secular academy. But there 
too, in the flurry of recent monographs and articles produced by non-church academics on 
ecumenical personalities, ideas, and institutions, the idea of the ecumenical movement as a 
“long” phenomenon, building steam over the 19th century, is common. Many scholars, in 
offering thumbnail sketches of the movement’s origins, draw attention to irenic impulses forged 
in foreign and home missionary conferences of the 19th century and formation of the institutions 
such as the Evangelical Alliance (1854) the Young Men’s Christian Association, the World 
Student Christian Federation (1895), and the Federal Council of Churches (1908) in the US. It 
has become customary, too, to emphasize the primary importance of the World Missionary 
Conference held in Edinburgh in the summer of 1910, which gathered 1,200 missionaries, mostly 
                                                
2 Ibid, xxii 
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from Europe and North America, to organize a campaign for the “evangelize the world in this 
generation,” in the confident slogan of its organizer, the American Methodist John Mott. The 
historian David Thompson, for instance, in his 2010 article on Ecumenism for the Cambridge 
History of Christianity, locates “the starting point of the modern ecumenical movement” in 
Edinburgh in 1910,3 while John Kent, in another recent work, sees 1910 as the year “when the 
search for institutional unity [among churches] was first systematically organized.”4 Recent 
works by Gene Zubovich and Michael Thompson have reiterated the same view; in Zubovich’s 
words, Edinburgh was the “turning point… the first time a major international Protestant 
organization called for unity among the world’s Christian populations to be expressed in 
concrete institutions.”5 
 
There is of course, an obvious truth in the observation that the ecumenical movement of the 
1930s did not spring from nowhere. It built on earlier efforts, institutions, and networks, and its 
leaders – such as Mott, the Dutch Reformed theologian W. A. Visser’t Hooft, and the British 
missionary statesman Joseph Oldham – were reared in the international Protestant milieux of the 
1900s and 1910s. And yet the idea of a “long” ecumenical movement is misleading in critical 
respects. First of all, very few Protestants before the 1930s found “ecumenical” a compelling or 
useful term to describe the form of Christian unity they sought. Its principle referent in their 
                                                
3 David Thompson, “Ecumenism,” Cambridge History of Christianity, ed. Hugh McLeod, vol. 9 (Camrbidge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 50. 
4 John Kent, The Unacceptable Face: The Modern Church in the Eyes of the Historian (London: SCM Press, 1987), 
203. 
5 Gene Zubovich, The Global Gospel: Protestant Internationalism and American Liberalism, 1940-1960 (PhD 
Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley, 2014), 5; Michael Thompson, For God and Globe: Christian 
Internationalism in the United States between the Great War and the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2015), chpt 4. 
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minds – the “Ecumenical Councils” of the 4th to the 8th centuries, so-called because they 
convened bishops from throughout the oikoumene, or habitable earth (then taken to mean at the 
time as the Mediterranean world and the extent of Roman imperium) to define heresies and 
establish orthodox doctrine concerning the nature of Christ, the relations of the Trinity, and the 
other matters that divided the early church – suggested a model of Christian unity that these 
international Protestants were keen to disavow. Ecumenical Councils carried an association with 
the ecclesiastical authoritarianism of the Roman Catholic Church that was the opposite of 
Protestant visions of a supra-denominational Christian community that would preserve, rather 
than squelch, differences of doctrine and nationality, and would be oriented not inwardly toward 
the church but, outwardly, toward engagement with the world. As we will see, periodic attempts 
to appropriate the term ecumenical, to invest it with a meaning that would reflect Protestant 
values, all ran aground over Protestants’ own disagreements concerning whether and how to 
cooperate with the Roman Catholic Church. In this sense, we can say that, to the extent that 
“ecumenical” Protestantism existed in the later 19th and 20th century, it failed to mobilize its 
intended constituency. 
 
But there is another reason to stress the failure of the “earnest unitive efforts” of Protestants in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries to promote Christian unity, rather than their success in furnishing 
the foundations on which the later, mid-20th century ecumenical movement would be built. 19th 
and early 20th century Protestant Christian unity movements were organized around a 
fundamentally different objective than the ecumenical movement of the 1930s. While the 
ecumenical movement of the 1930s sought to realize God’s sovereignty over the “church” – the 
community of Christians and churches – earlier movements for Christian unity sought to realize 
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God’s sovereignty over economic, political, and social life outside of the church, both within the 
territorial boundaries of “Christendom” and the expansive mission fields of Asia and Africa.  
19th-century movements for Christian unity needed to fail before the ecumenical project that 
produced A History of the Ecumenical Movement and marked the major event in world 
Protestantism of the 20th century, could be born.  
 
The focus of this chapter is on both describing the organizing ideas and assumptions of 19th and 
early 20th century ecumenism and charting their collapse. To do this, the history of international 
Protestantism will be re-periodized around a caesura: World War I, which brought to an end 19th 
century models of Christian cooperation and enabled a rethinking of the nature and aims of 
Christian unity in the world. By focusing on this event, I want to emphasize the critical 
importance of international politics in upsetting the antebellum Protestant paradigm of Christian 
unity. Until 1914, Protestants had seen doctrinal divisions as the principal impediment to 
Christian unity, while perceiving a wide space for practical cooperation in mission work and a 
range of social causes, including evangelization, social reform, and international peace. The War 
revealed that the greatest threat to international cooperation in Christianizing the world was not 
theological divisions but political ones. With a mere handful of pacifist exceptions, Protestant 
church leaders overwhelmingly endorsed their nation’s respective national causes in the war, a 
move that led them to perceive that erstwhile colleagues across the battle lines had forsaken the 
cause of Christ and turned instead to the mammon of nationalism, greed, or the will to power. 
Accounts of the long ecumenical movement fail to come to grips with the fallout of this fracture 
of the Protestant international, even occasionally seeing World War I as a long-term boon for the 
cause of Christian unity, since it spawned a number of new institutions – such as the Universal 
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Council of Life and Work, the International Missionary Council – intended to overcome the 
breaches that the conflict had caused.6 But the wounds caused by the war were not so easily 
overcome. Into the mid-1920s, these institutions served primarily as arena in which Allied and 
German church leaders clashed over the concrete political form that a “Christian” social and 
political order ought to take. In particular, the destruction of German missions operations during 
the war, the terms of the Versailles Treaty (especially the infamous article 231, ascribing 
responsibility for the conflict to Germany), and the League of Nations itself were sources of 
bitter conflict among Protestants. Rather than seeing these clashes as temporary obstacles, 
overcome in the end by the superior power of Christian brotherhood, I understand them here as 
events that so decimated traditional models of international Christian cooperation that they led 
Protestants to discard them altogether. After 1914, the possibility of international Protestant 
cooperation in the cause of social reform was hamstrung by a polarization that made both sides 
distrust the other for advancing “political” rather than authentically Christian agendas. In the late 
1920s and early 1930s, when a robust new agenda for international Christian cooperation took 
shape, it was not only because the scars of war had healed but because its leaders had abandoned 
the paradigm of Christian unity that had developed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first surveys the formation of 19th and early 20th 
century Protestant internationalism by examining the matrix of Evangelical Revival out of which 
it evolved and the objectives of Protestant missionary and social activities that emerged in over 
this period. We will stress that the first Protestant movements toward Christian unity demarcated 
                                                
6 The view is a feature of accounts that see Christian unity movements as pre-history to the creation of the WCC. 
Two especially prominent examples of this approach are Nils Karlstroem, “Movements for International Friendship 
and Life and Work, 1910-1925” A History of the Ecumenical Movement, vol 1. 512-3; and Thomas Fitzgerald, The 
Ecumenical Movement: An Introductory History (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). 
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spaces outside the authority of the church – spaces conceived territorially in the rubric of 
“missionary fields” at home and abroad, and conceptually in terms of the social, political, and 
economic relations that constituted “modern society.” The goal of Christian unity movements in 
the 19th and early 20th century was to establish the rule of Christ in these extra-ecclesiastical 
spaces.  
 
The second part of this chapter examines how the model of Christian unity collapsed during 
World War I. Its crisis occurred as a result of German perceptions that former colleagues and 
brethren in Allied countries were, under cover of Christian purpose, in fact committed to 
advancing the political rather than authentically spiritual or Christian aims. We will attend in 
particular to how this perception shaped German reactions to the International Missionary 
Council and the Universal Council of Life and Work. Throughout both sections, we will draw 
attention along the way to the periodic attempts to appropriate the term “ecumenical” to define 
these efforts at Christian unity, showing how they failed to gain traction as a result of 
disagreements among Protestants over how to approach the Roman Catholic Church. 
 
The Evangelical Revivals that swept back and forth across the Atlantic in the late 18th century 
and early 19th centuries fostered the associational Protestant culture that concerns us here. 
Stressing personal conversion and moral regeneration, striving for a new purity in this world, 
these revivals generated patterns of evangelical activism that brought Protestants into the “public 
sphere,” a space of voluntary association between the private realm and the state. Across the 
North Atlantic, Protestant activism in the 19th and early 20th centuries coalesced around a number 
of issues, including the evangelization work, the abolition of the slave trade, care for the sick and 
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the poor, initiatives for the moral regeneration of the working classes, and international peace 
efforts. These mobilizations gave rise to what Christopher Clark and Michael Ledger-Lomas 
have termed the “Protestant International,” an “informal spiritual empire, a network of formal 
bodies that federated believers across increasingly distinct national boundaries.”7 Protestant 
internationalism was buoyed on the industrialization of print media, migrations and movements 
of peoples, including and indeed above all missionaries into the “non-Christian” world, and the 
emergence of the public sphere in Europe. As historians Abigail Greene and Vincent Viaene 
have argued, the Protestant International was a precursor to other religious internationals that 
emerged in the later 19th and early 20th century and fashioned Catholics, Jews, Muslims, 
Buddhists and Hindus into the pioneers of a issue-based mobilization that formed the 
foundations of the globalization of civil society.8  
 
In the Protestant case, the impetus behind these public mobilizations was a sense that official 
church bodies, in their present form, were ill-equipped to carry out the responsibilities of the 
Christian faith in the new worlds opened up by “modern civilization.” European exploration and 
empire had opened up and brought to the awareness of “Christian” peoples vast new continents 
and populations of non-Christians which the church lacked the knowledge, organization, and 
resources to address. The intensification of imperial competition abroad and the consolidation of 
nation-states at home simultaneously fed the growth of Protestant efforts to promote international 
peace and arbitration, a move that reflected a growing understanding of inter-state politics as 
                                                
7 Christopher Clark and Michael Ledger-Lomas, “The Protestant International” Religious Internationals in the 
Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750 eds. Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2012), 23-4. 
8 Abigail Greene and Vincent Viaene, Introduction, Religious Internationals in the Modern World, esp. 1-4. 
 
 39 
constituting a unique “field” in which Christian principles of brotherhood and fellowship could 
be applied to chasten power politics. Meanwhile, industrialization and urbanization had created 
social conditions that had disrupted traditional community life, exacerbating class divisions and 
producing a population of the “unchurched,” primarily laborers who had left the church and 
bourgeoisie that retained only a nominal attachment to it. Peace movements, from the Quaker-led 
but interdenominational American Peace Society (1828) to the later World Alliance for 
Promoting International Friendship through the Churches, aimed to make Christian faith and 
morals an ethos of inter-state relations. 
 
An eschatological vision of the Kingdom of God imbued these cooperative efforts with scriptural 
justification as well as a sense of urgency and productively vague understanding of overall 
objectives. Among the justifications for the missions movement as well as social reform efforts 
was found in Jesus’s imperative in Matthew, “And this gospel of the kingdom shall be preached 
in all the world for a witness unto all nations; and then shall the end come.”9 Most, though not 
all, early advocates of Christian unity efforts were post-millennialist in orientation, embracing an 
understanding of the Kingdom as a present reality, coming into existence within history. “We 
gather here,” announced Judson Smith, an organizer of the New York Missionary Conference in 
1900, “…to study the work of God in many lands, to draw out in some detail the story of Christ’s 
advancing kingdom.”10 Archbishop Randall Davidson predicted at the Edinburgh World 
Missionary Conference in 1910, “it may well be that there be some standing here tonight who 
                                                
9 Matt 24:14, KJV 
10 Address of Rev. Judson Smith, Ecumenical Missionary Conference, New York, 1900: Report of the Ecumenical 
Conference on Foreign Missions, Held in Carnegie Hall and Neighboring Churches, April 21-May 1, vol. 1 (New 
York: American Tract Society, 1900), 30. 
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shall not taste of death till they see… the Kingdom of God come with power.”11 Nor were 
Americans and Britons the only ones to orient their work within the providential economy of the 
growing Kingdom. German missionaries, too, spoke of the goal of foreign missions as one of 
helping to “build the Kingdom of God and work for the consummation of the world.”12 
Protestant activists at home, such as the pioneer of “Inner Missions,” Johann H. Wichern and 
Friedrich Naumann in Germany, as well as Social Gospellers in the like Walter Rauschenbusch 
in the United States and proponents of the Settlement Movement in Britain like Samuel Barnett 
like regularly referred to “building the Kingdom of God” as the goal of their efforts.13 John Mott 
called the emergence and remarkable successes of his and other efforts to evangelize students in 
the US and Europe – as well as Asia -- in the World Student Christian Federation “a remarkable 
manifestation of… interest in the extension of the Kingdom of Christ.”14   
 
The Kingdom was a rubric that allowed Protestants in both spheres to assert the Christian nature 
of social action, to root it in a religious responsibility. The building of the Kingdom on earth was 
God’s work, but it required the active cooperation of the human will. Leaving the international 
                                                
11 Quoted in Brian Stanley, World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 
22.  
12 The line, from the German missionary and orientalist Johannes Lepsius in a tract of 1889, reflects a general 
orientation of German missionaries and Protestant activists working for reform at home as well as in missions 
operations abroad. Quoted Hanns Lessing, “Evangelische ‘Disaporafürsorge’ im ‘größeren Deutschland’” in 
Deutsche evangelische Kirche im kolonialien südlichen Afrika, Lessing, et al, hrsg. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 
Verlag, 2011), 145. 
13 For a discussion of the theme of Kingdom in Social Gospel Protestantism in the United States, see Gary Scott 
Smith, The Search for Social Salvation: Social Christianity and America, 1880-1925 (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2000) and Paul Carter, The Decline and Rise of the Social Gospel: Social and Political Liberalism in 
American Protestant Churches, 1920-1940 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), esp Introduction; for a 
discussion of its prominence in German home missions work and German theology generally see Marion Dittmer, 
Reich Gottes: Ein Programbegriff der protestantischen Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014). 
14 Mott, Evangelization of the World in this Generation, (New York: SVM, 1900), 1. 
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Protestant community critical room in which to accommodate differences over missionary 
strategy, and political outlooks and allegiances, the Kingdom idea stood for a beatific universal 
community beyond political programs, governments, and parties. Its vision of universal justice 
and humanity gave warrant and direction to a whole host of organizational efforts, which, 
especially by the late 19th century, drew on and contributed to a body of social scientific research 
and research on the science of religion. For social reformers, science offered the means through 
which the promise of the Kingdom would be translated into tangible, concrete forms – even as 
the nature of these forms remained ambiguous and up for dispute.  
 
Scholarship that has looked at modern Protestantism in international and comparative contexts 
has long emphasized a division between, on the one hand, “liberal” or “progressive” 
understandings of the Kingdom, rooted in Reform theology and dominant in Anglo-American 
churches, and a conservative or “quietist” understanding of the kingdom, shaped by Lutheran 
pietism and dominant in Germany. These accounts have emphasized the divergent political 
orientations shaped by opposed theological understandings of the Kingdom. Convinced of the 
possibility of building the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, Protestant liberalism embraced various 
progressive causes, including social and economic reform and international peace. By contrast, 
Lutheran emphasis on the transcendence of the Kingdom asserted the limitations of human 
capacity to shape society in accordance with God’s will, and became an impediment to social 
activism.15 As we will see in this chapter, these characterizations are useful in portraying, in 
                                                
15 In German and Anglo-American scholarship alike, the emphasis on theological and political divergence of 
German and Anglo-American traditions has tended to translate into an assumption that, while the liberal traditions of 
social Protestantism in the US and Britain understood the Kingdom as a possibility attainable within history, the 
Pietistic German tradition rejected this idea in theory, seeing the Kingdom as an eschatological reality private and 
interior within history. For two examples, see the Donald Meyer, The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-
1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960) and Johannes Christian Hoekendijk, Kirche und Volk in der 
deutschen Missionswissenschaft, abridged and trns. to the German by Günter Finkenrath, et al. (Munich: Chr. Kaiser 
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broad and schematic terms, divergent political profiles of Anglo-American Protestantism, which 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed the emergence of a liberal and progressive 
establishment, and German Protestantism, which remained supportive of monarchy, and socially 
and economically conservative.  
 
But exclusive emphasis on the political difference in Anglo-American Protestantism on the one 
hand and German Protestantism on the other obscures critical shared assumptions that made, in 
the decades leading up to 1914, Germans and Anglo-Americans willing and enthusiastic partners 
in a number of social and missionary ventures. In particular, neither “bloc” conceived Protestant 
religiosity as entirely private, involving only the salvation of the soul. Both traditions embraced 
efforts to extend the influence of Christian faith and ideals beyond the confines of narrow church 
communities and beyond the self, and both asserted that Protestant faith entailed both a 
responsibility to “Christianize” broader society and a series of broad principles that would 
provide guidance on how to do so. Moreover, they recognized the need for cooperation among 
lay activists, clerics, and intellectuals alike, and across denominational and national boundaries, 
in order to realize the Christianization of society.  
 
Thus, while attending to the political differences that defined these two blocs, our concern in this 
chapter will first be to locate these divergences within a common orientation around action 
within civil society that enabled international Protestantism to emerge in the first place. More 
important than theological differences is the formation of patterns of intellectual exchange, 
                                                
Verlag, 1967). The distinction remains dominant in recent literature on ecumenism (see eg. Mark Thomas Edwards, 
The Right of the Protestant Left: God’s Totalitarianism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)). As we will see, 
this idea of a theoretical difference between the two traditions reifies a polarization that only occurred as a result of 
World War I.  
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practical cooperation, as well as new international institutions, all of which fed the propulsion of 
Germans and Anglo-Americans alike into the public sphere, a propulsion that was understood 
and justified by both sides in terms of a responsibility to enact Christian faith beyond the 
institutional confines of the church in the broader “secular” world. It was, critically, not toward 
“ecumenical” society – understood as ecclesiastical, inward looking, churchly, and requiring the 
resolution of doctrinal disputes with a long legacy – but toward the Kingdom that Protestant 
missionaries directed their efforts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
 
I. “Occupying” the Field: The Protestant Foreign Missions Movement until 1914 
The modern Protestant missionary movement was constituted from its origins around 
cooperation among German- and English-speaking activists. Three Germans from the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Württemburg made up the first contingent of missionaries sent 
from Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) in 1799. For twenty-five years after its 
founding, in fact, the CMS, like many other British societies at the time, including the High 
Church Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, drew primarily on Germans 
and Danes to staff their overseas operations.16 The fact underscores the transnational origins of 
the modern missions movement, which was powered on an evangelical awakening that crossed 
political and continental boundaries with remarkable speed and was led by preachers and 
intellectuals – John Wesley and George Whitefield in England, August Franke and Nikolaus 
Ludwig von Zinzendorf in Germany, Jonathan Edward in the American colonies – who kept 
abreast of writings and developments in evangelical movements and social experiments and 
                                                
16 Andrew Porter, Religion versus Empire?  British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700-
1914 (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), chpt 2. 
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ideas across the North Atlantic.17 By the early decades of the 19th century, this community of 
missionary enthusiasts was becoming less transnational – that is, indifferent to national 
boundaries – and more distinctively international in nature in consciousness and patterns of 
cooperation.18 By 1830 German-speaking Europe had many societies of its own: the Basel 
Missions Society, drawing a largely German staff from the Swabian heartland, was founded in 
1815; the Berlin Missionary Society was founded in 1823, the Rheinische Missions Society in 
1828, and the North German Society in 1836. British missions organizations had emerged 
slightly before that time, first with William Carey’s Baptist Missionary Society (1782), the 
London Missionary Society (1795) – interdenominational but mostly Congregational – the 
Edinburgh and Glasgow Missionary Societies (1796), and the Church Missionary Society 
(1799). The Swedish Missionary Society (1835) and the Dutch Missionary Society (1833), the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions organized in 1810.19  
 
Within these organizations, understandings of the aims and methods of missionary work evolved 
considerably over the 19th and early 20th century. The period witnessed significant 
transformations in the ways in which Protestant missionaries understood the populations to 
whom they sought to carry the Gospel: lurid, sensational depictions of “heathen” abominations 
that dominated early missionary literature gave way during the 19th century to more apparently 
                                                
17 Reginald Ward, The Protestant Evangelical Awakening (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), Introduction and chpt 1. 
18 Clark and Ledger-Lomas, passim. 
19 For an overview of the founding of Protestant missionary societies in Europe (and North America), see William 
Richey Hogg Ecumenical Foundations; a History of the International Missionary Council and Its Nineteenth 
Century Background., [1st ed.] (New York,: Harper, 1952), chpt 2. 
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reverent descriptions of non-Christian “religions.”20 Growing over the 19th century, and 
fertilizing a field of comparative theology and religious studies in European and North American 
universities, a tradition of missionary scholarship – running from the Scottish missionary 
Alexander Duff’s studies of Sanskrit in the mid-century through the Lutheran Bruno Gutmann’s 
studies of the Chagga people and cultures of East Africa to early 20th century studies of 
Buddhism by the American Methodist E. Stanley Jones and Hinduism by the Scot J. N. Farquhar 
– evinced a genuine respect for Asian and African cultures while simultaneously reimagining 
Christianity’s ultimate superiority (and providing a discourse on the non-European “other” that 
abetted imperial control of Asian and African peoples). While early missionaries stressed the 
importance of saving souls and individual conversion, a growing emphasis over the 19th century 
on social reform and uplift, powered by the emergence of liberal theology and, especially in 
British and American cases, enthusiasm for the West’s “civilizing mission,” imparted to the 
missionary project a humanitarian cast and focus on secular institutions – such as schools and 
hospitals – that distressed some conservatives, who wished to keep focused on the primary work 
of conversion.  
 
In what follows we will give some attention to divergent approaches and ideologies of 
missionary work, stressing in particular a division between German and Anglo-American 
models, which developed their own distinctive emphases even as they cross-fertilized one 
                                                
20 For the shift from an early modern framework that conceived “heathen” or “pagan” religions in contrast to 
“religions of the book” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) to the schema of “world religions,” see Tomoko 
Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of 
Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); for the now considerable literature on the construction of 
“religion” as a category for ordering the non-Christian world that was a constitutive dimension of European 
colonialism, see Masuzawa, Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), and Christopher Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World: 1780-1914 
(London: Blackwell, 2004), chpt 9. 
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another. Our primary focus, however, will be on the methods evolved by missionaries across the 
North Atlantic world to define their common ends and to organize and systemize their efforts to 
achieve these. We will thus concentrate on one particular practice – the missionary conference – 
and emphasize the dominance of the objective of “occupying” heathen/non-Christian territory, or 
“fields,” a rubric that illustrated how Protestants in this period understood the territorial 
dimensions of God’s Kingdom. We will finally consider the ways in which missionary efforts to 
promote international and interdenominational cooperation gave rise to attempts at resolving 
doctrinal differences among churches in order to overcome divisions between churches deemed 
compromising to the cause of Christianity’s conquest of non-Christian peoples.  
 
The proliferation of missionary associations in Europe and North America and the peopling of 
Asia and Africa by missionaries spawned new ideas and practices of interdenominational 
Christian unity. While mission work was by no means incompatible with confessional 
exclusivism, many missionaries recognized that competition between sects and confessions 
compromised what they recognized as a common goal of evangelizing non-Christian 
populations. As Kenneth Scott Latourette has observed, “once transported from the setting in 
which the inherited confessional loyalties seemed an accepted and immutable part of the 
religious landscape, more and more missionaries came to believe that divisions among Christians 
were a scandal, a denial of the Faith.”21 First on the mission fields of Asia and Africa, then 
increasingly at the home base in Europe and America, missionaries responded to the “scandal” of 
their own divisions by claiming a common Christian identity and attempting to organize and 
coordinate their efforts to evangelize non-Christian peoples. The paradigmatic expression of this 
                                                
21 Kenneth Scott Latourette, “Ecumenical Bearings of the Missionary Movement and the International Missionary 
Council” A History of the Ecumenical Movement (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1954), 354. 
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cooperation was the missionary conference, a distinctive social practice and site of intellectual 
exchange.  
 
Beginning in the mid-19th century, and increasing in size, frequency, and number throughout the 
century, missionary conferences were opportunities for members of individuals societies to meet, 
share inspiration and advice, and to discuss matters of common concern in their relations with 
“native” peoples and imperial governments. One of the first such meetings took place in 
Ootacamund, South India, in 1858. It included representatives from eight societies working in 
South India, including the major non-conformist British missionary societies, the Basel 
Missionary society (staffed by Swiss and Germans), and a representative from the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPK). Delegates delivered papers on questions 
confronting their workers in the area, including effective methods of vernacular preaching, 
teaching and administration of missions schools, translation of the Bible, and the relation of 
Christian teaching to caste. They also worked out “comity” arrangements, through which the 
societies agreed to divvy up their respective “fields” of operation so as not to compete with 
converts and compromise the credibility of Christianity by highlighting sectarian disagreements. 
Among the conferences preliminary arrangements was “collect[ing] and publish[ing] the 
Statistics of the Missions in Southern India and Ceylon, and also of the yet unoccupied field of 
Heathenism,” a booklet which broke down territories in terms of population size, ethnicities 
represented, religious beliefs, social conditions, numbers of converts already won.22 
 
                                                
22 Proceedings of the South India Missionary Conference, Held at Ootacamund, Apr 19th-May15, 1858 (Vepery: 
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1858), 328 
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The Ootacamund conference illustrates the sense of spiritual solidarity between High-church 
Anglicans and evangelicals, Germans and Britons that was galvanized by shared trial, a common 
occupation with the problems of missionary praxis, and a perception of the immensity of the task 
before them. In a speech applauded by the meeting’s participants, G. U. Pope, the delegate of the 
SPK, spoke of a common mission that required members of different denominations to put aside 
their theological and doctrinal differences. The impossibility of any one society “successfully 
occupying the field” of South India as a whole made cooperation in spite of doctrinal differences 
imperative. “Protestant Evangelical Missionaries agree in a sufficient number of points to enable 
them to regard one another as fellow-labourers, to rejoice in each other’s success, and to be 
willing to regard the fields occupied by others as really brought under Christian teaching and 
influences.”23 Activities of the missionaries in this field were “different but not discordant,” Pope 
explained.24 Geography mattered to the missionaries: the site of their endeavors was one where 
evangelicals could assert, act on, and organize around a new sense of supra-sectarian solidarity: 
“while in Europe and America, controversies” over matters of doctrine “tend to elicit truth… in 
the Mission field they can result in nothing but evil.”25 The report of the conference celebrated 
the spirit of cooperation and unity that characterized the discussions. “We cannot but record,” 
announced the delegates, “our heartfelt joy and gratitude at the general unanimity of our views, 
and the perfect harmony of Christian love which, through the rich grace of our one Lord and 
Master, has prevailed among us.” The spirit of common approach to shared challenges generated 
a new sense of solidarity among “many beloved brethren who before were only known to us by 
                                                
23 Ibid, 334. 
24 Ibid, 337. 
25 Ibid, 334. In this spirit they sent a letter of protest to the Leipzig Mission, a confessional Lutheran mission, which 
had refused prior comity agreements and was seeking to draw catechists and converts into away from other 
missionary congregations. The Leipzig society would later shift its policy to embrace comity. 
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name… while the knowledge we have gained of each other’s labours, trials and successes will, 
we trust, greatly enlarge our minds, encourage out hearts and guide our efforts, so long as we 
may be permitted to labour in this heathen land.”26 
 
The meeting at Ootcamund was followed by similar meetings in India; 1862 marked the first 
Decennial Missionary Conference of Indian Protestant missions, which would bring delegates 
from German, American, Swiss, Swedish, and Dutch societies together with the (slowly) 
increasing numbers of “native” converts. Japan’s first missionary conference, in late September, 
1872, in Yokohama, included representatives from American and British societies as well as a 
Russian Orthodox Priest; its report announced that denominational divisions “obscure the 
oneness of the Church,” and resolved to work for the advent of a catholic “Church of Christ” in 
Japan.27 Similar conferences were held roughly every ten years in Japan. In China, where 
American mission societies had invested heavily, the first major international missions gathering 
took place in Shanghai in 1877, with 126 representatives from twenty-six missions. Like its 
predecessors, this gathering was largely European, with a handful of “native” pastors shown off 
more as trophies than participants (the one Chinese pastor attending as an “honorary member”). 
In 1907, a successor conference was held again in Shanghai where plans were launched for a 
national council of missionary societies with a permanent organization.28  
 
                                                
26 Ibid, Appendix, i. 
27 Hogg, 25. 
28 Hogg provides a useful overview of missionary conferences “in the field” in Ecumenical Foundations, chpt 2. 
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As conferences convened with increasing frequency in the missions field, Europeans and 
Americans began to hold similar events in Europe and the United States. While meetings in Asia 
and Africa focused on the local “field,” these gatherings surveyed the entirety of the missionary 
field, often distinguishing between fields “occupied” – places where missionary societies had set 
up stations and were operating schools and churches – and “unoccupied” – those where there 
was as yet no missionary presence. Large gatherings held in New York and London (1854), in 
London (1860), and in Liverpool (1880) were organized primarily by missionary societies and 
activists in Britain and the US, but included small contingents from missions societies on the 
European Continent. All of these conferences, like that at Ooctamund, emphasized the value, 
utility, and urgency of Protestant cooperation across denominational and international divides in 
the interest of a common purpose.  
 
To commemorate roughly one hundred years of Protestant missions, a “Centennial Missionary 
Conference” was organized in London in 1888. The meeting is especially important for our 
purposes because it witnessed the first serious attempt of the Protestant missionary community to 
position their efforts at interdenominational coordination as the true legacy of the “ecumenical 
unity” of the church, going back to the church councils of Nicaea, Ephesus, and Constantinople. 
On at least two occasions, participants in that conference referred to the gathering as an 
“ecumenical council.” Speaking toward the end of the conference, the British layman Sir S. 
Arthur Blackwood, claimed that the gathering was “an Oecumenical Council in the truest sense 
of the Word, because its participants were “those engaged either in directing or carrying 
Missionary enterprise throughout the world.”29 Another delegate, impressed with both the 
                                                
29 Report of the Centenary Conference on the Protestant Missions of the World, ed. James Johnston, 2 vols (London: 
James Nisbet, 1888), vol I, 467. 
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international and denominational variety included and the geographical scope of the missions 
fields surveyed, bullishly called it “the most important and thoroughly ecumenical council that 
has ever yet assembled.”30  
 
The appearance of these claims is prima facie surprising, since the term ecumenical had not 
previously been applied to Protestant efforts to promote international and interdenominational 
unity. It was the result, as Brian Stanley has persuasively suggested, of anti-Catholic sentiment, 
or more specifically a rough coincidence of Catholic and Protestant gatherings that enabled 
Protestants to first conceive their vision of cooperation as an alternative to Catholic assertions of 
universality.31 Behind Blackwood’s claim that the conference was Oecumenical “in the true 
sense of the word,” was an invidious comparison with the twentieth “ecumenical council” of the 
Roman Catholic Church – better known today as the First Vatican Council – convened in Rome 
eighteen years earlier. That Council’s decrees – including a canon defending papal infallibility – 
were roundly and predictably assailed by evangelical Protestants.32 It was the Catholic model of 
conciliar ecumenism – in which bishops and prelates sought to resolve doctrinal differences in a 
series of decrees that would be binding on all members, under penalty, in some cases, of 
excommunication – that Blackwood and others repudiated in their appropriation of the term 
“ecumenical.” A Protestant ecumenical council, by contrast, would have the purpose “not to 
frame new creeds, not to fight over old battles, but to organize more completely, and to start 
more powerfully, the most extensive and practical system of Gospel propagation that the world 
                                                
30 A. T. Pierson, “Literature of Missions: The Centenary Conference of Missions,” Missionary Review of the World, 
vol xi, no 9, (Sept, 1888), 641. 
31 Stanley, 18. 
32 For an account of Protestant reactions in the US, see Grant R. Brodrecht, ‘Our Country:’ Northern Evangelicals 
and the Union During the Civil War and Reconstruction (PhD Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2008), 378. 
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has ever seen.”33 This new vision of ecumenicity would take emphasis off of divisive questions 
of doctrinal validity and lay it instead on the “ecumenical” scope of the Christian mission – 
emphasizing the purely secular meaning of the word designating the inhabited earth. 
 
For a period, this polemical, anti-Catholic assertion of ecumenicity found a limited traction. The 
following Protestant missions conference, held in New York in 1900, was called an “Ecumenical 
Missionary Conference,” since, in the words of its organizers, “the plan of campaign which it 
proposes covers the whole area of the inhabitable globe.” However, the larger vision of a 
Protestant ecumenism failed to materialize at the time. Apart from references to the 1900 
conference, there are no appeals for an “ecumenical council” – much less any references to an 
“ecumenical movement,” a coinage that did not appear in print until 1925 – in Protestant 
literature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Even at the 1900 conference, the organizers felt 
compelled to couch their title in qualifications, noting that the gathering was ecumenical in the 
planetary scope of missions work, but “not because all portions of the Christian Church are 
represented by delegates;”34 some attendees, like the New York politician and missions activist 
Seth Low, looked forward to the day when a future gathering would include Catholic and 
Orthodox participants.35 As missionaries planned a third missions conference in Edinburgh in 
1910, they significantly dropped the original proposed title – “The Third Ecumenical Missionary 
Conference” – in favor of what they called the less “confusing” “World Missionary Conference.” 
Two years before that gathering, which has commonly been identified as the origin of the 
                                                
33 Report of the Centenary Conference, 469-70. 
34 Ecumenical Missionary Conference, New York, 1900: Report of the Ecumenical Conference of Foreign Missions, 
Held in Carnegie Hall and Neighboring Churches, April 21-May 1 (New York: American Tract Society, 1900), 10. 
35 Ibid, 14. 
 
 53 
Ecumenical Movement, its organizing committee decided “to change the name of the Conference 
from “Ecumenical Missionary Conference” to “World Missionary Conference.”  
 
The reasons for this change were that the term ecumenical has a distinctly historical and 
technical significance. It is associated with conciliar action, and as the meeting at 
Edinburgh is to be a conference and not a council, a deliberative and not a legislative 
body, the word ecumenical is inappropriate and misleading.36 
 
By 1910, in other words, Protestants had abandoned their campaign to redefine “ecumenical” as 
denoting deliberative conference, finding it now more expedient to distinguish the Protestant 
model of cooperation from “ecumenical” practices. Stanley has argued that it was the growth of 
authentic ecumenical spirit – an awareness of the relative quality of ones own denomination and 
the legitimacy of others – that ironically gave rise to this decision.37 There is something to this – 
the Edinburgh conference included far more denominations from Continental Europe than any 
previous gathering – but it is important to stress that it was one group in particular that likely 
occasioned the decision to jettison the title ecumenical with its razor edge of anti-Catholicism. 
One of the achievements the organizing committee of the Edinburgh committee was to secure the 
participation of a sizable Anglo-Catholic contingent, including official representatives of the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which had refused to take part in the Centenary 
Missions Conference of 1888 and the “Ecumenical Missionary Conference” of 1900. As a 
condition of their involvement, prominent Anglo-Catholics like Bishop Charles Gore and H. H. 
Montgomery pushed for a less antagonistic stance against Rome, ensuring, for instance, that 
                                                
36 Minutes of Executive Meeting Committee of the World Missionary Conference, 1910, Sept 1908, 18. See also 
Minutes of the General Committee, Sept 23, 1908, 21 (Union Theological Seminary Archives (hereafter UTS), 
World Missionary Conference Archives, Series 3, Box 1). 
37 Stanley, chpt 3. 
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South America would not be included in the designation of the “non-Christian world.” The 
dropping of the term ecumenical probably emerged from similar considerations. 
 
The Edinburgh Conference has widely been described as the culmination of the 19th century 
missions movement.38 Its chief organizer and chairman, John Mott, had by 1910 become the 
major figure in the international missions world largely through his work in creating the Student 
Volunteer Movement and the World Student Christian Federation, which grew out of attempts to 
recruit university students in Europe and the US, as well as in Asia, to missionary work. Far 
more representative of Continental viewpoints than either the London or New York gatherings, it 
included substantial representation from German and Continental societies. It marked an effort to 
integrate two traditions of missionary thinking that had emerged over the 19th century, one 
predominant in German missiological thinking and the other predominant in Britain and the US. 
But before examining the Edinburgh conference in detail, it is worth considering these two 
traditions and how they approached the task of “evangelizing” the non-Christian world. We will 
emphasize that, despite certain divergences in theological background and methods, they shared 
a common orientation around a specific problem: how organized Christianity could exploit the 
opportunities of non-western societies being transformed by the incursion of western modernity 
and the emergence of an interconnected world. The sense of possibility was balanced by an 
understanding of new challenges. As anti-Catholicism increasingly failed to provide a coherent 
enemy at home, missionaries became concerned that their evangelizing work into the non-
western world was threatened in the rear by a host of modern ills – materialism, atheism, 
alcoholism, and prostitution – spread to Asia and Africa as the result of modern communications 
                                                
38 Thompson, “Ecumenism,” 50-1; Hogg, 98. 
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and transportation, European empire, and economic globalization – the very factors that also 
brought missionaries to these regions. They feared the destructive effects of modernity on non-
Christian societies, and yet saw them simultaneously as further arguments why these societies 
needed to accept Christianity in order to retain moral coherence and social order. 
  
By the turn of the 20th century, it had become customary to distinguish two broad traditions 
within the foreign missions movement: a “liberal” majority, dominated by British and American 
missionaries and a strong and influential Lutheran-German minority, deeply tied to Pietism and 
particularly influential in German societies. The differences between these traditions primarily 
concerned their approach to the problem of the incursion of “western civilization” into the 
mission fields. Many Britons and North Americans embraced western “civilization” and 
“progress” as vehicles of God’s will. By contrast, a non-liberal minority, closely tied to 
Lutheranism and especially Pietistic traditions, focused more narrowly on individual conversions 
and viewed the western encroachments on native life with indifference or even hostility.  
 
For many in the liberal camp, spreading the Gospel was inseparable from bringing the rule of 
law, responsible government, hospitals and schools teaching secular subjects such as science and 
math and literature, and freedom of religion to non-Christian lands. To the extent that western 
governments aided this process, they served a providential role. There were also just useful: 
colonial authorities provided safety in territories where the natives might resist missionary 
incursions. But empire was problematic, too. Missionaries were never comfortable where 
economic motives seemed to trump humanitarian concerns and the evangelical imperative. When 
imperial administrations brutally oppressed native populations, Christian missionaries were 
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known to voice opposition – sometimes loudly. Colonial governments were not always so 
enamored of missionaries, either. Beginning in the late 19th Century, Dutch officials began trying 
to limit missionary activities in the East Indies as a result of conflicts with Muslims; the British 
government, an even more frustrating case, promoted the reformation and modernization of 
Hinduism in India, barred missionaries from the emirates of northern Nigeria, and promoted 
Islam in the Sudan.39 Civilization might serve God’s purpose, but its worldly agents were not 
always dependable allies. 
 
Continental European missionaries embraced a different set of theological emphases. Though 
Protestant missionary societies existed in most countries with Protestant populations, my focus 
here will be on the single largest and most significant contingent, comprising the German 
societies and the Basil Mission Society, which was legally Swiss, but drew most of its staff and 
financial support from the Pietistic hotbed of Southwestern Germany. With some notable 
exceptions, the German milieu put less emphasis on the salvific effects and providential role of 
civilization.40 A Pietistic emphasis on individual conversion and a broadly Romantic celebration 
of Kultur made many German missionaries advocates of the preservation of local cultures. Tribal 
orders and customs were seen as God’s handiwork and the potential foundation of Volkskirchen 
that would reflect the particular genius of individual peoples and point to the marvelous diversity 
of God’s creation (not to mention His heirarchies: there was generally little doubt that certain 
                                                
39 Andrew Walls, 43-4. 
40 The major source of the German missiological tradition remains Johannes Christian Hoekendijk, Kirche und Volk 
in der deutschen Missionswissenschaft, abridged and translated to the German by Günter Finkenrath, et al. (Munich: 
Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1967). For a particularly useful analysis of the German debates over the virtues of western 
civilization in the years before World War I, see Hanns Lessing, “Evangelische ‘Disaporafürsorge’ im ‘größeren 
Deutschland’” in Deutsche evangelische Kirche im kolonialien südlichen Afrika, Lessing, et al, hrsg. (Wiesbaden: 
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Völker had achieved higher levels of culture and Christianity than others had – and perhaps ever 
would). This concern with promoting local forms of Christianity turned some, like Gustav 
Warneck, the towering figure of systematic Missionswissenschaft in the late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries, and the Africa missionary Bruno Gutmann, into sharp critics of all attempts at 
westernizing native peoples, a vice they attributed mostly to Anglo-Saxons who had confused 
their own Zivilisation with the Kingdom of God. None of this is to say that Germans were, on 
balance, any less enthusiastic about the overseas Kaiserreich than the British were about their 
empire. German colonies, once acquired, were a gift from God that eased access to heathen 
peoples and helped to secure Germany’s precarious position among the world powers, and 
German missionaries were among the most enthusiastic proponents of Germany’s overseas 
empire.41 The critique of Europeanization contained within German missiology was more 
generally a strategy enabling missionaries to challenge British imperialism while defending their 
own imperial ventures; conversely British and American missionaries occasionally condemned 
the brutal and uncivilized character of German imperialism, especially in South West Africa. 
 
Above all, the theoretical differences between these points of view concerned a difference in 
how missionaries ought to present Christianity in relation to the social, material, and cultural 
export of “civilization.” For British and American missionaries, the central point was that 
civilization and the Gospel needed to travel together. These missionaries feared a situation in 
which European empire would deliver the edifices of civilization – science, modern industry and 
bureaucracy, material and technological progress – to the rest of the world without its moral and 
                                                
41 See most recently Jürgen Kampmann, “’Festhalten an der Nationalität und am Glauben der Väter’ Kolonie und 
‘Deutschtum in der deutschen theologischen Diskussion bis 1922,” also in Lessing, et al, 2011, is a useful, critical 
account of the German theologians’ failure to deal consistently with the claims of nationality. This has been a long-
standing theme since Hoekendijk’s work. 
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religious foundation. From Lahore in 1902, Joseph Oldham, a young Scottish missionary serving 
with the YMCA, wrote: “educated India is determined to have our western culture and 
civilization whether we like it or no… The question is whether [that civilization] is to be 
permeated by Christian principles, or whether it is to be agnostic and materialistic in its 
tendency. We are giving these young men our knowledge and our civilization; dare we give them 
this without also giving them our religion?”42 Germans, by contrast, took a deeper interest in the 
preservation of cultural difference. They were the champions of indigenous particularity and 
took as their objective the Christianization of non-western social orders and cultures: rather than 
seeking to hold together the unity of civilization and Christianity, German missions sought to 
develop the organic connection between the Gospel and the particular culture life and 
expressions of indigenous peoples. As Warneck put it, the purpose of missions work was to 
“plant” Volkskirche, communities that fortified folk ties, indigenous practices, and traditions of 
hierarchical rule precisely by Christianizing them. The only way to ensure a continuous, robust 
and rooted Christian adherence, rather than a superficial lip-service to Christianity that was more 
rooted in facile or material interest in the goods of Western civilization. 
 
The distinction between these two approaches, however, ought not to be overdrawn. By the early 
20th century, both Germans and Anglo-Americans increasingly were united around a shared 
anxiety toward the expansion of materialistic, atheistic, agnostic strains of civilization into the 
fields of the non-Christian world. They found themselves alike invested in the defense of 
“religion” abroad against the onslaught of modern civilization, emanating from the west. A 
common dilemma – how to transform non-Christian societies without leaving them to the 
                                                
42 Transcript of YMCA “Quarterly Paper” for April 20, 1902 (JO Papers, 1/1) 
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disintegrating and anti-religious impulses in modern life – dominated missionary thinking at the 
turn of the century. This dilemma lay at the heart of the Edinburgh Conference of 1910.  
 
As the conference report on “Carrying the Gospel to All the Non-Christian World” stated, the 
Edinburgh conference convened at a moment when the opportunities for missionary expansion 
seemed propitious.43 The world had become more interconnected than ever before, easing the 
travel of missionaries across oceans and into continental interiors. The exploration of the 
inhabited earth was basically complete. Improved means of communication and transportation 
have “spread out like a great network over nearly all of the great spaces of the unevangelised 
world,” making the “occupation” of previously inaccessible places in Africa and the Asian 
heartland possible for the first time.44 The spread of western learning – in large part through 
missionary schools – had removed inherited prejudices and superstitions. The “ancient religions” 
were on the retreat and non-Christians were more open than ever to the message of Christ. One 
particular advantage to the prospects of world evangelization “is that the vast majority of people 
of the non-Christian nations and races are under the sway, either of the Christian governments or 
of those not antagonistic to Christian missions.”45  
 
But what the Report termed the “open door” to the East would not remain open for long. If 
missionaries did not act “aggressively,” a series of mounting obstacles would overwhelm them. 
The uniquely “plastic” state of non-Christians would harden. The collapse of the ancient 
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44 Report of Commission I: Carrying the Gospel to All the Non-Christian World. Published for the World 
Missionary Conference 1910 (London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1910), 6. 
45 Ibid, 7. 
 
 60 
religions would create a “spiritual vacuum” which, if not filled with the spirit of Christ, would 
push non-Christian peoples to the “worst forms and practices of western life.” These included the 
“growth of habits of luxury and self-indulgence”46 and, more seriously, “the spread of infidel and 
rationalistic ideas and materialistic views.” “From many parts of the non-Christian world,” the 
report warned, “have come reports from our correspondents telling of the wide dissemination of 
agnostic, atheistic, materialistic, and socialistic (of a destructive character) literature, traceable to 
western sources… The writings of Haeckel, Huxley, and Spencer, and the anti-theistic and anti-
Christian articles… are widely circulated not only in India and Japan, but also in… Turkey and 
China.”47   
 
As they drove deeper into the non-Christian world, then, missionaries raced against an expanding 
“spiritual vacuum.” Far more than any other religion, this was the real threat to their enterprise, 
and it explains the urgency gripping Edinburgh in 1910. The rejection of religion in its various 
forms – “anti-theism,” “materialism,” “atheism,” all terms denoting a lack of or opposition to 
religion – spreading from the west threatened to undercut the basic approach to Christian 
apologetic on which the appeal to non-Christians was based. This approach can be seen in the 
Report of Commission IV of the conference, “The Christian Message in Relation to Non-
Christian Religions,” compiled under the leadership of the Scottish theologian D. S. Cairns.48 
Influenced by the approach of comparative theology and the writings of F. D. Maurice and 
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in the Indian Context (Bern: Peter Lang, 2001), chpts. 6 and 8. 
 
 61 
Wilhelm Herrmann, Cairns worked from the assumption that non-Christian faiths contained 
spiritual truths that intimated in partial or corrupted terms the universal truth of Christian 
revelation. The missionary’s task was to seek out these “points of contact,” using them as bridges 
for leading societies and souls to the Gospel. Cairns’s report was based partly on a questionnaire, 
distributed to hundreds of missionaries, asking them to reflect on where these “points of contact” 
could be found within the forms of non-Christian religiosity that they encountered in their fields 
(the report was divided into chapters on “Animistic Religions,” “Chinese religions,” “the 
religions of Japan,” “Islam,” and “Hinduism”). Possible points of contact included the 
recognition of a Supreme Being, belief in the immortality of the soul, or any practices or customs 
that seemed to encourage holiness or religious insight. Not all agreed on how such points of 
contact ought to be treated. Adherents of “fulfillment theology” like the India missionary J. N. 
Farquhar could take a relatively high view of other religions, viewing Christianity, for instance, 
as the “crown of Hinduism.” On the other hand, Wilhelm Dilger and other Germans of Pietistic 
outlook drew on points of contact – Anknüpfungspunkte – in order to illustrate contrasts between 
Christianity and other faiths.49 A. G. Hogg – a figure we will encounter again toward the end of 
this dissertation – argued that missionaries’ task was to establish the “challenging relevancy” of 
the Gospel to Hindu beliefs – evincing a kind of middle ground between repudiation and 
incorporation.50 But in all of these cases, overlapping spirituality was the conversation starter for 
missionaries, the condition of evangelical possibility. 
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By contrast, no possibility of communication existed in the spiritual vacuum. This was what 
made it so abhorrent: without religion, the apologetic maneuvers necessary to missionary work 
could not get off the ground. The atheist or materialist Asian or African was a nightmare 
scenario because he (and most missionaries did think of the archetypal Asian or African as male, 
even as they recognized the importance of female evangelists and converts) fell between the 
cracks of home and foreign missionary approaches: he lacked a spiritual point of contact with 
Christianity through the religion of her forebears, and he lacked the bare familiarity, however 
weak, with Christianity per se that home missionaries sought to kindle. In such civilized 
despisers of religion, missionaries caught a glimpse of their endgame: “The great question with 
reference to all of these countries [of the non-Christian world] is, Shall they be dominated by 
Jesus Christ and His religion or not? Unless the principles and spirit of Christ do shape the new 
civilisation it is sure to become materialistic and rationalistic.” “[N]o policy could be more 
disastrous than for the Christian Church to allow any people to become civilised without 
bringing the superhuman Gospel upon them in their transition state.”51 German and Anglo-
American theologians might embrace different estimations of the relation between Christianity 
and other religions, but so long as they agreed that their task in the field was to present the 
Gospel to the adherents of other religions, these differences existed within a consensus around a 
common interlocutor, who could be addressed through his intimation of the divine – his religion. 
The task of building the Kingdom in the non-Christian world, then, was primarily a matter 
displacing or “fulfilling” other religious civilization – before the fundament of “religion” was 
destroyed altogether. “Science” in this enterprise was recognized as a potential seedbed for anti-
religious thinking and ideas. However, properly understood, allied with Christian faith and put to 
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missionary ends, science was not at all opposed to religion but the means by which it could be 
improved and Christianized. 
 
At Edinburgh this elixir of anxiety and opportunity was shared by Germans and Anglo-
Americans. The two blocs did not announce their common aims in perfect unanimity. Gustav 
Warneck, prevented from attending in person due to old age, sent Mott a letter questioning the 
emphasis on speed and technical organization in the missionary enterprise. The greatest advance 
to the missionary cause would not come through erecting a “complicated machinery” of 
missionary operations from the West but through bringing about “a visible presentation of the 
Christian life on the part of persons who were once heathen.” In line with the German tradition, 
Warneck stressed the primary importance of local churches and “native” evangelists; he took 
exception too with Mott’s obsession with reaching all “unoccupied” regions of the world and 
aruged that it would be more prudent to devote energies to regions where Christianity had the 
greatest opportunities for growth or was most threatened by expansive Islam. But even 
Warneck’s critique reflected the fundamental understanding of missions work in the antebellum 
era: its purpose was to establish Christ’s rule over territory. The conference, he wrote, was “of 
such critical importance for the future of missions,” and he prayed that it would be “fruitful for 
the expansion and development of His Kingdom in the non-Christian world.”52 His 
disagreements concerned the methods for doing this, not the essential purpose itself.   
 
It is worth noting that although the report deploys many terms to describe forms of negation or 
criticism of religion – “agnostic,” “atheistic,” “rationalistic,” “infidel” – “secular” is not among 
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them. “Secular” enters the Edinburgh literature only in the context of a discussion of “secular 
education” in the mission field, that is, secondary or post-secondary education in which religious 
instruction was optional or non-existent.53 The rise of “national systems of education” in Japan, 
China, and Turkey, as well colonies like India, was worrying to the authors because it was often 
“secular” and threatened the overwhelmingly dominance that missionary schools enjoyed in 
much of the non-western world in the nineteenth century. There is an implication that these new, 
state-run schools contribute to “materialistic” outlooks among the educated classes by providing 
a conduit for natural science and other secular subjects while sidelining religion. But the 
outlooks themselves were not “secular.”  
 
Nor were they “secularist.” That there is no reference to “secularism” at all in the reports is 
consistent with the original intention of the term, first introduced in 1851 by the Victorian 
Freethinker George Holyoake. Holyoake envisioned secularism as a positive philosophy that 
would go beyond the skeptical challenge to Christianity and furnish what Freethought had often 
been accused of failing to provide: an alternative foundation for morality. (Secularism, he wrote, 
concerned itself with the “the province of the real, the known, the useful, the affirmative… The 
Secularist… asks what will but conduce to the welfare of a man in this world, and endeavours to 
promote that.”54) After a fairly brief efflorescence in radical Freethought circles in the 1850s and 
early 1860s, the term secularism seems to have fallen into general disuse, and even Holyoake 
preferred to call himself an “agnostic” after Thomas Huxley coined the term in 1869. As far as 
missionaries were concerned (and insofar as they were even aware of the term “secularism”), this 
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54 Quoted in Lee Grugel, George Jacob Holyoake: A Study in the Evolution of a Victorian Radical (Philadelphia: 
Porcupine Press, 1976), 74. 
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marginal, politically extreme, and particular mid-nineteenth-century attempt to substitute for 
Christianity an alternative, quasi-religious system of life and belief was not a concern in the 
mission fields they knew. It would take a war, its tumultuous global aftermath, and a crisis in the 
missionary movement to make the language of secularism a part of the missionary arsenal – but 
this is a topic we will take up in the following chapter. 
 
II. “Christianizing” the Social Order: Social Protestantism in Germany, Britain, and the 
United States until 1914.  
The “foreign” missions movement had a domestic counterpart – the “home” missions movement, 
as it was called in Britain and the United States, or Innere Mission in Germany.55 Home 
missions, like foreign missions, trace their roots to evangelical awakenings of the early 19th 
century. The American Home Missions Society, formed in 1810 as the counterpart to the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, was established to promote evangelical 
work among Native Americans and white settlers on the frontier, where they were cut off from 
church life in eastern towns and cities. By the 1840s and 1850s, however, most home missions 
work in North American and Europe had come to focus around a constellation of issues – 
unemployment and poverty, social “vices” such as prostitution and alcoholism, the decline of the 
family, care for the sick and indigent – broadly grouped under the rubric of the “social problem.” 
As the deplorable conditions of urban, industrialized modernity moved to the center of their 
work, home missions evolved into an enterprise that was distinct from foreign missions not only 
in the territorial jurisdiction it claimed – “home” as opposed to “foreign” – but in its conceptual 
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as opposed to foreign fields. 
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underpinnings. The first task of foreign missionary work was to expose the shortcomings of 
indigenous belief systems, laying bare their errors and insufficiencies, in order to champion the 
Christian alternative. By contrast, missionaries working the home front confronted something 
like the opposite challenge: their task was to rebuild or resuscitate Christendom threatened by the 
sins, corporate and individual, of modern life.56 Both home and foreign missionaries saw 
missions work involving the conversion of “society” and “individuals” alike – even when they 
disagreed over the precise relation between social regeneration and individual salvation. Home 
missions, however, focused on making theoretically Christian societies “truly” Christian in 
practice, whereas foreign missions focused on bringing exogenous peoples and beliefs into the 
ambit of Christendom.   
 
This categorical distinction was reflected in many ways. First, foreign missions societies in all 
European and North American countries were institutionally distinct from home missions 
societies and other Christian reform bodies. One partial exception to this rule – the international 
Student Christian Movement – distinguished in its conferences and literature between 
evangelization work in “home” and “foreign” fields, sometimes subdividing the former into 
evangelizing work in “Protestant” and “other Christian” (i.e. Catholic and Eastern Orthodox) 
areas.57 Missions work in “Christian” as opposed to “non-Christian” societies so clearly required 
                                                
56 Edward L. Queen, “Home Missions,” Encyclopedia of American Religious History, Vol. I (3rd edition), 643-7; 
Latourette (1941), chpts 6-8; For useful insights into home missionary thought and practice in the US in the 19th and 
20th centuries, see John A. Hutchison, We Are Not Divided: A Critical History and Study of the Federal Council of 
the Churches of Christ in America (New York: Round Table, 1941), chpt 1. For a useful overview of the conceptual 
framework of Innere Mission and how it was distinguished from foreign missions in the work of 19th century 
German missiology, see Klaus Schäfer “’Weltmission und Volksmission’ Geschichte – Bestandaufnahme – 
Perspektiven” (unpublished address before the Delegiertenversammlung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Missionarische 
Dienste, 24 May, 2005) http://www.a-m-d.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Texte/weitere_Autoren/Schaefer20040525.pdf. 
57 See, e.g. Report of the Conference of the World Student Christian Federation at Lake Mohonk, June 2-8 1913 
(WSCF: New York, 1913), 243-267. 
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different techniques of social action and strategies of persuasion that the distinction rarely 
required spelling out. But some explicit distinctions between the two can be found. As the 
Scottish Congregationalist John Brown Paton – familiar with the German tradition of Innere 
Mission – explained in 1873: “In contrast to the foreign ‘outer’ mission of the Church,” the 
“inner” mission of the church “sets forth its mission within land in which it is planted. bringing 
into vivid relief and definite vision the immediate and practical work of the Church among all the 
people of that land. The object of this immediate and practical mission is, that the country it thus 
occupies, shall become, not nominally but in reality, a part of Christendom in which the 
institutions and usages of society, and the condition of the people, harmonise with the righteous 
will of God.”58  
 
While it is customary to narrate the history of foreign missions as a convergence of tributaries 
toward the conflux of the Edinburgh conference of 1910, the history of social Protestantism 
before 1914 lacks a culminating event. Rather, it presents a picture of the various movements in 
“Christian” societies, most of them municipal, regional, and national in focus, mimicking one 
another in institutional organization and drawing intellectual inspiration from visions of 
Christian social reform that crossed national boundaries. Toward the end of the 19th century and 
in the first decades of the 20th, however, one specifically international issue moved toward the 
center of efforts at Protestant reform. Before the outbreak of World War I, an Anglo-German 
peace movement succeeded for a brief moment in mobilizing the support of church leaders and 
lay Protestant reformers in Britain and Germany. In what follows we will first outline in broad 
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terms the features of the home missions work as it relates to Protestantism, before focusing in 
detail on this effort at promoting German-British “friendship” through the churches.   
 
Many scholars have observed a political divergence between Anglo-American home missionary 
efforts and German ones. Antecedents of the home missions movement in Britain may be found 
in the social and moral campaigns of evangelical Protestants in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, especially abolitionism in Britain and the international Quaker peace movement. These 
efforts provided inspiration for later liberal and progressive politics in Britain and the US. 
Indeed, much home missions work in these countries took on an explicitly liberal cast. 
“Settlement houses,” such as Toynbee Hall in London and Hull House in Chicago, offered 
shelter, moral uplift, and Christian literature to the poor. They furnished a matrix of social reform 
movements in both countries. “Christian socialists” in Britain, centered around the Guild of St. 
Matthew (1877-1909) and the Christian Social Union (1889-1919), pillars of Victorian reform, 
were strong proponents of economic reforms which mobilized support within the Anglican 
Church and Non-Conformist churches. Meanwhile, the Social Gospel Movement in the United 
States, championed by figures like Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbusch, similarly 
championed progressive reforms, workers movements, and urban sanitation.  
 
By contrast, the origins of home missions in Germany were strongly conservative. The Hamburg 
pastor Johann Wichern founded houses for the care of orphans and promoted prison reform in 
Prussia in the late 1830s and 1840s out of a conviction that if churches did not evolve a social 
program and humanitarian networks of their own, socialism would sweep religion from German 
society. Wichern conceived of German “interior mission” as a Christian response to the threat of 
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socialist revolution and anarchy. His efforts found favor with conservative church leaders and 
with departments of the Prussian state.59 By the mid-century, a network of charitable 
organizations had sprung up around the country, serving as a nexus for Christian social action 
and reform advocacy. The Central Committee for Interior Mission of the German Evangelical 
Church [Zentral-Ausschuß für Innere Mission der deutschen evangelischen Kirche], founded in 
1849 in the aftermath of a wave of European revolutions, emphasized philanthropic work and 
generally did not challenge structural inequities in German society. However, social 
Protestantism in Germany was not uniformly conservative. Alfred Stoecker’s Christian Socialist 
Workers Party [Christlich–soziale Partei], for example, advocated national labor associations, 
higher wages, the eight-hour day, and pensions for widows and orphans. The Protestant Social 
Congress [Evangelisch-Sozialer Kongress] brought liberal theologians in German universities, 
such as Albrecht Ritschl and Adolf von Harnack, in the ambit of social reform while also 
providing a platform for liberals like Friedrich Naumann.60  
 
While social Protestantism had its liberal protrusion in Germany, German liberal reformers, 
unlike their British counterparts, never developed strong support among the clerics of its state 
churches [Ländeskirchen]. Wichern’s Inner Missions remained suspicious of the more structural 
transformations advocated by the Evangelical Social Congress. The terrain of social 
Protestantism in Germany was politically polarized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, while 
in the US and Britain, Social Gospel ideas drew support within the mainstream of clerical 
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60 For the most useful overview of the nexus of Protestant activism and state policy in the Wilhelmine and Weimar 
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leadership.61 In 1888, the Lambeth Conference of the Church of England advocated for factory-
act legislation; in 1897, the Conference recommended state aid for the sick, unemployed, and 
aged. In the United States, Social Gospel principles underwrote the formation of organizations 
such as the Federal Council of Churches – comprised of official representatives from 32 
denominational bodies – whose “Social Creed” (1908) laid out a robust condemnation of social 
inequality and unregulated capitalism.  
 
Despite an overall difference in the dominant political orientations of German and Anglo-Saxon 
Protestantism, it is worth underscoring their essential similarities. First, the most liberal Social 
Gospellers and the most conservative social reformers in Germany shared a conviction that 
Christianity was not, per se, a political doctrine but that its truth and social message transcended 
political categories and parties. Second, social Protestantism in Germany and the Anglo-
American milieu alike was grounded in liberal theology shaped by Schleiermacher and Ritschl – 
a theology stressing the immanence of God’s work and the presence of the Kingdom of God in 
this life. Even the “otherworldly” orientation of Pietistic Lutheranism embraced the Kingdom as 
the telos of social reform: Wichern’s Innere Mission commissions, for instance, had the purpose 
of “helping to build the Kingdom of God within Protestant Germany and among Germans living 
abroad.”62 The possibility of building the Kingdom – of instantiating Christian social relations 
and community within this world – brought Protestants into the associational space of the public 
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sphere. Both parties believed in the possibility and urgent necessity of building a Christian 
society outside of the church, one that would be actualized not merely in worship, preaching, and 
church attendance but in Christian social relations and in a unity of physical and spiritual well-
being for all classes of society. The conservative tenor of German home missions work might be 
understood at best as a function of the stronger mobilization of the organized Socialist Party 
(SPD) and the presence of an anti-religious political left that was never as strong in Britain, 
much less the US. But if a divergence in political orientation and sensibility surely existed, 
German and Anglo-American approaches to home missions were more alike than different: both 
emphasized that Christianity had a specifically public role to play, both emphasized corporate as 
well as individual salvation, and both believed that the Christian transformation of society 
required state action, not just private philanthropic initiative.63 No less a Social Gospeller than 
Walter Rauschenbusch could praise the German tradition of social Protestantism, with its fruits 
of the Protestant Social Congress and the Friends of Protestant Freedom, noting even in 1918 the 
“wonderful work of the ‘Innere Mission’ since Wichern.”64 
 
This shared theological matrix of liberal and conservative visions of social reform underscores 
how both were concerned with the “Christianization” of a modern civilization that seemed only 
precariously Christian. It was possible to embrace much different political choices – to support 
Prussian absolutism or “Christian socialism,” democracy or monarchy – while still subscribing to 
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the fundamental principle that wider, secular society was a site of Christian missions work, 
where souls and communities alike needed to be brought to reflect the ideals of the Kingdom. All 
movements of social Protestantism, notwithstanding their political variegation, sought to realize 
a truly “Christian society” that was not the ecclesiastical body of the church but the wider space 
of “society,” constituting class relations within national boundaries as well as international 
relations.  
 
In Germany, the US, and Britain, conceptions of Christian society became both highly 
nationalized and internationalized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In the US, social 
Protestantism often embraced a belief in America’s providential destiny as a nation called out 
among others to serve as a model to other nations of universal ideals of equality and freedom. In 
Britain, the same sorts of associations were identified with a world historical vision of the British 
Empire as both a civilizer of nations and a specific form of Christian commonwealth. In 
Germany, the nationalist thrust of the inner mission as well as liberal reformers such as Naumann 
and Stoecker expressed itself in advocacy for Volksmission at home (in contrast to 
Voelkermission abroad). According to this idea, the patterns and cultural forms of Christian life 
in Germany would reflect and amplify the peculiar virtues and difference of the German 
Volksgemeinschaft. Thus home missions reflected the same divergent assumptions about cultural 
difference that shaped foreign missions, discussed above. German-Lutheran and Anglo-
American-Reformed embraced the “generalizing universalism” which assert the validity of a 
Christian civilization in every situation, whereas German missions embraced a “relativizing 
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universalism,” where a category of nationhood/Volk is taken as universally valid but only to 
describe phenomena essentially different in every iteration.65 
 
The national orientation of social Protestantism as a rule lent Protestant support to imperial 
expansion and implicated the churches in national rivalry and competition. But Protestant 
nationalism did not merely incubate antagonism among Western nations, it also sought to 
overcome such antagonism. Groups such as the Federal Council of Church’s Commission on 
International Peace and Goodwill, established in 1908, supported arbitration movements, and the 
Lambeth Conferences of 1897 and 1908 urged arbitration and other peaceful methods of settling 
disputes. After the Hague Conference of 1907, the first Christian peace organizations with 
specifically international membership emerged. Following the Hague conference, two of its 
attendees, the British Quaker MP J. Allen Baker and the German Baron Eduard de Neufville 
succeeded in securing the support of church leaders in both countries for a series of exchanges 
between German and British church leaders.66 In 1908, Baker assembled an interconfessional 
committee and invited 130 German churchmen to England; the following summer, German 
churchmen returned the favor, convening with over 100 British theologians and clerics and lay 
activists in Germany. The idea behind these conventions, in the words of then Archbishop 
Randall Davidson, was to create “the right atmosphere” for dealing with relations between the 
two powers, and Westminster and Berlin patronized the efforts. In 1910, the German pastor 
Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze, a veteran of the Student Christian Movement and founder of a 
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British-style settlement movement in East Berlin, and the British liberal Willoughby Dickinson 
established in 1910 the Associated Councils of Churches of the British and German Empires for 
Promoting Friendly Relations between the Two Peoples. Periodicals, such as the Peacemaker in 
Britain (1911) and Die Eiche (1913) in Germany – were started to tout the venture and drum up 
support for German-British peace through Christian solidarity.  
 
Energized by progressive optimism and a conviction that shared religious and moral allegiance 
could tame imperial competition, these groups represented the first real attempt to unite 
Protestants internationally around a cause that was, specifically, a concern of “Christendom” as a 
whole, rather than merely individual Christian nations. The task of subordinating diplomatic 
relations between sovereign states to the Gospel of brotherly love was thus a unique issue in the 
repertoire of home missions in its international focus. It was distinguished from missionary work 
in the foreign fields, which contained no sovereign state powers, with the exception of Japan.67 
But these efforts met a monumental setback even before the ink was dry on their quixotic 
mission statements. At its first meeting in Constance, Germany, from August 3-4, 1914, “war by 
time table” requisitioned the German rail system; more than half the delegates could not even 
make it to the gathering. Those who did attend hastily declared the formation of a new institution 
– the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches (WA) – as Europe 
descended into war. The WA succeeded in winning the support of Andrew Carnegie, who funded 
its operation through the “Church Peace Union,” a philanthropic institution he founded later that 
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year. As we’ll see, however, during the War, “continuation committees” of the World Alliance in 
Britain, France, and the UK and United States never managed to bring church leaders in their 
countries into conference. The War eclipsed the vision of international Christian cooperation that 




Before addressing the impact of World War I on international Protestantism, one final feature of 
the landscape of Protestant-led cooperation of the antebellum era requires mention. In addition to 
the practical efforts we have examined here, aimed at extending the rule of Christ over the 
domains of western society and the non-Christian world, there were a number of efforts in the 
19th and 20th centuries to resolve longstanding doctrinal divisions between churches. In the 
United States and Britain, these efforts were often referred to as a search for “organic unity” 
among churches.68 Dialogues between individual Anglican and Orthodox clerics found 
surprising common ground in issues that had divided churches for centuries, including the 
Sacraments and the filioque, added by the Western church to the Nicene creed.69  
 
Though the organizers of the Edinburgh conference agreed to set matters of church “legislation” 
to the side, some did recognize that doctrinal differences between churches compromised the 
cause of missions work abroad. One outgrowth of the Edinburgh conference was the formation 
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of The World Conference of Faith and Order, founded by the American Episcopal Bishop of the 
Philippines, Charles Brent. The organization sought to provide a platform for the representatives 
of various Protestant and Orthodox churches to become better acquainted with each others’ 
theological and ecclesiastical positions in the hopes of working slowly toward “organic union.” 
But no efforts were made in these discussions to formulate, from a perspective outside or above 
the traditions represented in these conversations, the terms of such a union. Brent saw the body 
rather as an explicitly paramissionary organization, whose purpose would be to enhance the 
credibility of Christian churches in their efforts at evangelization abroad. He approached the 
question of resolving doctrinal questions separating the churches on the grounds that “it is little 
short of absurd to try to bring into the Church of Christ the great nations of the Far East unless 
we can present an undivided front. For purely practical reasons we feel the necessity of the 
Church’s realization of Unity.”70 The first assembly of the World Conference on Faith and Order 
would be delayed by the outbreak of World War I and not held until 1927.  
  
 
III. World War I and the Collapse of the Kingdom 
The War dealt a devastating blow to all Protestant international movements. It constituted a 
caesura. This was not because the experience of the war chastened optimistic assessments of the 
progress of the Kingdom – as we will see, some Protestants on the victor’s side found in the 
conclusion of the Peace, and in particular in the establishment of the League of Nations, new 
reasons for optimism that the era of a coming Christianization of the social and international 
order was nearer at hand than ever before. But it was precisely the postwar institutions that 
                                                




Anglo-American and many neutral Protestants championed that German Protestant leaders 
rejected, seeing them as instruments not of the Kingdom’s reach but of Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-
French) imperium. In other words, between 1914 and 1927, the prospects of a Protestant 
internationalism anchored in the Anglo-German cooperation on which it was based collapsed as 
a result of political conflicts between these two blocs. During the War and its aftermath, 
“politics” seemed to intractably divide the Protestant international and became a source of 
division far more destructive to the cause of cooperation and unity than theological and doctrinal 
differences had been previously. 
 
The story of the emergence of “politics” as a source of division among Protestants in this era has 
generally been glossed over in most church histories of the movement, as well as more recent 
accounts by secular historians. Though there has been no shortage of accounts of the animosities 
between German and Allied church leaders during and after the war, the emphasis of church 
histories has been on the ultimate reconciliation between the former belligerents. Moreover, 
many of these histories have drawn attention to the cluster of new international organizations – 
including the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches (1914), the 
Universal Conference on Life and Work (1919), and the International Missionary Council (1921) 
– that emerged during the war and in its immediate aftermath to recover the “unity” among 
Christians that the war tore apart. However, these institutions, all inspired and created by Allied 
or neutral church leaders, far from promoting cooperation and unity generally served well into 
the mid-1920s as arena for the expression of Allied-German recrimination. Their creation and the 
gatherings they organized furnished occasions for German and Allied church leaders to clash 
over whether the postwar settlement was a step on the way to universal harmony or a victor’s 
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peace that enchained the defeated. While church histories elide this period of conflict into a 
larger narrative of the advance of church unity, secular historians have tended to overlook the 
Allied-German rift altogether, focusing mostly on American and British support for the League 
of Nations and variations of Protestant liberal internationalism. 
 
The following section will treat the war and its immediate aftermath in two parts, first focusing 
on its impact on foreign missions and then examining its impact on European church leaders and 
lay activists whose work focused on the application of Christian faith and principles to social and 
international problems.  
 
The war dealt a devastating blow to cooperation among foreign missionaries, particularly 
between German and British missionaries. In August of 1914, Allied forces attacked German 
colonial possessions, and by 1915 the Kaiser’s overseas empire was essentially decimated, 
though fighting continued until 1918 between Allied troops and the resourceful German general 
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa. Almost without exception, able-bodied missionaries 
working in former German territories, as well as Allied colonies, such as India and Southeast 
Africa, were imprisoned or repatriated. To the Germans, the Allied treatment of German 
missionaries was an outrageous violation of a principle that had gained traction in missions 
discourse in the preceding half decade, that of the “supranationality of missions,” a bid to 
accommodate and welcome the efforts of missions groups from other nationalities within 
imperial territories.71 Karl Axenfeld, director of the Berlin Missionary Society, decried the 
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British Missionspolitik as an unprecedented incursion of the state into “religious” matters. Worse 
still, not one British missionary had condemned this crime. While it had always been true that the 
British missionaries tended to elide the interests of their Empire and the Church of England with 
the cause of Christ, the war had pushed this confusion to new extremes.  
 
The Deutscher Missions-Ausschuß, an organization representing all missions in German-
speaking territory, responded by issuing the “Appeal to Evangelical Christians Abroad,” drafted 
by Axenfeld and signed by most of the leaders of German missionary societies, including 
Richter, Paul Hennig of the Herrnhut Missions Society, as well as prominent supporters of 
German missions such as Adolf Harnak and Adolf Diessmann and the court pastor, Ernst 
Dryander in early September 1914. It claimed that Germany had gone to war in self-defense 
again “Asiatic barbarism,” attacked Britain for allying herself not only with Russia but with 
“heathen” Japan. The letter referred to “unnamable” crimes perpetrated on German missionaries, 
lamented the break of a union with those “who by blood and history and faith are our brothers, 
with whom we felt ourselves in the common world task more closely bound than with almost any 
other nation.”72 It went on to note the terrible setbacks the British missionary policy had dealt to 
the cause of world Christianization that both British and Germans had heralded in Edinburgh 
four years before. 
 
The mission fields which the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh indicated as the 
most important in the present day – in mid-Africa with its rivalry between Christendom 
and Islam for the black races, and eastern Asia remolding its life – are now becoming the 
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scenes of embittered struggles between peoples who bore in a special degree the 
responsibility for the fulfillment of the Great Commission in these lands.73 
 
A British response, written by Randall Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury, defended British 
conduct, citing evidence of the government’s desire to stay out of war in August 1914, while 
echoing the Germans’ remorse at the breach of fellowship between the two nations. None of this 
had a meliorating effect. Acrimony between the German and British churchmen increased 
steadily as the conflict wore on: not long after the “Appeal to Evangelical Christians Abroad,” 
twenty-nine Protestant pastors joined a dozens of German academics in signing the “Appeal to 
the Civilized World,” an encomium to the glories of German culture which emphatically 
dismissed charges of German “barbarism” in Belgium. Protestant voices on each sides of the 
conflict declared that the other had sacrificed the cause of Christ to perfidious national interests, 
besmirching the religious work of missions with the struggle for power. 
 
No direct correspondence or personal contact was possible after the autumn of 1914 among 
missionaries who had forged intimate bonds of friendship and cooperation in the years before the 
war. The Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh conference, chaired by Mott with Oldham as 
Secretary, kept in touch with German allies through the intermediary of Friedrich Würz, 
inspector of the Basel Missionary Society in Switzerland. Through Würz, who was sympathetic 
to the German cause, the Germans implored Oldham to lobby the British government for a 
release of missionaries and restoration to their stations. Oldham refused: while regretting the 
destruction of the German missions effort, he saw little likelihood that an approach to the British 
Government would do much good, and instead set to work organizing a “relief fund” for German 
missionary operations to ensure that their operations would be taken over by Lutheran societies 
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in Scandinavia and the US, or, barring the possibility of an intra-confessional hand-off, British 
missionaries.74 Privately, Oldham expressed his shock at Germany’s conduct in the War – 
especially after her introduction of poison gas, the use of which “fills me with horror,” as he 
wrote to a friend.75 Germany had “renounced her claims to a place in the family of nations.” In 
public, Oldham struggled to remain neutral. But the events of 1916 only deepened the conflict 
over the war time fate of missionary work, as British interned German missionaries in India, 
pressured China and South Africa to do the same, and appropriated properties of the North 
German Mission in West Africa.  
 
Abandoning their British channel in Oldham, the Germans turned increasingly to Mott by late 
1915, lobbying him to circulate a document enumerating German grievances among the 
Edinburgh Continuation Committee. When Mott declined to do so, they began to sense an 
erosion of Mott’s neutrality. Richter and Axenfeld dispatched lengthy letters to Mott criticizing 
his unwillingness to criticize “the Satanic campaign of lies and calumny” from English 
missionaries. Axenfeld even lectured Mott that America was effectively “an ally of our 
enemies,” since it continued to sell arms to the British, preferring to “earn billions” rather than 
retain strict neutrality. A momentary reprieve in the bad relations caused by Mott’s visit to Berlin 
in June 1916 was entirely undone by the Americans’ declaration of war against the Germans in 
April 6, 1917. Exacerbating the situation further, Mott took part in a special diplomatic mission 
to Russia under Elihu Root in June 1917. Though Mott maintained that his part in the mission 
had purely concerned “religious, educational, and humanitarian purposes,” the Germans 
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disagreed. The Evangelisches Missions-Magazin expressed the consensus view of the German 
missionary community in announcing that they could “only view Mott’s trip with great sorrow. 
We fear that he is now lost to the cause of German missions. The idea of a Protestant world 
mission was stabbed in the heart when Mott joined the belligerents.”76 When the Scottish 
missionary J. N. Ogilvie attacked the “fatal spirit of meglomania” which had consumed the 
Germans, making their missionary efforts “which a few years ago were a glory” now “a hissing 
and a shame” at a General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, the die was cast. Würz wrote 
Oldham that the conduct of Mott and the British will “destroy the last vestige of community that 
remains among us.”77 The German Missionsausschuß declared in 1917 that it no longer 
recognized Mott as Chairman and Ogilvie as a member of the Continuation Committee, which 
after this point effectively ceased to function. 
 
The end of the War found some of the victors in a reconciliatory mood, but this did not restore 
cooperation between the two blocs. In April 1918, before the conflict had reached its conclusion, 
umbrella missionary organizations in the US and Britain quickly set up an “Emergency 
Committee” to provide funding for war-impaired missions, including German missions. The 
following year, Oldham, through his contacts in the Foreign Office, succeeded in convincing the 
delegates at Paris to add a provision protecting German missionary assets from the general 
confiscation of German imperial possessions written into the Peace Settlement. Article 438 of the 
Versailles Treaty stipulated that the property of German missionary societies would be placed 
under “a board of trustees… composed of persons holding the faith [denomination] of the 
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Mission whose property is involved.” This provision, along with petitions by American and 
British to peace leaders to ensure rights of missionary freedom in the territorial Mandates 
enabled Germans to later recover their missionary holdings overseas; at the time it did little to 
ease the tensions between the Germans and the Allies. On his first postwar visit to Germany in 
1920, Mott was subjected to intense questioning at a meeting of missionary and student 
movement leaders over his conduct as a member of the Root Commission in Russia. Axenfeld 
afterward wrote Mott, “you have lost the important religious position you have enjoyed in 
Germany before the war and it will be very hard to regain it.” At a meeting in Crans, 
Switzerland, German and Allied representatives of the Edinburgh Continuation meeting 
reassembled to plan the formation of the International Missionary Council – the first plans for 
which had been floated in the months following the Edinburgh conference. But the meeting 
devolved into arguments over war guilt. In March 1921, the German Missionsausschuß voted to 
boycott all international meetings so long as German missions were barred from Allied held 
areas. Thus when the IMC was formally established at the Lake Mohonk conference later that 
summer, no German’s were in attendance – a fact that left Mott and Oldham deeply pained and 
embarrassed. “Is it not a fundamental Christian principle that differences between Christians, 
however deep and great, are to be resolved within the Christian fellowship and not as a precedent 
condition to it?” Oldham remarked pointedly to his colleague, the Council’s American Secretary, 
A. L. Warnshuis. To the Germans, however, the entire undertaking of international missionary 
cooperation seemed to have been absorbed into the British will to power, forfeiting its 




Politics, which missionaries had previously been able to sideline in favor of voluntary 
cooperation around a “religious” aim of evangelization, had split the missionary community at its 
heart. The Germans saw in the Peace Settlement and the League of Nations not an inclusive 
international system but Anglo-Saxon imperialism by subtler means. In a multi-part survey of the 
global missionary situation in the Neue Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, Richter predicted 
catastrophic consequences for Protestant missions under the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon 
“Nation-State-Concept” [Staatsidee].78 Richter argued that the German “people-concept” 
[Volksidee] had always recognized the right of heathen peoples to develop themselves along 
lines specific to their historical and racial particularities. But the “false” or “lying sign” 
[Heuchelschild] of political self-determination was quite another matter.79 It sprung from the 
peculiarly Anglo-Saxon notion that the state existed, not by the will of God as a guarantor of 
social order in a sinful world, but through the wills of individuals contracting to promote their 
interests and well being. If the British were not careful to explain where and how the principle 
was to be applied, Richter ominously warned, it threatened to break the dams of legitimate 
authority and throw nations into chaos, permanently setting back the cause of Christian missions. 
In Wilson’s idea of a world “safe for democracy,” German missionaries saw a world perilously 
unsafe for missions work. Axenfeld, for his part, similarly saw in the Peace Settlement the end of 
the principle of the supra-nationality of missions and its subordination of religious concerns to 
political ones. For him, the League institutionalized the system of international relations that 
justified the British destruction of German mission works. It set a precedent that could only be 
more dangerous in the hands of non-Christian states. What would happen if, at some future date, 
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war were to break out between the United States and Japan for control of the Southern Pacific? 
“Is it truly so difficult to recognize that, if it were to come to such a conflict, God forbid, Japan 
would have, in matters concerning the treatment of missionaries, a poor model [in Allied 
conduct] to follow?”80 Conversely, what if either missionaries in India or – more likely, Indian 
converts – were to throw their support behind resistance movements against the Raj in the 
putative name of God? Even as British missionaries labored to ensure missionary rights in 
mandated regions, for Axenfeld the restoration of the German empire remained a necessary 




World War I broke apart German-Allied cooperation in foreign missions work – the area where 
voluntary association of Christians in the 19th and 20th centuries had been most effectively and 
robustly international in scope. What effect did it have on the various international movements 
for social reform and international peace? For one thing, the conflict brought the problem of 
interstate relations to the center of the Christian social agenda in Britain and the US. A 
movement that had focused primarily on class relations within nations shifted its attention to the 
international domain. Walter Rauschenbusch, overstating the contrast somewhat, nonetheless 
captured the shift in emphasis in 1917: “Before the War the social gospel dealt with social 
classes; to-day it is being translated into international terms. The ultimate cause of the war was 
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the same lust for easy and unearned gain which has created the internal social evils under which 
every nation has suffered.”81  
 
But in proportion as international relations moved to the center of Protestant social thought and 
activism during and in the years after the War, the prospects for cooperation among German and 
Allied churches diminished. During the war, clerics in neutral countries led numerous attempts at 
conciliation, seeking to convene summits of church leaders from belligerent countries and to 
rally a united declaration concerning the War. But all of these came to naught. After the war, the 
terms of the peace, in particular the War Guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty and the proposal 
for a League of Nations, only exacerbated antagonisms between Allied and German church 
leaders. Seeking to overcome these tensions, Protestants in allied and neutral countries attempted 
once again to launch an “ecumenical” body, this time in 1919. Conceived by the Swedish 
Archbishop of Uppsala Nathan Soederblom, the “Ecumenical Council of Churches” would 
include not individuals or voluntary associations but representatives from official church bodies. 
The effort, however, failed in two respects. When Catholic Churches refused to join, the bodies’ 
organizing committee dropped the title “ecumenical,” marking yet another retreat for the 
Protestant-led vision of interchurch unity. Moreover, when the body – renamed the Universal 
Council of Life and Work – finally convened in 1925, seemingly intractable divisions between 
Allied and German church leaders ensured that it would fail in one of its primary objectives: to 
promote Protestant and Orthodox support for the League of Nations. 
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After the ignominious conclusion of the Constance Conference, the leaders of the World 
Alliance in Germany and Allied countries issued statements lamenting the outbreak of war, yet 
insisted on the justice and honor of their nations’ respective causes. William Temple compared 
the broken body of European Christendom to Christ on the Cross, “but this time… it is as though 
Peter were driving home the nails, and John were piercing the side.” Great Britain, however, “is 
engaged in a war from which… there was offered to our nation no honourable way of escape,” 
he insisted, distancing himself from pacifist opposition to the struggle.82 Peace, declared 
Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze in January 1915, was his dearest new year’s hope. And yet the 
German armies were engaged in a war of self-defense (Notwehrkrieg), and their success was a 
precondition of a peace that would be worthy of the sacrifice [der der Opfer wert ist].83  
 
From 1914 through 1918, the campaign to organize Protestants behind the cause of peace 
became the exclusive preserve of churchmen in Neutral countries. The most important of these 
figures – a towering presence in ecumenical historiography – was Soederblom. On various 
occasions in the Fall of 1914, 1916, and 1917, Soederblom appealed to church leaders on both 
sides to support a negotiated peace. If any Protestant churchman stood a chance in this quixotic 
campaign, it was him. It was not only that he had a degree of credibility as a citizen of a neutral 
country. A veteran of the Student Volunteer movement, Soederblom was close friends with 
church leaders in Europe, including in Britain Temple and the Scottish Congregationalist A. E. 
Garvie; in France, Paris Professor of Theology Wilfred Monod, who belonged to one of France’s 
most prominent Reformed families and was head of the French Protestant Federation; and in 
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Germany, Adolf Diessmann and Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze. He was also a Lutheran with deep 
ties to the academic and clerical world of German Protestantism: between 1912 and 1914, for 
example, he had been a Professor of Religion at the University of Leipzig. Soederblom’s son 
served as a German officer in the war and was killed in combat.  
 
Soederblom’s wartime efforts met with repeated frustration, however. Seeking to rally 
churchmen from belligerent countries to support a peace appeal in 1914, Soederblom was turned 
down by the Germans (who portrayed the German campaign as one of just self-defense), the 
British (who insisted on the need to vindicate the violation of Belgian neutrality), and the French 
(who insisted on the total evacuation of foreign forces from French soil as a precondition for a 
peace summit). Moved by Pope Benedict XV’s peace appeal in 1917, Soederblom even reached 
out to individual Catholics, such as the Archbishop of Cologne, to participate in a conference for 
Protestant and Catholic churches to bear witness to Christian solidarity in the face of the conflict 
in January of 1916. The Archbishop expressed his interest in the proposal but declined to attend, 
observing that it would be necessary first for the Pope to announce his position on the matter. As 
for Protestant churches from belligerent countries, they refused to participate. Until 1917, 
Americans in the Church Peace Union and the World Alliance had supported Soederblom’s 
efforts, backed by large contingents of American Protestantism that wished to stay out of the 
conflict. But the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany and the sinking of 
the Lusitania eroded the appeal of American pacifism, while the mainline of American liberal 
Protestantism threw its support behind Woodrow Wilson’s decision to bring the United States’ 
into the War in April 1917.84 Before long, Social Gospellers such as Shailer Matthews and 
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Arthur J. Brown, a leading voice in the Federal Council of Churches, came to suspect 
Soederblom of harboring “pro-German” sympathies.85 When in the spring of 1917 Soederblom 
organized an international conference in Uppsala, only representatives from churches in Neutral 
countries – Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden – sent delegates. It was not 
until October 3, 1919 – after the close of the Paris Peace Conference – that Soederblom, at last, 
managed to convene German, British, Italian, Belgian, and French delegations in one place, at a 
chateau in Oud Wassenaar in Holland. Even this was only a partial victory. While British and 
French and American churches sent official representatives, the only Germans attending – 
including the liberals Siegmund-Schultze and Diessmann – came as individuals, and represented 
a position far more conciliatory than most of the German church hierarchy (the delegation was, 
for one, willing to sign a statement acknowledging German’s moral culpability for the violation 
of Belgian neutrality – a position that the newly constituted Deutsche Evangelische Kirche, a 
body representing all regional churches in Germany, would not endorse). Dubbed a “spiritual 
peace conference,” the gathering at Oud Wassenaar was conceived as an opportunity for postwar 
Christians reconciliation, and statements were passed defending the principle of the 
supranationality of missions (but not demanding the reinstatement of German missions), 
supporting the protection of religious minorities (a movement urged by sections of the Hungarian 
Evangelical Churches), and identifying in rather vague terms the necessity for Christian churches 
to support efforts to strengthen international law. Even with the liberal Germans, however, 
agreement was persistently beyond reach: when the French delegation attempted to pass a 
motion supporting the War Guilt clause in the League charter, the Germans nearly left the 
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conference, insisting that no political conditions must be laid down on the renewal of 
international friendship among the churches.    
 
While a meeting of churches proved impossible between 1914 and 1918, in Allied countries, the 
War ushered in new visions of international Christian unity, inspired by an experience of 
sundered fellowship that both sides found irreparable. Already in 1914 William Temple called 
for the church to become “an international society, actually and perceptibly one, bound together 
by devotion to Christ. If there were such a society in the world, the individual Christian would 
feel his membership of it in the same way as he feels his membership of his nation.”86 
Particularly in Great Britain, a body of thought emerged arguing that the church was essentially 
international, its universalism an ethos reining in the aggressive impulses of sovereign states. A 
Commission of the Church of England on Industrial Questions convened in 1918 recommended 
that work on “moral and social questions” across international boundaries could help to suture 
the “divisions of Christendom” and the “violated fellowship” between belligerent nations. “We 
say deliberately,” its report declared, “that in the region of moral and social questions we desire 
all Christians to begin to act together as if they were one body, in one visible fellowship… to 
bring all Christians together to act in this one department of life as the one visible body would 
involve no loss and manifold gain. We should get to known and trust one another: we should 
learn to act together and we should prepare the way for fuller unity.”87   
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These appeals were significant. They revealed that even while churches in belligerent countries 
found it impossible to meet with one another during the War, they evolved a conception of 
broken fellowship that clarified a postwar task of reconciliation. Experienced as a rupture in 
international Christian solidarity, the war ushered in nostalgia for an age when the church 
universal subtended and superseded national and local identities, allegedly providing a moral 
consensus restraining the worst excesses of international power politics. It was not uncommon, 
especially in Britain, to look wistfully back to the Middle Ages – even while dealing a jab to 
Catholic authoritarianism for provoking its fracture. “The old Papacy,” wrote Temple, “was the 
noblest ideal by which men generally have ever tried to act. But… it tried to reach its goal by a 
short cut. It used the world’s methods for God’s purpose.” Temple looked forward to a 
reconstitution of the church as an international society that would ensure the freedom of 
Christians to embrace their confessional independence. If the “wild Europe” of the Middle Ages 
“could even for a time acknowledge the ideal of a divine society transcending national divisions, 
we have hope that such a society might be built again, with all the deeper understanding that the 
centuries have brought.”88 Increasingly, efforts to promote Christian unity after the War would 
seek a Protestant varient of Catholic Christendom that would realize the moral and spiritual 
conquest of “worldly” motives, which Rome, in her confusion of politics and religion, had failed 
to achieve.  
 
After the war, Allied and Neutral church leaders found occasion to act on their vision of an 
organized body of churches representing the unity of Christendom. Marrying Medieval nostalgia 
with the optimism of progressive internationalism, architects of these efforts found in Woodrow 
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Wilson’s proposal of a League of Nations an institutional model of postwar Christian 
organization. The League was widely welcomed among Protestants in the US and among liberal 
Anglicans and non-conformists – and received the enthusiastic support of Neutral churchmen in 
Scandinavia and Switzerland.89 Soederblom himself was a strong supporter. But it was not just 
that the League per se, or the values of open diplomacy and the moralizing of international 
relations, appealed to these churchmen. Many church leaders saw the League’s proposal as the 
template for a parallel organization of churches. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople 
was the first to call for such a body in the summer of 1919. The Holy Synod of the Church of 
Constantinople (the Ecumenical Patriarchate) issued a formal invitation to the Anglican Church, 
the Old Catholic churches in the European Continent (which retained Catholic rites but had 
broken away from Rome), and the Armenian Orthodox Churches to form a “league of churches.” 
The proposal was put forward by the locum tenens of the Ecumenical See, the Metropolitan 
Dorotheos of Brussa: 
 
As the most significant announcement and recommendation for union of the different 
nations in a League of Nations have come from the great Republic of the United States of 
America in the Western world, so also the most significant announcement and 
recommendation for the study on the approach and the union of the different Christian 
denominations in a League of Churches ought to come from the Great Church of 
Constantinople in the East.90 
 
In advancing this proposal, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was responding to its own 
circumstances, quite different from those of Soederblom, the Americans, French, and Neutrals. 
The Ecumenical Patriarchate seems to have conceived the proposal as an instrument for limiting 
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the incursions of Protestant missionaries into Orthodox “fields” in the Middle East – a practice 
which often left Protestants seeking converts from Orthodox churches. It further sought to unite 
Protestants and Orthodox behind a campaign to prevent the Italian government, “abetted by the 
covetousness of the Roman Catholic Church,” from claiming territories on the Aegean Sea and 
northern Epirus, predominately Greek Orthodox.91  
 
The Metropolitan’s proposal was reported in the church press in England, and to a lesser extent 
the United States.92 Soederblom too took note – perhaps through a friend serving as a Swedish 
diplomat in Constantinople93 – and, in 1919, advanced his own proposal for a “league of 
churches.” Like the Metropolitan’s plan, Soederblom’s would comprise formal church bodies. 
But in contrast to the Orthodox emphasis on church comity in the Near East and Catholic 
incursions into Greek populations in the Balkans, Soederblom envisioned a league focused on 
the range of social, economic, and moral issues that had been at the center of home missions 
work, as well as, above all, international peace and reconciliation. He hoped that this body would 
expand beyond the ambit of Protestant churches, incorporating not only Orthodox Churches but 
the Catholic Church as well.  
 
Signifying the scope of his plans, Soederblom invoked again the idea of an “ecumenical” 
assemblage. “What I propose,” Soederblom wrote in the British periodical The Contemporary 
Review in July 1919 (which was followed up by a similar appeal that fall in Die Eiche) “is an 
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oecumenical council representing the whole of Christendom, and so constructed that it can speak 
on behalf of Christendom, guiding, warning, strengthening, praying in the common religious, 
moral, and social matters of mankind.”94 The proposal illustrated that the cause of international 
peace had become the churches’ central “spiritual” and “moral” issue. It was there where the 
reforming energies of Christians were most needed. “The world has now learned, from dreadful 
realities, that the sovereignty of States is not the last word in politics; that, on the contrary, each 
must relinquish something of its sovereignty for the sake of the whole, and recognize itself as 
belonging to a higher unity… if our civilization is to be saved from mutual destruction of its 
component parts.” For Soederblom, the war made western civilization “willing to recognize the 
greatness of the despised Middle Ages.” Sovereignty – the unqualified right of states to decide in 
their own case – had been effectively discredited. “Even in politics it is necessary to work upon 
sound moral principles, and the universal church was needed as a new source of common moral 
authority.”95 This “common moral authority” was needed now more than ever. The League of 
Nations had borne witness to a desire to base international relations on transparency and open 
diplomacy in the hopes of bringing to bear moral influences on politics. But no such change 
could be effected, Soederblom insisted, unless the churches united to exert their influence on the 
actions of states. “The unity of nations must become religion or part of our religion,” [italics 
original] he wrote. “If… the League of nations, is ever to be more than a dreadful caricature or 
an empty form, effective only by means of might and oppression, it must become Christian in 
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earnest, even as the very thought of it is regarded with faith and enthusiasm by hundreds of 
thousands who rarely if ever enter any church.”96  
 
Wilson’s League of Nations was premised on the belief that participating states would not have 
to give up their sovereign claims; in fact, the League system carved a unique space for national 
self-determination. For Soederblom, by contrast, the cause of peace required states to relinquish 
sovereignty. However, his proposal was premised on a conception of ecclesiastical authority that 
paralleled Wilson’s ideas of sovereignty. As members of the League of Nations were not 
required to renounce authority to a centralized body, so members of Soederblom’s ecumenical 
body would not derogate from their authority in matters of doctrine or church order. Here was 
the same principle at work that had underwritten all voluntary organizations of Protestants 
around missionary and reform efforts in the years before the War. Indeed, while Soederblom 
praised medieval Christendom, his vision counterposed the Roman approach to unity – 
centralized and authoritarian – with an “evangelical catholicity” that would be based upon the 
principle of religious “freedom” represented in the Protestant Reformation. While Rome had 
sought to squelch difference in “the greatest hierarchical organization ever known in the history 
of religion,” Soederblom’s council would recognize a unity within a diversity of beliefs, 
 
one that should allow the various religious communities to retain their creeds and 
organizations undisturbed, and continue their accustomed manner of divine service, but at 
the same time serve and strengthen the cause of spiritual unity, realizing that each one of 
the different sections of Christianity has its own gift of grace in the common heritage of 
faith, its contribution to worship, to the ideal of life and the future.97 
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Soederblom’s proposal was essentially a demand that church bodies themselves could no longer 
hold aloof from the sphere of social and international activism that had previously been the 
preserve of voluntary organizations. They would need to learn to bracket disagreements over 
matters of “faith and order” in order to concentrate on a kind of practical unity in service. Not to 
do so was to admit Christianity’s corporate impotence in the modern world. “An evangelical 
catholicity is imperative, or division will end in helpless weakness.” Soederblom acknowledged 
that the Faith and Order movement, since 1910, had taken on the challenge of resolving doctrinal 
disagreements, but he argued that churches could not wait for these debates to be resolved before 
giving some corporate expression to Christian unity. “It is a magnificent and lofty task to work 
for greater uniformity in creed and Church government, as the Conference of Faith and Order 
seeks to do, but the unity must find expression now among the various parts at present 
composing the whole.”98 
 
Soederblom’s proposal would include in theory every Christian church, including all Protestant 
denominations, the Anglican Churches, the Roman Catholic, and the Orthodox Churches. In light 
of his failed efforts to bring Rome to conferences during the War, Soederblom found that “it is 
too much to hope that Rome, with its exclusive sectarian isolation, should as yet be willing to be 
represented in any such common council.”99 But he did suggest that the two remaining “ancient 
offices” of the Christian church” – the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople – should hold seats ex officio on the council, alongside three or four elected 
representatives from Protestant denominations in America and Europe, “according to their 
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importance and characteristic influence.” He stressed that the churches in the United States and 
Germany, where there were numerically “the largest continents of evangelical Catholicism,” 
deserved the greatest levels of representation.  
 
Soederblom made his proposal for an ecumenical assembly of churches at the meeting of the 
World Alliance in Oud Waassenaar in 1919; further plans were discussed at meetings in Paris 
later that year and in Geneva in 1920. Though some individuals, like the Swiss Reformed pastor 
Otto Herold, resisted the idea that the conference ought to involve Orthodox representatives – 
and vehemently opposed Soederblom’s openness to the eventual inclusion of the Catholic church 
– most figures in the World Alliance supported the idea that – in the words of the American 
Federal Council on the matter – the “the ultimate conference should be inclusive of all Christian 
bodies of all countries.”100 Archbishop Davidson agreed to throw the support of the Church of 
England behind the venture so long as both the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and of 
the Roman Catholic Church would participate. When the Orthodox Churches agreed to send a 
delegation to the planning meeting in Geneva in 1920, Davidson was satisfied. As for Rome, it 
proved sufficient to meet Davidson’s qualms that Soederblom invited the Vatican to take part.101 
Unsurprisingly, and consistent with its position on Protestant-led ventures up to the time, the 
Vatican refused to take part; the Curia’s response to Soederblom only acknowledged receipt of 
his invitation and did not make any statement concerning the conference itself. 
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While Rome’s refusal to take part in Soederblom’s venture was unsurprising, it proved decisive 
in ensuring that the effort would not be called an “ecumenical council,” as Soederblom had 
hoped. Examining the anemic minutes of the Geneva conference, it is difficult to determine 
whether the term was abandoned out of a desire to keep peace with Rome by avoiding a phrase 
that would suggest Roman Catholics had no place in the true church, or out of the opposite 
sentiment: to give up altogether in courting Rome. Though Soederblom clearly envisioned a 
Council that could claim to be ecumenical even without the Roman Catholic Church, others 
disagreed. J. A. McClymont of the Church of Scotland moved on the last day of the meeting to 
omit the word “ecumenical” from the conference’s title, though the neither the official minutes 
or the notes of the meeting preserved in the World Council’s archives record why.102 The 
following day, the American Arthur J. Brown pushed for renaming the conference in order to 
“avoid embarrassments which would come out of employing the term ‘Ecumenical.’” Once 
again, the minutes do not explain Brown’s reasoning or Soedblom’s reaction – though they do 
offer hints that the non-participation of Rome was the critical issue. “It is hoped that this 
Conference will be ecumenical,” the minutes state, implying that so long as all churches were not 
represented, it could not call itself ecumenical.103 At that meeting, the decision was made to call 
the new body the “Universal Conference of the Church of Christ on Life and Work,” with 
Soederblom’s apparently grudging support.104 
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As for the German Churches, the Representative Body of the German Evangelical Church, or 
Kirchenausschuß, was invited to the conference in 1921. Under the presidency of Herman 
Kapler of the Prussian United Church, the Germans agreed to participate, only to pull out in 
January 1923 in protest against the French occupation of the of the Ruhr. Careful coaxing by 
Soederblom convinced Kapler and other leaders of the German Evangelical Church to change 
their minds, and in the end, Germany sent a delegation to the Stockholm conference of 1925. 
However, the events of that gathering showed that critical political disagreements still frustrated 
the cause spiritual unity on practical issues.     
*** 
By proposing his “league of churches,” Soederblom’s hope had been for participating churches 
to find a measure of practical agreement and a platform for advocacy on social and international 
issues, while leaving to the side divisive matters of church doctrine and order. As Hermann 
Kapler, head of the German delegation at Stockholm, phrased the conference’s logic, “Doctrine 
Divides—Service Unites.” That phrase would become the informal motto of the Life and Work 
movement as a whole, quoted regularly by Soederblom and others throughout the mid-1920s. In 
fact, however, “service” did not unite. German and Allied Churches clashed when they 
assembled in Stockholm in August 1925 over the specific political form that such social and 
international Christian “service” entailed.  
 
The centrality of political as opposed to theological differences in the German-Allied conflict 
that defined the Stockholm conference has not adequately been understood. Many scholars of 
ecumenical history and historical works that have drawn on this body of research have reiterated 
that it was two “theological” orientations – German Lutheranism, with its otherworldly 
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orientation, Pietistic conservatism, and the Social Gospel of Allied church leaders on the other –  
that clashed at Stockholm. In these accounts, different understandings of the Kingdom of God, 
with Lutherans emphasizing its wholly transcendent nature and human impuissance, and the 
Anglo-Saxon liberals convinced of bringing the Kingdom to realization within history through 
human exertion, explain the bitter conflicts that nearly broke up the conference.105 Yet it was not 
theological but political differences that complicated practical cooperation, above all over the 
question of the nature of the League of Nations. On issues such as moral reform (e.g. support of 
the family, hygiene, and sexual ethics), care for the poor and the provision of medical and social 
services, German and Allied delegates spoke in a similar language stressing the need for the 
social application of Christian principles. Where they differed was not over the theoretical 
question of whether the Kingdom could be realized within history, or the eschatological reality 
beyond it. The decisive disagreement was rather over the question of whether the specific 
organization of the League could be recognized as a sign of the Kingdom (as Allied Churchmen 
were inclined to believe), or rather as a power-political organization used to secure and 
legitimize allied war gains and imperial interests abroad.  
 
At a conference in Hälsingborg, Denmark, delegations from Protestant and Orthodox churches 
set the agenda for the conference. The themes – “The Church and economic and industrial 
problems,” “The Church and social and moral problems” – including prostitution, alcohol, and 
crime – “the Church and international relations,” and “the Church and education” – represented a 
précis of the concerns of home missions organizations as they had evolved over decades. In 
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Allied nations, the most liberal sections of church opinion dominated the study preparations for 
the conference: in the US, study of the themes was organized by the Federal Council of 
Churches, while for the British delegation, the Conference on Politics, Economics, and 
Citizenship (COPEC), held in 1924, doubled as preparation for the Stockholm gathering. 
COPEC, organized by William Temple, R. H. Tawney, and Bishop Wood, aligned Anglican and 
non-conformist leadership of British churches along a platform advocating redistribution of 
ownership of industry (leavened by calls for reconciliation and not conflict between capital and 
labor) and comparing the Covenant of the League of Nations to “the laws of Christ applied to 
nations.”106 It was, in the words of historian Kenneth Barnes, “the monumental event in the 
social gospel movement in England in the 1920s.”107 The German preparations, by contrast, were 
controlled by the Kirchenausschuß, which excluded more liberal individuals such as Diessmann 
and Siegmund-Schultze from taking part. (Siegmund-Schultze, who had become from his post as 
editor of Die Eiche perhaps the greatest advocate of international church cooperation in Germany 
at the time, was denied a place in the German delegation altogether, and managed to attend only 
after receiving a personal invitation from Soederblom.). The Kirchenausschuß had been vocal in 
the earlier 1920s in its opposition to the Weimar Republic (while heeding the Kaiser’s request 
that they cooperate with the new rulers), the Versailles Treaty (“a monstrous injustice done to the 
German people”),108 and the League of Nations (“a syndicate of the victors,” and a “system of 
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enslavement”).109 By 1924, ensured by Soederblom that no discussion of war guilt would take 
place at Stockholm, the Kirchenausschuss released a “Social Message,” that in vague terms 
praised the courage of the middle classes under the difficulties of inflation, and condemned 
conflict between workers and capital.110 While expressing sympathy for the economic 
depredations of the working class it called above all for national unity. Significantly it issued no 
findings on international affairs. While American and British preparations focused on the 
production of extensive reports, Kapler and the bishops of the Kirchenaussschuß focused on 
ensuring that the Germans would arrive in Stockholm presenting a united front, especially in 
their opposition to the League. He even convened a meeting in Berlin to prepare the delegation’s 
theological position on international relations. One British delegate recalled later that the 
Germans resembled a “solemn phalanx,” and their positions “seemed almost drilled.”111  
 
At Stockholm the conference organizers had scheduled discussion of international relations for 
later in the meeting, hoping to build consensus on issues such as “labor and unemployment” and 
“moral and social questions” before tackling the more divisive issues. For the first few days, the 
discussions dealt with matters of industrial reform, social and moral problems, and the relation of 
the church to public life. Disagreements remained muted. Both sides agreed that the churches 
were not merely concerned with the salvation of souls but with the well-being of society as a 
whole. To be sure, it is possible to read off from the speeches the different political orientations 
of Social Gospel and Lutheran figures.  The Dean of Worcester Cathedral, the Rev. W. Moore 
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Ede, lamented that the church had been “driven out” of society by a regnant laissez faire 
ideology that “proclaimed that the way to promote the well-being of society was for everyone to 
look after his own interest.” But the church was complicit in its own exclusion, at fault for 
focusing on “personal salvation” while ceding the responsibility for the salvation of society to 
the state.112 For the Dean the conference was an event of great promise for those who “believe in 
the Social Gospel.” “What we need to attempt to-day is to extend the range of Christian idealism 
within the economic order which we have inherited. We must seek to transform it from 
within.”113 According to the economic historian and British delegate Sir William Ashley, the 
“civilized world was entering a period of nationalization or socialization” of industry, after long 
heralding the virtues of individual enterprise. The churches’ task was to create “the initial driving 
force” – an ethos of “unselfish desire for social betterment” – for these efforts to consolidate the 
public regulation, and where necessary public ownership, of industry.114 From the French 
delegation, Elie Gounelle channeled Walter Rauschenbusch’s call for the “Christianization of the 
social order.” Christians needed to prove by their actions that they were not a mere “appendage 
of capital,” as the advocates of “revolutionary materialism” argued they were.115 “We express the 
wish that the churches may strive without wearying for the transformation of the present 
capitalist régime,” a transformation that demanded workers’ entrance “through honest and 
productive labour, into the ownership of the means of production.”116 
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Speeches from the German delegation contained nothing like these calls for structural 
transformation or a redistribution in ownership of the means of production. Indeed, the Germans 
seemed to caution against such radical proposals by asserting the limitations on human efficacy 
in social reform. “Nothing could be more mistaken or more disastrous than to suppose that we 
mortal men have to build up God’s Kingdom in the world,” intoned the Bishop of Saxony, 
Ludwig Ihmels.117 Hermann Kapler similarly declared that sin laced all efforts to transform 
society, reminding the assembly of “the perverseness of the world and the hardness of man.”118 
The social reforms these figures emphasized were aimed not at curbing the power of capital, or 
socializing the means of production, but rather at providing welfare services for the poor. Pastor 
Jacob Schoell stressed that the greatest domain for the church’s work lay in the sphere of 
strengthening bonds of family and morality. “Of greatest importance is the Christian shaping of 
sexual life, marriage and family,” – pointedly relegating social and economic matters to a 
secondary place. But some German delegates called for a more expansive program of social 
reform. Licentiate Johannes Steinweg, director of the Central Board of Home Missions in Berlin, 
suggested that the differences between the churches on economic and social problems were not 
so large as they might appear. “Christian love does not merely carry on the struggle with 
individual need; it has to do with collective distress on a large scale.” The churches’ role must 
extend beyond mere private philanthropy; they had a responsibility to prod the state and to guide 
its policies in the promotion of social welfare. “Side by side with social ‘caritas’ must stand 
social reform, the reshaping or the transformation of the conditions of life in their wider range 
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and bearing.”119 To be sure, the divergent politics of Lutheran and Social Gospel thinking on 
social problems was in evidence here, and expressed itself in the German’s emphasis on the 
limitations on structural transformation: “the poor ye shall always have with you,” counseled 
even the reform-oriented Steinweg. But the larger point is that none of these divergences 
suggested to delegates themselves a critical breach of “unity.” No specific questions of labor or 
class relations divided the two groups, and the conversation remained at a high level of 
generality. On economic and social questions, local variations (critical as they were in their 
political implications within national contexts) were lodged within an orotund consensus that 
churches had a social responsibility, not merely to individual souls, and that the state could be 
enlisted to support reforms for the expansion of a Christian society.  
 
Yet as the conference moved to discuss international affairs, conflict erupted. Predictably, 
delegates from Allied countries spoke out in favor of the League. According to the Bishop of 
Lichfield, churches had a specific responsibility to “seek to strengthen the League of Nations, 
and will never be satisfied till all the peoples of the world are in covenant together.”120 “Dare we 
do less,” asked Charles Brent of the US, “than hold… that it is the duty of the churches to 
through their united weight in support of the organized fellowship of nations?” Without the 
support of the churches and their moral guidance in international politics, the League would 
become an arena of inter-state competition. Divorced from organized Christendom, the League, 
as well as other international institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the 
Geneva Protocol, would become nothing but “machines which have no saving or regenerating 
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power for human beings.” “The League of Nations needs the sympathetic support of the 
churches to help it to become, in personnel and character, representative of all mankind.”121 
Pastor Jules Jézéquel, General Secretary of the French National Union of Reformed Churches, 
was more frank than others in laying out the political responsibilities of the churches in the 
international sphere, declaring that “the Church ought to become the careful attendant of the 
League of Nations.”122 
 
When a subcommittee on international affairs, chaired by Brent, drafted a statement expressing 
the Conference’s support for the League of Nations and its efforts to promote world peace,123 
German delegates rose to object. The report “did not take fully into account,” declared Kapler, 
“the extraordinary difficulties involved.” It was based on “fatal misconceptions.”124 Julius 
Richter was more blunt: “We Germans suffer severely from the regrettable fact that most of the 
decisions of the League of Nations, as far as Germany is concerned, are obviously unjust and 
have even gone beyond the fearful conditions of the Treaty of Versailles” – likely a reference to 
the Leagues refusal to intervene when France and Belgium reoccupied the Ruhr in 1923.125 To 
German eyes it appeared that underneath the Allied churchmen’s bromides about world peace 
lay a will to power. To support the League was not to advance the cause of Christ but to advance 
the cause of Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-French) world domination and the suppression of Germany. 
With the expressions of the Allied church delegations in mind, Karl Victor Klingemann, 
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Superintendent of the Rhine Province, asked the pardon of the assembly “if I state a view of the 
great questions involved which may not be yours.” In Germany, “we suffer under heavy burdens 
and cannot judge with that equanimity which may come natural to nations satisfied with the 
present state of things.” The idea of a League of Nations – acceptable and noble in the abstract – 
was in its present form not an instrument of international peace, but a device of victorious 
nations to enforce the German subjugation. “In the present state of the League we cannot find 
religious power or any communion with the Kingdom of God.” 126 Pastor Walther Wolff of the 
Provincial Synod of the Rhineland echoed the same charge, arguing explicitly that the purpose of 
the Life and Work Conference – and the church as a whole – did not lay with advancing, 
ministering to, or guiding the operations of the League. “We, who wish to speak about the 
divinely willed basis of international relations, ought to avoid even the slightest semblance of 
conscious or unconscious hypocrisy, and we must not be led astray by human, nay, far too 
human, formulas, but endeavour to penetrate into the truth. Consequently we are here concerned 
neither with pacifism, nor with the League of Nations, nor with the idea of arbitration, all of 
which are nothing but human attempts to regulate international relations under the viewpoint of 
higher expediency.”127  
 
The delegates at Stockholm remembered the day of the conflict over Brent’s proposed statement 
as “Black Tuesday.”128 Soederblom had to urge some Germans not to walk out of the conference. 
In view of the churches’ deep divisions over the League, the Stockholm Conference 
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unsurprisingly issued no Report on International Questions. Thus, it is unconvincing to see the 
conflict between Allied and German church leaders over the League as rooted in theological 
disagreements over the relation between the Kingdom of God and history. As we have seen, both 
blocs believed that the Kingdom was partially, if not entirely, realizable this side of eternity, and 
both concurred in seeing the Kingdom as the telos of Christian social action and reformist 
impulses. The critical point is that they began to clash over the specific form of Christian service 
in international relations. The War and the peace settlement compelled German and Allied 
leaders to take sides; as a result the coherence of a Christian social program that could be 
embraced by all Protestant churches was shattered. The denouement of the Stockholm 
conference revealed that the campaign to “occupy” the field of international relations, like the 
campaign to “occupy” non-Christian lands overseas, had become political in nature. Rather than 
defining a domain of international Christian cooperation, Stockholm defined a domain of 
conflict. In the aftermath of the war, former belligerents could no longer recognize one another 
as allies in a common cause. In their support of the League, Germans suspected Allied church 
leaders of being fundamentally driven by political, as opposed to Christian, motivations.  
 
Conclusion  
The later 1920s witnessed an improvement in relations between German and Allied Church 
leaders that reflected a more general spirit of internationalism sweeping the European Continent. 
After threatening to withdraw from the Universal Conference on Life and Work immediately 
after the Stockholm conference, in 1926 the German churches found themselves in a more 
conciliatory mood. That August, French and German representatives worked out a common 
statement condemning war and insisting “that no final moral judgment is necessarily established 
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in political instruments.”129 They further agreed that the Conference would entertain no 
discussions of German war guilt. The following month, Germany entered the League of Nations 
and the German churches’ criticism of it largely ceased. President Kapler and the Archbishop 
Davidson agreed to host a conference on the topic of the “Kingdom of God” for German and 
British theologians in Canterbury in 1927, evincing an effort to conceive of differences between 
the two blocs as primarily theological in nature and to create a common understanding on those 
grounds. In 1929, a German economist and pastor, Hans Schoenfeld, was appointed to lead the 
Study Department of Life and Work. In 1926, the International Missionary Council began 
planning what it imagined as the successor to the 1910 Edinburgh Conference, an event which 
Mott, Oldham, and the IMC leadership hoped would involve a substantial representation from 
German mission societies.  
 
The churches, too, had their “Locarno” moment in the later 1920s. But the rapprochement 
between Allied and German churches did not bring with it consensus around a new social 
program. Nor was it the older, antebellum vision of the territorial expansion of missions that 
would provide the organizing conceptual frame for international Protestant cooperation into the 
1930s. Drawing on a new intellectual movement of dialectical theology, which originated in 
Switzerland and Germany after the war but largely in isolation from international Protestant 
institutions and networks until the late 1920s, missionaries, lay activists, and clerics in the late 
1920s and early 1930s conceived a new common endeavor that came to be called the ecumenical 
movement. In a remarkable reorientation of the aims of international Protestantism, clerics and 
lay leaders in the years following 1928 shifted their goal away from extending the Kingdom over 
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the domains of society, economics, and politics – and away from the aims of “occupying” 
territories at home and abroad. Instead, they turned to organizing the rule of Christ within the 
“church” itself, a community that was recast in the 1930s as an alternative public sphere, a world 
fellowship that would not isolate Christians from the world but would provide the unique locus 
of reconciliation between nations, races, and classes on a global scale. This transformation will 
be the subject of the following chapter, which traces how Protestants came to conceive “secular 
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In early January 1915, Joseph Oldham received large envelope from Friedrich Würz, director of 
the Basel Mission Society. Würz had become since the outbreak of the World War I a 
spokesman for the aggrieved leadership of the German missions community. Through him, 
Julius Richter, Karl Axenfeld, and other heads of German missions societies communicated with 
their erstwhile colleagues in Great Britain and the United States, generally to lodge irate protests 
against Allied treatments of missionaries in the field. On this occasion, Würz had enclosed – 
along with an agitated letter from his own pen accusing the British of exaggerating the 
significance of Belgian neutrality – a number of recent articles from German authors attacking 
the British Missionspolitik. He called on Oldham to join the anti-British chorus in the name of 
Christian solidarity. 
 
In his reply, Oldham did not say much about the treatment of German missionaries. Rather, 
looking to defuse tensions, he offered what could be described as an “ecumenical” account of the 
causes of the War. It was the result, he wrote, not of English perfidy or German aggression but of 
a complete breakdown of western civilization, which had spurned Christianity and become 
dominated by materialism, egoism, and power worship:  
  
I cannot help thinking that the war is teaching us to draw a clearer distinction than we 
have done in the past between the Church of Christ and what we have been accustomed 
to speak of as Christian civilization… We have assumed that we had ‘a Christian 
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civilization’ which has something which we could proudly offer to the non-Christian 
world. God is showing us how rotten that civilization is.1 
 
This reading of the War was offered in a gesture of conciliation, but it was also Oldham’s deeply 
held personal view. In the years following 1914, the idea that the War had revealed the 
fundamentally unchristian nature of contemporary western civilization became a commonplace 
among church leaders in Allied countries.2 Even as they defended for the Allied cause, many 
Protestants in Britain and the US did so with a sense of reservation, convinced that a deeper 
sickness of modern society was to blame for the conflict. “In a world gone pagan, what is a 
Christian to do? For the world has gone pagan,” William Temple, Rector at St. Paul’s Piccadilly 
and future Archbishop of Canterbury, assured the readers of a pamphlet series, Papers for War-
Time. While Germany’s actions showcased a particularly vicious repudiation of Christian ideals, 
they were but symptoms of an underlying corruption – expressed in an overemphasis on 
nationalism and an acquisitive modern society – that had infected Britain as well. The American 
missionary statesman John Mott sounded a similar note, writing in 1915 of the “colossal 
exhibition the War affords of the unchristian character of much of our so-called Christian 
civilization.”3  
 
By the early 1920s, German Protestants had come to a similar conviction. In German parlance, to 
assail Zivilation was to attack its Anglo-French champions; it thus was a mode not of self-
chastisement but of intra-Protestant combat, generally tied to a defense of German Kultur. But 
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after the defeat of 1918 and the formation of the Weimar Republic, many German Protestants 
came to believe that Germany too was becoming an “unchristian” society. Clerics, missionaries, 
and lay Protestant activists lamented the fall of the Kaiser – summus episcopus of the Protestant 
Church in Prussia – and the secular foundations of the Weimar Republic, which shattered an 
alliance of “throne and alter” that most Protestant leaders in the 1920s remembered nostalgically. 
Further, many were horrified by a gauntlet of kirchenfeindlich movements threatening the 
Church’s position from the Left and Right. These included not only the Communist Party and 
elements antagonistic to the church in the Social Democratic Party, but also neo-pagan 
movements that valorized Germany’s mythic past while derogating Christianity as a religion of 
the weak. Among the figures churches found arrayed against them in the 1920s was General 
Erich von Ludendorff, who dramatically left the Protestant church in 1927, embracing the Nordic 
god Wotan.4  
 
In Germany and former Allied nations, then, a Protestant discourse of cultural pessimism 
emerged in the 1920s, constituting a distinctive strain within a larger body of literary and 
philosophical reflection on the decline of western civilization. While scholars of German history 
have linked the phenomenon of cultural pessimism to nationalist politics,5 this line cannot be so 
clearly drawn when we examine the history of Protestantism from an international vantage point. 
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In the 1920s, fears of de-Christianization provided a matrix for reconciliation between estranged 
blocs German and Allied Protestants. These fears afforded Protestants an opportunity to re-think 
the bases of Christian unity, and to formulate a new understanding of their common mission in 
an era of improved international cooperation following the German entry into the League of 
Nations and the Treaty of Locarno. The aim of this chapter is to explore how German-Allied 
reconciliation took place. In the late 1920s, opposition to “secularism” furnished an agenda of 
international cooperation distinct in its aims and methods from the program to realize the 
Kingdom of God on earth that had united the Protestant international in the decades before 1914. 
 
The decisive event in the emergence of this new program was a conference held by the 
International Missionary Council in Jerusalem in 1928. There, a gathering of 231 representatives 
from missions societies in Europe, Britain, and the North America, as well as numerous 
representatives of the so-called “younger churches” from Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
declared that a new enemy, a world-wide “secular civilization,” had displaced other religions as 
Christianity’s chief global rival. “Secularism,” as it was first defined at Jerusalem and elaborated 
by missionaries in the months that followed, was a fundamentally new concept in the Protestant 
imagination. It was not “atheism,” “unbelief” or “indifference,” terms that Protestants had 
previously used to designate localized threats to the faith, mostly among workers and intellectual 
elites. Nor was it equivalent to philosophical negations of God or metaphysical reality. 
Secularism was rather a positive “system of life and thought,” which had succeeded in 
establishing itself as the hegemonic worldview of modern industrial society, in the “East” and 




Grounded in a scientific, experimental attitude toward truth, this dominant belief system rejected 
the idea of a cosmos ordered by a transcendent deity. “Secular civilization” described a world in 
which social and international conflict resulted not from political factors but from a modern 
repudiation of religion, among all classes and nations, as the basis of social, moral, and epistemic 
cohesion. The missionary construction of secularism, achieved through missionary strategies of 
categorization that had previously been applied to characterize non-Christian religions, enabled 
Protestants to re-conceive their relations with one another as collaborators in a new missionary 
task: to reformulate the Christian message in a form that would be persuasive, and speak in the 
terms of the “modern mind.” In the months following the Jerusalem conference, missionaries in 
Germany as well as former Allied and Neutral nations cooperated to mobilize theologians and 
philosophers around the task of constructing Christianity as a critique of the secular worldview. 
They did so in an atmosphere of crisis which acknowledged that the church as a whole was at 
present unequipped intellectually and spiritually to confront this enemy which it faced at home 
and abroad. 
 
This chapter traces German and Allied perceptions of the de-Christianization of modern society 
in the 1920s, showing how these perceptions culminated in the idea of secular civilization around 
which former belligerents declared their united opposition, re-consolidating the international 
Christian unity that proved so elusive since the outbreak of World War I. Narrowing our focus 
from the broader world of international Protestantism to the community of missionaries, we will 
focus on the figure of Joseph Oldham, who was a major architect of the idea of secularism 
crafted in the months leading up to the Jerusalem conference. In the 1920s, Oldham worked at 
the nerve center of Protestant missionary operations, serving as Secretary of the Edinburgh 
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Conference Continuation Committee from 1910-1921, editor of the International Review of 
Missions from 1912 to 1927, and Secretary of the International Missionary Council. The anti-
secular campaign that emerged after Jerusalem marked the long-sought success of his efforts 
since the War to re-establish comity and cooperation among estranged German and Anglo-
American blocs. 
 
The chapter has two parts. The first shows how developments in missionary thought in both 
spheres in the early 1920s laid the ground for the Jerusalem moment, even as German-Allied 
relations remained a scene of residual conflict over the issues of war guilt, the League of 
Nations, and Allied postwar internationalism. Behind the foreground of these conflicts, however, 
both blocs conceptualized the de-Christianization of modern society as an unsettling of the 
antebellum division, discussed in the last chapter, between “Christendom” and the “non-
Christian world.” German and Allied missionaries conceptualized this unsettling in different 
ways, and proposed different solutions, in the years leading up to Jerusalem. Outside Germany, 
missionaries developed a new concept of the “non-Christian world” as a global society or “world 
civilization,” constituted by international trade, imperial politics, and communication and 
transportation technologies. This deterritorialized mission field united all nations, races, and 
classes but lacked any common religious ethos, and hence required Christianity to achieve the 
moral and social cohesion material and economic integration could not provide. By contrast, 
Germans rejected the internationalist politics that this vision implied. Focusing their attention on 
German society, they identified de-Christianization rather in terms of the formation of anti-
Christian “worldviews” at home, including pagan nature worship and Bolshevism, and, for 
champions of a new movement of dialectical theology, strains of “cultural Protestantism” 
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[Kulturprotestantismus] that deified human values, institutions, and civilization itself instead of 
the transcendent God of scriptural revelation. 
 
In the second part of the chapter, we will examine the construction of secular civilization at the 
Jerusalem conference and early, groping attempts by German and Allied thinkers to define this 
new global rival. To identify the conflict between secularism and Christianity was to 
acknowledge that organized Christianity had failed in its efforts to subordinate modern souls and 
societies both in the foreign “fields” of missionary endeavor and at home. It marked a 
recognition that Christianity was not on the way to securing its dominance but had been defeated 
by a new system of life and thought that had been nurtured within the Christian West, but had 
spread throughout the globe. Chastened together, Protestants developed a new international 
program: to rethink and reformulate the Christian “worldview.” This was a task that theologians 
and Christian intellectuals must lead. The call for a Christian worldview marked a new 
development for Protestant internationals who had sought before 1928 to separate “theological” 
and “doctrinal” discussions from practical and service-oriented tasks of the church. In this new 
program, we can see the early origins of what would become the ecumenical movement of the 
1930s. But in 1928-9, the appeal to the theologians was gesture made in desperation, motivated 
by the sense that Christianity had been decisively dislodged from its position of cultural and 
social authority.  
 
I. Unsettling the Boundaries of “Christendom” and the “Non-Christian World:” 1914-1927 
As we saw in the last chapter, the missionary movement of the 19th century had organized along 
two fronts. “Foreign” missions were charged with spreading the Gospel in the “non-Christian 
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world,” encompassing Asia, Africa, and the South Pacific. “Home” missions aimed to revitalize 
the faith within the European and North American societies of “Christendom,” targeting groups 
like the rural and urban poor, immigrants, and laborers whom the churches had failed to reach. 
Notwithstanding the different theological and political orientations that shaped how missionaries 
in different countries and confessions approached their tasks, Protestants in all parts of the North 
Atlantic agreed that spreading the Gospel required at home required fundamentally different 
techniques and strategies than spreading it abroad. In the foreign fields, missionaries’ task was to 
vindicate Christianity’s superiority to other “religions.” At home, the task was to vindicate 
Christianity to those who were indifferent to or had repudiated it. As we saw, both projects were 
understood to be parts of a common program of Christianizing the world whose objective was 
the building of the “Kingdom of God” on earth.  
 
The catastrophe of World War I unsettled this division between “home” and “foreign” missions. 
This unsettling occurred in both Germany and Allied countries, but it was conceptualized in 
different ways, which reflected in part the different experiences of political defeat and triumph as 
well as divergent theological traditions between the Anglo-American and German milieux. The 
concern in this section is to examine how thinkers in both spheres registered a collapse of the 
Christendom/non-Christendom dichotomy, and in doing so sought to re-imagine the missionary 
task for a postwar age. 
 
Oldham offers an useful point of entry into the impact of the war on missionary thinking in 
victorious nations. Around the time that Oldham wrote his letter to Würz, he composed two 
pieces for Papers for War-Time. Both examined at close range the “rotten civilization” to which 
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Oldham had evoked in the letter quoted at the outset of this chapter. That civilization’s 
distinguishing characteristic was the domination of materialistic, acquisitive, and self-seeking 
impulses that only Christianity, Oldham claimed, could keep in check. The “antagonisms of the 
nations were only one expression” of this secularized civilization. “The same wrong attitude is 
seen in the racial prejudice and hatred which is one of the most sinister features of our time.” 
Another manifestation was “the industrial warfare and class alienation that disturb the life of all 
western nations and was increasingly evident in industrial centers in Asia as well.” Nationality, 
class, and race: these were the three axes, as Oldham saw it, on which the “disintegrating 
influences” of civilization acted, and together they pointed to the global extent of the crisis that 
the war revealed. “For the first time,” he wrote, “we have a world civilization so interdependent 
in all its parts that its dissolution would spread universal ruin.”6 Oldham’s first book, The World 
and the Gospel (1916) expanded on these insights, fleshing out his conception of a “world 
civilization” threatened by the absence of a common religious adhesive: 
 
The peoples of Asia and Africa constitute two-thirds of the population of the globe… 
[T]heir lives and destinies have become inextricably interwoven with our own. The world 
is now one; the interdependence of its parts is increasing from year to year. Few 
important questions are without their international aspects. The social order which we 
have to try to Christianize is a world order… The fight for a spiritual view of the world, 
for justice and fair-dealing, for the protection of the weak and the redemption of 
childhood, for the establishment of goodwill and brotherhood, takes many forms and 
must be waged on many fronts, but it is the same fight.7 
 
The global scope of Oldham’s anxieties here drew on an imperial frame of reference. Indeed, he, 
along with other liberal-minded British imperialists like Edwyn Bevan and William Temple were 
                                                
6 Joseph Oldham, “The Church and the Hope for the Future,” Papers for War-Time, no. 36 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1915), 6. 
7 Joseph Oldham, The World and the Gospel (London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1916), 70. 
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the first to include “races,” along with “nations” and “classes,” in their conception of the 
worldwide social order that was threatened by the War.8 But after the War a vision of a supra-
European “international society” as the specific site where Christianizing influences must be felt 
registered beyond British circles as well.  
 
The 1920s witnessed an explosion of literature in the missionary community contending that the 
goals of missionary movement had decisively changed. The object was no longer primarily to 
“occupy” foreign fields, but rather to achieve world-wide social and spiritual integration. 
Missionaries in North America, Britain, and Neutral countries embraced this view, as did many 
“native” church leaders in Asia. “Today the battle-line [of missions] is no longer thousands of 
miles away from the home base,” wrote the Chinese pastor Y. Y. Tsu in 1926. “It follows the 
Main Streets of the cities of the world, it goes through the homes and farms of all climes, and 
finds Christian and heathen nations on both sides of the line.” No longer a campaign to 
“conquer” non-Christian lands, the missionary movement had become “a struggle between love, 
neighborliness, human brotherhood and the forces of peace on one side, and enmity, greed, 
injustice, and the forces of discord on the other.”9 One measure of the new dimensions of 
missionary work was that even Protestants who had previously not been deeply involved in the 
foreign mission community found its work of pressing broader significance. To Samuel McCrea 
Cavert, a Presbyterian minister and head of the American Federal Council of Churches, missions 
                                                
8 See Edwyn Bevan, “Brothers All: The War and the Race Question” Papers For War-Time no. 4. Cf. accounts of 
ecumenism from American historians who concentrate on the matrix of race relations in the US to explain 
progressive ecumenical politics. It was, rather, the global frame of the British empire that first generated the idea of 
a “world civilization” that not merely upset older dichotomies of civilization and barbarism but asserted a common 
social order or polity of which races were contributing members.    
9 Quoted in Samuel McCrea Cavert, The Adventure of the Church: A Study of the Missionary Genius of Christianity 
(New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1927), 45. 
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were not “something apart” from Christianity but “the warp and woof of the Gospel itself.” His 
work The New Adventure of the Church (1927) explained why: “Geographical definitions will no 
longer suffice” to demarcate the missionary field,” he wrote.10 Technological advances and 
economic interconnections had reduced the “modern world… to the dimensions of a single 
dooryard. A voice in San Francisco is heard in London. One goes from New York to Tokyo in 
the time it took his grandfather to go from New York to Buffalo. What affects one person now 
affects all.”11 Like Oldham, Cavert described this spatially and temporally contracted yet “sadly 
sundered” civilization constituted by the fault lines of group conflict. “Capital and labor line up 
in hostile camps. Nations are arrayed in bristling distrust, building submarines and bombing 
planes with which to protect themselves from one another. Races are separated by yawning 
chasms of prejudice, the white man assuming himself to be inherently superior to the black and 
the yellow, and imposing himself upon them in ways which they bitterly resent.”12 In this world, 
the Christian mission was “a far greater undertaking than occupation of the geographical areas of 
the globe with preachers of the Gospel;”13 it entailed nothing less than “bringing every province 
of our thinking, every area of our social thinking and conduct, every region of the relation of 
individuals, classes, races and nations to each other…under the influence of Christ.”14 Francis P. 
Miller, Administrative Secretary of the World Student Christian Federation, echoed the same 
point, noting that, in the postwar world, the “essence of missions” had become “not geographical 
expansion, but expansion. [Missions] does mean carrying the Gospel to Africa, but it also means 
                                                
10 Cavert, The Adventure of the Church, 25. 
11 Ibid, 21. 
12 Ibid, 15. 
13 Ibid, 24. 
14 Ibid, 27. 
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just as truly carrying the Gospel into some as yet unoccupied area of human relations.”15 [italics 
original.] 
 
The question was how this new world order could be “Christianized.” Numerous programs and 
proposals emerged in the 1920s seeking to explain how this could be achieved. Champions of the 
League of Nations saw the organization as a step in the direction of a formation of an 
international community of nations organized according to Christian principles. Wide-spread 
especially among North American Protestants, this view was echoed in statements such as that 
by the Canadian Liberal politician Newton Rowell. For him, the League reflected a conception of 
international relations in which one nation would view another, “not as a real or potential enemy, 
but as a real or potential friend.” This would substitute “competition in the preparation of war” 
with “co-operation for the preservation of peace.” While “the old conception was essentially 
pagan, the new is essentially Christian.”16 We saw in the last chapter that enthusiasm for the 
League was widespread among Protestants throughout former Allied and Neutral nations. But 
there were other approaches as well. Oldham, for instance, supported the League but invested his 
energies elsewhere, above all in promoting missionary education in Africa and Asia. Oldham 
prioritized education as a means of building up a corps of non-western Christian leadership, 
imbued with a consciousness in a universal community of the church. “If…,” he declared to a 
Swedish missionary society in 1924, “Christianity is the real remedy for the ills from which the 
world is at present suffering, the educational work of the Church abroad is of supreme 
importance. If Christian principles are to exert an influence on the relations between different 
                                                
15 Francis P. Miller, “Forward,” The Church and the World ed Francis Miller (New York: Association Press, 1926), 
v. 
16 Newton Rowell, “The League of Nations” International Review of Missions, vol. 10 (1921), 402. 
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nations, they must be understood and in some form accepted by all peoples.”17 According to this 
vision, political institutions like the League would not themselves do the work of Christianizing 
international relations, which required the prior formation of elites with the right set of moral 
ideals. During the 1920s, Oldham put this belief into practice through his work with the Phelps-
Stokes Fund, whose Tuskegee-style approach to technical education he believed might be 
effectively combined with religious instruction in order to help young Africans find their place in 
the modern society of nations.18 Drawing on these ideas, he also became active in efforts to 
reform colonial administration in East Africa.19 
 
For many Protestants, a critical part of the program to “Christianize” international relations 
entailed promoting the growth and independence of churches outside of the West. In a sense, the 
movement to “indigenize” Christianity was an old one: mid-nineteenth-century missionary 
leaders like Rufus Anderson and Henry Venn had argued that the goal of missionaries overseas 
was to make themselves redundant – to “euthanize themselves,” in Venn’s memorable phrase – 
by building up “native churches” that could be independent and self-sustaining.20 But the years 
following World War I saw the first serious efforts at devolution of authority to indigenous 
churches. In the early 1920s, the national missionary councils in China, Japan, India, and Africa 
                                                
17 Joseph Oldham, “The Western Contribution to Education in Asia and Africa,” undated [likely Feb or March 1924] 
(JO  Papers, 15/6/77). Published in Christian Education in Africa and the East, ed. Michael Sandler (London: 
Student Christian Movement, 1924), 1-11. 
18 Elisabeth Engel, Encountering Empire: African American Missionaries in Colonial Africa, 1900-1939 (Stuttgart: 
Fritz Steiner Verlag, 2015); Keith Clements: Faith on the Frontier: A Life of J. H. Oldham (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1999).  
19 See Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), chpt 7, 225-6; Penelope Hetherington, British Paternalism in Africa (London, F. Cass, 1978); 
Clements, chpts. 9-10. 
20 For Venn, see Andrew Porter, Religion versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 
1700-1914 (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004) 167-172. 
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were transformed into national church councils in which Chinese, Japanese, Indian and African 
Christian leaders were given larger authority.21 The International Missionary Council, founded in 
1921 with Oldham as its international secretary and Mott as Chairman, was intended to be a 
partnership between Western missionaries and non-Western church leaders. The idea behind 
these campaigns was to strengthen the church as a global community, united in encouraging the 
reconciliation of peoples and as a body of like-minded elites that could oversee the nurturing of 
friendship and understanding. The program reflected the idea that only as a multi-national and 
multi-racial society could the church effectively contribute to the formation of an international 
ethos within various nations.  
 
After the War, then, Protestants in Allied countries imagined the missionary “field” as a spiritual 
and social domain that cut across the traditional geographical demarcations of East and West, 
Christendom and non-Christendom. While the older vision of missions work was based on the 
notion of territorial expansion from a Western core outward, the new vision identified missions 
work as the key to international reconciliation against the disaggregating powers of race-hatred, 
nationalism, capitalism, and communism.22 While the older vision imagined non-western peoples 
as the recipients of Christianity, the postwar viewpoint emphasized the church as the bulwark of 
international order.  
 
                                                
21 Hogg, 210-15. 
22 Missionaries wrote surprisingly little focused on the specific threat of Soviet Communism. They saw it as an 
expression of class antagonism, and in this respect mirrored its rival, capitalism. Both fit easily into the broad 
diagnosis of a world imperiled by centrifugal forces. 
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The campaign to re-establish ties with German Protestants, attempted fitfully since the outbreak 
of the War itself, was a further dimension of the international turn in missionary thinking among 
Protestants in Allied and Neutral countries. Oldham, as a Secretary of the IMC with strong ties to 
Germany (having spent the academic year 1904-5 studying under Gustav Warneck in Halle) was 
central in these efforts. As he re-conceived the missionary task and its institutions in the 1920s, 
Oldham kept up a regular effort and correspondence with the heads of German missionary 
societies and lobbied the British government to enable Germans to return to their operations 
overseas. Looking to draw the Missionsausschuß back into international partnerships, Oldham 
and Mott promptly made one of the major activities of the IMC the administration of financial 
aid to German missionaries still working overseas. Oldham and the heads of British missions 
societies also lobbied the British government for easement of the restrictions on German 
nationals in British colonies and the restitution of German missions properties in India and 
British Africa. By 1923 the British government had adopted a policy of no restrictions upon 
missionaries “recognized” by the Conference of British Missionary Societies in British colonies 
and mandated territories.23 The following year, the Conference recognized eight German 
missionary societies, which began to rebuild their operations in India, Cameroon, Tanganyika, 
and Togoland, though individual missionaries were still required to secure permits from British 
authorities.  
 
If these developments brought some progress in the restoration of international missionary 
cooperation, suspicion of Anglo-American tactics and motives remained the dominant theme of 
German missionary literature between the Armistice and the Jerusalem Conference. Irate over 
                                                
23 William Richey Hogg, Ecumenical Foundations; a History of the International Missionary Council and Its 
Nineteenth Century Background (New York,: Harper, 1952), 230. 
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what they viewed as Allied missionaries’ “complicity” in the expropriation of German missions 
properties overseas, the German Missionsausschuß boycotted the founding of the International 
Missionary Council in 1921. Meanwhile, German missionaries in the early and mid-1920s only 
intensified their criticisms of the Social Gospel and the Anglo-Saxon reduction of Christianity to 
Aktivismus. For the Germans, the new internationalism of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts was, 
far from an attempt to regroup and redirect missions work, a profound threat to the Christian 
cause in the world, since it was based on a systematic confusion of religious and political 
motives. In his 1922 Die evangelische Mission: Ursprung, Geschichte, Ziel [The Protestant 
Mission: Origin, History, Aim], the Marburg theologian and missionary Heinrich Frick assailed 
the watchword of Student Volunteer Movement – “the evangelization of the world in this 
generation” – as a trite and unrealistic program that had always been more about spreading 
civilization than advancing the Gospel.24 Frick acknowledged that Anglo-Saxons since the War 
had given up on their campaign of world “occupation” by an missionary army committed to 
quixotic ideas such as planting two churches a day and preaching the Gospel to every living 
human within twenty years. But if anything, the overly political and worldly orientation inherent 
to the Anglo-Saxon missions project was flaring up worse than ever in the postwar period, as 
American and British missionaries posed as champions of international society and world peace. 
For Frick, there were two things wrong with the internationalist missionary project: first, it 
evinced a syncretistic streak which inclined Americans to an overly favorable estimation of other 
religions, to the point where Christianity became little more than one expression among many of 
a universal spirituality. Second, Anglo-American preoccupation with social and humanitarian 
                                                
24 Heinrich Frick, Die evangelische Mission: Ursprung, Geschichte, Ziel (Bonn, Kurt Schroeder, 1922), esp 352-61. 
On this critical document and its appraisal of American Protestant “activism,” see William R. Hutchison, Errand to 




work over preaching the Gospel eclipsed religious aims with worldly concerns. To be sure, 
German missionaries even before the War had lodged warnings against their American and 
British counterparts’ tendencies to confuse the spread of civilization with the spread of the 
Gospel. But as Frick’s case illustrates, after 1914, these critiques became qualitatively different, 
in that they questioned the very motives of Anglo-Saxon missionaries.25 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, Julius Richter had lodged similar complaints against Anglo-Saxon 
aims and methods in the years following the War. Indeed, for him, the ambition to “Christianize” 
international relations belied a confusion of imperial and missionary objectives that brought the 
motives of his Anglo-Saxon counterparts into question. While Oldham and others sought to 
orient the task of missionary education around preparing non-European peoples to make their 
distinctive “contribution” to the Christianization of racial, national, and class relations – a project 
which channeled its own assumptions about white superiority – Richter argued that missionary 
schools ought to forgo all forms of “modern” education. He feared in particular that contact with 
any form of western civilization would nurture in non-Christian peoples a commitment to the 
principles of national “self-determination” and demands for political independence. The few 
schools that German missions still administered – in Dutch Suriname and Java – concentrated on 
the cultivation of ties with Volk tradition in an effort to stave off the disorienting effects of 
westernization. The aim was still here the development of indigenous Christian cultures that 
would retain “points of contact” with native traditions – rather than preparing them for 
membership in a new, international church.26  
                                                
25 Frick, Die evangelische Mission, 360-72. 




Hostile to missionary internationalism, and preoccupied with regaining access to their former 
fields, Germans continued throughout the early and mid 1920s to view missions work through 
the paradigm of geographical expansion and the occupation of non-Christian space. No 
significant voice in the German community echoed the idea of a global missionary field of 
modern civilization, so prevalent among British and American missionaries. Nostalgic for the old 
Kaiserreich, the Germans evinced little concern with the unfolding of conflicts between nations, 
races, and classes – or they attributed such conflicts precisely to Anglo-Saxon world hegemony. 
Nor did they recognize a particular Christian mission to make the world church a space of 
international Christian cooperation and unity across national, racial, and class lines.  
 
Nonetheless, German missionary writings of the period reveal that there, too, the distinction 
between “home” and “foreign” missions work was becoming unsettled. This unsettling was most 
pronounced in writings of the 1920s that interrogated the traditional distinction between the 
“heathen” [Heiden] of Africa and Asia and the Entkirchlichen [unchurched] or abgefallenen 
Christen of Europe, populations that could be considered nominally Christian but who had 
“fallen away” from the church in practice and had become indifferent to organized Christianity. 
In a widely-discussed essay of 1919, the German theologian, lexicographer, and missionary 
enthusiast Gerhard Kittel declared that Germany had become a “heathen nation” [heidnische 
Volk] or was at least well on the road to becoming one. Pagan attitudes such as nature worship 
and materialism had spread far and deep among the younger generation27 Bringing the Gospel to 
the youth would be, in his estimation, a task essentially similar to evangelizing Africa or Asia. 
                                                




That German Christians faced such a prospect was in large part due to the War, which had 
severed the relation of the younger generation from the faiths of their fathers.28 It is possible that 
some of the German missionaries repatriated from their fields in Allied or Allied-conquered 
territories overseas may have also contributed to this elision of distinctions between foreign and 
home missions work. As Hartmut Lehmann has shown, a great number of these returnees took 
up work in home mission societies, where their encounters with a socialist movement and the 
revival of neo-pagan spiritualisms may have underscored similarities between new thought 
movements at home and religions abroad.29 As Georg Beyer, head of the Berlin Mission Society, 
argued in 1919, foreign missionaries were the best equipped Christian apologists to convert 
irreligious Germans to Christianity – after the War, whose loss Beyer attributed to the weakening 
of Christian faith in the population.30  
 
Similar views were expressed by theologians influenced by a new theological movement – so-
called “neo-orthodox” or “dialectical” theology – that swept Germany and Switzerland in the 
years following the War. A detailed account of the movement’s origins and early development, 
the subject of a vast literature, is beyond the scope of this chapter. But it is important for our 
purposes to note how dialectical theologians like Karl Barth and Emil Brunner in Switzerland 
and Friedrich Gogarten and Rudolf Bultmann in Germany contributed to a broader postwar 
unsettling of the categories of Christian and pagan in German-speaking Protestant world. Barth’s 
epochal Letter to the Romans, first published in 1916 and substantially revised in its second 
                                                
28 Ibid, 411.  
29 Hartmut Lehmann, “Missionaries Without Empire: German Protestant Missionary Efforts in the Interwar Period 
(1919-1939), Missions, Nationalism, and the End of Empire (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Pub, 2003). 
30 Georg Beyer, “Die Heidenmission im Dienst der Volksmission,” Handbuch der Volksmission, ed. Gerhard 
Füllkrug (Schwerin: Bahn, 1919), 121-48. 
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edition of 1922, assailed liberal theology since Schleiermacher for domesticating God’s 
revelation in human values and institutions. Appalled by his German professors and mentors’ 
conscription of God’s support for the German war effort in documents such as the “Letter to the 
Civilized World” – and by the general scene of pious war mongering among Christian leaders on 
both sides – Barth’s Letter to the Romans asserted a humanly unbridgeable divide between 
divine will and human understandings of the same. Drawing on Kierkegaard and Overbeck, 
Barth sought to liberate theology from the framework of scientific knowledge and focus it on its 
“true” object: a God who could not be known except in the event of an existential crisis of 
revelation that upset all categories of rational or affective apprehension. Every attempt to ground 
theology in the human subject short-circuited exactly the knowledge it sought. God was “wholly 
other,” Barth wrote; hence he was not an object of cognition or source of feeling but a subject 
that addressed humankind from beyond, with a message of judgment and salvation. Any 
apprehension of God on the part of fallen humanity was due exclusively to God’s self-revelation, 
not to the exertions of the human mind. To speak of Jesus as an ethical exemplar or Christianity 
as an uplifting, civilizing cultural force was a form of “pagan” idolatry which effaced God’s 
action with a human construction: religion.31 In the 1920s, the journal Zwischen den Zeiten, 
served as a platform for Barth and his fellows in arms, from which they attacked a German 
theological establishment beholden in their view to an attempt to domesticate the divine within 
human consciousness. In their view, western civilization had departed from faith in God by 
elevating Kultur to the level of an absolute, becoming in effect a new, “pagan” civilization. 
 
                                                
31 Karl Barth, Epistle to the Romans trns. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
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Throughout the 1920s, Barth, along with his colleagues, evinced relatively little interest in 
engaging the missionary community. The ideas of the movement Barth led did, however, furnish 
a concept of Christian idolatry which some thinkers applied explicitly to unsettle the idea of 
European culture as “Christian” in any meaningful way. Missionaries like Karl Hartenstein of the 
Basel Mission brought Barth’s repudiation of “Christian culture” into missionary discourse. 
Drawing on Barth, he asserted a relentless distinction between Christian faith and the dominant 
ideas of a civilization that reduced God’s revelation to culture, ethical action, or the unfolding of 
historical of historical consciousness.32 For Hartenstein, even most of the parishioners of the 
Ländeskirchen in Germany had become captive of a “naturalized” culture that claimed the 
mantel of Christian religion but was essentially heathen, deifying “culture” in the place of 
Christ.33  
 
Though critical of the Anglo-American missionary tactics, then, Germans Protestants too were 
questioning the boundaries between “home” and “foreign” missions in the 1920s. For figures like 
Kittel and Hartenstein, the question was not how to activate Christianity in social programs that 
would counter the antagonisms of nations, races, and classes on a global scale. They raised the 
question instead of whether Christians at home might increasingly have to re-import the 
strategies of foreign missionary apologetics to deal with rising heathenism in Germany. Here was 
a vision of Christendom in which the task of the church was not merely to extend its influence 
                                                
32 Karl Hartenstein, “Was hat die Theologie Karl Barths der Mission zu Sagen?” Zwischen den Zeiten 6 (1928), 59. 
33 Not all missionaries agreed with these views: Siegfried Knak, head of the Berliner mission, wrote a lengthy but 
courteous critique of Kittel (Knak, “Voelkermission und Volksmission” Flugschriften der deutschen Evangelischen 
Missions-Hilfe 11 (1921)) arguing that, while the home missions task in Germany had certainly grown as a result of 
Communist and neo-pagan movements, the work of restoring formerly Christian people to the Gospel was essential 




over society through the instrumentalities of philanthropy and social legislation. Rather, 
Christianity had to confront and defend itself against new, modern religions or quasi-religions 
that had taken hold on the home front. Christianity in this view had become, not merely a 
religion that must reassert its hold over society, but one religious option among many in the 
tumultuous and divisive spiritual market of the Weimar Republic.  
 
I have suggested that the 1920s ought to be seen as a transitional period for Protestant 
missionaries, when movement leaders in Allied countries and Germany alike struggled to come 
to grips with a missionary situation profoundly different than the one they had known before the 
War. On the one hand, these two blocs re-imagined the missionary task of the church in much 
different ways: while Allied Church leaders envisioned a de-territorialized, global space of 
“world civilization,” Germans focused on recovering their missions stations abroad, and 
remained suspicious of the Anglo-Saxon internationalism that in their view colored attempts to 
rethink missions work in the postwar world. Despite this difference, however, both German and 
former Allied missionaries rethought the missions project in ways that unsettled the distinction 
between “home” and “foreign” missionary work. The epochal accomplishment of the 
International Missionary Conference of 1928 was the construction of a new missionary task that 
would galvanize both contingents by positing a spiritual enemy that they faced in common: a 
secularistic worldview or “system of life and thought” that was not limited to the West but 
characteristic of a modern, world-wide civilization linked together East and West. To the 
construction of this enemy we now turn. 
 
II. The Jerusalem Conference and the Construction of Secular Civilization 
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The Jerusalem Conference of 1928 was envisioned by its architects as the successor of the 
Edinburgh conference of 1910. It would be the first major conference of the International 
Missionary Council since the end of the War. By the time an organizing committee – referred to 
simply as the “Committee of the Council” – was formed in 1926 to oversee the planning for the 
conference and commissioning of preliminary reports, relations between Allied and German 
Protestants had improved enough for Germans to take an active interest in the conference. As 
we’ll see, even as Germans persisted in pointing out the characteristic errors and threats posed by 
Anglo-Saxon Social Gospel during and after the Jerusalem conference, these critiques became 
secondary in comparison with a new recognition of common purpose uniting them with the rest 
of the international missionary community.  
 
The significance of the Jerusalem Conference was due to the way in which its organizers, 
drawing on traditional missiological strategies of categorization, channeled anxieties over the 
waning influence of Christianity to argue that Christianity faced a new enemy in the world, a 
world-wide “secular civilization,” which they defined not as the absence of religion but as a 
positive “system of life and thought.” In some ways, the idea of secularism married elements 
from the German missions discourse of the 1920s examined above – namely that western 
civilization had not merely fallen away from Christianity but produced new, positive worldviews 
that opposed Christianity as total accounts of reality – with the de-territorialized conception of 
the missionary field espoused by non-German Protestants. But secularism as conceived at 
Jerusalem was not a synthesis of existing ideas but rather a conceptual innovation. The term 
expressed a conviction, shared by Allied and German missionaries, that the “religious” 
conception of the world, grounded in the idea of an all-powerful spiritual world or deity who 
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ordered the universe according its design, had been decisively dethroned. Modern industrial 
society looked instead to science to explain the sovereign forces of nature and society, giving rise 
to a worldview in which belief in God among those inclined to believe might be tolerated, but in 
no sense could furnish a common ground for common social, political and economic life.  
 
The critical innovations that we will look at here all took place within a field of preparatory work 
focused on the production of a volume of essays studying “Non-Christian Systems of Life and 
Thought.” This volume followed the model of the report of Commission IV at the Edinburgh 
conference, which, as discussed in the last chapter, included reflections from missionaries and 
scholars of religion on the “points of contact” between Christianity and its various competitors 
among both “world religions” such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, as well as the 
“primitive” or “heathen” religions of Africa and the South Pacific islands. But there was a 
critical difference between these preparations in 1910 and 1928. According to Mott’s biographer, 
Oldham, Mott, and the American secretary of the IMC, A. L. Warnshuis, met in 1927 in New 
York to consider whether alongside articles on the message in relation non-Christian religions, 
some kind of reflection on materialism and rationalism might be commissioned as well.34 This 
discussion continued at a conference planning meeting in London in March. Though the minutes 
of this meeting do not describe in any detail the conversations that took place, they do record the 
outcome: “It was proposed that another paper should be added to those already proposed on the 
different religions. The title finally approved for this was Secular Civilization, dealing with the 
                                                
34 Charles H. Hopkins John Mott: A Biography (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979), 660. 
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attempts to find alternative spiritual foundation for the world to Christianity.” [original 
emphasis]35  
 
In contriving the category of secular civilization, missionaries undertook the inverse of the 
secular construction of religion that scholars like Talal Asad have recently analyzed.36 Here, by 
contrast, was a religious construction of “secularism” that conceived it, not as atheism or 
materialism by another name (much less as a demarcation of the powers of church and state, a 
meaning the term would not become widely associated with the term until after World War II), 
but as a new spiritual competitor to Christianity, a worldview that had come to occupy the role of 
religion in providing an underlying worldview or orientation to modern life. If “secular 
civilization” denoted, or “dealt with,” a search for spiritual foundations, it was not simply the 
negation or critique of spirituality represented by those earlier ideas. The phenomenon of secular 
civilization filled the “spiritual vacuum” of non-theistic beliefs that, as we saw in the last 
chapter, missionaries feared in 1910 would make evangelizing work in the non-Christian world 
impossible.  
 
From the moment of its first appearance in 1927, secular civilization provoked a conversation 
about how to formulate the Gospel in a way that would make “contact” with the assumptions and 
categories of this new way of life and thought. In the months leading up to the conference, this 
conversation was limited to British and American voices, and it was dominated by the 
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application of an evangelical strategy that had been prevalent among liberal theologians in their 
efforts to translate the Gospel into terms comprehensible and persuasive to the adherents of non-
Christian religions. That strategy sought to establish a commensurability between Christianity 
and secularism on the basis of “values” that the two held in common – and to proceed to 
demonstrate that Christianity embodied or expressed those values in a more perfect form. But at 
the Jerusalem conference and in the months following, the missionary community as a whole 
came to believe that this was not a promising approach. However superior Christian values might 
be, to assert or demonstrate this fact, through argument or action, failed to meet the secularists’ 
objections to Christianity, which was not an disagreement over values but a question of ultimate 
authority. Was the universe ordered by impersonal forces that could be discovered and mastered 
by science, or by a God who ruled the cosmos according to his personal will? As Oldham put it 
in 1929, “in the past we have been addressing audiences… whose conscience was on our side.” 
Speaking to other religions that accepted the idea of an ultimate transcendent authority or 
objective order in the world, missionaries could present the Gospel as the final or most perfect 
account of this divine order. But secularism was a worldview premised on the repudiation of this 
idea of a supernatural authority. The secular mind’s very “sense of truth is against us.”37 Modern 
man had turned away from religion to science as the ultimate arbiter of truth, embracing with it a 
view of the universe as ordered by blind, impersonal forces that had no meaning or purpose of 
their own.   
 
To formulate the claims of the Gospel as a response to such a worldview would require a 
fundamental rethinking of the message, task that missionaries believed that they could not 
                                                
37 Joseph Oldham, “The New Christian Adventure: A Statement Made to the International Missionary Council at 
Williamstown, Mass. July, 1929” (London: International Missionary Council, 1929), 6. 
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undertake alone. It required a mobilization of the intellectual elites of the church as a whole, in 
order to combat a challenger that faced off against the church in all parts of the globe. As 
Oldham wrote to Robert E. Speer, Secretary of the American Presbyterian Mission, reading the 
Jerusalem reports had brought home “with an altogether new clearness that some of the major 
issues affecting the Christian cause in the world to-day lie outside the recognised province of the 
mission boards and are plainly the concern of the Church as a whole.”38 The upshot of the 
encounter with secularism was a program, led by missionaries, to organize theologians and 
philosophers to “reformulate” the Christian message in relation to an understanding of the world 
that the church at present was intellectually unequipped to address.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will trace how the effort to conceive a apologetic strategy 
vis-à-vis secular civilization went through two stages between 1928 and 1929. The first strategy 
– the search for common values – was abandoned as missionaries became convinced that it failed 
to meet the secularist challenge, which was rejection of God’s authority on the basis of a 
scientific cosmology positing impersonal, natural forces as the dominant order of the world. But 
the missionaries did not wish to revert to the “fundamentalist” position of rejecting science in the 
sense of rejecting findings concerning the age of the earth, the evolution of the species, and the 
authorship of scripture. They thus could do little more than assert the difference between the 
“Christian” and the “secular” worldview, while professing their own incapacity to bridge this 
divide. It would not be until 1930, as a result of theological inspiration drawn into the discussion 
on secularism from a movement of dialectical theology, that missionaries would discover a way 
of inscribing the secularist challenge within a cosmology that defended God’s authority.    
                                                






Shortly after the London meeting in 1927 that recommended commissioning a paper on “secular 
civilization” for the Jerusalem volume on the “Christian message,” Oldham, along with his 
colleagues William Paton, a Presbyterian missionary who had worked in India, and William 
Temple, now Bishop of Manchester, composed a short memo reconnoitering this new 
phenomenon.39 The document began by outlining the general approach envisioned for the 
“Message” report. “Our plan, as you will remember, is to approach this subject from a point of 
view in the main experimental… that is to say, while no treatment ought to exclude the formal 
differences between Christianity and the ethnic religions… we wish to gather information and to 
promote thought on another aspect of the subject, namely, the spiritual values which are found in 
the ethnic religions and in Christianity.” But in Europe and America, and increasingly in the East 
as well, the major “alternative faith or inspiration for living, as against mere irreligiousness” was 
the “spirit of secular civilization.” Oldham, Paton, and Temple went on to enumerate three 
“spiritual” values associated with secular life: the honest and rigorous pursuit of truth 
characteristic of modern science, the aesthetic appreciation found in modern art, and a spirit of 
philanthropy and service to humanity independent of Christian inspiration. These were all 
aspects of secular civilization that Christians ought to celebrate and treat as spurs to discover 
expressions of the Christian message awesome enough to incorporate and supersede them. “Can 
                                                
39 The memo was written as a letter from Oldham’s office address (Edinburgh House, 2 Eaton Gate, London, S. W. 
1) to Mott May 9, 1927 (WCC, 260.001/02). I am inferring the likelihood of Paton and Temple’s contributions to 
this letter from the minutes of a conference preparatory meeting held three days before the letter was sent: “It was 
agreed that Mr Paton, Mr Oldham and the Bishop of Manchester should write a letter to Dr Mott explaining just 
what they mean by ‘secular civilization’, and what they want the writer [of the study of the subject for the Jerusalem 
preparatory volumes] to deal with.” (“International Missionary Council, Note of the Meeting of the Committee to 
deal with Emergencies on May 6th, 1927,” 1-2 (WCC, 213.08.33)). 
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we find,” they asked, “someone who can sketch this type of thought for us with sympathy and 
insight, doing justice to its positive best and show also where it fails and what true Christianity 
has to give that it can never give?”40 
 
The man chosen for the job was Rufus Jones, an American Quaker and Professor of Philosophy 
at Swarthmore College. His paper, “Secular Civilization and the Christian Task” extended the 
line of thinking laid out in Oldham, Temple, and Paton’s memo. Like that document, Jones 
speech stressed the global reach of this new “non-Christian system of thought and life:” not only 
was secular civilization gaining ground among the educated classes in the East, it was also the 
nexus for the Marxist movement and the source of communism in Russia, which “has placed 
itself by official action definitely outside all Christian churches.” Jones’s definition of 
“secularism” – a term he used interchangeably with secular civilization – seemed to question 
whether it could be understood as a properly “spiritual” phenomenon. “I am using ‘secular’ 
here,” he clarified at the outset, “to mean a way of life and an interpretation of life that include 
only the natural order of things and that do not find God, or a realm of spiritual reality, essential 
for life or thought.”41 But his discussion of secularism repeatedly stressed its “spiritual,” even 
“religious” elements, and he identified these as promising “points of contact” that could be used 
by missionaries to plead their case to the modern mind. Like Oldham, Paton, and Temple’s 
memo, Jones’s paper also concentrated on secularism’s “values of life,” and Jones’s account of 
these values followed the 1927 memo closely Those who were indifferent to traditional religions 
(Christian or non-Christian) embraced “high and noble ends,” Jones wrote, such as the 
                                                
40 Memo from Oldham’s address/Mott, 2-3. May 9, 1927. (WCC, 260.001/02). 
41 Rufus M. Jones, “Secular Civilization and the Christian Task,” The Christian Life and Message in Relation to 
Non-Christian Systems (New York: International Missionary Conference, 1928), 284. 
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appreciation of beauty found among lovers of art, nature, and poetry. For such people, “the 
esthetic order is… a divine order” giving rise to “attitudes not unlike that of worship.”42 Jones 
also praised the commitment to the pursuit of truth exemplified in modern science, finding there 
too evidence of a “devout and truly religious spirit.”43 Further, he acknowledged that the 
humanitarian spirit of non-Christian believers – their concern for the poor and for social 
improvement – often put Christians to shame. 
 
Jones’s paper went on to outline a strategy through which Christianity could vindicate itself 
against this new opponent. He elaborated a program, steeped in Social Gospel ideas and an 
appeal to cooperation with other religions, bound to excite German animus. First, he robustly 
embraced ideals of the Social Gospel, arguing that Christianity would need to prove its claims to 
truth through “a convincing laboratory experiment” that would exhibit the power of the faith to 
drive progressive reform. Cooperative action of all Christians to “transform the unlovely sections 
in our modern cities and make them sweet, wholesome, and beautiful… [and] carry the 
reconciling spirit of a constructive wisdom into the complex problems of labor, business, and 
industry…” would demonstrate to the world Christianity’s power and bring at last the Kingdom 
of God to earth.44 Second, embracing the sympathetic attitude toward non-Christian religions 
typical of theological liberalism, Jones called for Christianity to join forces with other world 
religions to oppose a “common enemy” of secularism. He emphasized the need for Christianity 
to draw inspiration and insight from other religions, which he conceived as collaborators in a 
                                                
42 Ibid, 243. 
43 Ibid, 244. 
44 Ibid, tk. 
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search for religious verities. “Other religions are not so much ‘false’ as they are inadequate and 
hampered by their limits,” he wrote, and he argued that Christ “comes to ‘fulfill,’ to complete, to 
realize the divine creative work” in other religions – not to eliminate the foundations they had 
built. In the conclusion of his speech he called with a flourish for an alliance of all religions to 
defend the spiritual way of life against secular civilization.45We go to Jerusalem, he wrote, “as 
those who find in the other religions which secularism attacks, as it attacks Christianity, 
witnesses of man’s need of God and allies in our question of perfection. Gladly recognizing the 
good they contain, we bring to them the best that our religion has brought to us.” 
 
In assessing the broader impact of Jones’s presentation on the missions community, it is critical 
to distinguish between the category of secular civilization it brought into a wider international 
discourse and the liberal vision of missions work that his paper endorsed. Predictably, Germans 
attacked Jones’s speech as a particularly extreme version of the theological liberalism they 
anathemized, seeing it as part of a larger imbalance and Anglo-Saxon bias in the gathering. 
Richter, in a review of Jones’s speech published after the gathering, attacked it as a typical 
defense of Social Gospel activism that “dissolved” the Gospel into humanitarian social concern, 
and effaced the unique truth of Christianity vis-à-vis other religions.46 Far more significant, 
however, than these replays of older conflicts was the remarkable unanimity that emerged at the 
conference around the idea of secularism as Christianity’s new global rival. In smaller group 
discussions on the message that followed Jones’s presentation of his paper, most all delegates 
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clamored to join the conversation about “secularism.” “So great,” the authors of the Conference 
Report later wrote, “was the interest in the subject of the Christian Life and Message in Relation 
to Modern Secularism that it was necessary to hold two meetings, and these were attended by 
nearly half the members of the Council.”47 In these discussions, and the conversations that 
followed the event, the missionary community came to recognize that an evangelical approach 
based on the search for common values between Christianity and secularism was a non-starter. 
Indeed the problem of secularism seemed to invalidate all previous approaches to missionary 
work as they had been focused around other religions.  
 
What I want to emphasize about these conversations is that they all analyzed secularism, not as a 
system of values, but as a crisis of authority. “Science,” missionaries agreed, was an authority of 
sorts for the modern mind. But it represented a reign of chaos, since the cosmos it revealed 
lacked any ultimate meaning or purpose. The apologetic task in response to this challenger 
would thus have to establish Christianity as a unifying framework into which all values, forms of 
knowledge, and moral claims could find their end and orientation. What was needed, as the 
Dutch missionary Hendrik Kraemer put it at Jerusalem, was a new Christian “worldview,” an 
account of ultimate truth that would restore a Christian order to all realms of knowledge, society, 
and ethics. “What hampered missionaries was that they did not have a comprehensive view of 
life, but a set of detached dogmas,” he declared at Jerusalem. So long as they lacked a clear and 
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comprehensive world view, “neither the Church nor the missionaries could be quite clear about 
their message.”48  
 
This project – to produce a Christian “worldview” – was of fundamental significance for the 
history of international Protestantism. It effected a number of transformations in earlier ideas and 
practices. First, the project transformed the aims and organization of the missionary movement. 
A constellation of societies originally organized to carry the Gospel to the unoccupied fields of 
Asia and Africa mobilized itself to organize a theological assault against an enemy that was 
present in all parts of the world, and would ultimately destroy religious systems of belief, where 
it wasn’t doing so already. Second, this project furnished a new spirit of international 
collaboration in place of the conflict and suspicion that had previously dominated relations 
between Germans and Allies: all sectors of the missionary community, as we will see, rallied to 
the cause of producing a new Christian worldview. Further, the aim of this project fundamentally 
differed from the earlier program of seeking to establish the Kingdom of God; its goal was the 
production of a new knowledge of the Gospel, not of practical methods and programs for 
Christianizing social relations. In this sense, the effort to produce a Christian worldview laid the 
groundwork for the later emergence of the ecumenical project of the 1930s. But in the 
transitional moment of late 1928 and 1929, missionaries did not see themselves as leaders of a 
new movement, confidently advancing against the enemy. Rather, they sounded an alarm of 
confusion and crisis: the church as a whole lacked the weapons it needed, and it remained at this 
critical juncture unclear how where these weapons could be found. Was there a way to formulate 
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Christian convictions so as to make them persuasive in a world that ceased to find religion of any 




In a summary of the Jerusalem Conference published in the International Review of Missions in 
the Autumn of 1928, William Paton explained what the gathering had achieved – and what 
remained to be done. The delegates had departed Jerusalem united in the “permanent 
conviction… that this world of secularist thought has come to stay… if we are thinking of the 
future, there lies the enemy.” Secularism had decisively displaced the array of old challengers – 
Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Confucianism – as Christianity’s major rival in the world. “It is 
abundantly clear that the ethnic religions cannot withstand it; [secularism] destroys them 
inevitably as they come into contact with it.” However, Paton went on, “to recognize this is only 
to state a task, not to explain a problem.” The Jerusalem conference attendees had in fact reached 
no understanding of what secularism was, or how the church could effectively counter this new 
menace. “It is clear,” he continued, laying out the task ahead, “that the Church… is called in this 
generation to use all its powers to commend with persuasive force, backed up by sincere and 
[sic] consistency of practical application, the Christian Gospel to the mind of our time.”49  
 
In Paton’s account, the challenge of secularism did not mandate the “alliance” with other 
religions, as Jones had called for. As we’ll see, this was a silver lining of secularism: since it 
seemed poised to “destroy” other religions, its dominance allowed missionaries to leave behind 
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divisive debates among themselves over the relation between these religions and Christianity. 
Moreover, while acknowledging the need for “practical application” of the Gospel, Paton put 
emphasis on the intellectual challenge of presenting Christianity to the modern mind. 
Missionaries could put aside as well the question of whether the League of Nations or other 
particular political bodies were advances or retreats in the Christian cause. The new work was 
one of theological “construction,” as a similar report put it in early 1929. And the first step to 
reimagining the Christian message was establishing a clearer understanding of the world in 
which it needed to be preached.  
 
Joseph Oldham made his first attempt to describe this world in a speech at a gathering of the 
Committee of the IMC held in Williamstown, Massachusetts, in July 1929. The speech illustrates 
how missionaries first began to conceive of secularism as a problem of authority, rather than the 
commensurability of religious values. Oldham began by underscoring the profound difference 
between the missionary situation in 1910 as compared to 1929. Significantly, there had been at 
Jerusalem “no commission on unoccupied fields,” as there had been at Edinburgh in 1910, in the 
“Carrying the Gospel” volume, examined in the last chapter. “But the meeting at Jerusalem did 
none the less arrestingly call attention to a vast, important field, which, while it cannot be 
described as unoccupied, has certainly not yet been entered with a fraction of the energy, 
courage, and resources that are required.” This “field,” Oldham stated, was “the world of modern 
industrial civilization, based on the results of scientific enquiry to the increase of wealth and 
welfare, and dominated by the scientific outlook.” The scientific outlook posed a new challenge 
to Christianity. “We must bear in mind that we have to do here not merely with old 
controversies, in which the Church has always been engaged, in regard to a theistic… view of 
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world.”50 A “scientific outlook” was not equivalent to atheism or materialism.  Rather, it was a 
comprehensive, self-sufficient, and complete understanding of life, embraced by modern peoples 
“as the explanation and interpretation of the creative forces of their actual world.”51 This 
worldview had gained prestige as a result of the stunning successes of the application of science 
in the natural and social worlds. “Secular civilization is successfully subduing to its purposes the 
forces of nature. It is enabling men to cross the oceans, to conquer the air, to open up deserts to 
make things grow where nothing grew before, to improve the breeds of plants and animals, to 
stamp out diseases and to engage in a multitude of other efforts of which the results are 
indubitably real.”52 These achievements “obscure for many the thought of God as a living force 
in the world.” Their effect on the spiritual life of humankind was to propagate an understanding 
of truth discoverable by scientific experiment and analysis alone. “The scientific method relies 
on experiment, and it is therefore natural for those who live in a world in which the application 
of the scientific method has brought about such dazzling transformations to look to experiment in 
individual and social conduct as the supreme means of discovering truth.”53 The success of the 
experimental method left no room for the “religious” conception of a divine agent, ordering the 
universe. It explained the world with reference to immanent, natural and social forces, 
discoverable and harnessable by human ingenuity. What Christians were confronting in the 
secular view of life, then, was an alternative account of “reality,” “not simply one of several rival 
philosophies,” but rather a broad underlying set of ideas and assumptions that furnished modern 
man with a view of the world in which religion simply lacked any compelling meaning. For 
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Oldham this view of the world was present across a number of distinct intellectual and social 
contexts. “Whereas in previous generations it was the relatively few highly educated and serious 
minds that had their faith undermined by the new knowledge, today the assumption underlying 
the secular attitude to life are through the universities in all countries being communicated to 
successive generations of students and through books, magazines, and the press permeating the 
general mind.”54 “The masses, and not merely the thoughtful few,” in the West as well as in the 
East, had embraced science as the arbiter of truth, and in doing so, adopted secular view of the 
world.  
 
Oldham pointed to two recently published works as classic expressions of the secular viewpoint, 
H. G. Wells’s Open Conspiracy (1928) and Walter Lippmann’s A Preface for Morals (1929).55 
Both works reinforced the inadequacy of an approach to secularism based on common values 
between it and Christianity. Lippmann and Wells expounded high ideals of selfless service to 
humanity, and both authors indeed held out hope that such ideals could form the basis of a new, 
quasi-religious ethic. Lippmann’s work in particular was not an attack on religion, but a 
diagnosis of a modern condition in which belief in God seemed impossible, even for those who 
wanted to believe. The triumphs of science, the retreat of Christianity into milquetoast 
modernism, the long-term consequences of the “logic of toleration” developed in the wake of 
early modern sectarian conflicts, and the rise of patriotism constituted together what Lippmann 
termed, in a phrase that Oldham quoted, the “acids of modernity.” The agent dissolved in these 
acids was God. What was lay beyond the realm of credibility for this modern mind, in 
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Lippmann’s account, was a universe ordered by God’s benevolent hand – “the theocratic idea.” 
For Oldham, the missionary challenge was one of upholding the authority of God in the face of 
the vision of reality that Lippmann described. “It is necessary for us to explain and vindicate the 
grounds on which as Christians we accept Jesus as lord and Master, as arbiter in matters of 
conduct and our guide in life. We have to show in what sense He is an authority.”56 And yet 
Oldham conceded that Christians – himself included – had no idea of how this demonstration of 
the reality of God’s authority in the world could be effectively achieved. “We have to do here 
with a state of mind on which the mere re-assertion our religious convictions will have little 
effect.” 
 
Other attempts by missionaries to define of secularism in this early context of the immediate 
aftermath of the Jerusalem conference stressed, like Oldham, the theme of modernity’s 
repudiation of the kingship of God. Often these accounts were more explicit than Oldham’s in 
evoking the confusion and anarchy of world that lacked any conception of overarching authority. 
But even here, the emphasis was not on organized Christianity’s failure to represent its God as a 
persuasive common standard and point of integration. If modern man had lost confidence in God, 
these accounts asserted that Christians had not yet found an adequate means of re-securing this 
confidence. For the Anglican theologian Oliver Quick, secularism could be identified precisely 
as the failure of Christianity to furnish an integrative common standard for various social groups 
as well the spheres of modern life – art, economics, society, politics, and religion – lacked an 
integrative common orientation.  
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The Christianity of the reformed churches has not succeeded in interpreting the great 
central doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement in such a way as to make men find 
in Christ Himself a unifying authority over all life which may provide a common goal 
and a common lay for all the manifold activities of the human mind and spirit. Each 
activity pursues its own peculiar line of study, knowledge and creation. Each claims its 
own autonomy, and refuses to accept standards of good and bad, right and wrong, from 
any authority outside itself. ‘Business is business,’ say some, meaning thereby that 
industrial activities cannot submit to standards of conduct intended to apply equally to all 
dealings of men with one another. ‘Art for art’s sake’ is by now an older-fashioned 
slogan, which has declared the right and duty of the artist alone to fix the canons by 
which his creations are to be judged. Each separate science pursues its own road to truth, 
and has its own methods of verification…57 
 
William Paton echoed this theme in an article published in the International Review of Missions 
later that year. Secularism for him was not a discrete set of ideas but rather an “enemy” which 
was nothing but “the result of the failure of religion to integrate the life of man.” Secularism was 
the “separation of the departments of life from the centre to which they belong, so that they 
become kingdoms in their own right, self-dependent, acknowledging no common suzerainty.”58 
In Germany, Martin Schlunk, director the Missionsausschuß gave a similar account in a speech 
to conference of missionary societies of Brandenburg in the Spring of 1929. The phenomenon of 
Säkularismus identified at the Jerusalem meeting was no “single branch of knowledge, no 
graspable institution,” but rather, 
 
a prevailing mood, a principle, a lifestyle that one encounters in all places, which, like 
poison gas, conquers all life in its presence. It is the feeling that Christianity is in terminal 
decline.59  
 
                                                
57 Oliver Quick, “Lausanne, Jerusalem, and the Modern World,” The Church Overseas (Apr, 1929) 99-110. 
58 William Paton, “What is Secularism?” International Review of Missions vol 18 (1929), 354. 
59 “Wo finden wir den Säkularismus? Wie fassen wir ihn? Es ist kein  Wissenzweig, keine irgendwie greifbare 
Institution, sondern, ich möchte sagen, eine Grundstimmung, ein Prinzip, eine Lebenshaltung, denen man überall 
begegnet, die wie Giftgas alles, was Leben hat, in ihre Gewalt bekommen. Es ist die Stimmung: Das Christentum 
hat abgewirtschaftet.” Martin Schlunk, “Der Kampf Gegen den Saekularismus daheim,” Neue Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift 7 (1929), 194. 
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If secularism had become the chief enemy of the church, then the fault lay with Christians 
themselves. The very idea of secularism registered an acknowledgement that the church had 
failed to fulfill its historic mission in the world. God had been displaced from the modern 
imagination, leaving not an absence but a ruling authority that was no ruler at all, but a reigning 
principle of relativity: the truth that denied absolute truth. As Lippmann had put it, “Whirl is 
King.” It was a formulation that exactly captured the concept of secularism as Christian 
missionaries themselves understood it, and in it was implied a new idea of the task of the church.  
 
Having described the condition of secularism, each of these missionary authors issued an appeal 
for a new formulation of the Christian worldview that would unify various categories of 
knowledge. The imperative was to offer Christianity as a new unifying framework of truth. This 
was, all agreed, a task for theologians. Paton argued that the great work of the church today fell 
on those called to the vocation of thought. “It involves in the realm of thought an explanation of 
the Christian view of God and the world, so that that view is shown not only to be compatible 
with (for instance) biological fact, but to be the inner truth on which ultimately the other 
depends.”60 Schlunk made the same point: The task of a Christian world view would be to 
demonstrate that that “which science lacks, we have,” namely “unity, finality [Geschlossenheit], 
and ultimate orientation [Bezogenheit] to the ultimate cause” that the modern world in its 
fragmentation secretly sought. The task was not to attack the “relative truths of individual 
sciences, “but to make them recognizable as relative truths[, and] to place them in the light of the 
eternal truth of God.” A new theology was needed, not to “discredit the ethical forces of 
                                                
60 Paton, “What is Secularism?,” 356.  
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secularism” but to assimilate them under the aegis of faith. Schlunk called for a “great synthesis” 
of thought.61  
 
In response to the challenge of secularism as the reign of a scientific mode of knowledge, the 
years following the Jerusalem conference witnessed an unprecedented reorganization of the 
missionary project. A community that had constituted itself around a set of challenges and body 
of expert knowledge pertaining to the study of non-European peoples and religions reached 
beyond its boundaries, to recruit and organize a range of figures that had not previously been 
involved in the missionary work, narrowly conceived. In the months following the conference, 
Oldham, Paton, and Schlunk formed small study groups of missionaries and theologians. Their 
correspondence swelled in this period with letters to missionaries, theologians, clerics, and lay 
Christians in the urgent task of mobilizing thinkers to contribute to the pressing task of the 
“theological re-statement” of the Christian message.62 Paton, working closely with Temple in the 
weeks after the conference on Theology and the World Missions, planned a follow-up 
conference on “Christian Sociology” that was held in York in October. During his travels in the 
Near East and India in the spring, he encouraged the Christian Councils of missionaries and 
representatives of mission churches in these countries to form “groups of people who would give 
themselves to the most thorough study” of the problem of secularism in the context of non-
western societies, “taking the Jerusalem volume on the Christian message as a basis, and seeking 
to carry further the work done there.”63 Paton also remained in close contact with the director of 
                                                
61 Schlunk, 196. 
62 The records of these correspondence are held primarily in Oldham’s personal papers at New College in Edinburgh 
and the International Missionary Council Collection at the World Council of Churches Archives in Geneva, see esp 
WCC, 26.11.34. 
63 Paton/ (WCC, 26.0021). 
 
 152 
the YMCA in Switzerland, Joachim Müller, and Adolf Keller, a Secretary of the Universal 
Council on Life and Work, as they organized a “Study Conference of World Christian 
Organizations” in Geneva in May 1929. For his part, Oldham worked his American contacts, 
encouraging Warnshuis that Spring to convene a group of theologians in Chicago and asking 
John Mott to draw together “first-rate minds” to study on the issues raised at Jerusalem.64 
Oldham also contacted theologians, churchmen, and intellectuals – including the Scottish 
philosopher John Macmurray, T. S. Eliot, R. H. Tawney – in Britain to organize discussion 
groups in England.65 Hugh Mackintosh, theology professor at New College, Edinburgh, was 
assigned to organize a “Scottish Group.”66 Meanwhile, on the European Continent, the educator 
and theologian Philip Kohnstamm and Hendrik Kraemer organized a discussion on the Christian 
worldview in Holland.67 In Germany, Schlunk and his colleague Walter Freytag, Secretary of the 
Missionsausschuß, encouraged all of the mission boards to sponsor independent “round tables” 
on the Säkularismusfrage.68  
 
The German participation in this project is particularly worth emphasizing. Richter, who was in 
attendance at the Williamstown conference, was so impressed with Oldham’s discussion of 
                                                
64 See Oldham’s correspondence with Mott from the Winter and Spring of 1929 in held at the Yale Divinity School 
Archives (hereafter YDS), Mott Papers, Box 66, and Oldham/Warnshuis, February 8, 1929 (WCC, 26.11.05/10). 
65See Oldham’s correspondence and papers in WCC, 261.010 and 301.2.010, which also includes a list of organizers 
responsible for similar groups in Japan, China, “Near East,” and India; also Paton’s parallel efforts in WCC 261.010. 
66 Oldham/Mackintosh Feb, 24 1930 (WCC, 301.2.010). 
67 See Oldham/Kohnstamm correspondence (WCC, 26.11.34) and Notes on a “Conference in Holland,” Dec 1929 
(WCC 261.010). 
68 For a record of these German efforts, see “Technische Vorbereitungen un Protokolle von Konferenzen und 
Tafelrunden der kontinentalen IMC-Studiengruppe für die Säkularismusfragen. 1929-33” Archiv des Evangelischen 
Missions-Werkes, EMW, 0155. See also Schlunk, Freytag, and Richter’s correspondence with Oldham in the 
archives of the World Council of Churches, (WCC, 24.11.34). 
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secularism that he had it translated and reprinted in the Neue Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, 
and proudly forwarded to Oldham himself the response to the article from the aging Adolf 
Harnack, who averred that there could be little question that the article put its finger on “the most 
important Christian missionary task of to-day…”69 After Jerusalem, Germany was not an 
exception to the international missionary community; its leaders and mission boards joined the 
general organizing rush to pool thought around the challenge of opposing secularism. Recent 
works by Todd Weir and Hent de Vries, in tracing the first emergence of the terms Säkularismus 
and Säkularisierung into German philosophical, theological, and sociological vernacular to the 
Jerusalem conference, underscore the extent to which German Protestants embraced a program 
in accordance with the broader post-Jerusalem consensus.70 Siegfried Knak, an erstwhile staunch 
critic of Anglo-Saxon Aktivismus who had replaced Georg Beyer as head of the Berlin 
Missionary Society, published Saeklularismus und Mission in 1929, a work that largely echoed 
the estimation of the Jerusalem conference, defining Christianity’s new enemy in the world as “a 
worldview and attitude” behind the “commerce, politics, industry and technology of the day.”71 
In a letter to Oldham, the director of the Leipzig Missionary Society Carl Ihmels – son of 
                                                
69 Oldham’s translated speech was published under the title “Der Säkularismus als Menschheitsgefahr” Neue 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, 10 (1929). Harnack’s response to the article is found in Richter/Oldham, November 
12, 1929: “Ich danke Ihnen herzlich für die Zusendung des Aufsatzes von Oldham (Unchristliche Weltkultur). Hier 
liegt in der Tat die wichtigste christliche Missionsaufgabe der Gegenwart oer vielmehr die wichtigste christliche 
Aufgabe überhaupt.” (WCC, 26.11.34/17). 
70 Hent de Vries, Religion: Beyond a Concept (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 435; Todd Weir, 
“Secularism and Secularization. Postcolonial Genealogy and Historical Critique” (Münster: Preprints and Working 
Papers of the Center for Religion and Modernity, 2015), 10.  
71 Siegfried Knak, Säkularismus und Mission (Glütesloh: Bertelsmann, 1929), 2. See also the collection of Siegfried 
Knak’s reflections on the Säkularismusfrage in Evangelisches Ländeskirchliches Archiv in Berlin, Archiv des 
Berliner Missionswerks, Nachlaß Siegfried Knak, (1/10997). This folder also includes correspondence with the 
members of missionary societies in Berlin/Brandenburg concerning the possibility of organizing discussion groups 
on the secularism problem, as well as copies of contemporary publications by a small minority of still revanchist 
German theologians suspicious of the term’s international (and more distantly British) origins. (for instance Wilhelm 
Scholz, “Säkularisation, Säkularismus und Entchristlichung. Ein Wort zur Auseinanderhaltung der drei Begriffe” 
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 11, 4 (1930). 
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Ludwig Ihmels, Bishop of Saxony, who had powerfully assailed Anglo-Saxon activism at the 
Stockholm conference – wrote to Oldham, “I have the impression that the question concerning 
secularism has begun to stir the feelings [of theologians and missionaries] in Germany.”72 In 
November 1929 Oldham circulated a memorandum reiterating many of the themes from his 
Williamstown speech, and sent it around to the heads of missionary societies in Germany and 
Switzerland, soliciting their response. Karl Hartenstein responded to Oldham’s speech with an 
enthusiastic affirmation of its claims: “The lines you have drawn out in your Memorandum are 
really ours and we are very thankful that we came in personal touch you, so that we could see 
what the real task would be in facing the secularistic problem. I realize more and more that the 
whole problem of theology and church will be touched by this question of secularism so that we 
are compelled to go into the last crucial points of faith and community which must be taken in 
view to enter the spiritual house of this secularistic world.”73 Oldham for his part believed, as he 
wrote to Mott in January 1930, that “I am more impressed than ever with the importance of the 
contribution which the continent [sic] can make to our thinking in regard to the ‘message.’”74 
Around the same time, he praised Schlunk’s efforts to organize study of the Säkularismusfrage: 
“I have felt ever since the meeting at Jerusalem that this is a field in which the contribution of the 
Continent and of Germany in particular must be proportionally of greater importance in relation 
to the Anglo-Saxon world in the actual extent of missionary opportunities.”75 
 
                                                
72 Ihmels/Oldham March 7, 1930, 1 (WCC, 24.11.34). “Ich habe den Eindurck, daß die mit dem Säkularismus 
zusammenhängenden Frage anfangen auch die Gemüter [feelings, stirrings] in Deutschland stark zu bewegen.”  
73 Hartenstein/Oldham Feb 1, 1930 (WCC, 26.11.34) 
74 Oldham/Mott, Jan 16, 1930 (WCC, 26.11.34/17). 





The months following the Jerusalem conference found the international missionary community 
united in defeat – and scrambling to launch a guerilla campaign. I have stressed in this chapter 
how a common perception of Christianity’s failure to assert its dominance over modern 
civilization at home and abroad furnished the foundation for new solidarity among previously 
estranged Allied and German Protestants. By the time of the Jerusalem Conference, relations 
between these two blocs were already on the mend. But anti-secularism concretized common 
objectives and furnished a program of practical cooperation. It was a program that dissolved the 
categories and distinctions of the 19th century missionary movement, based on a territorialized 
spiritual geography demarcating “Christian” and “non-Christian” worlds. The ascendency of 
secularism revealed that the church in all parts of the world faced off against a common enemy. 
The novelty of the new situation was illustrated by the fact that missionaries felt themselves 
unequipped to respond to a challenger that was not a religion but an ascendant secular worldview 
rejecting the religious understanding of divine omnipotence in all of its traditional forms. To 
make Christianity credible in the modern world, they believed, would require incorporating the 
truths of science into a new synthesis. But how this could be done without rejecting those truths 
tout court – and following a path that American fundamentalists had recently shown to lead to 
public embarrassment and irrelevance – was unclear. As we’ll see in the next chapter, the 
solution to the problem framed in the months after the Jerusalem meeting came from a surprising 
source. The movement of dialectical theology, which attracted many young theologians in 
Germany and Switzerland in the 1920s, had not exerted a significant influence on the missionary 
community throughout the 1920s. But it was in that movement’s conception of revelation – 
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which its leaders conceived as an “existential” event irreducible to rational categories – that not 
only missionaries but also the wide field of Protestants and Orthodox thinkers who rallied to the 
post-Jerusalem agenda in the years following 1929 would discover the reality they sought. 
Dialectical theologians contended that Christianity’s historical decline could be mastered by 
comprehending it in the terms of revelation – as a consequence of man’s rebellion against God. 
Secularism in this view was not the triumph of science but the rebellion of man in his inveterate 
resistance to the only lord that could offer salvation. The effort to restore the authority of that 
lord over a modern subject whose rebellion assumed catastrophic proportions in the 1930s gave 





















“Let the Church be the Church!”: Dialectical Theology, the New Anti-Secular 




William Paton began an article in the July 1929 number of the International Review of Missions 
with an anecdote. “A friend of mine told me recently that a member of his congregation had 
come to him and plaintively enquired, ‘What is this ‘Secularism’ that everybody talks about 
now?”1 The question in the mouth of the parishioner was undoubtedly the central concern of 
Protestant missionaries in the months following the Jerusalem Conference. More than that: it 
would become in the 1930s the dominating question of international Protestantism as a whole, 
providing a point of reference that would join the intellectual and clerical leadership of non-
Roman Christendom together in a single conversation centered on diagnosing the nature of 
secularism and advancing a Christian “response” to it. “We are apparently witnessing a 
convergence of ideas toward a new, creative thought,” the Dutch missionary and theologian 
Hendrik Kraemer wrote in 1930, essaying the responses to the Jerusalem conference among 
various strains of Continental theology. That gathering had “concentrated universal attention on 
a problem of decisive importance for the future, namely the relations of Christianity and 
secularism.” The effort to organize a united front against secularism, Kraemer predicted, would 
inspire Christians to a regenerative re-discovery of their faith that would, in the coming years, 
take on new forms of characteristic expression. The fact that secularism was identified as a 
“missionary” problem was significant, Kraemer explained: just missionaries had reinterpreted 
Christianity in the past through their encounters with other religions, so too, now, the Christian 
                                                
1 William Paton, “What is Secularism?” International Review of Missions vol 18 (1929), 346.  
 
 158 
community and its message – eternal and transcendent in its apparently infinite capacity to speak 
to the needs of all humanity – would be transformed in relation to its new opponent, secularism.2 
 
Kraemer’s prediction was prescient. The discourse on secularism in the years following 1930 
indeed fundamentally reorganized the thought and practice of international Protestantism. From a 
constellation of networks and institutions devoted to realizing the Kingdom of God in the wider 
world, international Protestantism became, in the decade following the Jerusalem Conference, 
and in direct response to the rival of secularism its participants identified, an effort to realize the 
“church” as a distinctive society, set apart from a hostile world in its essential convictions about 
the nature of man, history, and the foundations of human community. As this new program 
coalesced, Protestants and Orthodox elites rallied around the idea of “ecumenical” Christian 
unity – an idea that, as we saw in chapter 1, that had previously failed to mobilize. This epochal 
shift was the result of a new understanding of the church as the only possible locus of 
community life in a world whose divisions and conflicts – which seemed to amplify to 
catastrophic proportions in the 1930s and 1940s – were the consequence of modernity’s rejection 
of God. From this point onward, the question of whether Protestant and Orthodox cooperation 
could be called “ecumenical” without the official cooperation of the Roman Catholic Church was 
moot. The ecumenical church was not a council of ecclesiastical bodies but a universal 
community encompassing all nations, races, and classes united in obedience to God. Only such a 
society, ecumenists argued, could withstand the centrifugal pulls of rationalistic individualism on 
the one hand and “neo-pagan” collectivisms of nationalism, fascisms, and communism on the 
other.  
                                                




This chapter examines how the critique of secularism generated the intellectual foundations of 
the ecumenical movement as a program oriented around the realization of the church. We will 
stress that the critical development here was a conception of secularism originally advanced by 
dialectical theologians from the European Continent as they made their first ventures into to the 
post-Jerusalem conversation about secularism after 1930. Focusing on a number of figures 
within the remit of this movement, including Karl Barth, Theophil Spoerri, W. A. Visser’t Hooft, 
and Nicholas Berdyaev, we will give particular attention in the early parts of the chapter to two 
men: the Swiss Reformed theologian Emil Brunner and the German Lutheran Karl Heim. While 
by no means the sole architects of the ecumenical anti-secularism, their early reflections on 
secularism in 1930 are particularly important for our discussion since they highlight two 
intellectual innovations – the conceptualization of secularism in terms of Christian anthropology, 
and the program of ecclesiastical “realization” – that would be foundational to the movement in 
the decade that followed. Their work shows that the essential features of anti-secularist ideology 
were in place before most Protestants were concerned with the phenomenon of Nazism. It was 
not racist anti-liberalism per se that ecumenists saw as the chief threat to their faith, but a 
secularized civilization of which Nazism was a symptom. 
  
Building off the perspective of dialectical theology, ecumenists in the 1930s understood 
secularism, not as the success of science in shaping the modern world, but as the rebellion of 
man against God, achieved through man’s attempt to make science a comprehensive account of 
life and the universe. Rejecting the historicist orientation of liberal theology that had shaped 
characterizations of secularism in 1928-9, these thinkers placed the drama of the modern world 
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within the anti-historicist frame of man’s eternal relation to his creator. First in the Renaissance 
and with growing impudence in the centuries that followed, modern man had wielded reason to 
assert his autonomy from God and his dominion over the world. This rebellion had brought about 
spiritual confusion and uncertainty and with these, a collapse of social order. In response, 
modern man had sought to recover a transcendent purpose through “neo-pagan” or “political 
religions” of nationalism, Fascism, and Communism. But in seeking order on a false basis, these 
"religions" only prepared the way for an amplification and globalization of unrest. Dialectical 
theology, in other words, centered the debate about secularism not around the acceptability of 
specific scientific findings, but around the problem of authority and social order, and the 
common conceptions of ethical responsibility and collective purpose necessary to ground social 
existence in the modern age.   
 
By recovering this conception of secularism and its degeneration into neo-paganism, we will 
discover a critical point about the origins of the “ecumenical movement” itself, which have been 
generally misunderstood by existing scholarship. Most recent scholars have characterized 
ecumenists as theological liberals, committed to promoting an accommodation with science and 
other religions and espousing to a host of liberal, pluralistic cultural and political projects. They 
have thus linked the ecumenical project to a longer progress of secularization through which 
Protestants made their peace with the “Enlightenment,” a limited, private role for religion, and 
the institutional separation of church and state.3 By showing how ecumenism emerged originally 
                                                
3 This is interpretation has been advanced primarily by scholars focusing on American Protestants and follows a 
division central to historiography of modern American Protestantism, emphasizing the division between “liberal” 
and “evangelical” or “fundamentalist” Protestantism. Its most important expositor is David Hollinger (see After 
Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013); see also Gene Zubovich, The Global Gospel: Protestant Internationalism and American Liberalism, 1940-
1960 (Ph.D dissertation, U.C. Berkeley, 2014), Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in 
American War and Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), and William Inboden, Religion and American 
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out of anti-secularism, we will locate its history not within the dominant narrative of 
Protestantism’s self-secularization but within a longer story of attempts by internationally 
minded Christians to re-imagine – in response to divisions within their own community – the 
historical form that God’s universal dominion must take. For ecumenists of the 1930s, that form 
was theological community united in opposing a Christian worldview based on revelation to 
various manifestations of “secularism” and pagan movements that, despite their apparent 
differences, were essentially similar in asserting human self-sufficiency in defiance of God’s 
sovereignty. This program of ecumenical internationalism would prove remarkably resilient, in 
spite of the political polarization of Europe in the 1930s, and in particular in spite of tensions 
between anti-Nazi and Nazi-sympathizing Protestants. One key to its success was that it was able 
to conceive precisely this polarization as a symptom of the secular disintegration that ecumenical 
Christianity must overcome – a task whose conceptual foundation we will examine in this 
chapter and whose practical execution we will examine in the following chapter.  
 
The present chapter has three parts. The first will examine Brunner and Heim’s writings on the 
secularism in 1930, showing how they were occasioned by the international mobilization of 
theologians that followed the Jerusalem Conference and how they developed a polemic attacking 
secularism that sought to relativize, without rejecting, the truths of modern science. The second 
part will show how various theologians in the period between 1930 and 1937 expanded these two 
thinkers’ critique of individual autonomy to include a constellation of movements that seemed to 
oppose it, such as nationalism, Fascism, and Communism. They achieved this feat of conceptual 
                                                
Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment. (New York: Cambridge University Press 2008). In attempting 
to locate not only American Protestants but the ecumenical movement as a whole within this schema, these works 
not only misrepresent the intentions non-American ecumenists but American ecumenists as well, who embraced, as 
we will see, the framing of secularism first advanced by European dialectical theologians.  
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synthesis by positing that contemporary humanity was in the grips of a “secularism syndrome,” 
according to which the bid for autonomy generated an opposite but equally anti-Christian trend 
toward new heteronomies. We will then trace the percolation of the secularism syndrome idea in 
wider circles of Protestant and Orthodox thinking in the 1930s, showing how it furnished the 
premise on which ecumenists elaborated the project of world Christian unity in the face of 
political polarization, the collapse of liberal democracy, and the growing strength of political 
movements of Nazism, Fascism, and Communism. Finally, we will show how a self-consciously 
“ecumenical movement” emerged as a program to “realize the church” in opposition to 
competing secular and pagan programs of social order. Since the Protestant and Orthodox actors 
we have been following in this dissertation began to refer to themselves as ecumenists in this 
period, we will follow their usage.  
 
I. Dialectical Theology and the New Anti-Secular Polemic 
We saw in the last chapter how the confrontation with secularism prompted missionaries to reach 
out to theologians in order to formulate a new understanding of the Christian “message” that 
would make effective “contact” with the assumptions of the modern world. The theologians that 
missionaries recruited proved willing and enthusiastic partners in this enterprise. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to examine all of these discussions in detail. Here I want to focus only on 
the origins of a line of argument that would go onto provide the intellectual foundations of the 
ecumenical movement that emerged in the 1930s.  
 
In 1929, the missionaries who had assembled in Jerusalem confronted a problem. They had 
identified secularism as a new global rival, but they found themselves – and the church as a 
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whole – unequipped to defend Christianity against it. The root of this impasse lay in the tradition 
of theological liberalism within which all missionaries – and indeed most of North Atlantic 
Protestant world – operated throughout the 1920s. Though German missionaries and church 
leaders at times assailed the politics their Anglo-American counterparts yoked to it, liberal 
theology furnished Germans too with a set of broad assumptions and categories. Liberal theology 
stressed a historicist reading of scripture that welcomed the findings of Higher and Lower 
criticism. It repudiated doctrinal dogmatism and insisted on the compatibility of Enlightenment 
reason and Christian revelation. Liberals embraced an immanent conception of God who was 
present within human experience and working out his providential plan toward the Kingdom.4  
 
Secularism posed a crisis for this current of thinking because it described a historical condition in 
which the progress of God’s plan had been halted. Intellectual elites, the working classes, and the 
bourgeoisie alike were turning away from God; science had become the new authority and 
shaping force of modern civilization. Missionaries could cast aspersion on secularism for causing 
moral and epistemic disorder and fragmentation. But doing so only underscored the historical 
failure of Christianity as a unifying cultural and religious framework and did nothing to suggest a 
positive program for regenerating the faith. Missionary writings on secularism in 1929, then, 
evinced a cognitive dissonance: on the one hand, secularism was an enemy, on the other, the 
imperative of liberal theology was to accommodate, not deny, the advances of natural and social 
science. As theological liberals, missionaries were unsure how to vindicate God’s authority while 
at the same time accepting the age of the earth, Darwinian evolution, and the human authorship 
                                                
4 See William R. Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1976) and Gary Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology 3 vols. (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001-6). 
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of scripture. Especially for American and British missionaries, the recent catastrophic implosion 
of Fundamentalism seemed to underscore that any publically robust form of Christianity must 
not take the route of wholesale rejection of science. But on what grounds could secularism be 
rejected, while salvaging science?  
 
In the years following 1930, dialectical theologians would furnish the answer to this question. In 
the following section, we will focus on two dialectical theologians in particular – Emil Brunner 
and Karl Heim – illustrating how their diagnosis of secularism represented the first attempts to 
conceive this phenomenon outside the liberal theological framework. Brunner and Heim made 
the question of secularism not one of the credibility of science – acceptable within its appropriate 
domain of “natural” phenomena – but of man’s obedience to God. This shift was achieved 
through repudiating the historicist orientation of liberal theology and insisting on the anti-
historicist horizon of Existenz, with its focus on the eternal relation of man with his creator. At 
stake in this shift, Brunner and Heim argued, was recognizing that scientific rationality and 
divine revelation were two distinct grounds of knowledge and morality, whose only 
reconciliation could come through a subordination of the former to the latter. Insisting on 
revelation as ultimate truth, they interpreted the success of science and the historical decline of 
organized Christianity within the biblical account of original sin. From this perspective, science 
was an instrument of modern man’s rebellion against God. Indeed, they went on to claim, the 
entire modern project of the West sought to enshrine and normalize that rebellion, making 
human autonomy the basis of a new form of social order and civilization. Brunner and Heim’s 
early reframing of secularism would become normative for the ecumenical movement in the 




In order for this conception to emerge, the concepts and categories of dialectical theology needed 
to be first brought to bear upon the problem of secularism that had been diagnosed at Jerusalem. 
We discussed in the last chapter the role of dialectical theologians in problematizing in the 
German-speaking world a division between foreign and home missions, through the advance of a 
critique of Christian culture as a form of heathenism, or the idolatrous worship of culture, and a 
re-assertion of divine transcendence. For the most part, however, throughout the 1920s, 
dialectical theologians declined to elaborate the relevance of their ideas to questions of social 
reform and missionary work, convinced that the task of theology was above all one of 
explicating God’s self-revelation: it was essential to their point that the task of theology had been 
obscured by the confusion of the categories of society, history, culture and politics with the 
object of faith, a God who remained “wholly other.” There were, however, by the late 1920s, a 
handful of German-speaking churchmen who had become interested in applying the insights of 
dialectical theology to a broader field of ethics and social theory. Three of these figures – Heim, 
Hendrik Kraemer, and Karl Hartenstein, Würz’s successor as director of the Basel Missionary 
Society – had attended the Jerusalem conference. Another figure, Emil Brunner, was brought 
into the post-Jerusalem conversation by Joseph Oldham’s effort in late 1929 to convene a group 
of theologians on the European Continent to discuss the secularism problem. That group 
epitomized the idea of anti-secularism as a program that could unite formerly estranged blocs, 
since it included Germans as well as Swiss and French and Dutch thinkers. 
 
Oldham’s group, the so-called “the Continental Group,” convened for the first time on October 
7, 1930, in Basel. Its members – including German missionaries Walter Freytag, Heinrich Frick, 
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and Siegfried Knak, the Dutch theologians Philippe Kohnstamm and W. A. Visser’t Hooft, the 
French theologian Henri Monnier, and the Czech philosopher of science Emmanuel Radl – were 
assigned to read in advance a short document prepared by Oldham himself on secularism, as well 
as longer essays from Brunner and Heim.5 We will examine these latter two essays in some 
detail, emphasizing in particular the importance of Brunner’s contribution to the longer 
development of ecumenical thinking in the 1930s. In order to understand the arguments 
advanced in this essay, it is necessary to consider Brunner’s intellectual trajectory in the years 
before 1930, when he developed a conception of the polemical “task” of theology that, though 
developed independently from the missionary community, would prove crucial for its re-
organization in confrontation with secularism.  
 
In the early 1920s, Brunner was among the first theologians in Switzerland to join Barth in his 
quest to reorient theology around the existential crisis of revelation. However, even in that 
decade his trajectory took him down a path different from Barth and many of his other partners 
in arms. Brunner’s works of the mid-1920s, including his inaugural lectures as Professor of 
Systematic Theology at Zürich and his 1927 work The Mediator [Der Mittler], evinced an 
interest in developing a Christian social ethics. Brunner’s ethics sought to elucidate a divergence 
of “theological” and “philosophical” understanding of the origins and basis of society by 
recovering a dimension of existential reality as the plane on which the human being encountered 
God and discovered the foundation of his social and moral obligations in the world. By the late 
                                                
5 The history of the “Continental Group” and its connection with the proliferation of study groups on the secularism 
problem that emerged between 1929 and 1933 deserves more serious attention than it has received. For accounts that 
mention the “Continental Group,” Brunner’s papers prepared for it, and the conversations that occurred there, see 
Werner Ustorf, Sailing on the Next Tide: Missions, Missiology, and the Third Reich (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 
2000), chpt 7, and Frank Jehle, Emil Brunner, Theologe im 20 Jahrhundert (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 2006). 
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1920s, Brunner’s focus on the problem of Christian ethics led him to develop a conception of 
theology’s “polemical” or combative task: its concern with critiquing the basis of modern 
“worldviews” or ideologies, dominant forms of social thought that were opposed to the Christian 
conception.6 First in a series of lectures given in the United States in 1928, then in a 1929 article 
“The Other Task of Theology,” Brunner laid the groundwork for a conception of theology’s task 
that would prove immensely influential to the larger world of Protestant thought in the 1930s, 
though it was developed at the time apparently without knowledge of the Jerusalem conference’s 
proceedings.7  
 
While the primary task of theology, Brunner argued, was reflection on the Word of God, the 
“other” task was to find the languages and questions by which to present the Word of God as a 
“question” concealed by the regnant attitudes and beliefs of contemporary culture. “Eristics,” 
from the Greek erizein, for struggle or combat, was the name that Brunner gave to this “other 
task,” which departed from traditional approaches to Christian apologetics in its decisive 
rejection of rational argumentation as the path along which the unbeliever would be led to faith 
in God.8 The Enlightenment tradition of natural theology, Brunner wrote, had made the mistake 
of attempting to defend Christianity on rational grounds, which were foreign to biblical 
revelation. In this way it ceded the territory to its opponent without a fight, placing the Christian 
                                                
6 Alaister McGrath, Emil Brunner: A Reappraisal (Hoboken: Wiley, 2014), chpt 2. For an account of the break that 
Brunner’s turn to “polemics” caused with Barth (and an interpretation of the role of “The Other Task of Theology” 
in this story, which culminating in their major debate over natural theology in 1934, see Bruce McCormack, Barth’s 
Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Deveopment 1909-1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 402-7.  
7 For an account the relation between Brunner’s theological approach and German missiology, see John Flett, The 
Witness of God: The Trinity, Missio Dei, Karl Barth, and the Nature of Christian Community (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2010), chpt 3. 
8 Emil Brunner, “Die Andere Aufgabe der Theologie” Zwischen den Zeiten 7 (1929) 255-76. 
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in the “doubtful position” [verzweifelte Lage] of having to “prove the Gospel as theoretical 
truth.”9 The task, however, was to throw reason itself into doubt, to expose it in light of the 
biblical conception of man as a creature both in search of God and, as a consequence of original 
sin, unable to find God by his own powers. Brunner’s eristics sought to re-conceive the project of 
apologetics as an effort to provoke in individuals consciousness of an existential crisis that 
rational thinking only obscured. That crisis was the Word of God itself, which encountered man 
from beyond the pale of history, announcing to him his true nature – as a sinner whose salvation 
could only be achieved through Christ. This revelation demanded a decision of faith. Brunner’s 
eristics characterized human rationality as at once a concealment of this decision and a pursuit of 
a truth it could not rightly comprehend so long as it sought to secure it by its own powers of 
apprehension. It would be the task of eristic theology, Brunner wrote, “to show how through 
God’s word reason expressed both humans’ need for salvation and their incapacity to achieve 
it.”10 Brunner was not arguing here that rational inquiry was insufficient as a mode of divine 
apprehension. Had he simply argued that reason was insufficient for salvation, he would have 
been uttering a platitutude of Christian thinking differentiating him in no way from the liberal 
theology of Jones, Paton, Quick, or Oldham. Brunner’s point rather was that rational inquiry 
must be seen “dialectically,” from two perspectives. On the one hand, it was a means by which 
the human creature sought to apprehend the truth of himself and his universe; it bespoke the 
dignity of man as a creature formed in the image of God. At the same time, however, in seeking 
to ground such knowledge on itself, rational inquiry was also a “fatal error,” an assertion of 
                                                
9 Ibid, 260. 
10 Ibid, 260. “Es wäre also die Aufgabe der eristischen Theologie, zu zeigen, wie durch menschliche Vernunft teils 
Quelle lebensfeindlichen Irrtums und teils in ihrem eigenen unvollendbaren Suchen erfüllt wird.” 
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human will that alienated man from God by occluding the event of revelation and the decision it 
demanded.11   
 
“The Other Task of Theology” was published in the journal Zwischen den Zeiten in the autumn 
of 1929. It seems doubtful that Oldham was familiar with the article; though he read German and 
followed developments in German theology, there is little indication that he read Zwischen den 
Zeiten, or indeed had evinced much interest in the movement of dialectical theology before 1929. 
It is possible, however, that Oldham was familiar with an incipient version of Brunner’s 
argument in “The Other Task,” laid out in the latter’s 1928 Theology of Crisis, in which Brunner 
had argued that the task of theology was to “deliver” the Western world from the “colossal 
ideology” of the Enlightenment, which “rests on a quite definite understanding of human life in 
which man does not see himself as he is” – as a sinner before God – but rather as a autonomous 
rational agent.12 The Theology of Crisis was published in Britain in October 1929. The following 
month, Oldham wrote to Martin Schlunk to inquire whether, “in view of the general objects 
which we have at heart” in developing a Christian response to secularism, it would be desirable 
to have Brunner attend a meeting of a small group of missionaries and theologians from the 
European Continent that Oldham was planning to hold in Basel the following year. “I feel… that 
the movement which Brunner represents is important,” he added.13 A few weeks later, Oldham 
wrote to Brunner himself, sending him a copy of the speech he had given at Williamstown that 
summer. Brunner’s reply expressed his interest in and gratitude for Oldham’s speech – claiming 
                                                
11 Ibid, 176.  
12 Emil Brunner, Theology of Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner, 1929), xxii. For publication history see Alistair 
McGrath, Emil Brunner: A Reappraisal (Hoboken: Wiley, 2014), chpt 2. 
13 Oldham/Schlunk November 11, 1929 (WCC, 26.11.34/17). 
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even to have read it “out loud” with his wife – and the two met in person in Zürich in January.14 
Brunner agreed to join the group. He also agreed to produce a preliminary article for the first 
meeting, which was published under the title “Secularism as a Problem for the Church” in the 
International Review of Missions in October. That piece, along with a speech that Karl Heim 
gave at the Bremen Missionary Society conference in the summer of 1930, furnished the basis of 
discussion at the first meeting.  
 
It is worth looking at both of these interventions in some detail, in order to analyze the crucial re-
orientation of perspective on secularism they advanced. While missionaries between 1928 and 
1929 had seen secularism as a product of the historical advance of science and its stunning 
successes in remaking modern society, these thinkers offered a different aeteliogy. The 
worldview of secularism that grounded the social, political, and economic order of modern 
civilization as a whole, they argued, was a decision against God, an attempt by man to ground his 
existence on his own powers of reason. In this view, secularism was a phenomenon distinctive of 
the Christian West, not because of the West’s technical and scientific achievements, but because 
of the particular relationship between man and God revealed by Christianity, a relation that was 
prior to, indeed the condition of possibility for, the emergence of modern scientific and industrial 
civilization. According to Christian revelation, because of original sin, man existed at a distance 
from God. Man met God’s revelation as a personal “Word” from beyond: morally responsible to 
God, he was also free to affirm or deny God’s will. By decoupling man from the cosmos and 
asserting his peculiar status as a person formed “in the image of God,” Christianity had made 
possible its own contemporary impotence – and consequently contemporary humanity’s distress.  
                                                




Brunner’s article began by positing “secularism” as an unprecedented phenomenon in world 
history.15 In all times and places, not only the “ancient Mediterranean culture,” but “also the old 
China and Japan, Mexico and Peru, even the world of so-called primitive peoples,” civilization 
had always been tied to religion. The decline of any particular religion had always been 
synonymous with the collapse of the civilization that had been built upon it, while new 
civilizations that arose to replace “decadent” ones always advanced their own understanding of 
man’s binding ties with the divine. Outside of the Christian West, the separation between culture 
and religion “never takes place; what really happens in every case is simply the replacing of one 
religious supremacy by another.”16 It was a “fact” of world history that “man always feels 
himself to be bound, in two respects, bound to higher powers and bound to society.” Even in 
civilizations that were oriented toward the “mundane” – that is, the things of this world in 
contradistinction to a realm of eternity or transcendence – the religious sense expressed itself in a 
recognition of the objective order in which one belonged. The “mundaneness” of ancient Greek, 
Roman, and Chinese culture, for instance, was a “a mundaneness which somehow receives its 
delimitation, its norm, its law… from beyond itself, from a divine world.”17  
 
The essence of secularism, Brunner contended, was not an orientation toward the things of this 
world but rather the emancipation of the individual from his double bind, to God and to his 
fellows. It was an emancipation that only could have occurred “on Christian soil,” since it 
                                                
15 Emil Brunner, “Secularism as a Problem for the Church,” International Review of Missions vol 19 (Oct 1930), 
495-511. 
16 Ibid, 495. 
17 Ibid, 496. 
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required Christianity’s understanding of the relative independence of man as an individual 
endowed with free will, beholden to God for salvation but also free to accept or reject God 
through a decision of faith. In Brunner’s account, secularism first emerged during the 
Renaissance, whose creative lights carried out the first attempt to base a civilization on the 
systematic denial of man’s responsibility to God and the elevation of his own powers over self 
and cosmos. While orthodox Christianity understood man as a “pilgrim” in the world, 
responsible ultimately to a Lord in heaven, “the men of the Renaissance” asserted their lordship 
over self, society, and the natural world, uprooting themselves from the objective order of God’s 
creation: “Man is no more assigned a place in the world; he confronts it as its lord and regards it 
as material for his will.” This epochal declaration of independence was for Brunner not the 
consequence but the precondition for the emergence of modern science. “Modern science,” he 
wrote, “is only possible as the product of the autonomous and emancipated personality.”18 
 
In Brunner’s account, “reason” was the “means and principle” of man’s emancipation: and it was 
through the application of reason to reshape both the natural and the social world that he asserted 
both his independence from other men (since “rational knowledge is what each man can tell 
himself”) and from God (“for it is in virtue of reason that he is lord of the world, and through 
reason he makes it his scientific and technical object.”). Brunner did not derogate reason 
absolutely: rightly used, reason could illuminate the divine order present in both the natural 
world and in social “orders” of creation such as the family and the state. He further clarified – 
against any comers who might accuse him of espousing Christian “fundamentalism”19 – that 
                                                
18 Ibid, 496. 
19 Not mentioned in “Secularism as a Problem for the Church,” “Fundamentalism” as advanced by American 
Protestants such as George Machen and William Jennings Bryan was familiar to Brunner from this time in the 
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Christians ought to accept the findings of the scientific method as it had been applied to 
questions of the origins of the earth, the heliocentric universe, and the human authorship of the 
scripture. But as he argued the previous year in “The Other Task of Theology,” reason had to be 
understood dialectically; it was at once an instrument for apprehending God’s order and the 
instrument that enabled man to violate that order, by drawing the natural world and the social 
order alike under human control. What Brunner attacked were applications of reason that denied 
the limits of its applicability, and in doing so became an instrument of human will to power. 
“Through reason the modern man is God to himself, for every law of truth and good he possess 
in himself, that is, in his reason.”20 Secularism in Brunner’s telling was nothing but the abuse of 
reason for the purpose of making its bearer self-sufficient, a law unto himself, unwilling to 
recognize dependence upon God. In a line: “Autonomy is self-deification.”21 
 
Brunner’s account went on to describe a series of apparently inexorable consequences that 
followed from Renaissance man’s declaration of independence. All sense of an inherent, 
objective moral order rooted in God’s will, was eaten away in the following centuries through a 
succession of philosophical movements from the Enlightenment to Romanticism from scientific 
positivism. Philosophical idealism, a remnant belief in the divinity of man, was challenged by a 
mechanistic conception of the universe as an order that could be controlled by human ingenuity. 
Man came to believe that the social order itself was nothing but a human contrivance, established 
by the free consent of human wills. “The State no longer represents an original social order but a 
                                                
United States, as a visitng student at Union Theological Seminary 1923-4; his lectures on the Theology of Crisis 
advanced dialectical theology as an alternative to theological “modernism” on the one hand and “fundamentalism” 
on the other. See McGrath, 58-9. 
20 Brunner, “Secularism as a Problem for the Church,” 498. 
21 Ibid, 498. 
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mere contra social; economic relations and the life of the peoples can only be understood as the 
play of tyrannous and egotistic wills. Marriage and the family are purely natural forms 
dominated by the principle of utility or of sex, and therefore also conceived as exemplifying the 
contrat social.”22 The result of the new “temper” of emancipation then was an alienation of man 
from God as well as the natural world, which he now stood over and against in a position of 
exploitation and technical utility, as well as his fellow man. The final stop on this downward 
spiral was a relativism which denied the possibility of truth and even tired of self-assertion itself 
– a denouement which earned Brunner’s admiration, at least, for its frank recognition of the 
endpoint of man’s bid for autonomy.  
 
The upshot of Brunner’s account was a conception of secularism fundamentally different from 
that advanced at Jerusalem and in the months following – and pregnant with a future. Oldham, 
Paton, Schlunk, Quick, and the other missionaries who wrestled with the question of secularism 
in the months following the Jerusalem conference had all understood it from a historical 
perspective; they had described a triumph of scientific assumptions about the nature of the world 
and reality. Brunner was arguing by contrast that this triumph needed to be seen in the true light 
of revelation as a particularly extreme and complete form of rebellion against God. Vindicating 
God’s sovereignty required recognizing that modern “man” was his rival claimant to the throne, 
and debunking the “scientific worldview” as the ideology serving as its defense. “This historical 
study,” he concluded, “has been meant to lift the idea of secularism out of the fashionable 
superficiality into which it has fallen, and to cast a clearer light on the grounds for this, the most 
important movement of the last three hundred years.” It was only by shifting the frame of 
                                                
22 Ibid, 503. 
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reference from the historical progress of science to man’s eternal relationship with God that the 
truth of secularism could come into view: 
 
Secularism is not the product of modern science; modern science is the product of secular 
thought. It is not the product of social relations, such as modern democracy, the reverse is 
the case; it is not the product of modern civilization and economic life, the reverse is the 
case. The modern world is the product of the new temper and this new temper is the 
individual’s basing himself on his own reason, the autonomy and autarchy of the rational 
individual… Emancipation from God is the principle and ground of the modern 
development of civilization, not its consequence. Behind modern culture stands the 
modern man, as its bearer, its shaper, its causa efficiens. The perversion of all relations is 
a product of a perversion in the self-interpretation of man. The ordinary view is exactly 
the reverse; it moves inward from without, it sees the modern man as the product of the 
new relations and thus transposes cause and effect.23 
 
The “ordinary view” here was a general conception of modern civilization advanced by self-
identifying secular thinkers themselves. But it was equally a description of Christians’ own 
understandings of the phenomenon of modern civilization. The critique was leveled, implicitly, 
at Oldham, Schlunk, Paton, and other missionaries understandings of secularism as the failure of 
Christianity to assert its authority over modern society. To view the matter in that way was to 
parrot the modern self-understanding itself, to play into the hands of the secularist heresy, and 
“cede the ground,” as Brunner had put it “The Other Task,” without a fight. We will examine 
below how Brunner re-articulated his program of “polemic” theology as a response to the 
phenomenon of secularism, and how this entailed a new conception of the role of the church as a 
theological community, constituted through a collective search for the recovery and fighting 
proclamation of God’s Word. 
 
Heim’s essay “The Struggle Against Secularism” [Der Kampf Gegen den Säkularismus] differed 
from Brunner’s article in some respects: it did not, for instance, lay as much emphasis on rational 
                                                
23 Ibid, 500. 
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autonomy as the “means and vehicle” of modern rebellion. For Heim secularism could just as 
easily take the form of deification of the “world” – the nature of cosmos – as of man. But like 
Brunner, Heim rooted the secularist heresy in the existential possibility uniquely furnished by 
Christian revelation, which placed man in the agonizing condition of a decision to accept or 
reject God’s Word of salvation. Again the problem of the secular worldview was inscribed 
within the perspective of an anthropology centered on the concept of sin, offering an account that 
would not repudiate scientific findings but rather attempt to recover the moment of divine 
repudiation that lay behind them.  
 
Heim’s address began by challenging two common accounts of secularism. He did not identify 
secularism with the conception of reality generated by Newtonian physics – the “worldview of a 
system of closed causality,” [Weltbild des geschlossenen Kausalzusammenhanges] which denied 
divine agency in natural or social processes. Nor had secularism emerged from the triumph of a 
“technical” Weltanschauung that had taken shape in the wake of the industrial revolution and the 
proliferation and increasingly wider application of technology in various realms of life. Instead, 
the prevalence of technology merely explained the ease with which the secular worldview had 
spread throughout the world – furnishing a configuration of moral and spiritual assumptions that 
fed secularism’s epidemic profusion like the crowded living conditions of the Hamburg 
waterfront enabled the spread of cholera.24 Heim supported this claim by observing, first, that the 
worldly orientation of secularism had existed in many forms well before the birth of modernity, 
for instance in the philosophies of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, as well as analogue 
                                                
24 Karl Heim, “Der Kampf gegen den Saekularismus,” 2. Speech delivered at the the Bremen Missionary 
Conference, Summer 1930, (WCC, 26.11.34/20). Technics enables the spread of secularism “etwa wie gewisse 
Wohnungsverhaeltnisse im Hafenviertel von Hamburg schuld daran waren, dass die Cholera, nachdem sie einmal 
eingeschleppt war, sich rasend schnell verbreitete.”   
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areligious philosophies in the non-western world. Second, the leading expositors of the modern 
scientific worldview, including Galileo, Copernicus, Descartes, and Newton, had been believing 
Christians. Their innovations had not shaken, but rather strengthened, their belief in the God of 
creation.   
 
The “final ground” [letztes Grund] of secularism could not, in fact, be discovered by taking 
scientific worldviews on their own terms. Like Brunner, Heim argued that secularism could only 
be understood by recovering the spiritual condition of man illuminated by Christian revelation. 
Non-biblical religions, he argued, asserted an identity of the eternal and the natural orders. 
Natural forces were identified with the actions of Gods. While purely “this-worldly” 
philosophies had taken shape in non-Christian cultures, these had either been contained to a 
small intellectual elite or, if they succeeded on a larger scale, had brought on large-scale cultural 
collapse.25 Biblical religions, by contrast, had advanced a strong distinction between time and 
eternity – between the ruling forces of existence in this world and God’s eternal kingdom. The 
relative autonomy of the “world” imagined in Judaism and Christianity allowed for a distinction 
between two dimensions of being: one constituted by the relation between the subject and objects 
and another constituted by the encounter of the subject with the divine person of God. Invoking 
Martin Buber’s distinction, Heim referred to these modes of relation as the “I-it” and the “I-you.” 
Biblical revelation distinguished the two through its absolute prohibition on the objectification of 
the divine as an idol or image: God was not an object but an entirely different kind of being, 
present in the world but fundamentally different from it. Such a God revealed humankind’s 
                                                
25 Ibid, 6. “Wie die Glieder eines Körpers absterben, wenn das Herz stillsteht, so können diese Kulturgebilde keine 
Eigenleben führen, wenn sie nicht vom Herzblut der Religion durchströmt werden.” 
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“embarrassing position” of dependence: its salvation relied upon the action of a God who “comes 
to us from beyond,” and “with whom we can never become identical.”26 
 
In consequence of the ontological division between time and eternity in Biblical religions, 
humanity was, for the first time, confronted with a choice concerning its ultimate “orientation.” 
Scripture revealed a decision, between allegiance to the world and allegiance to God. “Already 
through the either/or relation that exists between these two realities… it becomes possible from a 
biblical standpoint – indeed it appears as a serious possibility, confronting every human being – 
to decide for the cosmos and against God.”27 It was biblical revelation that framed the choice in 
which secularism made sense. “Whosoever therefore will be a friend of the world is the enemy 
of God” was the biblical expression for secularism.28 Like Brunner, Heim asserted that 
secularism could not be understood as a product of scientific progress; it must rather be 
understood as a rejection of God and the personalist conception of the universe posited in 
Christian revelation.  
 
Brunner and Heim’s ideas offer the first examples of a significant re-description of the 
phenomenon that missionaries had identified at Jerusalem. For both figures, the anti-historicist 
frame of existential decision, central to the broad current of dialectical theology, brought to light 
the source of modern secularism that historical thinking and liberal theology concealed. The 
                                                
26 Ibid, 12. 
27 Ibid, 14. “Schon durch dieses exclusive Entweder – Oder Verhaeltnis, das zwischen beiden Realitaeten besteht, 
durch das Ausgeschlossensein jedes Identitaetspunktes wird es also vom biblischen Standppunkte aus moeglich, ja 
es erscheint geradezu als die eine sehr ernsthafte Möglichkeit, die vor jedem Menschen steht, sich fuer den Kosmos 
und gegen Gott zu entscheiden.” 
28 Ibid, 14. 
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triumph of secularism could only be explained as concealment, through a dimension of Existenz,  
of the reality of man confronted with God’s revelation – a concealment which itself only 
underscored the deep truth of Christian anthropology rooted in the conception of man as a sinner, 
inveterately disposed to assert his own agency in the place of God’s. Already within weeks of 
Brunner and Heim’s writings, Oldham had publically adopted their understanding of secularism. 
No longer was it merely the “scientific outlook” of modern industrial civilization, as he had 
characterized the phenomenon in 1929; it was now, as he declared in a speech before a Dutch 
Missionary Conference in the summer of 1930, “the demonic attempt to the world or the self in 
the place of God.”29 In the years that followed, Protestants and Orthodox Christians across the 
North Atlantic would likewise embrace the idea of modernity constituted by man’s rebellion 
against his creator. 
 
II. The Secularism Syndrome: The Emergence of Neo-Pagan Religion from the Crisis of 
Individual Autonomy 
Brunner and Heim’s assessments of secularism both took their aim at scientific rationality as it 
first emerged in the Renaissance evolved through the forms of Enlightenment, mechanistic 
philosophy, scientific positivism, and modern idealisms. But the broader polemical program that 
they advocated – one in which the crucial task was distinguishing between worldviews that made 
“man” the center of existence and a Christian view which placed God as sovereign – could be 
applied as well to interpret a range of movements that dethroned reason and questioned science. 
This became clear in the years between 1930 and the Oxford Conference of 1937– the 
culminating event of Protestant and Orthodox thinking on the problem first framed at Jerusalem 
                                                
29 Joseph Oldham, “The Christianizing and Unchristianizing of the World,” 1930 (Joseph Oldham Papers, 15/2/8), 3. 
The speech mentions both Heim and Brunner’s articles, noting their “remarkably similar” conclusions (1). 
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nine years before. By the time preparations for that event began in 1935, Joseph Oldham, the 
principal organizer of the conference’s monumental study program (which we will examine in 
more detail in the following chapter), could declare that the Christian Church’s “vital conflict” 
was not only with secularism but with “the secular and pagan tendencies of our time.”30 The 
“pagan” tendencies here referred to various cultural and political movements – such as 
nationalism, communism, and fascism – which did not valorize rational autonomy but denigrated 
it in the name of collective solidarities. In this section we will explore how apparently opposed 
social and political ideologies – from fascism to communism to liberal individualism – were 
integrated under the rubric of the modern repudiation of God’s authority. The critical step in this 
history was the emergence of an idea I will term the “secularism syndrome,” according to which 
new forms of collectivism were born in reaction against modernity’s spiritual and social chaos 
but only served to perpetuate it, since they too failed to find salvation in the only authority that 
could offer it.31 Adapting anti-secularism to the fracturing of European political order was a 
strategy for solidifying unity among Christians and churches across national and ideological 
divisions. Its aim was not to anathematize Protestant or Orthodox Christians who declared 
political allegiance to international Communism or the Nazi state (or liberal democracy, for that 
matter), but to define Christianity as a universal faith that might accommodate all political 
allegiances. In this utopian vision, Christians could unite in policing what seemed to be an 
                                                
30 Indeed it was precisely the aim of the Oxford Conference study preparations “to understand the true nature of the 
vital conflict between the Christian faith and the secular and pagan tendencies of our time.” See Joseph Oldham’s 
“General Introduction” to the Oxford study volumes. Eg. “General Introduction,” Christian Faith and the Common 
Life (Chicago: Willett, Clark, and Company, 1936), vii. 
31 My account here draws on an interpretation first advanced by Graeme Smith in his work Oxford 1937: The 
Universal Christian Council of Life and Work Conference (Frankfurt aM: Peter Lang, 2004), 74-95. Smith, 
characterizing the diagnosis of Oldham, Brunner, and other Oxford intellectuals in the mid-1930s, argues that they 
saw “totalitarian” movements as a “postmodern” reaction to modern individualism and its socially disintegrative 
effects. In contrast to Smith, I stress that ecumenists interpreted “individualism” and “totalitarianism” not as 
ontologically distinct (“modern” and “postmodern”) but as different expressions of the anti-theistic animus that 
characterized the modern age.   
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increasingly unstable boundary between the political and the religious, and keeping the former in 
its place by declaring Christianity the fundamental basis of social and spiritual order.  
 
Shortly after Brunner and Heim issued their critiques of secularism in 1930, other voices 
challenged their focus on hypertrophic rationalism. Theophil Spoerri, for instance, a professor 
literature and colleague of Brunner’s at the University of Zürich, published in 1931 Die Götter 
des Abendlandes, which argued that what was distinctive of contemporary European culture was 
not the Renaissance “deification of man” but rather the search for new idols.32 Perhaps on 
Brunner’s suggestion, Spoerri was put in contact with Oldham, and drawn into preparations for 
the meeting of the Continental Group in 1930 and a subsequent meeting of the group in 1932. In 
Spoerri’s account, humankind could not bear the isolation of true independence, and had run to 
embrace new impersonal principles – nationalism, fascism, and communism – as replacements 
for God. W. A. Visser’t Hooft seconded the point in a letter to Oldham critiquing Brunner’s 
presentation of secularism. “Modern man is getting over his over his worship of freedom,” 
Visser’t Hooft averred in 1931. More decisive than individualism was “the new collectivism.” In 
movements such as “fascism, national-socialism, communism, etc,” he wrote, man discovers 
new transcendence. And we are therefore not only face to face with the job of filling a vacuum, 
but also of fighting the new idols.”33 No less a figure than Karl Barth had argued the same thing 
when, in a speech delivered at a meeting of the World Student Christian Federation in 1932, he 
joined the post-Jerusalem debate. The idea of “secularism” misrepresented the basic spiritual 
                                                
32 Theophil Spoerri, Die Götter des Abendlandes: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Heidentum inder Kultur 
unserer Zeit (Berlin: Furche Verlag, 1931). 
33 Quoted in “Christentum and Wirklichkeit: Memorandum by J. H. Oldham” (1931?), a document quoting 
responses received from Continental Group participants to a “Christentum und Wirklichkeit,” a paper prepared for 
the Group in preparation for its second meeting in 1932. (WCC, 26.11.34/24). 
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condition of modern civilization, he argued. “Does ‘Christianity’ see and understand that, in 
contrast to the past, it is faced today by a whole series of other ‘religions?’”34 Barth argued that 
what were often seen as worldviews or “philosophies of life” were in fact new religious 
movements, which were not grounded individual autonomy but rather its submergence. “Man 
can chose his philosophy of life, or even invent one of his own.” A religion, however, differed 
from a worldview in that it “takes hold of man with a power which overcomes all personal 
choices and desires and which forces him to obey without knowing, or wishing to know why he 
does so.” Barth identified three modern “religions.” Communism asserted the “sovereignty… of 
the ‘working class’ as the absolute standard and goal of all things, claiming supreme sacrifice 
and excluding all other claims.” Fascism” ascribed absolute value to the principles of “race” 
“people,” or “nation,” finding in a strong leader such as Hitler or Mussolini the embodiment of 
these principles. “Americanism,” Barth’s third religion, embraced the “gods [of] health and 
comfort,” and was perhaps the “strongest of the three,” because “neither of the others is so self-
dependent, so plausible, so easy and cheerful to live up to.” Seemingly opposed to one another, 
the conflict between these religions was in fact insignificant, since “they are able to practice 
mutual tolerance,” agreeing to recognize one another’s gods as legitimate for those to whom it 
speaks and even “learn from one another.” But the opposition between these new religions and 
Christianity was “merciless” and absolute, since Christianity claimed the existence not of one 
god among many but of the God: it thus forced the followers of these religions to “justify their 
most sacred rights, namely their very existence as religions.”35 
 
                                                
34 Karl Barth, “Questions Christianity Must Face,” Student World (3rd Quarter, 1932), 93. 
35 Ibid, 95. 
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Was the enemy facing the Christian church primarily of one secularism or of a resurgent 
paganism? Distinct as these assessments of the dominant tendencies of modern civilization were, 
the remarkable and decisive feature of ecumenical discourse in the 1930s was that it did not 
fracture over this question. Indeed, the ecumenists’ improbable achievement of the 1930s was 
the construction of a synthetic account of modern civilization that explained the disintegration of 
liberal democracies in Europe and the wider world as part of a “secularism syndrome.” 
According to this argument, humankind’s initial rebellion against God had taken the form of 
scientific rationalism and hypertrophic individualism. But the destruction of traditional moral 
and religious by Renaissance and Enlightenment heresies had taken their toll: contemporary 
humanity in the 1930s was desperate to restore a sense of order, moral assurance, and purpose 
that modernity had destroyed. This interpretation effectively linked “secularism” and “paganism” 
as two consecutive stages of the secularization process, the former a moment of defiant self-
confidence, the latter an illustration of man’s desperation in alienation from God.  
 
After Hitler’s ascent to power in Germany, Christian intellectuals increasingly understood the 
course of modern politics through the lens furnished by these debates over the nature of 
secularism, debates whose foundational assumptions had been in place already before 1933. Not 
only Nazism, but an array of political movements – including nationalism and Communism – 
came to be grouped together under the rubric of collectivist reactions against secular 
individualism, and held up as proof positive of that the modern project of scientific mastery and 
rational autonomy had was dying by self-inflicted wounds. Critically, these new movements, 
while apparently different of secular individualism, were in a fundamental sense identical with it, 




The Russian Orthodox émigré philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev – among the theologians drawn 
into the post-Jerusalem study groups and a participant in a gathering of theologians convened by 
Paton, Adolf Keller, and the Swiss head of the YMCA in 1929 to discuss the problem of 
secularism identified at Jerusalem –  was one early theorizer of the secular syndrome. 
Berdyaev’s 1933 The End of Our Time devoted primary attention to an theological analysis of 
Soviet Communism, which he saw as a pseudo-religion, resembling a faith in its aspiration to 
provide a total account of reality and ultimate purpose, despite an ostensible commitment to 
atheism. Communism’s growing international strength, including its triumph in Russia, had to be 
understood as a consequence of the “end of the Renaissance.”36 Much like Brunner, Berdyaev 
identified the Renaissance as the beginning of western humanity’s turn from Christianity to a 
new “faith in man and the autonomous powers which were his strength,” a faith Berdyaev termed 
“humanism.” But the “paradoxical denouement of modern history” was that “humanism has not 
strengthened man but weakened him.”37 “Autonomy” turned out to be a foyer to despair and 
loneliness, which left man with no sense of obligation or orientation. “Man is tired to death and 
is ready to rest upon any kind of collectivism which may come,” Berdyaev wrote.38 Communism 
provided deracinated man with a sense of responsibility and purpose that secularized 
“humanism” was powerless to afford. 
 
                                                
36 Nicholas Berdyaev, The End of Our Time: Together with an Essay on The General Line of Soviet Philosophy 
(New York: Sheed & Ward, 1933), see esp chpt 1. 
37 Ibid, 15. 
38 Ibid, 16. 
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This pattern of interpretation could be applied to draw any number of new political movements 
into the matrix of secularism and its endgames. A report on “Church and Community” of the 
Oxford Conference of 1937 applied it to nationalism and to Communism alike: both were 
modern “attempts to reconstruct social and moral life” in the ruins of secular atomization. The 
report suggested that nationalism was the more important of the two reactions against modern 
individualism, noting that outside of Russia it seemed to be carrying the field of modern politics 
in “Japan, China, India, Turkey, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Ireland, and… many others countries.” 
At its root, nationalism was a response to the collapse of “old loyalties and pieties,” which had 
destroyed the “spiritual unity of the community,” deprived societies of “common standards” and 
all sense of trust between members of the community. Having emancipated themselves from 
“unquestioned authorities,” modern man was now seeking to construct new ones.  
 
If the evolution of society during the last few centuries has been from corporate solidarity 
to individual self-determinism, modern nationalism aims at a reversion to a position in 
which men’s rights and duties spring naturally out of their station in the community. 
Instead of the individual being solicited by a multitude of competing claims between 
which he has himself to arbitrate, the national community itself is to be the sole source of 
standards and values. The freedom of the individual to manage his own life as he will is 
deliberately sacrificed to social cohesion.39  
 
The freedom to choose the sources of one’s own ultimate allegiance was like the “’freedom’ of 
an unemployed man to spend his time as he will, which means in practice that no significant way 
of spending it is open to him, and that his life is emptied of meaning and savour.”40 In this 
condition of rudderless autonomy, man gave himself “willingly and gladly” to a new sense of 
                                                
39 “Longer Report on Church and Community,” The Churches Survey Their Task, ed. Oldham, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1937), 193. 
40 Ibid, 193. 
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purpose supplied by nationalism (or communism), which were projects that were not narrowly 
political but offered instead a response to unmet “spiritual needs.” 
 
In connection with the ecumenical diagnosis of the secularism syndrome, it is worth noting that it 
was here, as a part of the endgame of modernity’s self-dissolution, that ecumenists located the 
phenomenon of “totalitarianism.” The term, of course, was widely deployed in the mid-century 
North Atlantic, beginning in the 1930s, and Catholics may have been the first to bring it into 
wide circulation.41 The idea of a “total” state, assuming control over all dimensions of social and 
personal life, was for ecumenists one form that the reaction against secular disintegration in its 
nationalist, communist, or fascist variants could take. Ecumenists were careful in their 
discussions of totalitarianism to distinguish the phenomenon from questions over the formal 
rights and powers of the state – a merely political question on which Christians might 
legitimately disagree. Oldham made the distinction clear. In an essay of 1935 he noted that 
Christianity per se had not object to “authoritarian” forms of government per se: “The social 
benefits which have resulted from the increased activity of the state” in various fields – including 
relief for the unemployed, “town and country planning,” the organization of agriculture and 
business – “are sufficient evidence that a large extension of the functions of the state is not in 
itself something to be resisted or feared.”42 (Indeed, he continued, “the aims of an authoritarian 
state might be inspired by, or in large measure consistent with, the Christian view of life.”43 
“Totalitarianism,” however, was essentially anti-Christian, since it was not a political form but a 
                                                
41 James Chappel, “The Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism Theory in Interwar Europe,” Modern Intellectual 
History 8, 3 (2011), 561-590. 
42 Joseph Oldham, Church, Community, and State – A World Issue (London: Harper & Bros, 1935), 8. 
43 Ibid, 14. 
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conscription of the state to serve a purpose only religion could properly fulfill, of providing a 
universal and ultimate sense of purpose and meaning to life. “The totalitarian state is a state 
which lays claim to man in the totality of his being; which declares its own authority to be the 
source of all authority… which seeks to impose on all its citizens a particular philosophy of life; 
and which sets out to create by means of all the agencies of public information and education a 
particular type of man in accordance with its own understanding of the meaning and end of 
man’s existence. A state which advances such claims declares itself to be not only a state but also 
a Church.”44 Rightly understood, totalitarianism was an expression for a longing for order and 
moral purpose that modern individualism had destroyed. But it was critical to see that the 
Christian church could not isolate “totalitarianism” as its exclusive or even privileged enemy in 
the world. “The deeper meaning of totalitarian claims will be missed if they fail to open our eyes 
to a state of things which is found in every country.” In democratic states as well, 
instrumentalities of education, the press, broadcasting and cinema were all propagating a concept 
of life opposed to the Christian conception of the nature and destiny of man. “The life and death 
struggle of the Christian Church is “none the less real where the general mind of the community 
becomes paganized, even though the state may remain politically neutral.”45 
 
Understood from the standpoint of ecumenical theology, new forms of collectivism, whether 
they were described as “totalitarian” or “utopian” or “neo-paganism,” or designated as “political 
religions, only extended the rebellion against God begun in the Renaissance. Like the 
individualism and reliance of rationality that they repudiated, these movements expressed an 
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attempt of modern man to redeem himself. Surveying the broad lines of discussion at the Oxford 
Conference and the body of reports it generated, the American chapter of the Universal Council 
of Life and Work stressed that the conference delegates had broadly united around this 
interpretation of contemporary politics and culture: 
 
Not only did the Conference characterize the present era as one of disintegration but it 
diagnosed contemporary evils as due to the secularization of the spirit and outlook of 
humanity. Again and again it was proclaimed that humanism, the elevation of man’s 
power and authority to the level of the divine, was responsible for the present condition 
of society. Thus the ascription to the state of supreme power and construction of utopias 
as means whereby man engineers his own salvation… were deplored as responsible for 
the collapse of human values.46 
 
By 1937, when these words were written, the contemporary scene of “modern civilization” in its 
global dimensions was very different from that of 1928-1930. The success of anti-democratic 
and anti-liberal forces was assured not only in Germany and in Europe, but in Japan and Asia as 
well. Extremism on the Left and Right was on the rise. For ecumenical thinkers these 
developments were all to be understood within the framework of the secularist repudiation of the 
Christian God, an interpretation first achieved through dialectical theology’s reframing of the 
phenomenon identified in 1928 at Jerusalem. The effort to escape the anarchy brought in the 
train of the Renaissance only led to new configuration’s of modern man’s rebellion against God. 
In fact, as ecumenists were keen to point out, viewed from a global perspective, the new 
collectivisms of resurgent nationalism, communism, and fascism only exacerbated the moral and 
social anarchy they claimed to overcome. What seemed like a regimentation of life and the 
restoration of “community” ties through collectivist movements was, in fact, a more profound 
form of social and spiritual disorder. As the Oxford Report on “Church and Community” stated: 
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Human life is falling to pieces because it has tried to organize itself into unity on a 
secularistic and humanistic basis without any reference to the divine will and power 
beyond itself. It has sought to be self-sufficient, a law unto itself. Nor is there any hope in 
the ascription of sacred quality to nation, or state, or class. A false sacred, a false God, 
merely adds demonic power to the unredeemed passions of men. Though bringing about 
temporary and local unity it prepares for mankind an even worse and wider conflict.47 
 
Over the 1930s, then, the discourse on secularism evolved to incorporate the rise of anti-liberal 
political movements in Europe and elsewhere. The new “collectivisms” such as nationalism, 
fascism, and communism evinced the shattered confidence of the Enlightenment project and the 
desperate bid to restore order and morality that followed from the abandonment of God. Yet they 
failed to secure the end they sought. “Local unity” or momentary consolidation of a new 
communal order was only a foundation of conflict on a larger, more global scale, as war erupted 
in Spain and Manchuria and the European Continent seemed possibly poised for a second 
conflagration From a theological perspective, the source of these conflicts was plain to see. Like 
the individualism they apparently rejected, these new collectivisms were based on the attempt to 
assert human independence from the divine. New collectivisms were the symptoms of modern 
project, not alternatives to it. These interpretations of contemporary political conflict retained the 
theological orientation of Brunner and Heim’s early interventions of 1930s. That is, they 
characterized modernity in terms of an epochal rebellion against God, begun with the liberation 
of the individual from responsibility to God in the west and only exacerbated by attempts to 
restore responsibility and community life. Only by restoring the relationship with God, they 
implied, could man find the spiritual and social peace he vainly sought to secure for himself. 
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We saw in the last chapter how anti-secularism was born as an expression of international 
Protestant solidarity in 1928. The successive reinterpretations of secularism and paganism over 
the 1930s were attempts to shore up the unitive function of this discourse. As it had had united 
the blocs of German and Allied Protestantism estranged after World War I, so anti-secularism 
would retain the allegiance of German Protestants even as many of them – including Heim, 
Knak, Frick, and Freytag – declared enthusiasm for Hitler’s government. (We will examine in 
detail how the Reich Church was practically incorporated into the ecumenical movement in the 
next chapter). The critical innovation that the concept of secularism furnished was a distinction 
between allegiance to nation or race that might be legitimate so far as it was “political” but not 
religious – and the phenomenon of a “pagan” elevation of such loyalties that constituted a 
challenge to God’s sovereignty. Anti-secularism objected to the hypertrophy of the state, or to 
nationalist (or class) loyalties at the moment that they transgressed their appropriate bounds and 
become “total” sources of meaning and purpose. The question of when exactly this transgression 
occurred – that is, the question of what particular policies and programs evinced the existence of 
spiritual totalitarianism rather than a merely legitimate and Christian use of state power or 
nationalist loyalty – was a question that the theology of anti-secularism in its 1930s iteration did 
not only not answer, but was designed to evade. Its goal, indeed, was specifically to avert such 
discussions of particular policies or political programs, in order to assert the primacy of a 
common Christian and spiritual front against modernity’s repudiation of God. The description of 
modernity’s spiraling social and spiritual disorder furnished the foil against which ecumenists 
would articulate their own conception of a Christian alternative to secularism. To the discussion 
of ecumenists positive proposals for social order, and the ways in which these proposals 




III. “Let the Church be the Church:” The Anti-Secular Origins of the Ecumenical 
Movement 
Emil Brunner’s 1930 “Secularism as a Problem for the Church” provides a starting point to 
understand how the ecumenical movement emerged out of the dialectical theological critique of 
secularism. Having characterized the phenomenon of secularism as a demonic assertion of 
independence on the part of modern man against his two fold-responsibilities to his fellows and 
God, Brunner concluded with some thoughts on the task of the church in its conflict with this 
new challenger. Elaborating on the idea of an “eristic” theology from his article on the “Other 
Task of Theology” from the year before, he argued that Christian thinkers must take the 
offensive, polemically asserting revelation against reason as the only source of true 
understanding of human nature and the world. Armed with dialectical insight, theology must 
become a “struggle of faith with the powers of the Zeitgeist,” confronting modern man with his 
true nature and by so doing “[deprive] him of his alleged positions, and [show] him the 
destructive and dissolving nature of his thinking, in order to place him before the message of the 
living God.”48 However, Brunner’s account in 1930 did not merely reiterate his position; it broke 
new ground. Cognizant of an audience more international than Zwischen den Zeiten, and 
embracing the collaborative ethos of Oldham’s efforts to promote post-Jerusalem study, Brunner 
explained how eristic struggle formed the basis of a new understanding of the church as a 
community united through its theological endeavor. In this understanding, we can find the 
intellectual origins of a re-orientation of international Protestantism, away from its prior 
ambition to build the Kingdom of God and toward its 1930s focus on realizing the church. 
                                                




For Brunner, combating secularism required in the first instance that Christians correct their own 
secularistic understanding of the universe. Any attempt to combat secularism by an appeal to 
“religion” in general was bound to fail, since “religion” as such was a merely a psychological or 
sociological phenomenon, a constellation of rational or affective efforts to relate to the divine. In 
this sense, Brunner explained, Christianity “is not ‘religion’; it does not have its basis in religious 
thought, feeling or action, but in the divine action and the divine word.” The crisis of the church 
in the modern age was that the church itself had lost its true basis: Christians were themselves 
secularistic in the sense of denying God’s self-revelation as the source of truth and knowledge. 
Only by recovering its origin – the Word of God – could the international community of 
Christians discover its calling in the world.  
 
That the Church should recover this [the Word of God], its real ground, which it has lost 
nearly everywhere—this is the first and incomparably the most important task of the 
Church in view of the problem of secularism. The Church must reconsider and cast back 
to the possession it has lost. But this reconsideration is just theology, theology as a 
struggle for the truth of the Word of God, for the true self-interpretation of man which is 
given in revelation.49  
 
Christians must learn to collectively orient themselves around a theological ethics of 
responsiveness to God’s revelation. This entailed the chastening of intellectual ambition, and the 
cultivation of obedience to God’s self-disclosure, which humankind encountered always as a 
message from beyond. Theology was thus a means of expressing the bonds between God and 
man and among men that formed the Christian community. The church, the community created 
through this collective ethics of responsiveness, was not one religious body among others but as 
the only authentic basis of social existence. As much as Brunner’s theology insisted on the 
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“either/or” of Christian faith – entailing a decision either for or against God – he was here 
advancing a “both/and.” For it turned out that the critique of secularism most likely to be 
efficacious in the world would come only through the church recovering what it truly was. “As 
men of to-day we can only apprehend the divine Word through conflict with the thought of our 
time. And we can only sustain the conflict if we understand the Word of God in its proper 
content.”50 Thus Brunner announced the deceptively simple task of the church in relation to 
secularism: 
 
The first task of the Church is once more to become a Church, i.e. to recover again the 
thing that makes it a Church, namely, the Word of God, without which it is only an 
ecclesiastical body without a soul.51 
 
Brunner’s utterance here expressed, for the first time, the objective of what would come to be 
known in years following as the “ecumenical movement:” a movement that would seek, not to 
Christianize the world, but to Christianize the church, a community set apart from the world, 
and, in its opposition to the spiritual foundations of modern society, the guardian of the only 
truly universal social order. Brunner’s early articulation of this task shows how it was originally 
grounded in the re-orientation of the problem of secularism first brought about dialectical 
theology. But in the years that followed, the program brought into focus within the horizon of 
Existenz would gain adherents well beyond the circle of theologians and church elites and 
laypersons who identified themselves as “dialectical theologians” – including among those who 
would indeed take issue with many of Brunner’s ideas (such as American Protestants who found 
Brunner’s preoccupation with sin corrosive to the springs of Christian action.) This percolation 
enacted, in other words, the intra-Christian theological “struggle” that Brunner described, one in 
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which theological debate within the Christian community would serve as a new means of 
constituting international Christian unity. 
 
For some sense of the longer-term success of Brunner’s proposal, consider the similarity of the 
quotation above to what can justly be viewed as the classic statement of international ecumenism 
in the 1930s, the “Message” issued by the Oxford Conference of Life and Work in 1937:  
 
The first duty of the Church, and its greatest service to the world, is that it be in very deed 
the Church—confessing the true faith, committed to the fulfillment of the will of Christ, 
its only Lord, and united in Him in a fellowship of love and service.52    
 
These words, widely cited from 1937 onward, became the basis of the “crusading motto” of the 
1930s ecumenism: “Let the Church be the Church!”53 Both official statement and unofficial 
watchword encapsulated an argument already present in Brunner’s essay of 1930. They insisted 
that the mission of the church was not external to the Christian community but a matter of its 
internal reorganization. “We do not call the world to be like ourselves, for we are already too like 
the world,” explained the Oxford “Message.” “Only as we ourselves repent, both as individuals 
and corporate bodies, can the Church call men to repentance. The call to ourselves and to the 
world is to Christ.”54 This reorganization was an attempt to configure a form of community life 
that would subordinate human agency to the sovereignty of Christ – the “only Lord” of the 
church. The unity of the fellowship of the church “is not built up from its constituent parts, like a 
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federation of different states, it consists in the Sovereignty and redeeming acts of its one Lord.” 
Earlier programs of international Christian unity had perceived a world in which the struggle to 
extend God’s sovereignty had primarily involved its outward projection and expansion. The 
ecumenical program, however, posited a struggle was internal to the church: a struggle for 
obedience against the prideful self-assertion of man that modernity sought to normalize and in 
doing so amplified. But this internal struggle was not an introversion or a turn away from the 
world: indeed, its basis was a polemical re-description of modernity that sought to present intra-
Christian debate within the framework of a master narrative of sin and reconciliation. The 
overcoming of the modern world’s rebellion would take place once it was re-conceptualized and 
re-located within the church.  
 
How ecumenists in the 1930s sought to practically use theological discourse as a means of 
organizing the church towards this end is the subject of the next chapter. Our concern in the 
remainder of this chapter is to examine the intellectual foundations of this organizational effort. 
We will do so by investigating a broad reorientation that occurred in that decade, away from the 
task of spreading the Kingdom, toward that of realizing the church. This shift, in one sense, 
entailed a celebration of churchly identity and otherworldly orientation. But the shift was made, 
as Brunner’s article suggested, not with the intention of abrogating Christianity’s public role, but 
rather redefining it as a new form of public engagement, centered around combat. The shift 
evinced, in other words, acceptance of the both the idea that Christianity faced off against a 
many-headed hydra of secularism/paganisms and that in order to combat these, a new 
formulation of the Word of God was needed. In its aspiration to universal dominion, Christianity 
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could not merely “apply” its teachings to the social realm; it had to do battle first with opponents 
asserting their own authority to organize social and spiritual life in the modern world.  
 
This “church-centric” vision of international Protestantism was extremely successful in the 
1930s; to best illustrate this, we first turn to its relationship to a milieu removed by theological 
and cultural temperament from that of Continental dialectical theology. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, American Protestants in the 1920s had already been touting the “church” as a 
critical expression of Christian solidarity. But in the 1920s these appeals had remained 
fundamentally committed to the earlier 19th century view that the church’s role was to 
“Christianize” the social order through the development of concrete programs for reform 
bringing social relations into conformity with an ideal Kingdom of God. The innovation of this 
program, as opposed to pre-1914 versions, was simply that it globalized a picture of the society 
that needed to be Christianized: rather than distinguishing between a “Christian” West and a 
“non-Christian” rest, Anglo-American Protestants argued that the church must direct its 
reforming efforts towards the international scope of relations between “nations, races, and 
classes”.  
 
In the 1930s, the focus shifted away from the development of concrete proposals, toward 
asserting the church as a solidarity in opposition to multiple spiritual, national, and ideological 
challengers. The American Congregationalist John Bennett, a young theologian at Auburn 
Theological Seminary, registered the shift in a 1935 article in the journal Christendom, later 
expanded the following year into a book with the title Christianity – And our World. Bennett 
began his work by contrasting the attitudes of the generation of Protestants that had come of age 
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before the War and his own postwar generation. “For the past generation it was possible to be 
sincerely Christian and yet fit easily into civilization,” he wrote. “The world seemed to be a 
hospitable place for the development of Christian faith and the realization of Christian ideals.”55 
Walter Rauschenbusch’s 1912 classic, Christianizing the Social Order, gave epitomic expression 
to those expectations. Rauschenbusch had surveyed a world in which, in Bennett’s words, “the 
greater part of the work of Christianizing the social order was already done.” Christian principles 
and faith dominated “the home, the church, the school, and the political state.” It remained only 
to apply Christian principles to the “economic order” in order to bring at last the Kingdom of 
God to the world. Yet today, Rauschenbusch’s outlook was “completely foreign to the world in 
which we live.” “No longer can Christians fit easily into their world,” for “the forces which have 
most momentum in our society are pagan forces.”56 Communism was “avowedly anti-Christian,” 
but bourgeois capitalism and Nazism were likewise hostile, though they often assumed a 
“Christian veneer.” Resurgent paganism forced Christians everywhere to recover a sense of 
where they stood. “It is as Christians come to see the degree to which they are living in a world 
which is alien or hostile that they are thrown together as a Church against the world.”57 Bennett 
argued that the church was a social order that was the antidote to “individual egoism” and 
“collective egoism.”58 Insofar as Christians realized their fellowship with one another through 
common faith, Christianity would check the centrifugal forces of individualism as well as the 
                                                
55 John C. Bennett, Christianity—And Our World (New York: Hazen Foundation, 1936), vii. 
56 Ibid, viii. 
57 Ibid, 59. 
58 Bennett’s discussion (18-22) follows Reinhold Niebuhr’s contrast between “individual egoism” and “collective 
egoism,” in which a capacity for self-transcendence present in “personal” relationships is undermined by the 
structural patterns of behavior constituting class, national, and racial groups. See Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and 
Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), esp chpt 1.  
 
 198 
conflicts generated by race prejudice, nationalism, and Communist and Nazi totalitarianism. 
Bennett concluded with reference to the anonymous second century “Epistle to Diognetus” – a 
reference common among American ecumenists in the 1930s and 1940s59 – asserting that it was 
the church that “holds the world together.” In the “period of disintegration” that defined his own 
day, Bennett argued that the Christian fellowship – spread throughout the world as the result of 
the missionary movement – was the “only international organism which has real roots in the 
various nations.”  
 
Bennett’s contemporaries embraced much the same concept of the church and its task in a hostile 
world. Like him, they argued that the times demanded a new understanding of an institution that 
had been synonymous with Christianity’s irrelevance and narcissism. According to Samuel 
McCrea Cavert, writing in 1936 in the Bulletin of the Federal Council of Churches (widely 
circulated and aimed toward a popular audience), most people understood the “church” as a local 
parish – “the church of Jonesville,” or at best a national denomination. Truly understood, 
however the church was “the universal Church of Christ, binding together men and women of 
every nation, race, and class, throughout successive generations, in a world fellowship.”60 
Recovering a true understanding of the meaning of the church was the deepest need of humanity 
in its present state of crisis.  
 
The other forces that are today the chief rivals of the Church for the allegiance of 
mankind are sounding rallying cries that are hopelessly divisive. Hitler is crying, 
‘Whoever is not of German blood cannot follow me.’ Mussolini is crying ‘Whoever is 
                                                
59 See for instance Francis P. Miller, “New Religion of Nationalism,” in The Christian Message for the World Today 
eds E. Stanley Jones et al. (New York: Round Table, 1934), 68 and Samuel McCrea Cavert, “Ecumenical Church in 
Time of War,” Anglican Theological Review (Apr 1940), 17..  
60 Samuel McCrea Cavert, “The Editorial Outlook,” Federal Council Bulletin (Nov 1936), 1-2.  
 
 199 
not an Italian nationalist cannot follow me.’ Stalin is crying, ‘Whoever is not of the 
proletariat cannot follow me.’ Is there any uniting voice? There is One: ‘Whosoever [of 
whatever race or nation or class] would come after me, let him take up his cross and 
follow me.’ Upon the Church rests the responsibility of giving adequate embodiment of 
that unifying Voice in the world today.61 [Brackets in the original] 
 
The question for Cavert and Bennett then, was not how Christians could transform the social 
order but how they could “realize” the church. Their colleague Henry Van Dusen, President of 
Union Theological Seminary in New York, echoed the point. “No one who tests the pulse of 
contemporary feeling can have failed to note the signs of a reviving interest in the church,” he 
wrote in 1936. While the theological modernism had cultivated distrust of religious institutions 
among seminarians in the 1920s, Van Dusen’s current students were discovering the church as a 
global solidarity at the moment that totalitarian states in Spain, Mexico, Germany and Russia 
threatened Christian interests. For these students, what Van Dusen characterized as a “feeling 
after the church” was not a derogation of Christianity’s public role but the fulfillment of it.62 
Such a transformation could only be imagined in a world where the church had become an 
alternative to competing programs of social and spiritual mastery over a single, worldwide 
civilization.  
 
Along with the valorization of the church came the repudiation of the Kingdom of God as an 
goal attainable by human effort. Indeed, very idea of “building the Kingdom of God on earth” 
seemed to ecumenists to represent a secularization of Christianity. Reinhold Niebuhr reminded 
his growing transatlantic audience repeatedly in the 1930s and 1940s that this was a utopian 
vision at odds with the essential point of Christian anthropology, which was that even the most 
                                                
61 Ibid, 4. 
62 Henry Van Dusen, “The Meaning of Oxford, 1937,” Federal Council Bulletin (March 1937), 6. 
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idealistic human efforts were shot through with sin. The realization of the Kingdom could only 
be at God’s initiative.63 In advancing the position Niebuhr was simply reiterating the 
predominant post-Jerusalem opposition of the secular and the Christian worldviews, the latter 
ostensibly based on the deification of man, and the latter rooted in an understanding of man’s 
fallen nature. William Temple stressed the same point. For him, as for Niebuhr, to deny the 
attainability of the Kingdom in history was not a counsel of withdrawal from the world but a 
demand that Christian social and political action be animated by a sense of the limits of human 
agency. In his essay for the Oxford study volume on Christian Faith and the Common Life, 
Temple asserted, “[w]e must rid ourselves completely of the Pelagian notion that we can ‘build’ 
or ‘extend’ the Kingdom of God.” Christians at best had the responsibility to “prepare the way 
for the Lord; but he will come in his own time.”64 Christians’ social responsibility was to 
embody the ethics of the Kingdom – that is, to bear “witness” in social and political life to an 
authority that could not be identified with any existing temporal institution, idea, or value. The 
goal of the Christian hope was not “any social or political achievement,” and God’s final victory 
over history does “not… crown our efforts by the establishment of the perfect cooperative 
commonwealth.” “Our task is not to construct the Kingdom, but to live in the conditions of this 
world as those who, by the grace of God through the redemption effected in Christ, are citizens 
of the Kingdom.”65 The church, Temple explained, was nothing other than the community of 
those seeking to live as “citizens” of the Kingdom in this world. 
 
                                                
63 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, passim; An Interpretation of Ethics (New York: Harper & Bros, 1935), 
passim. 
64 William Temple, “Christian Faith and the Common Life,” in Christian Faith and the Common Life ed. Nils 
Ehrenstroem (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), 61-2. 
65 Ibid, 62. 
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To articulate the shift from Kingdom to church, a new language was needed. It was in the effort 
to describe the new object of international Christian unity that the terms “ecumenical” and 
“ecumenicity” came at last into broad usage in the 1930s. The words became invested with the 
hopes of Protestant and Orthodox Christians who were committed to the anti-secular campaign. 
Berdyaev predicted confidently that atomistic individualism, “already beaten in a false fashion 
by Communism,” would be vanquished “truly by the Church and the oecumenical spirit.”66 
Beginning in 1933, when the Universal Council of Life and Work began to organize study 
groups similar to those that Oldham and others had organized in the immediate aftermath of the 
Jerusalem Conference, they were called “ecumenical study conferences,” since their aim was to 
reach a consensus around Christian teaching in opposition to secular understandings of questions 
ranging from the responsibility of the state, to the concept of the nation, to the bases of a just 
economic order.67  
 
Reflecting the rupture that the anti-secular program marked, the term ecumenical carried for all 
of its champions an aura of novelty and excitement. Though its usage grew in the early 1930s, 
especially on the European Continent, the term’s international breakout year was 1937. For the 
delegates of the Oxford Conference that July and a gathering organized the following month in 
Edinburgh by the World Conference on Faith and Order, the word crystallized common 
aspiration. “One of the ways in which ideas are spread is through new terms,” explained the 
American division of the Universal Council of Life and Work in its short summary of Oxford 
Conference literature. “If we in America are to appreciate the central drive of the Oxford 
                                                
66 Berdyaev, 109. 
67 See “The Church and the Social Order” (Study Report), Rengsdorf, 8-15 March 1933. (WCC, 24.002). 
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conference, we must learn the meaning of a word hitherto little used among us – namely, the 
word ‘ecumenical.’ It means world-wide, and as applied in the deliberations at Oxford and also 
at Edinburgh it signifies ‘concerning the whole household of the faithful,’ meaning the entire 
Christian Church in conscious fellowship.”68  
 
The growth of this conscious fellowship was the “good news” of the era for the advocates of 
international Christian cooperation. “The glorious word ‘ecumenical,’ is beginning to have a new 
place in the life of the Church,” declared Samuel McCrea Cavert, Secretary of the Federal 
Council of Churches of the USA in an article reviewing preparations for the assemblies at 
Oxford and Edinburgh.69 Filing stories for the Christian Century on location from Great Britain 
that summer, Charles Clayton Morrison, editor of the Christian Century, explained to his 
American readers that the assembled clerics, theologians, lay Christian philosophers and activists 
were “learning to use this word ‘ecumenical.” It, “and its substantive, ‘ecumenicity,’ are on all 
our lips. We are an ‘ecumenical movement,’ both Oxford and Edinburgh are its expression.”70 
John Mackay seconded the verdict: “A new term has been added, or, perhaps, one should say, an 
ancient term has been restored, to the current speech of educated Christians,” he wrote in 1937, 
in his review of the two gatherings. “Whatever may prove to be the other achievements of the 
world gatherings of churches held at Oxford and Edinburgh, this at least is one: the word 
‘ecumenical’ was definitely reborn at these conferences with a richer connotation than had ever 
                                                
68 “Salient Features of the Oxford Conference,” 5. 
69 Samuel McCrea Cavert, “The Church as a World Community” Federal Council Bulletin, vol 19, 9 (Nov 1936), 
13. 
70 C. C. Morrison, “Our Christianity is True!” Christian Century (August 4, 1937), . 
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belonged to it before.”71 In his opening address to the Oxford Conference, Cosmo Lang, 
Archbishop of Canterbury, declared that the existence of an “ecumenical movement” uniting not 
only Christians in Europe and North America but in Asia and Africa as well, was “a wholly new 
fact in Christian History.”72  
 
As ecumenists came to embrace the ecumenical church, they simultaneously reimagined prior 
efforts to promote world Christian unity as a pre-history to their current efforts. These accounts 
attributed to ecumenists’ forebears a purpose that had been unthinkable to them at the time. For 
the authors of the Oxford Report on “the Universal Church and the World of Nations,” the true 
significance of the missionary movement was not that it had extended the “Kingdom” in the 
world – as antebellum missionaries had in fact understood their objective – but that it had 
enabled the church to become truly “oecumenical,” by drawing into it members from all nations 
across the inhabitable earth. “A special ground of faith and courage amid the perplexities of our 
age is that the Christian Church is becoming truly oecumenical… [since] the missionary 
movement of the past century” had succeeded in making “the bounds of the Christian community 
co-extensive with the inhabitable globe.”73 Moreover, attempts to cultivate a sense of common 
Christian identity across denominations had served, not to bolster the power of churches to 
transform broader society, but rather to enable Christians to “[realize] anew that the Church is 
one.” This sense was now being sharpened still further by “the emergence in different parts of 
the world of political systems usurping the role of Churches, and demanding absolute allegiance 
                                                
71 John MacKay, “The Ecumenical Road,” Christendom 4 (Autumn 1937), 535-8. 
72 Quoted in Oldham, Introduction, The Churches Survey Their Task, 31. 
73 “Report on the Universal Church and the World of Nations,” The Churches Survey Their Task: The Report of the 




of men and women.” In response to these challengers, “Christian churches in every land” were 
being awakened to their “deepened loyalty to Christ and the Church and a fresh sense of their 
need of solidarity in Christ.” 
 
The report on the “The Universal Church and the World of Nations” further clarified how the 
campaign to realize ecumenical unity differed from previous efforts to work for international 
peace and cooperation. The latter failed to comprehend from a “Christian point of view” the 
problem of social and international disintegration. “The term ‘international’ necessarily accepts 
the division of mankind into separate nations as a natural if not a final state of affairs. The term 
‘oecumenical’ refers to the expression within history of the given unity of the Church. The one 
starts from the fact of division and the other from the fact of unity in Christ.” To view churches’ 
“thought and action” as international in nature was true insofar as, on the plane of history, 
national and ecclesiastical divisions still defined the landscape of Christendom. But the aim of 
“the church” per se must be the cultivation of a unity not achieved by human effort, but given by 
God and registered as an imperative of Christian obedience. Relations among churches were 
“oecumenical in so far as they attempt to realize the Una Sancta, the fellowship of Christians 
who acknowledge the one Lord.” Such relations expressed in preliminary form a reconciliation 
of all peoples achieved in Christ’s sacrifice and yet incomplete within history. Christian 
revelation furnished “an insight not derived from ordinary political sources. To those who are 
struggling to realize human brotherhood in a world where disruptive nationalism and aggressive 
imperialism make such brotherhood seem unreal, the Church offers not an ideal but a fact, man 
united not by his aspiration but by the love of God.”74 
                                                





This chapter has examined the intellectual origins of the ecumenical movement that first 
emerged in the 1930s. It has argued that the movement took form as a critique of secularism first 
advanced by dialectical theologians. In this critique, secularism was a rebellion against God that 
could take the form of imperious rationalism or neo-pagan religion. As described by dialectical 
theology, secularism was not an autochthonous rival. The condition of possibility for its 
historical emergence was the relation between man and God established in Christian revelation. 
Christians confronted secularism as an enemy present in the wider world, but also present within 
the church, in the form of divisions among churches and a “rationalization” of Christianity that 
had contributed to the contemporary crisis. Social division and conflict in all forms was a 
consequence of original sin, but the Christian church was distinguished from broader society as 
the unique site where the “sin” of division was acknowledged and repented – and overcome by 
God’s grace. Foregrounding the scriptural revelation of man’s separation from God, ecumenists 
inscribed the crisis of modern civilization within their own community, as a struggle among 
Christians and Churches to recover the eternal Word of God in terms germane to the present age. 
Establishing the dialectical tension between revelation and reason underscored that the quest to 
build the Kingdom of God in history was a product of the secularistic hubris that it was now the 
task of the Christian community to combat. Ecumenists thus declared that their goal was to 
realize the church, not the Kingdom, in history, and they reinterpreted the history of previous 




By encompassing liberal individualism and its apparent opposites of Nazism and Communism 
under the rubric of a coherent enemy, ecumenists sought to consolidate Christian unity in a 
decade of political polarization that threatened once again to alienate the Germans from their co-
religionists in other countries. Novel as the ecumenical objective was, those who organized 
around it struggled to walk the same narrow road as their predecessors, fashioning a Christian 
program at once public but not “political,” relevant to broader society but above parties. As we’ll 
see in more detail in the next chapter, ecumenists were remarkably – disturbingly – successful in 
retaining the loyalties of German church leaders and theologians who cheered Hitler’s ascent to 
power in 1933 and were willing to make peace with the regime throughout the 1930s.  
 
In the following chapter, we will examine how ecumenists sought to realize the church in 
practice. Insisting sharply on the sovereignty of God and obedience of man, ecumenists 
nonetheless still embraced the instrumentalities of bureaucratic organization in order to usher the 
community of the church into existence. To make God’s authority effective in the world required 
organization and exercise of power. The question of what institutions ought to exert that power, 
and toward what practical and immediate goals, would begin in the 1940s to undermine the 


































A “Personal Community” against Secular Civilization: Institutionalizing the 




By the mid-1930s, the Protestant and Orthodox advocates of international Christian unity had 
become “ecumenists.” They saw the realization of an “ecumenical” church as the solution to the 
crisis of secularism, a reigning spiritual and social disorder brought on by modern man’s 
rebellion against God. This chapter shows how, between 1929 and 1945, ecumenists reconceived 
and reformed a constellation of existing international organizations in accordance with this 
objective. Their efforts sought to transform the “church” from an institution aloof from the 
public sphere to a new kind of public body, inclusive of all nations, races, and classes. To 
achieve this transformation, ecumenists conceived and constituted in practice the ecumenical 
church as a community of persons. As a “personal community,” ecumenists believed, the church 
would break through ecclesiastical isolation and become a social order in which the dialogue 
between diverse cultural, political, and religious perspectives would instantiate universal God’s 
rule.  
 
Recent scholarship has underscored the significance of idea of the person in interwar social and 
political thought. A range of thinkers from diverse philosophical and religious traditions – 
including ecumenical Protestants, Catholics such as Jacques Maritain, the German 
phenomenologist Max Scheler, and the French essayist and thinker Emmanuel Mounier – turned 
to the concept of the person to re-imagine the bases of social order in the interwar period.1 
                                                
1 See for instance Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 
esp chpt 2; Marco Duranti, “Conservatives and the European Convention on Human Rights,” Toward a New Moral 
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Intentionally vague in their concrete political implications, philosophies of the human person 
were deployed to summon the possibility of a spiritual and often specifically religious third way 
between binary alternatives: capitalism and communism and individualism and collectivism. In 
these accounts, “personal community” was envisioned as a social order in which individual self-
realization would come through, not at the expense of, a communal life of responsibility and 
service to others. For the Non-conformist Emmanuel Mounier, for instance, the person was used, 
as Samuel Moyn has recently written, “to insist on respect for self-realization that ‘collectivism’ 
ruled out, while pressing it to imply a community that brought atomized individuals back 
together.”2 For Christian thinkers, the idea of the person was a strategy that rooted authentic 
social order in responsibility to God. While Catholic thinkers stressed communal rights and 
duties of the person to God and others, ecumenical variations on personalism, deeply shaped by 
dialectical theology in the 1930s, traced out a vision of universal community encompassing all 
nations, races, and classes.3 The idea of personal community articulated ecumenical opposition 
to both moments of what was discussed in the last chapter as the “secularism syndrome”: it 
offered resistance to rationalistic individualism on the one hand and neo-pagan religions – such 
as Communism, fascism, and Nazism – on the other. The origin of the affective and ethical 
bonds that created such a community lay an act of faith: an obedient “yes” to God’s word that 
simultaneously bound one to others in relations of charity and mutual responsibility. In this 
                                                
World Order? Menschenrechtspolitik und Völkerrecht seit 1945, eds. Norbert Frei and Annette Weinke (Göttingen, 
2013), 82-93; and most recently Terrance Renaud, “Human Rights as Radical Anthropology: Protestant Theology 
and Ecumenism in the Transwar Era,” The Historical Journal (forthcoming). For Scheler’s personalism, see Stephen 
Schneck, Person and Polis: Max Scheler’s Personalism as Political Theory (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1987) and Michael Gubser, The Far Reaches: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Social Renewal in Central Europe 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). 
2 Moyn, 85 
3 Renaud, 11. 
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account, Christian faith would balance the claims of individual freedom and communal 
responsibility, achieving a synthesis that fatally eluded secular attempts at social integration. 
 
For ecumenists, the idea of the person played a critical role in the institutionalization of their 
movement. It enabled them to assert the larger, public significance of the church. In this view, 
the church was a universal society actualized in the polyvocal responses to God’s address. Rather 
than an institution cut off from the modern world, the church was the only form that a truly 
global social order could take. This order was conceived as a public, communicative space, 
actualized through theological conversation and debate among those “personally” addressed by 
revelation. Rather than evincing a Christian accommodation within the secular “public sphere” 
as conceived by Jürgen Habermas and others, the ecumenical public denied the very possibility 
of mutuality and recognition among secular points of view: God’s Word was the origin of 
society and the basis of authentic “common life.”4 Ecumenists sought to institutionalize a public 
of persons through organizations – such as the World Council of Churches – created to facilitate 
and regulate this conversation, and by establishing the protection of “persons” as a bulwark of 
international order – an objective pursued, first in the 1940s, by the Commission on a Just and 
Durable Peace in its efforts to promote the legal norm of human rights. As we will see, these two 
programs to institutionalize personhood generated tensions in the movement. Wartime efforts to 
                                                
4 In defining the public as a “communicative space,” I am drawing on Jürgen Habermas, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere trns. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989) 
(see also the Introduction to The Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press 
1992)). The Christian personalist critique of the secular public constituted not a “counterpublic” in Michael 
Warner’s sense of the term, but a challenge to the condition of possibility of public life outside of Christian 
revelation. (See Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (Cambridge: Zone Books, 2002). In developing the 
idea of the ecumenical movement as an alternative public space, premised on a critique of the organizing 
assumptions of “secular” modern civil society, I draw on James Kennedy’s incisive characterization of the imagined 
community of the ecumenical church in “Protestant Ecclesiastical Internationals,” Religious Internationals in the 
Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 292-318, 
see esp 296-7. 
 
 211 
enlist the support of states and international political institutions to defend the rights of 
personhood undercut the anti-secular program that had brought the idea of the person to the 
center of ecumenical discourse in the 1930s.   
 
This chapter traces how ecumenists from 1929 to 1945 brought a constellation of existing 
international Christian organizations in line with the critique of secularism and the “personalist” 
social theory that emerged from it. As we saw in chapter 1, international Christian institutions 
were originally designed to organize Christians and churches internationally to realize the 
Kingdom of God at home and abroad. Realizing this task required a division of labor to promote 
Christian unity in different areas: missionary societies and conferences promoted cooperation in 
the spreading of the Gospel in non-Christian lands, the World Conference on Faith and Order 
organized churches to resolve doctrinal disagreements, and bodies like the World Alliance for 
Promoting International Friendship through the Churches and the Universal Council on Life and 
Work sought to coordinate Christians’ and churches’ social and humanitarian activities. But in 
the 1930s, as movement intellectuals cast secular civilization – the reigning disorder of 
modernity brought on as the result of modern man’s rebellion against God – as the dominant 
rival of Christianity on the world stage, the theory and practice of these institutions shifted. 
Institutions first created as instruments for organizing the various operations of the world church 
were re-imagined as mechanisms for resolving the crisis of modern social disorder by generating 
a personal community cutting across social and political boundaries. Between 1939 and 1945, 
ecumenists developed proposals for a postwar political order, based on the protection of 
universal human rights that were meant to preserve the theological ethics of personalism and 
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empower it to shape the conduct of states. But these proposals undermined the practices of 
theological anti-secularism that had inspired them in the first place.  
 
This chapter has four parts. The first part will briefly explore ecumenical conceptions of 
“personal community,” showing how ecumenists in the 1930s located the defense of 
“personhood” as the major front in their struggle against secularism. The battle against 
secularism, in the forms of both atomistic individualism and the neo-pagan collectivism, would 
be prosecuted, ecumenists believed, by a “personal community,” in which theology – the effort 
to reach a collective understanding of God’s message to the world – would constitute the basis of 
social order. 
 
The second part of the chapter will examine what this theological community of persons looked 
like in practice. The first personal communities ecumenists built emerged within the network of 
study groups convened in the wake of the Jerusalem Conference of 1928. In the last chapter, we 
saw how the concepts of secularism were developed and propagated within these groups. Here 
we attend to these groups not from the perspective of ideas they produced but rather from that of 
the practices on which they were based. These practices involved the production, circulation, 
critique, and revision of theological essays seeking to describe the nature of the conflict between 
Christianity and secularism. The aim of these practices was not to conclusively resolve 
discrepancies between viewpoints among Christians united in a more fundamental agreement on 
the necessity of Christian opposition to secularism. The aim was rather to clarify points of 
disagreement as diverse expressions of a common faith, to distill questions on which Christian 
thinkers might legitimately differ, and to invite participants to further dialogue. These strategies 
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of inclusion, however, enacted exclusions of their own: of non-elites and non-European thinkers, 
of those who denied that Christianity and secularism were conflicting systems of thought, and 
those who saw in dialogue and ecumenical sympathy a tolerance for heretical belief. We will 
examine these dynamics of inclusion and exclusion by looking at how ecumenical study was 
administered in groups such as Joseph Oldham’s “Christian Message” group, similar American 
and European ventures, as well as the World Student Christian Federation’s “Message 
Commission” and the preparations for the 1937 Oxford Conference of Universal Council of Life 
and Work.  
 
In the third part of this chapter, we will consider how ecumenists’ accounts of theological 
dialogue became conceptualized under the rubric of ecumenical movement, a vision of the 
progress of personal community that furnished the conceptual foundations of the World Council 
of Churches. Contemporaneous with the emergence of anti-secular practice, and as a reflection 
on it, thinkers such as Adolf Keller, Oliver Tomkins, Suzanne de Dietrich, and W. A. Visser’t 
Hooft theorized theological debate as an act of obedience to God that instantiated the universal 
community of the church. To these thinkers, the church took historical form through polyvocal 
responses to a God who overpowered the domestications of human consciousness. Here, I show 
how their theories of ecumenical unity within difference drew on themes from dialectical 
theology to conceive exchanges and encounters with other national and confessional traditions as 
sites of a supra-historical encounter with the divine other. Their vision thus harnessed the anti-
historicist eschatology of dialectical theology with a commitment to the progressive realization 
of the church as a worldwide Christian community within history. International Christian 
organizations were thus providentially instruments for reconciling history and eternity. Even 
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while they repudiated older liberal theologies that portrayed social reform or revolution leading 
to the Kingdom of God, ecumenists nonetheless insisted that God’s redemptive acts were indeed 
visible within history, specifically in the formation of a world Christian community expressing 
itself in conferencing, the formation of global networks of personal relations, and ongoing 
theological conversation. The 1938 constitution of the World Council of Churches, which 
consolidated existing international Christian organizations into a new body, reflected this social 
theory and philosophy of history in its aims and structure. 
 
The fourth part of the chapter focuses on World War II, showing how the conflict prompted 
ecumenists to imagine an alternative political order that would enshrine their personalist 
theology in concrete political institutions. The idea of human rights, which ecumenists developed 
after 1939 and which furnished the central principle of postwar order thinking in groups like 
John Foster Dulles’s Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, was an attempt to a translate 
theology of personal responsibility into proposals for the reform of international political 
organizations. The ecumenical turn to “rights” represented a rapprochement with worldview 
secularism even as the concept sought to limit the menace of national sovereignty. At the same 
time, with the wartime collapse of international communication, the life of the ecumenical 
exchange and debate was hamstrung. Though the work of the Commission on a Just and Durable 
Peace has been interpreted by many historians as a culmination of interwar ecumenical activism, 
it marked at the same time a departure from ecumenical practice: Dulles and his commission, 
along with similar groups in the UK, privileged not inter-Christian dialogue but the mobilization 
of mass publics and state apparatuses. Their success in enshrining the personalist concept into 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights represented simultaneously a 
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realization of ecumenical hopes and threat to the practices of dialogue and exchange on which 
the ecumenical movement had been based. 
 
I. “Personal Community” in Ecumenical Social Thought 
 
In his 1929 speech at Williamstown outlining secular civilization, Joseph Oldham described 
secularism as a crisis of authority. Its distinguishing characteristic was the repudiation of God’s 
providential order in the name of an understanding of existence based on experiment and 
induction. For Oldham this crisis was identical with an increasing de-personalization of life. 
“The civilization which has grown up as a result of applied science is largely and increasingly 
impersonal. The relations between human beings have become so complex, impersonal forces 
have come to dominate human society.” The dominance of “forces” over “persons” expressed 
the diminishing influence of Christianity. “In simpler conditions of an earlier society, man’s 
goodness could be exhibited over practically the whole range of his activities and relations.” But 
in the more complex conditions of modern society, “it is not possible for him to manifest his 
goodness in the same way, inasmuch as the conditions do not permit him to be good alone.”5 
Modern society compelled man to act in groups, thus effacing or minimizing the opportunity for 
a specific kind of inter-personal relationship.  
 
The good society for Oldham was the personal society, one that enabled the fulfillment Christian 
morality that was threatened where persons were folded into larger social groupings. The 
personal relationship was the site at which God exerted his authority. In the 1930s, a similar 
                                                
5 Joseph Oldham, “The New Christian Adventure: A Statement made to the International Missionary Council at 
Williamstown, Mass. July 1929” (London: International Missionary Council, 1929), 6-7.  
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vision of personal relations as the site of God’s sovereignty became a central motif of anti-
secular polemic. But it also underwent a change, as a consequence of dialectical theologians’ 
framing of the secularism problem. In particular, dialectical theology’s emphasis on alienation – 
on man’s distance from God, and his incapacity by his own innate powers to make contact with 
the divine – made the idea of the person a powerful vehicle for Christian reflection on the 
problem of difference and community. Indeed, over the 1930s, ecumenists drew on the concept 
of the person to insist that the characteristic feature of Christian society was its capacity to 
contain and mediate difference without succumbing on the one hand to anarchy and social 
dissolution or on the other to “totalitarian” domination. Ecumenists thus often concentrated their 
attack on secularism at the point of anthropology, elaborating a conception of man as a 
theological being, united to others through a common relation with God.6 
 
Brunner had argued as early as 1930 that the critical point of a Christian anti-secular polemic 
must address the question of man.7 While the Enlightenment had asserted man’s self-sufficiency, 
Christianity insisted on his dependence on God. Throughout the 1930s, theologians centered 
their attacks on secular modernity around this point: by locating, they claimed, the ground and 
purpose of existence within itself, modern society had made authentically social existence with 
others impossible. The Yale theologian Robert Calhoun, for instance, in his paper prepared for 
the Oxford Conference, asserted the difference between Christianity and “modernism” – a 
phenomenon he argued found epitomic expression in American pragmatism – was a matter of 
different attitudes toward experience. Whereas “modernism” asserted that the human creature 
                                                
6 For accounts that place debates over the nature of man at the center of transatlantic intellectual life in the 1930s 
and 1940s, see Mark Greif, Age of the Crisis of Man (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), and Renaud.  
7 Emil Brunner, “Secularism as a Problem for the Church” International Review of Missions vol 19 (Oct 1930), 508. 
 
 217 
was constituted through experience, the Christian understood that “’the center of gravity’” for 
human life and thought lay “outside the range of human experience.”8 Emil Brunner, in his 
contribution to the volume (a summary of his recent work Mensch im Widerspruch (1937, 
translated as Man in Revolt (1939)) similarly posited that “[m]an is a ‘theological’ being; that is, 
his ground, his goal, his norm, and the possibility of understanding his own nature are in God.”9 
For both of these thinkers, responsibility to God implied responsibility to others. For Brunner, 
“the source of man’s responsibility is the same as its content, namely, unselfish, spontaneous 
love: it is this love which makes him responsible, and it is this love again which he owes his 
neighbor.”10 Pierre Maury similarly underscored how responsibility to God created the basis for 
relations to others. The anthropology of the Christian faith, he argued, committed the church to 
see “in every man (and not only in its members) a creature in the image of God.” This committed 
Christians to a view of the other that was mediated by a prior relation to God’s Word. Maury 
argued that the church was committed to “defend in each and for each… not [primarily] the 
sacred rights of human personality, not any moral value, but the ‘brother for whom Christ 
died.”11 
 
Oldham himself, six years after his Williamstown speech, would identify “personal community” 
as the central theme of the Oxford study preparations, “an issue which is to the various lines of 
                                                
8 Robert Calhoun, “The Dilemma of Humanitarian Modernism,” in The Christian Understanding of Man, eds. T. E. 
Jessop and Robert Calhoun (London: Willett, Clark, and Company, 1938) 69. 
9 Emil Brunner, “The Christian Understanding of Man,” in The Christian Understanding of Man, eds. T. E. Jessop 
and Robert Calhoun (London: Willett, Clark, and Company, 1938) 142. 
10 Ibid, 152. 
11 Quoted in Renaud. See Pierre Maury, “The Christian Understanding of Man,” in The Christian Understanding of 
Man, eds. T. E. Jessop and Robert Calhoun (London: Willett, Clark, and Company, 1938),  267 
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inquiry what the hub is to a wheel.”12 What is important in this conception – critical to the 
history of ecumenical institutionalization examined here – is the way in which the idea of 
personhood dictated the relation with God as template for relations with others. For in the rubric 
of “responsibility” – literally, response-ability, or an ability to respond – ecumenists advanced a 
vision of society in which the relations between human persons mirrored relations between the 
individual and the person of God. “The Christian Church is committed by its central affirmations 
to the belief that the life of man finds its meaning and fulfillment in a community of persons,” 
Oldham wrote in 1935, surveying the preliminary work of the conference. Oldham clarified that 
this conception rested on the prior act of God’s revelation and an ethics of responsiveness to 
God’s Word that constituted responsibilities to both the divine and to others.  
 
God has spoken to us in His Son. He has revealed Himself through His Word. The word 
– used in the widest sense to include every form of self-expression – is the means by 
which persons communicate with persons. In addressing us God invites from us a 
response. He asks for trust, loyalty, and obedience. Through our response to the word 
addressed to us we become responsible persons and only through such response to the 
Father of our spirits can we become truly persons.13 
 
The person in this conception was a being conceived not from a sociological, biological, or 
philosophical perspective, but from a theological one. Persons were creatures whose social 
existence was constituted through their obedient response to God’s address. For Oldham the 
person lit the way for a Christian alternative running between solipsistic individualism – the 
original source of social atomization – and the collectivism that sought and failed to overcome 
this atomization. It was in its capacity to clarify the point of opposition to both alternatives that 
the appeal of the idea of the person lay. “The reason for emphasizing this central element [of 
                                                
12 Joseph Oldham, Church, Community, and State – A World Issue, (London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1935), 
35. 
13 Ibid, 36. 
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personal community]… is that it is precisely this understanding of the life of man that is denied 
by all the doctrines that are in the ascendant to-day. It is denied by those who maintain that the 
final and decisive thing in life is blood or race,” those who “contend that man’s ultimate loyalty 
is owed to nation or a state,” and those “who hold that man’s primary need is bread and that his 
life his wholly determined by material realities.”14 Shifting his aim from the triumvirate of 
Nazism, nationalism, and Communism to the self-authorizing individual, Oldham fired again. 
The claim that persons realized their nature only through community with God and others “was 
equally opposed to the view which regards man as an individual existing in his own right… free 
to pursue his self-centered aims, unfettered by bonds which unite him inseparably with his fellow 
men.”15 Though the “modern collectivist systems” were a “justifiable” response to “self-seeking 
individualism,” they “have their origin in the same secular mind from which individualism 
sprang and the same mistaken confidence in the self-sufficiency of man.” Only the relation of 
alterity could preserve a community from the imperious human will. “To subordinate the other to 
our own view or will is to destroy fellowship or community. For community implies the 
continued presence of the other in his otherness.”16 For Oldham, this vision of an order at once 
radically pluralistic and morally coherent could only be realized as the church; conversely, the 
public role of the church in the present age was to become, in practice, the solution to the crisis 
of social order besetting modern man.  
 
                                                
14 Ibid, 37. 
15 Ibid, 37. 
16 Ibid, 38. 
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It surely seems ironic today that a vision so explicitly founded on the recognition of otherness 
would be unmoved to even so much as mention the role of non-Christians. But for Oldham, that 
exclusion was just the point: only Christianity could secure the radical pluralism demanded in an 
age of global interconnection. A universal society based on the recognition of difference would 
challenge the parochial solidarities of race and class, as well as the anarchy of individual 
liberation. Oldham stressed that “personal community” was not just a theory; it needed to be 
realized as well in conduct: “the personal life as a response to the claims of persons is something 
that has to be lived,” embodied in the concrete actions of individuals and communities.17 More 
important than theoretical riposte was the living embodiment of an ethics of personhood, based 
on the give and take between others in search of a common obedience to God. In fact, as we’ll 
see, the practice of “personal community” that ecumenists called for took shape as a collective 
effort to develop a polemic against secularism. The theology of personhood, as ecumenists 
understood it, was a reflection of the practices through which ecumenists sought to stimulate one 
another in the collaborative production of the Christian message to the modern world. 
 
II. Personal Community in Practice 
 
To understand the ecumenical personalism as a practice, we need to look back to the years 
immediately following the Jerusalem Conference of 1928, specifically to the study groups that 
emerged in these years to address the question of the conflict of Christianity and secularism. In 
the last chapter, we focused on the substance of the concepts of secularism produced by 
participants in these groups. Here it is our task to interrogate more closely the nature of the 
                                                
17 Ibid, 41. 
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practices that constituted these groups. As we will see, these groups were more than ad hoc 
instruments for theorists to find mutual stimulation and share and disseminate ideas. They were 
efforts to build a theological community governed by rules and procedures for managing conflict 
and clarifying consensus. It was in these rules that ecumenists first developed, in embryonic 
form, the governing structures of what they would later present to the world as the “ecumenical 
community” of the church. 
 
Joseph Oldham, so instrumental in publicizing the idea of “secularism,” was also the chief 
architect of this new form of theological community. From his first efforts to form study groups, 
he was quite clear that the cultivation of affective ties and a sense of personal “fellowship” were 
central to the intellectual program he envisaged. As he explained his broader vision in the spring 
of 1930, the task of combating secularism required 
 
that in all countries small groups of persons who are alive to [the] gravity [of the 
challenge of secularism to the church] should set themselves to discover with completely 
open minds and an uncompromising sincerity what are the crucial issues which 
Christianity has to face in the modern world. The first task is not to find an answer to 
questions but to discover what the critical and decisive questions in the present situation 
really are… We should find out what are the real questions, and the search must be 
undertaken in co-operation so that we may have a sense of fellowship and solidarity (as 
far as possible international) in a common task.18 
 
For Oldham, concentrating reflection on a set of questions entailed specific organizational 
procedures. First, groups needed to be convened in order to decide what these questions were. 
Oldham was involved in the organization of many such groups, as we saw in the last chapter, but 
here we will focus on the illustrative case of the so-called “Christian Message Group,” which 
first convened in Basel in the fall of 1930 and included eight members: Oldham himself, Emil 
                                                
18 Oldham and Frick, “Christianity and the Modern World,” 2 (WCC, 261.010) 
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Brunner, Karl Heim, Walter Freytag, Philippe Kohnstamm, Henri Monnier, Heinrich Frick, and 
Visser’t Hooft. At its first meeting, the group began by formulating the questions around which 
its collective study would revolve. They decided upon two: “In what respects and how far are our 
Christian teaching and preaching at the present day unreal?” and “What is the meaning of the un-
Christian character of the actual modern world?”19 Following the formulation of these questions, 
the group selected two of its members, Karl Heim and Emil Brunner, to write papers in response 
to these questions. Once completed, the essays were submitted to Oldham, who circulated them 
to the group, soliciting their criticisms and comments. These responses themselves were, in turn, 
mailed to Oldham, who produced a lengthy summary that reproduced long sections of text from 
individuals' responses, organizing these around a number of themes.20 The idea in this procedure 
was to identify points of agreement and disagreement among the participants, using this 
clarification as the basis of further discussion. In response to the criticisms that Oldham 
circulated, Brunner and Heim produced second drafts of their papers, which were re-circulated to 
participants to serve as the basis of the group's second in-person conversation, held in 1932. The 
purpose of this procedure was not only to achieve a kind of collective intellectual clarity around 
major problems, but also to generate a spirit of collective undertaking in which even the 
clarification of disagreements would serve the function of strengthening a common sense of 
identity and purpose.   
 
Pioneered by Oldham, the form of anti-secular discourse was reproduced by others, often under 
the auspices and support of international Christian organizations. When Visser’t Hooft organized 
                                                
19 Oldham, “Note on Continental Group,” WCC, 26.11.34/21 
20 “Christentum und Wirklichkeit, Memorandum by Joseph Oldham” (WCC, 26.11.34/24). 
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the first meeting of the World Student Christian Federations “Commission on the Message,” he 
selected, out of the total thirty participants, fifteen – including himself, Oldham, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Josef Hromadka, John MacKay, and the Indian theologian S. K. Datta, to produce 
papers on a range of themes relating ‘the “Federation’s Message in relation to the Principal 
Alternatives to Christianity offered by the Modern World.”21 These essays would “be 
multigraphed and translated and sent out to the delegates so that everyone will have read them 
before the meeting,” providing common points of departure for the conversation.22 Likewise the 
Theological Study Group, first convened by Union Theological Seminary Professor Henry Van 
Dusen in 1934 in an effort to extend Oldham’s European efforts into the United States, 
commissioned papers from each of the roughly half dozen participants in its yearly meetings, all 
of which addressed a single theme, including “What is Essential and Distinctive in the Gospel 
Message Today,” “the Church,” “Grace,” and others.23 These papers were circulated in advance 
and provided a means of orienting conversation and debate around both a common theme and 
individual interpretations or points of view on it. A social theory was embedded in these 
exercises, one centered on the principle of building an intellectual community by assuring that 
participants were speaking about and in response to a single point of view.  
 
Those who organized these groups denied that their purpose was the establishment of theological 
unanimity. Rather, they valorized debate, individual expression, and disagreement as constitutive 
                                                
21 “Programme of Retreat of Student Leaders, Holland, July 31st to August 5th, 1930” (WCC, 213.10.11). 
22 Visser’t Hooft/Zuylenveld Participants Feb 30 1930 (WCC, 213.10.11). 
23 For accounts of the Theological Discussion Group, see Heather Warren Theologians of a New World Order: 
Reinhold Niebuhr and the Christian Realists: 1920-1948 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chpt 4 and 




of the pluralistic fellowship that distinguished the church from the disorder and strife of secular 
civilization. Oldham’s group agreed that no attempt should be made “to formulate conclusions to 
which its members would be expected to subscribe.”24 He explained his thinking on the matter in 
detail to a colleague in 1930:  
 
My whole interest in the subject [of secularism] is in order that we may see more clearly 
where the Christian forces can most successfully direct their efforts. This will come about 
through a deepening understanding of our problems rather than through any attempt at 
formulation which, just because of the immensity and richness of the problem, must 
necessarily be different for different minds. To put the matter briefly, I am quite satisfied 
that different minds should be brought into contact with one another for the sake of 
mutual stimulus, leaving each entirely free to embody the results of that common 
thinking in whatever formula of point of view seems to him most adequate.”25  
 
Van Dusen took the same position in his statement inviting American theologians to the first 
meeting of the Theological Discussion Group in 1933. “The aim of the discussion will be to 
discover what is essential and distinctive in the Christian gospel for today. There will be no 
thought of formulating a statement or articulating a position, or creating a school of thought.” 
What was sought was explicitly not “another forum for theological debate,” but “something of 
the nature of an informal fellowship for sharing convictions.” 26 Church Against the World – a 
volume of essays drawn from contributions to the Theological Study Group by three of its 
regular participants, Yale professor H. Richard Niebuhr, the German-émigré theologian Wilhelm 
Pauck, and the former World Student Christian Federation General Secretary Francis P. Miller – 
articulated the same understanding of a community of inquiry united by a concern to “represent a 
                                                
24 Oldham, “Note on Continental Group,” (WCC, 26.11.34/21). 
25 Oldham/Joachim Müller 12 Sept 1930 (WCC, 26.11.34/17). 
26 “Proposed Conference Retreats of Younger Christian Thinkers,” (YDS, Theological Discussion Group Papers, 
Box 5, fld 48), 1.  
26 Ibid, 1. 
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point of view” opposed to that of the dominant worldly orientation of modern civilization. “The 
title of our book,” wrote Niebuhr, “is not so much the enunciation of a theme as it is the 
declaration of a position. We are seeking not to expound a thesis but to represent a point of view 
and to raise a question… ‘What must we do to be saved?’”27 As participants in a similar study 
group put it in 1929: “Discussion with the modern world means, primarily, a searchingly critical 
discussion with ourselves, with Christianity as it is.”28  
 
Between 1930 and 1934, efforts to institutionalize an anti-secular Christian community took 
place on a small scale. Convinced that intimacy was the secret to insight, these groups usually 
numbered around 5 to 10 and never more than 30 participants. Their organizers saw blockbuster 
assemblies like the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910, which drew hundreds of 
delegates and issued platitudinous resolutions, as structurally unsuited to the challenge of 
nurturing serious reflection. Between 1935 and 1937, however the enthusiasm for the study 
group model among participants and the widely acknowledged urgency of the topic of 
conversation overcame the anxieties of scale. Various informally coordinated efforts to cultivate 
group thinking were integrated, brought under the umbrella of an ambitious effort of 
centralization that preceded the Oxford Conference of the Universal Council of Life and Work in 
1937. Oldham himself, appointed by Life and Work as the chief organizer of the conference, 
presided over this centralization. Not only was the task of the conference study preparations – to 
“understand the true nature of the vital conflict between the Christian faith and the secular and 
                                                
27 H. Richard Niebuhr, “Introduction,” in H. Richard Niebuhr, Wilhelm Pauck, Francis P. Miller, The Church 
Against the World (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1935), 1-2. 
28 “Final Minutes of the Conference on Oecumenical Research” prepared for the Study Conference of World 
Christian Organizations, Geneva, July 30-Aug 2, 1929, 2. 
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pagan tendencies of our time”29 – a continuation and expansion of the post Jerusalem agenda, it 
was also a culmination of the practice of anti-secular community first developed in the years 
following 1928.  
 
Oldham’s appointment as study director of the Universal Council of Life and Work placed at his 
disposal a support staff and resources considerably greater than those he could marshal through 
his own efforts. Henry Van Dusen coordinated contributions from North American participants, 
while Life and Work’s Geneva Research Department, comprised of Hans Schönfeld of Germany 
and Nils Ehrenström of Sweden, oversaw the work of translating and mimeographing 
contributions between English, French, and German. In the two years preceding the Oxford 
Conference, this group coordinated the commissioning, circulation, reviewing and critique of 
over 250 papers written by theologians, clerics, and lay Christian thinkers written on nine 
themes: The Christian Understanding of Man, The Kingdom of God and History, Christian Faith 
and the Common Life, The Church and Its Function in Society, Church and Community, Church 
and State, Church Community and State in Relation to the Economic Order, and Church 
Community and State in Relation to Education. Each essay was circulated among at least four 
and sometimes as many as thirty or forty persons, representing a cross section of churches 
nationalities represented in Council of Life and Work, who were each asked to write a critique.30 
The critiques were then submitted to the author, who redrafted the essay. The cycle was repeated 
                                                
29 Oldham, “General Introduction,” Universal Church and the World of Nations (Willett, Clark, and Company: New 
York, 1938), vii. The Introduction was printed at the head of all of all nine volumes of Oxford preparatory material. 
30 For a description of Oxford study preparations, see Keith Clements, Faith on the Frontier: A Life of J.H. 
Oldham (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 314, Nils Ehrenstroem, "Movements for International Friendship and Life 
and Work, 1925-1948," in A History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948, vol. 1. ed. Ruth Rouse and Stephen 
Neill (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1948); and now Michael Thompson, For God and Globe: Christian 
Internationalism in the United States between the Great War and the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2015), ch. 5. 
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in most instances more than once. With an eye to ensuring roughly proportional representation, 
Oldham and his associates selected the best papers to publish in six volumes shortly after the 
conference.  
 
One purpose of these papers and the process of critique and revision that went into their 
production was to ready delegates for the work of the Oxford Conference itself, which convened 
from July 12-26, 1937. The five reports drafted and released while the conference was in session 
– addressing the themes of “Church and Community,” “Church and State,” “Economic Order,” 
“Education,” and “the Una Sancta and the World of Nations” – were written quickly yet reflected 
a level of intellectual engagement and consensus that could only have been generated through 
years of preparatory work.31 But as Oldham repeatedly stated, the larger goal of preliminary 
study was not the conference itself, or any specific collective utterance that might come out of it, 
but rather “the education of a wider constituency.”32 He envisioned a trickle-down effect, in 
which “groups for study” of the major themes of the Oxford Conference “would be formed 
among members of theological faculties, among theological students, in the local parish or 
congregation and in connection with young people’s organizations. There is no reason why there 
                                                
31 The final Section reports – some of which, including the report on the Una Sancta and the World of Nations – 
contained sections that paraphrased the essays of individual authors – were drafted within one week and “accepted” 
by the plenary session (the reports on “Church and Community” and “Church and State” were referred back to 
session and completed after the close of the conference. Conspicuous to reviewers and participants (and ecumenical 
commentators since) was the high quality of the reports; American theologian J. H. Nichols averred that “the 
authority of the Oxford Reports was unprecedented, at least in Protestant social ethics, and their competence enabled 
them to rank with the best of secular thought, a phenomenon scarcely seen since the seventeenth century.” (quoted 
in Edward Duff, SJ., The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches(London, New York: Longmans, Green, 
1956), 16).  
32 Minutes of the of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Universal Council on Life and Work at Chamby 
(Switzerland), 1935, 32. 
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should not be hundreds or even thousands of such groups.”33 The production of an anti-secular 
polemic was synonymous with the creation of a community of opinion. 
 
Eschewing any claim to a final, exhaustive formulation of the Christian message, the Oxford 
Conference preparations mirrored its predecessors in aiming at the indefinite perpetuation of a 
conversation, the formation of a community of ongoing inquiry. These conversations were to be 
the beachhead of a Christian invasion of modern thought, a strategy that was underscored by 
Oldham, Van Dusen, and others’ assiduous courting of intellectuals and opinion shapers across 
the Atlantic world. From the beginning of the anti-secular exercise, Oldham sought out “first rate 
minds” who were also institutionally and culturally elite. R. H. Tawney and T. S. Eliot in 
England were early participants in these discussion groups. Among the authors commissioned to 
write studies for the Oxford conference were well known Protestant theologians like Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich, and Russian Orthodox émigré theologians like 
Nicholas Berdyaev and Georges Florovsky. Politically well connected lay Christians such as 
Philip Kerr (Marquis of Lothian), John Foster Dulles, and Alfred Zimmern also took part. The 
open-endedness of the conversation was central to the movement’s vision of a “universal” 
community, in which faith would provide the means of including persons of all nations in a 
collective search after an understanding of the Gospel. In this vision, like-mindedness was 




                                                
33 Ibid, 33. 
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Though they were intended to clarify disagreements and produce debate, the administrative 
practices that brought Christian intellectuals into these communities of discourse also kept others 
at the margins, and excluded some altogether. Not all dissent was welcome. Here we will focus 
on three excluded groups to illuminate the contours of the “mainstream” of theological anti-
secularism as well as its often-permeable boundaries. There were, first, those whose theological 
outlook was deemed insufficiently attuned to the challenge of secularism as a rival, anti-
Christian system of thought and way of life. The decision to exclude these individuals was often 
openly and explicitly discussed; it helped the organizers of the study groups clarify the nature of 
their project and its aims. Other exclusions were less explicitly justified; they reflected, rather, 
the structural inequalities instantiated in an elite organization dominated by North Atlantic 
theologians and church leaders that carried over and reflected assumptions about European 
superiority and imagined geographies of periphery and metropole. Study organizers were on the 
whole rather indifferent to the problem of how to involve non-elite opinion in these discursive 
communities (though they did think hard about the technical challenge of how to reach a mass 
audience with their ideas). Further, they often assumed that the place of Christians from the non-
western “younger-churches” in these conversations was primarily that of passive recipients, 
whose role would be to absorb the insights of North Atlantic theological elites. Finally, anti-
secular practice effectively excluded many German Protestants of the Confessing Church on 
account of their refusal to acknowledge the competing German Reich Church – which embraced 
the Nazi regime’s church legislation – as a legitimate church. There was an irony in this 
exclusion, since most ecumenists sympathized with the Confessing Church and celebrated its 
resistance against the Nazi regime. But the Confessing Church’s anathemazation of the Reich 
Church – which members of the Confessing Christian group saw not as one church among others 
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but as a heretical body that had forfeited the Gospel for idolatrous nationalism – could not be 
reconciled in practice with the movement’s commitments to dialogue and mutual recognition.34 
Surprisingly, up until 1937, ecumenical practice more effectively integrated the corporate 
participation of the Reich Church than it did the Confessing Church. 
 
The record of deliberations among the chief organizers of these gatherings reveals how 
selections were made based thinkers’ willingness to embrace the idea that the Christian mission 
in the world entailed intellectual combat against secularism as an opposed worldview. Those 
who rejected this framing or found their primary theological commitments elsewhere were either 
quietly ejected from the conversations or not invited in the first place. An illustrative example is 
Karl Barth, a theologian who, despite the enormous impact of his writings on Christian thought 
in general and ecumenical theology in particular, was never invited to take part in ecumenical 
study groups. The literature on Barth and ecumenism has stressed that Barth himself was 
skeptical of the ecumenical movement in this period, but it has failed to see that ecumenical 
leaders were convinced that he would not be a productive presence in the community of opinion 
they were seeking to build. To Oldham and Visser’t Hooft, Barth was objectionable not because 
he was a polarizing figure but specifically because they believed that his approach to theology 
denied the premise of anti-secular combat. They came to this view of Barth by 1930, in large part 
as a result of his disputes with Emil Brunner over the “point of contact,” where Barth maintained 
that argument and persuasion were powerless to produce Christian faith, which could only come 
from God’s initiative. Oldham and Visser’t Hooft came to believe that the Swiss theologian had 
                                                
34 The Catholic Church was not invited to take part in the Oxford Conference. Nonetheless, individual Catholics like 
Christopher Dawson, a friend of Oldham’s, did participate in preparatory study (Dawson contributed an essay, “ to 
volume The Kingdom of God and History (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938, 197-217)). Moreover groups of 
German Catholics published volumes of essays addressed the Oxford theme. (TK) 
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embraced an understanding of theology that all but vitiated human agency and thus the 
possibility of reaching an audience of the secular-minded. As Visser’t Hooft put it, Barth had 
taken the position “that God’s word to us is spoken into emptiness.” This was problematic 
because “the possibility of answering is practically excluded. The danger… is that it is no longer 
in a real sense dialectic. It becomes again onesided and onesidedness in theology always means 
rationalization.”35 Barth’s complete rejection of natural theology, as Visser’t Hooft read it, 
denied any agency to humans in turning back the tide of modern secularism. This reading 
“confirmed my view that it is perhaps better not to have Barth in any of the meetings like the one 
at Basle,” Visser’t Hooft wrote in 1930 to Oldham, who concurred.36 Barth was not only not 
invited to take place in those consultations; he was excluded from all ecumenical discussions 
until after the War. 
 
At the opposite end of the theological spectrum, the organizers of ecumenical study also had no 
time for “modernists” preoccupied with establishing the compatibility of Christianity and 
scientific rationality. If Barth’s radically otherworldly orientation seemed indifferent to the anti-
secular struggle, theological modernists erred in the other direction. Their thinking erased the 
tension between Christian and secular worldviews through a preoccupation with accommodating 
science and faith.37 After a period of experimentation with the membership of various study 
groups in the US and Europe, older liberal theologians whose work had been shaped by the 
                                                
35 Visser’t Hooft/Oldham October 21, 1930 (WCC, 26.11.34/6). 
36 Visser’t Hooft/Oldham December 2, 1930 (WCC, 26.11.34/6). 
37 The issue here was not whether science and religion were compatible – no ecumenical theologians took the 
fundamentalist position of the incompatibility of science and revelation. The issue was rather a willingness to 
acknowledge conflict between Christianity and secularism as comprehensive accounts of reality – a tension based on 
the idea that the scientific worldview, while offering procedures useful in explaining natural processes, innately 
transgressed its appropriate boundaries. 
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prewar project of Kantian theology found themselves on the outside. When the modernist 
University of Chicago theologian Henry Nelson Wieman argued at one of Oldham’s theological 
study groups in 1929 that “rationality and scientific method” could be used to determine the most 
psychologically efficacious formulation of the Gospel, he ensured that he would not be invited 
back.38 Oldham objected that Wieman “is trying to make a case for Christianity on a basis which 
many of us regard as hopeless. He is trying to find a place for it within the abstract scientific 
view, whereas the first step towards progress seems to many of us to be the clear recognition that 
religion is essentially different in character from the scientific attitude toward life.” The 
exclusion of “modernists” was not complete or total, just as it is hard to fit individuals into an 
ideal type. But Wieman was not the only older horse put out to pasture: important thinkers like 
William Hocking, for instance, who expressed reservations over whether anti-secular polemic 
was in the best interest of Christianity, was not invited to the Van Dusen’s Theological 
Discussion Group and relegated to a minor role in Oxford preparations, though he had had 
played an important part in the missionary and church unity movements of the 1920s. In Europe, 
a similar fate befell the Czech liberal theologian and philosopher Emanuel Radl, an early 
participant in the Basel Group discussions who was not invited back. The American theologian 
Ernest Johnson had his contribution to the Oxford volume on “The Church and Community” 
outright rejected by Oldham – seemingly because it argued that the rise of Nazism and 
Communism could be explained with reference to political and economic, rather than spiritual 
factors.39 
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39 Oldham on Johnson’s paper: “though it contains some interesting matter it is quite definitely not what we had in 




Beyond those excluded from the program on ideological grounds, there were a number of what 
might best be termed structural inequalities in ecumenical discourse. These ensured that there 
were margins to the conversation in which ecumenical elites hoped that messages would resonate 
but which they believed had little to say in response. The insights generated by carefully selected 
international elites would percolate down through publications and educational institutions to a 
broader audience. Thus the York conference in 1929 had imagined that one product of the 
deliberations of theological elites over the struggle against secularism would be the development 
of new curricula for seminary courses. Oldham vision of a 1,000 “Oxfords” reflected a similar 
view of distribution and publicity: once they had been exposed to the essays of leading 
theologians and lay intellectuals, pastors and ordinary lay people could learn to ask the right 
questions and discuss them amongst themselves. Following the Oxford Conference, thanks to the 
efforts of the Federal Council of Churches, “little Oxfords” actually did take place: in one 
instance, church goers in the city of Evanston, Illinois, gathered on a regular basis on Sunday 
afternoons in 1938 to discuss the Oxford literature, hear speeches from American churchmen 
who attended, and produce their own reports in the conference theme.40 Tellingly, even the 
church leaders who organized these debates had no institutional mechanism in place for 
circulating the findings of these popular conferences back up to the elite level: there is little 
evidence that what was said at these local gatherings was reckoned with seriously by the 
ecumenical elites who encouraged their organization.  
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In addition to being mostly confined to intellectual, clerical, and in some cases political elites, 
these groups were also overwhelmingly European and North American. Though organizers of 
the discussion groups disputed how representatives from “younger churches” of Asia ought to be 
incorporated, they were, in general, kept at the margins. It is true that the organizers of anti-
secularism encouraged the formation of discussion groups outside of the West: Oldham’s 
colleague William Paton, for instance, convened secularism discussion groups in Bombay, Cairo, 
Beirut, and Baghdad while on a tour of missions outposts in 1929, and encouraged local 
missionaries to oversee them and organize them on an ongoing basis.41 Oldham’s papers indicate 
that he kept a record of “theological groups” convened in China, Japan, and India – but no 
records, minutes, of papers produced in the meetings seem to have made their way into 
Oldham’s hands; or if they did, he didn’t preserve them.42 But there were few serious efforts to 
incorporate the findings or insights of non-Europeans into discussions among western 
theologians. When John Mott, Chairman of the International Missionary Council, floated the 
idea of convening a “world group” that would involve theologians from Europe, North America, 
as well as Asia, Oldham was skeptical. Such a group would likely be too large and lose the 
collaborative esprit. Its primary advantage, Oldham wrote, would be “get[ing] the idea well 
lodged in the mind of some leading Orientals.” Some months later, when he learned that C. T. 
Chao, an American-educated theologian at Yenching University, was passing through London on 
his way to take up a fellowship in Oxford, Oldham requested him to attend an upcoming meeting 
of a British study group: “You will meet some of the best Christian minds in England and if it is 
in any way possible for you to be present you would, I think, find it worth your while to change 
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42 Oldham, “Theological Groups,” (WCC 301.2.010). 
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any engagement that you can get out of to come to this meeting.” There was no mention or 
expectation of the possibility that Chao would substantively contribute to the work of theological 
construction; the priority for him was the preliminary one of learning to think the problem of 
secularism in the right way.  
 
Mott’s suggestion that Asian thinkers be included in these conversations indicates that there were 
some disagreements among the western elites who organized the groups. Moreover, while the 
groups that Oldham organized were in practice exclusively American and European, other anti-
secularism discussion groups incorporated non-Europeans and Europeans more successfully: the 
World Student Christian Federation, for example, involved a range of Asian thinkers in its first 
meeting on the Christian message, including WSCF Secretaries S. K. Datta, T. Z. Koo, as well 
the P. C. Hsu, a philosophy professor and Chao’s colleague at Yenching University. Subsequent 
Federation retreats – which were held roughly twice a year between 1930 and 1935 – similarly 
reflected a level of non-western inclusion that never made its way into the Life and Work 
preparations. When Oldham took control of Oxford preparations, his American deputy Van 
Dusen periodically chafed at his colleague’s indifference to including a sufficiently “adequate” 
number of Asians in the group: “active Oriental participation is indispensible as a third point of 
reference and solvent between the two poles to which European and American thought tend 
incurably to gravitate,” he wrote Oldham at one point, adding that it was uncertain whether “we 
can speak of a general ecumenical Christian conference without adequate and able representation 
from the Orient.”43 In the end, however, no contributions to any of the Oxford study volumes 
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were commissioned from non-Western thinkers. Only 40 representatives from “other regions” – 
ie., regions outside of Europe and the North America – were invited to attend the conference 
itself, and many of these were representatives from white settler churches (as in New Zealand, 
Australia, and South Africa). Two non-Europeans – T. Z. Koo of China and the Rev. Chukichi 
Yasuda of Japan – delivered addresses in at the Oxford plenary sessions.  
 
Though some ecumenical elites protested the marginalization of non-western church leaders and 
intellectuals, their case simply did not seem all that important to the movement leaders in the 
1930s. By contrast, there were intense debates over whether and how to involve German 
Protestants in the ecumenical program of theological study at a time when the churches in that 
country were bitterly divided in their attitudes toward the Nazi regime. Given that Nazism 
figured in ecumenical polemic as arguably the most menacing manifestation of “political 
religion,” one might expect that clerics who welcomed and sought accommodation between the 
Protestant church and the regime would be excluded from the community of discourse discussed 
here. In fact, however, the establishment Reich Church was far more integrated into the 
preparations for the Oxford Conference than the anti-establishment Confessing Church, which 
included German Protestantism’s most vocal critics of the Nazi regime, including Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, Martin Niemöller, and Hans Böhme. 
 
The integration of German Protestants with open and avowed loyalty to the Nazi regime, who 
were willing to go along not only with Hitler’s domestic reforms but with his church policies, 
such as the purging of non-Aryan pastors and the re-organization of ecclesiastical government 
around the Führerprinzip, is a topic that has been largely passed over in most literature of the 
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ecumenical movement. Most of this work has tended to focus on either ecumenists who 
heroically stood up to the regime and supported the Confessing Church – like George Bell, 
Bishop of Chichester – or the broadly anti-totalitarian cast of ecumenical discourse in the 
period.44 It has ignored or soft-pedaled the role of ecumenical organizers who took a much more 
critical view of the Confessing Church – among them, no less a figure than the Secretary of Life 
and Work’s Research Department, Hans Schönfeld, who received a portion of his income from 
the Reich Church Ministry after 193845 and, in the interest of inclusion and dialogue, ensured 
that German Christians were involved in Oxford study preparations and conference planning 
sessions. Reich Church representatives attended a meeting on Church and Community in Fanö, 
Denmark, in 1934 as well as organizational meetings for Oxford study preparations in Paris in 
1934 and in Chamby, France, in 1935 and 1936. What has also been overlooked is that the 
Oxford Conference preparations generated significant contributions from Reich Church 
intellectuals. With the support of the Universal Council, the Reich Church leadership 
commissioned essays on the theme Kirche, Volk und Staat (an “advertising brochure for the 
                                                
44 Most movement historiography – most of it produced after 1945 has highlighted the opposition to Nazism among 
the movement leaders such Joseph Oldham and above all George Bell. See for instance Nils Ehrenstrom, 
"Movements for International Friendship and Life and Work,” Biographies of George Bell’s campaign to draw 
attention to the Church Struggle in Germany and valorize the cause of the Confessing Church has contributed to the 
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Armin Boyens’s account of the relations of the Reich Church with the ecumencial movement (Kirchenkampf und 
Ökumene 1933-1939: Darstellung und Dokumentation (Munich: Kaiser, 1969)) suggests that the German Church 
leadership only used the movement to shore up their own legitimacy – and that of the Nazi government – abroad and 
at home, an account that flattens a more complicated engagement and tends to downplay the significance of the very 
deep engagement between Geneva and the Reich Churches, as well as a shared commitment to what I have called 
here ecumenical practice. The most exhaustive accounts of the Kirchenkampf, including Klaus Scholder, Die 
Kirchen und das dritten Reich 3 vols. (Frankfurt aM: Ullstein, 1977-2001) and Gerhard Besier and Scholder 
Spaltungen und Abwehrkämpfe 1934-1937 (Munich: 2001). Vols 1 and 2 of Scholder’s history of the German 
Church struggle, offer a more nuanced account of the church struggle and its bearing on the ecumenical movement, 
as does Eberhard Bethge Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000).  
45 Bethge, 669. See also Bethge, 551, where Bethge characterizes Schönfeld as “effectively a member” of the Reich 
Church around Bishop Heckel, and Bethge, 350, where he recounts Schönfeld advising Bishop Heckel in his 
dealings with George Bell. 
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Third Reich” according to Karl Barth46) as a companion to the Oxford volumes edited by 
Oldham. That the German Evangelical Church was not represented at the Oxford Conference 
was not at all the result of Geneva’s efforts – indeed, Life and Work had put substantial energy 
into attempting to broker an agreement between the Reich Church and the Confessing Church so 
that there could be a united German delegation. The reason for their absence was only the 
intervention of the German state, which, refused to grant passports to the German delegation on 
the eve of the conference.47 
 
There were numerous reasons for a pattern of ecumenical relations that effectively included (up 
until the state’s decisive intervention) the Reich Church while excluding most members of the 
Confessing Church.48 All of them reflect unsettling features of the discursive regime that 
valorized theological dialogue as a means of international inclusion, and which had emerged 
within a movement animated since the 1920s by efforts to achieve rapprochement and 
cooperation between German and Allied churches. First, German Christians such as Reich 
Bishop Lüdwig Müller, tapped by Hitler to oversee sweeping reforms of church, embraced an 
anti-secular ideology that resonated in many ways with the post-Jerusalem agenda advanced by 
the ecumenical leadership. Müller and his deputy Theodor Heckel agreed that “secularism” – 
particularly Bolshevism and a modern Lebenstil prevalent in the cities and among disaffected 
                                                
46 Quoted in Boyens, Kirchenkampf und Oekoumene, 138. 
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workers and intellectuals – was the chief enemy of the church in the modern age.49 Many of the 
earliest participants in Oldham’s study groups, particularly the missionaries Julius Richter, 
Siegfried Knack, and Walter Freytag. would go on to become not just Reich Church loyalists but 
Nazi Party members. Others, such as Karl Heim, embraced in the mid-1930s the centrist Young 
Reformation Movement which sought a middle way between the Confessing Church and the 
German Christians, objecting to the intrusions of the German state in ecclesiastical affairs while 
proclaiming a “joyful yes to the new German State.”50 Allegiance to the post Jerusalem agenda, 
in other words, could be accommodated easily with pro-Nazi politics. 
 
To be sure, the anti-secularist agenda as envisioned by the Reich Church and its supporters in the 
1930s differed in critical ways from that envisioned by Allied ecumenists. For one thing, Reich 
Church intellectuals and clerics were understandably cool on Anglo-American and Continental 
polemics against totalitarianism that dominated in the ecumenical mainstream, since these 
polemics so often identified the Nazi regime they supported as an efflux of pagan religion. They 
also embraced theological orientation that legitimated the Volk as an “order of creation” 
continuous with God’s revelation, a position that was in the minority outside of German 
Lutheranism (though not unrepresented: Scandinavian Lutherans also espoused order of creation 
theology). But disagreements over the role of the state and the nation were considered within the 
bounds of ecumenical discourse. Indeed, ecumenists saw it as central to their project of 
promoting world Christian dialogue to resolve these intra-church debates, and to exclude a group 
                                                
49 For an account of how anti-secularism – especially fear of Bolshevism – turned German missionaries to embrace 
Nazism after 1933, see Werner Ustorf, Sailing on the Next Tide: Missions, Missiology, and the Third Reich (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2000). 
50 Quoted in Gary Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology, (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1999), 103. 
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of Christians eager to take part in ecumenical consultations on the basis of their “political” 
allegiances seemed to offend against the vision of a church truly inclusive of all nations, races, 
and classes. Oldham recognized that these were open questions in his introductory pamphlet to 
the Oxford Study program: In fact he highlighted the need to study questions such as: “What is 
the Christian understanding of the common bonds which constitute the life of a people or nation? 
What is the relation between the community and the state?”51 His pamphlet even invited 
consideration of “how far ought the Christian Church to be a Volkskirche?”52 These were the 
pressingly urgent questions of theology which divided Christians and the appropriately 
ecumenical attitude toward them was to invite as many points of view to the table – so long as 
they identified as Christian and were willing to play by rules of debate and conversation. 
 
The main reason that Reich Church intellectuals were more involved in the study program of the 
Oxford conference is that they were willing to play – and exploit to their advantage – the rules of 
theological dialogue that constituted ecumenical polity. Far from univocally belligerent against 
co-religionists from other countries, the Reich Church actively sought out the support of 
churchmen outside of Germany and cultivated their ecumenical contacts. They viewed the 
ecumenical movement as a means of legitimating the Reich Church and delegitimizing the 
domestic opposition of the Confessing Church – which is not to say that their involvement was 
wholly cynical: the Reich Church included a number of theologians and thinkers, such as Eugen 
Gersteinmaier, Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, and Paul Althaus, who took part in international 
Christian conferences and consultations before the outbreak of World War II. Meanwhile, the 
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supporters of the Confessing Church attempted to pressure ecumenical bodies into deciding 
unilaterally to support their view of the Reich Church as a heretical church. From 1934 onward, 
Bonhoeffer pressed this point repeatedly with Geneva: the ecumenical movement needed to 
decisively repudiate the Reich Church as a heretical church if the Council was committed to the 
true church and not merely an association of peoples interested in theological discussion. Despite 
sympathy for the Confessing Church among ecumenist circles, this demand that other German 
churches be excluded was a bridge too far for a movement founded on the belief that it was 
precisely through dialogue and mutual recognition of churches that the church actualized itself in 
history. The French General Secretary of the Council of Life and Work, H. L. Henriod, explained 
to Bonhoeffer that the Council lacked the authority to make such determinations: if a church 
claimed to be a Christian church, the council could do nothing but welcome it to the table.53 As 
Schönfeld put it in a memo attacking the Confessing Churches ultimatum, the Oxford 
Conference preparations sprang from the very “soil of the church.” But he denied that there 
could be a place in this project for a theology that refused to acknowledge in good faith the 
legitimacy of other understandings of Christianity. “if what is demanded here [by the Confessing 
Church] is a theology that declares itself to be absolute, then it will hardly be possible to deal 
with this within the framework of our ecumenical research.” Bonhoeffer’s response to this was 
as clear as it was incompatible with the study program: Geneva seemed capable only, he wrote, 
of advancing “theological problems.” “What is demanded is an ecclesiastical decision, not a 
theological dialogue with the German Christians.”54 
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III. Anti-Secular Discourse as Ecumenical Movement: Theologies of “Ecumenism” and the 
Origins of the World Council of Churches 
We have examined so far how anti-secularism was institutionalized as a practice of theological 
dialogue administered by international church elites and organizations. These practices created 
an intellectual community, centered on the North Atlantic and largely Protestant but including 
Orthodox thinkers as well. For this community, the achievement of “personal fellowship” – 
linking individuals with one another through collaborative search for God’s Word – constituted 
the church’s resistance to secular society. As anti-secularism was institutionalized, some 
movement intellectuals reflected on this process itself, developing an ecclesiology that emplotted 
the progressive realization of the ecumenical church within history. This theory viewed 
theological dialogue, not merely as an ad hoc response to the urgent need for a more robust and 
persuasive formation of the Christian message to the modern world, but as the constitutive 
activity of the church itself, entailing a communal ethics that connected human communities with 
the divine. Adopting a term which had remained, until that time, marginal within international 
Christian discourse, these theorists described that community as “ecumenical,” denoting both its 
world-wide extent as well as the ethics of spiritual and intellectual pluralism on which it was 
based. In applying the term “ecumenical” to a new practical reality, they helped to publicize a 
new meaning of the word and extricate it from associations with formal ecclesiastical bodies. 
“Ecumenical Unity,” they argued, in no way resembled the authoritarian approach to church 
governance epitomized by the Roman Catholic Church. In fact, these theorists argued, 
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“ecumenicity” was a mode of Christian humility, which accepted the inassimilability of diverse 
expressions of Christianity as the historical manifestation of a universal faith. This body of 
theory drew on dialectical theology to interpret the practices of anti-secular discourse as the 
solution to humankind’s sinful lust for domination. 
  
In its systematic postponement of resolution, these theorists argued, ecumenical dialogue 
embodied submission to the divine logos. It offered, then, a solution to the problem of 
sovereignty that was at the center of the crisis of modern life, evinced in the “totalitarian” claims 
of the state and the cogito alike. If modernity was defined as humankind’s usurpation of God’s 
sovereignty, the bureaucracies of international bodies were instruments for restoring sovereignty 
back to God, and putting man in his rightful place. Critically, ecumenical institutions made no 
claim to speak for the church, rather, their function was to regulate an ethics of responsibility – 
and “response-ability” – to the utterances of others. In this way, ecumenical theory concealed the 
exercise of power by bureaucratic elites, presenting them merely as instruments that would 
liberate persons from the servitude of inherited national, racial, and sectarian biases into the 
positive freedom of responsibility to God. This connection of bureaucratic organization and 
godly community formed the basis of the constitution of World Council of Churches, which 
emerged from consultations among various Christian unity movements in the mid-1930s looking 





As Visser’t Hooft noted in his 1954 history of the meaning of ecumenical, it was only in the mid 
1930s that the terms ecumenical, and ecumenical movement, entered into wide use.55 We have 
seen in previous chapters how Nathan Söderblom attempted to rally church leaders to the idea of 
forming an “ecumenical council” of churches in the 1920s. The proposal, however, failed to 
mobilize, and though a handful of German and Scandinavian theologians occasionally employed 
the word “ecumenical” to refer to nature of the worldwide church in the 1920s, the term had no 
broad circulation. But in the 1930s the term was able to experience its “break-through” because it 
was invested with a new meaning, describing the phenomenology of Christian anti-secular 
dialogue.  
 
Among the earliest and most important theorists of this new interpretation of ecumenicity was 
the Swiss dialectical theologian, director of the International Christian Social Institute in Geneva, 
and veteran of numerous Christian unity institutions, Adolf Keller.56 Keller’s case is especially 
important to us he was the first to employ the term “ecumenical” research to the collaborative 
study on secularism, thus linking what had been a parochial vocabulary to an ideological and 
institutional project pregnant with a future. In the Spring of 1929 Keller became involved with 
Joachim Müller, head of the Swiss YMCA, and William Paton in an effort to organize a study 
conference in Geneva to address the Christian response to “a new conception of life [that is 
sweeping through the world in a strong and united current,” a development that “was realized 
with special clearness by the meeting of the International Missionary Council at Jerusalem at 
Easter, 1928.” Keller and Müller’s agenda for the meeting differed in few respects from the 
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56 For a useful general biography of Keller, see Marianne Jehle-Wildberger, Adolf Keller: Ecumenists, World 
Citizen, Philanthropist, trans. by Mark Kyburz and John Peck (Eugen, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2013). 
 
 245 
similar documents produced around the time by Oldham, Paton, Visser’t Hooft, and Van Dusen 
– except in the special emphasis it placed on reflexive theological consideration of the 
communities of discourse that were produced in these consultations. The challenge of secularism 
raised, Müller and Keller wrote, in particularly acute form “the essential meaning of oecumenical 
fellowship.” 57 That meaning Keller sought to analyze in the years that followed through a 
creative appropriation of the theology of Karl Barth. 
 
Two years after the Geneva study conference, Keller completed what would become his best-
known work, Der Weg der dialektischen Theologie durch die kirchliche Welt.58 The work shows 
how dialectical theology furnished a way for advocates of world Christian unity to conceive the 
practices of theological debate and dialogue already underway in the post-Jerusalem study 
groups as the sites of the historical emergence of the community of the church. The idea of an 
ecumenical movement, as Keller understood it, denoted a widening debate over the meaning of 
Christ’s revelation that would gradually incorporate the national and confessional divisions of 
churches and denominations. 
 
Der Weg der dialektischen Theologie durch die kirchliche Welt was an extended treatment of the 
theology of Karl Barth and its reception and the North Atlantic world. The work surveyed the 
impact of neo-orthodox thinking on churches in Europe and the United States, on Protestant, 
Orthodox and Catholic churches, and on missionary work. But Keller aspired to much more than 
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a reception history; he wanted to show how Barth’s concept of existential “crisis” provided a 
new ethic of citizenship for Christians to participate in what he called the “ecumenical” unity of 
the church. Previous approaches to Christian unity, Keller argued, had sought to resolve 
differences by focusing on “a mere ‘minimum theology,’ that is, the smallest circle of that 
common knowledge which had been gained by the mutual subtraction of all that is 
differentiating.”59 But the effort to distill a minimum theology exemplified the Pelegian ambition 
to achieve salvation through works. It was an expression of human pride in the form of an 
imperious rationalism. Rather than seeking to “resolve” disagreements over doctrine or the 
nature of church’s social responsibility, Christians could find in Barth’s theology a new approach 
to the problem of sectarian and confessional difference. The “ecumenical movement,” in Keller’s 
view began with the experience of an existential crisis, namely recognition of the irresolvability 
of doctrinal disagreements through human ingenuity and compromise. To be ecumenical was to 
experience as a judgment of God the “inner contradiction between that which the church 
preaches and that which the church now is; a contradiction between its designation to be the 
Body of Christ, Corpus Christi and that which the church really is, namely, a distressing picture 
of division and discord, a lacerated and dismembered Body of Christ.” And yet collective 
recognition of international and interconfessional division as a form of sin provided, ironically, 
the basis of a new Christian solidarity.  
 
In Keller’s account, Barth showed how a theology that began, not with human understanding of 
the divine but with the disruption of God’s original act of self-revelation could form the basis for 
a new mode of engagement with those of other confessional traditions. 
                                                




In a theology of revelation we never begin with the ‘reaction’ of man, but with the 
‘action’ of God. God speaks to me—that is what first strikes me. God, however, 
according to the testimony of other people, also speaks to him, also to the other church, in 
a different way. That occurs to me first as an offense, as a contradiction. We can either 
revolt against it or we can take it as a dialectical mystery, as the illumination of a 
universal truth modified by variations of time and place. God’s time is a different time 
from that of the human spirit.60 
 
Barth’s “wholly other” God was, for Keller, the God of the other Christian, the other church: 
accessible not through one’s own powers of apprehension but precisely in the offense and 
resistance provoked by difference. If the idea of an ecumenical council suggested the image of an 
ecclesiastical imperialism, in which a church elite would impose its views on others, the 
ecumenical ethics Keller espoused was premised on the humble acceptance of theological 
disagreement as an experience of God’s judgment on all attempts to formulate Christian faith. 
“The Ecumenical Movement,” Keller wrote, “has been accused of ‘hybris.’ If understood 
correctly it is rather a new humility of those individual churches which do not consider their 
preliminary and accidental nature as something final.”61 
 
One consequence of Keller’s idea of ecumenism was that various descrete organizations: 
Universal Council of Life and Work, the World Conference on Faith and Order, the World 
Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, and the International Missionary 
Council, were now understood to be taking part in essentially the same activity: that of 
cultivating a community of theological dialogue. This claim of an underlying identity of function 
was most dramatic and surprising the cases of Life and Work and Faith and Order – the two most 
well known international Christian organizations at the time. Throughout the 1920s the 
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leadership of these institutions had emphasized that their roles were functionally distinct and 
complementary: Life and Work focused on promoting practical cooperation in social activism 
and bracketed all discussion of doctrinal disagreements, while Faith and Order focused on the 
resolution of doctrinal disagreements. Now Keller claimed that both bodies were involved in the 
same work of “translation.” Faith and Order was involved translating distinct confessional 
traditions into “responses” to questions of doctrinal and ecclesiastical order faced by all 
churches. Life and Work was concerned with translating social problems and injustices into 
theological questions concerning the nature of a Christian organization of society and the manner 
of God’s providential action in history. This idea of a single ecumenical practice would become 
in the next five years critical to the movement, as its leaders entertained proposals for 
consolidating Faith and Order and Life and Work into a single organization.62 
 
With the help of his strong contacts in the American and British Protestantism, Keller’s book 
quickly found an English translator and publisher and appeared as Karl Barth and Christian 
Unity in 1933. To an American and British audience that tended at this time to view Barth as an 
intransigent apostle of orthodoxy and intolerance, the book presented a sharply different view. 
But Keller was offering more than a palatable Barth: he was formulating the ethics of a new kind 
of Christian community. In the 1930s, in this community, individual and collective obedience to 
God was actualized through the give and take of conflicting theological perspectives; theology 
was the idiom of inter-personal relations that enabled the balance of collective purpose and 
individual difference. This vision furnished ecumenists with an argument that they alone held the 
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solution to a crisis of social order based on the exclusive claims of nationalism, racial prejudice, 
and proletarian revolution. 
 
Those who self-identified as “ecumenical” in the mid-1930s saw themselves as participants in 
the sort of theological community that Keller described.63 The young Anglican priest Oliver 
Tomkins was one such individual. “It was at my first Federation Conference in 1930 that I 
became an ‘oecumaniac,’ and I have been trying ever since to understand what it was that began 
for me there,” he wrote in 1937. In “A Beginners Guide to Oecumenism,” published in the 
World Student Christian Federation’s periodical Student World in 1937, Tomkins offered a story 
of his conversion. Becoming ecumenical (or ecumeniacal), Tomkins wrote, began with the 
experience of “groping for an emphasis” – a common point of contact among their various 
different commitments and perspectives. This was the central event of international Christian 
conferences. He wrote of his own experience in one of the retreats organized by Visser’t Hooft's 
“Commission on the Message:”  
 
The ‘oecumenical group’ at that Conference was supposed to look at all the different 
expressions of Christianity represented there, and see if it could find in them anything 
that could be called the ‘Message of the Federation.’” That was in the glorious days when 
Americans, on the crest of the 1929 boom, felt they were ‘bringing the Kingdom of God’ 
at unprecedented speed; when the voice of Karl Barth first came booming across Europe, 
not very distinct as yet, but already uncomfortably insistent on such things as sin; when 
the British on the whole had American ideals but were increasingly prepared to dress 
them in the decent clothes of evangelical language; when the Russian Orthodox were for 
most still interesting refugees, who had a bewildering habit of lapsing into obscurantist 
affirmations about the Faith of the Church. ‘Groping for an emphasis’ was certainly about 
                                                
63 Other illustrations of the terms proliferation include the following. In 1933, Life and Work started hosting 
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Rengsdorf, 8-15 March 1933. (WCC, 24.002).) In 1934, the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations 
christened its new French-language review Oecumenica. 
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all that could be expected from a group like that, and ‘oecumaniac’ was a fitting pun to 
express the lunacy of trying to do it at all.64 
 
To Tomkins the technical exercise in crafting a common affirmation of faith only seemed 
technical: beneath it, a profound collective spiritual transformation was taking place. Tomkins 
called the experience a “pilgrimage,” which proceeded through stages that were essentially the 
same whether they appeared in the microcosm of the individual experience of the international 
life of the church and in the macrocosm to the history of what he called the “oecumenical 
movement.” The first stage was one of surprise at the “reasonableness of other traditions and 
consequent optimism of a quick solution.” But this “puppyhood of oecumenism” was fleeting. 
“Close fellowship is followed by each tradition having to define itself more clearly… Then 
comes the painful discovery that there are differences which cannot be explained away.” It was 
critical for conversation to reach this sense of impasse, in which reason was revealed to be 
incapable of resolving fundamental disagreements “on the nature of man himself, on the manner 
of God’s self-revelation, on the character of means of grace and of the hope of glory” that stand 
“at the heart of our common faith.” The apprehension of a central emphasis that lay in the space 
between irresolvable positions was the paradoxically common experience that bound participants 
together. “When the doors were shut, Jesus came and stood in the midst of them… Just when all 
progress seems to be barred and door irrevocably locked, those who thought they were divided 
know that they are at one in a way which defies expression. They know, they know not how, that 
the same Lord who called them called also those from whom they differ.” Here was the “hardest 
lesson” of oecumenism: “we must love those of another confession not in spite of their 
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convictions, but because of them; not because we like them for their human qualities, but 
because we find them in the love of Christ.”65  
 
The destination of Tomkins’ pilgrimage was an understanding of theological and national 
traditions as different interpretations of a common faith. Anglicanism and Calvinism, for 
instance, “in many ways conflict; but the conflict takes on religious importance only when an 
Anglican and a Calvinist discover that it is their common faith in God about which the disagree.” 
The consensus sought in ecumenical conferences was a consensus over the value of difference as 
an experience of the divine.  
 
When we prayed together, heard the Bible together, listened to the Faith expounded, we 
knew that beneath all differences it was the same Lord who had called us. In that paradox 
lies the command and the task of oecumenism. Oecumenism is our answer to the Divine 
Imperative to realize the unity we cannot express. [italics original]66 
 
As Tomkins explained oecumenism, it was a collective solidarity that could be expressed only in 
prayer and listening. This denouement of ecumenical “pilgrimage” was not a conference report – 
but the chastening activity of attempting to formulate a Gospel that was, in the last instance, an 
utterance from God, not man – and thus necessarily remained beyond the capacity of human 
expression.  
 
Suzanne de Dietrich expressed a similar view. “In a time like ours, when so many masters claim 
men’s allegiance and on the other hand so many souls claim to be their own master, the Christian 
community is slowly coming to a new awareness of what it means to be ‘Christ’s slaves’,” she 
                                                
65 Ibid, 127. 
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wrote in the same Student World issue that published Oliver Tomkin’s contribution.67 Dietrich, 
born in Alsace and a Secretary of the WSCF since 1936, had secured an international reputation 
in student circles since the late 1920s as one of the most inspiring biblical exegetes of her 
generation.68 In this article she sought to ground the conventional wisdom of the ecumenical 
movement on scriptural bases. “The Bible knows of a man-made and a of a God-given unity,” 
she wrote, counterposing in the manner of Reformation preaching an Old Testament law and 
New Testament gospel. The Genesis story of man’s attempt to build a tower “’whose top may 
reach to heaven’” ended with its collapse.69 By contrast, the New Testament offered the story of 
the Pentecost, in which, expectant and faithful, a “few men” waited until “the first of the Holy 
Spirit descend[ed] upon them.” The same alternatives faced humankind today. “Now we are 
living in a ‘Tower-of-Babel age’,” she wrote. “We are faced with world-wide ideological 
movements aflame with the conviction that they are building up a new world-order, and bringing 
Heaven to earth.”70  
 
In contrast to these efforts, the ecumenical movement was called to bear witness to a “God-given 
inclusiveness.” She went on to elucidate the nature of this elastic unity – “a unity based not on 
uniformity.” It was grounded, rather, on a valuation of difference as a mode of Christian 
contrition. “We are ready to acknowledge our trespasses as individuals; but we are generally 
much less ready to acknowledge them as a group, be it a racial, a national, or a religious 
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community.”71 But it was through acceptance of the Christian “other” that submission to God’s 
will became possible. We should, she wrote, “learn to see the other, not in our own perspective, 
but in the perspective of God’s calling to him.”72 The common ground of the early Christian 
community – like that of the contemporary church – was always hidden behind and within 
disagreement over its meaning and mission. Reading Paul’s letter to the Galatians, “still hot with 
the fire of the battle, one senses a tremendous inward struggle.”73 Paul and his correspondents 
“have come to an agreement not by way of mutual concession, but because each of them 
acknowledged that the other had received his calling from God.”74 In its apparently infinite 
powers to include difference the church differed from the brittle unities of human vintage. The 
deduction from this view was that Christian unity was always both “fact and promise.” Signs of 
it appeared in history – and these signs seemed, Dietrich implied, to be multiplying in the in 
1930s within the Federation and other ecumenical bodies – but its complete realization lay 
beyond time.  
 
John Mackay too witnessed signs of the appearance of the oikoumene. Like Keller he noted that 
the unfolding of ecumenical unity took place through the activities of all international church 
organizations. In the article reflecting on the Oxford and Edinburgh conferences examined at the 
beginning of this chapter, he tied together the missionary expansion of Christianity with the 
growing sense of global Christian solidarity in a metaphor of ecumenical progress.  
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The amazing success of the Christian missionary movement during the last century 
planted branches of the church in every representative area of the world. A truly 
ecumenical church became possible for the first time in history. A truly ecumenical 
church became possible for the first time in history. This possibility began to pass into 
actuality after the Edinburgh Conference of 1910. The scattered children of the ‘Great 
Mother,’ members of the diaspora, sought to express their unity in life and faith and 
missionary action. Stockholm [the first conference of Life and work in 1925], Lausanne 
[the first conference of Faith and Order in 1927] and Jerusalem were highway inns, 
‘Interpreter’s Houses’, for pilgrims on the ecumenical road.’”75 
 
Here was the ecumenical faith as a triumphal philosophy of history, one that would shape 
approaches to the movement down to our own day. Though earlier champions of Christian unity 
had rejected thinking of their aims as “ecumenical,” and not thought of themselves as part of an 
ecumenical movement, Mackay could see things otherwise with the advantage of hindsight. All 
previous efforts to promote world Christian unity had secretly served to advance the church 
along the ecumenical road. 
 
What is interesting about Keller, Tomkins, Dietrich, and Mackay’s accounts is that they located 
ecumenism as an identity, community, and theological worldview that emerged exactly and only 
in the sorts of exchanges, dialogues, conferences, personal relationships and common study 
enabled by international bureaucracies. Such a social existence actualized “persons” under the 
sovereignty of God, furnishing an ecclesiology that addressed not questions of order and worship 
within existing denominational structures but rather the broader social crisis of modernity. The 
purpose of ecumenical bureaucracy was to plan and stage the personal encounters that would 
actualize the church as community constituted precisely in the failure of human ingenuity and 
goodwill. The administrative work of organizing gatherings, drafting reports, and crafting 
statements was a work of the creative destruction of human pretensions to complete knowledge: 
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only God could bring together what human organization alone could not achieve. The idea 
enabled the conceptual unification of Christian’s world history as the formation of a world 




For ecumenists, existential crisis – the recognition of alienation from God described by 
dialectical theology – was always a collective experience: it galvanized a pluralistic Christian 
community. In the 1930s era of ecumenism’s emergence and popularization, the movement also 
addressed a more material and mundane set of crises. The histories of these crises were 
intertwined. After 1929, all of the organizations committed to international Christian cooperation 
faced budget shortfalls. The idea of ecumenism provided an intellectual framework that guided 
the institutional consolidation of these bodies, a development that culminated in the decision, 
taken months before the Oxford and Edinburgh Conferences and ratified by the delegates at these 
meetings, to merge the Faith and Order and Life and Work movements into a single “World 
Council of Churches.”  
 
As we have seen in chapter 1, up through the 1920s, relationships among the various Christian 
unity movements had been understood overwhelmingly in terms of a division of labor. 
Söderblom, for example, distinguished Faith and Order and Life and Work as two 
complementary – but theoretically distinct – “ways to unity:” the first pursued a method of 
“faith” that aimed to reconcile differences in church doctrine and confession, and the second a 
method of “love” that brought them together “practically” through “Christian cooperation in 
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social action.”76 But in the 1930s, Keller’s view that all Christian organizations were involved in 
essentially the same activity – theologically resolving the problem of social existence itself – 
became widespread. Church leaders as a result began to see redundancy in “ecumenical” 
organizations. “The crisis of the ecumenical movement, which is the subject of so many 
discussions” declared the Biblical scholar Arvid Runestam at an executive committee meeting of 
Life and Work in 1932, “is the crisis of the ecumenical movement as a whole.”77 A memo drawn 
up by Schönfeld on “The Future of the Oecumenical Movement” in 1933 noted that though “at 
present the Oecumenical Movement is being carried on from four different centres [Life and 
Work, Faith and Order, the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, 
and the International Missionary Council] increasingly… the expansion of the work of each is 
bringing it closer to the field occupied by the others.” In particular, “it is becoming apparent that 
the difficulties encountered in each field have their roots in theological and philosophical 
conceptions which affect all phases of Christian thought and activity alike.”78 
 
The eye for redundancy was sharpened by economic necessity. At the same time as the encounter 
with secularism had enabled a conceptual unification of the ecumenical movement and the 
emergence of forms of ecumenical practice broadly the same across various institutions, all of 
these bodies were experiencing financial set-backs brought about by the Great Depression. In 
1931 after years of narrow surpluses, expenditures of the Universal Christian Council for Life 
and Work exceeded receipts by 18,000 Swiss Francs, and the institution ran a cash deficit of 
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5,726 Swiss Francs.79 Though the Council’s Finance Committee, under new leadership from 
1933, succeeded in stabilizing the deficit in the years that followed, Life and Work’s financial 
difficulties were only finally resolved when it was dissolved as an independent organization in 
1938 and reconstituted as a division of the World Council of Churches-in-Formation. Faith and 
Order’s financial difficulties began even before Black Friday: following an inaugural conference 
in Lausanne in 1927, in the fiscal year July 1928-July 1929, the organization ran a deficit of 
$12,476 – over half its operating budget of $22,720. By 1931, a campaign to increase church 
contributions and “some very liberal individual gifts”80 balanced the yearly budget but Faith and 
Order remained in debt until 1934.81  
 
These material concerns provided the backdrop for a “consultation” among the top leadership of 
the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, the International 
Missionary Council, the World Student Christian Federation, Life and Work, and Faith and 
Order held in York in 1933. Convened by Archbishop William Temple at the suggestion of 
William Adams Brown, the meeting was the first of a series of roughly yearly gatherings to 
consider steps for integrating what was now regularly referred to in the singular as “the 
ecumenical movement.” There were two broad options on the table – greater informal 
coordination that would allow organizations to share the costs of conferences, staff, and project 
budgets, or a formal merger of one or more movements. Though earlier talks of closer inter-
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organizational collaboration had focused on the possibility of joining Life and Work with the 
World Alliance (the two major “service”-oriented movements) discussions in the “Committee of 
Fourteen,” later expanded into a “Committee of Thirty-Five,” centered on the relation between 
Life and Work and Faith and Order. Some older voices, such as Wilfred Monod, as well as the 
German Evangelical Church representative Erich Stange, opposed combining the two bodies.82 
But the strong proposal of consolidation had won out by 1935, propelled in part by Temple’s 
decision in that year to make his own support for “an interdenominational, international church 
council representing all the churches with committees to carry on various projects now forming 
the objectives of distinct world movements.”83 In separate meetings in the summer of 1936, Life 
and Work and Faith and Order appointed a Committee of Thirty (later thirty-five) representatives 
“to review the work of ecumenical cooperation since the Stockholm [Life and Work] and 
Lausanne [Faith and Order] conferences and to make recommendations to the Oxford and 
Edinburgh conferences regarding the future policy, organization, and work of the ecumenical 
movement.”84 These recommendations of the Committee of Thirty-Five held that the two 
movements “should be more closely related in a body representatives of the Churches and caring 
for the interests of each Movement.”85 The proposal was accepted in a plenary session at Oxford 
with two dissenting voices.86 At Edinburgh, it passed nem. con. after the Bishop of Gloucester, 
sympathetic to the objections of German bishops to the plan, had succeeded in altering the 
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language of the resolution to clarify that “some members of this Conference desire to place on 
record their opposition to this proposal.”87 
 
The World Council of Churches was not an inevitable product of material factors that made 
sustaining numerous expensive international outfits untenable after 1928-9. Rather, the particular 
strategy of consolidation ecumenical leaders pursued reflected ecumenical ideology’s specific 
understanding of theological conversation – the traditional remit of Faith and Order – and social 
action – the remit of Life and Work. For ecumenists theological discourse was authentically 
social existence. The management of disagreements and the ethic of openness to the other 
modeled harmonious pluralism to a secular world hopelessly divided by racial, national, and 
class conflict. The confrontation with secularism thus suggested to the movement the intellectual 
plausibility, even desirability, of a more institutionally streamlined international movement at the 
moment that such consolidation became more of a live possibility than ever.  
 
After the proposals for the Council were accepted by committees of Faith and Order at 
Edinburgh and Life and Work at Oxford later that summer, a meeting was took place Utrecht in 
1938, where delegates from both organizations finalized a constitution, drafted in 1937, for the 
new body. This group, dubbed the Council’s “Provisional Committee,” brought into existence an 
institution that reflected the core ideas of the ecumenical movement as it had taken form over the 
1930s. Membership in the WCC would be offered to those “Churches which accept our Lord 
Jesus Christ as God and Savior” – implying, of course, that there were many such churches and 
                                                
87 Quoted in Nils Ehrenstroem, “Movements for International Friendship and Life and Work, 1925-1948,” A History 
of the Ecumenical Movement: 1517-1948 vol 1 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1954), 433-4. 
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that no historically extant church was identical with the true church.88 The Council’s functions 
would be to facilitate common action by member churches, cultivate cooperative study among 
Christians, host world conferences, and “promote the growth of ecumenical consciousness in the 
members of all Churches.” The new body would carry forward the discussions on ecclesiastical 
and doctrinal matters historically advanced by the World Conference on Faith and Order and the 
discussions on social ethics advanced in the Universal Council of Life and Work under one 
roof.89  
 
Representation in the new body would be on a regional basis, reflecting the – sometimes very 
rough – estimations of church members in different parts of the world. Continental Europe was 
granted the largest number of representatives – 110 – followed by the US (with 90), Great 
Britain and Ireland (with 60), 50 from Asia, 25 from Africa, Australia, and South America, and 
otherwise not represented. An exception to the regional principle was granted in the case of the 
Orthodox Churches, which were given 85 seats. Representatives from church bodies would be 
appointed for five years – the amount of time between Assemblies – and regional bodies would 
determine what percentage among the allotted spaces in the Assembly would go to which 
denominations and churches.90 A “Central Committee” of 90 representatives, reflecting the same 
regional percentages, would meet on a yearly basis to handle the Council’s business and issue 
pronouncements on a more regular basis, while a smaller “Executive Committee” of the Central 
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Committee would meet roughly twice a year and would be charged with the practical work of 
coordinating theological study, executing relief plans, and hiring staff.91 
 
That the Council was an expression of the vision of ecumenical community developed in the 
1930s was most clearly visible in the section of its constitution outlining the authority of the new 
body. The section enumerated two powers. The first was the authority to “take action on behalf 
of constituent Churches on such matters as one or more of them may commit to it.” The second 
was “to call regional and world conferences on specific subjects as occasion may require.”92 As 
we have seen, the authority to convene discussions among church representatives and to set the 
agenda of these conversations (“on specific subjects as occasion may require”) was essential to 
ecumenical governance. The third article articulated the limits of this governmental authority: 
“The World Council shall not legislate for the churches; nor shall it act for them in any manner 
except as indicated above or as may hereafter be specified by the constituent Churches.”93 An 
explanatory letter to the constitution written by William Temple elaborated on this point: 
Council was “not a federation as commonly understood, and its Assembly and Central 
Committee will have no constitutional authority whatever over its constituent churches.”94 
Rather, he wrote it was to be a forum in which churches could freely consent to statements or 
positions taken in common. “Any authority that [the Council] may have will consist in the 
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weight which it carries with the churches by its own wisdom.”95 According to its architects, then, 
the World Council was not a “mouthpiece” of non-Roman Christendom, but a vehicle for the 
emergence of a universal Christian community. Its role was to remove obstacles inhibiting the 
spontaneous emergence of this “community,” through generating personal contacts between 
representatives from churches across the world. Underwriting its creation was an ideology, not of 
social progress, against which orthodox theology asserted limits based on original sin, but of 
ecclesiological progress. And the Council was the instrument: it was assumed that churches 
would evolve toward greater reliance upon this body and, through it, on one another in their 
witness on pressing political, religious, and ethical questions of the day.  
 
Those who publicized the Council emphasized that it would provide a powerful institutional 
opportunity for churches to deliberate and give united voice to certain basic positions of the 
Christian faith. “The Council will provide a central forum from which expression may be given 
uncompromisingly to certain universal standards of thought and conduct which Christians 
everywhere are called upon to follow,” announced one pamphlet distributed in the United States 
to promote fund-raising for the new body.96  
 
The most important expositor of the theology behind the Council was its first General Secretary, 
Visser’t Hooft, who guided the body through its natal stage from 1938 to its founding 1948, and 
would serve as General Secretary until his retirement in 1968. Visser’t Hooft spent much of the 
war reflecting on the significance of the council and its purpose within the larger ecumenical 
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movement. Among his many writings on the meaning of the Council and the fellowship it sought 
to represent and extend, one is particularly useful to us here. In 1945, Visser’t Hooft began “The 
World Council of Churches: Its Nature – Its Limits,” an essay he finished early in 1946 and 
would later publish as part of the Amsterdam conference preparatory documents.97 The essay 
interpreted the Council as a body caught between its status as a man-made institution and as an 
instrument of divine revelation. Visser’t Hooft began by clarifying what the organization was 
not. The Council must not be understood, on the one hand, as a representative body with legal 
authority over the churches, for the simple reason that the Council itself was not a church. It 
lacked the notae ecclesiae, the marks of the church, present in the original Christian koinonia 
depicted in the Acts and the Epistles. Though it was clearly a Christian fellowship of some sort, 
its members lacked “full common witness” – they embraced different and incompatible teachings 
on Christian worship – and “full sharing in the sacramental life.”98 On the other hand, it was 
equally misguided to view the Council as “just an organization” which Christians to might use 
on an ad hoc basis to consider together the problems of unity, to become more familiar with each 
others traditions, and to collaborate on specific tasks. Though some “practical supporters” of the 
Council viewed the Council in these purely “human” terms, the Council was in fact more than 
this because its very existence gave expression to the unity of the Una Sancta. The fellowship 
that both created and was nurtured by the Council was God’s fellowship, and its visible 
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manifestation was a sign of his working to bring Christians across the world together. “The 
World Council cannot be a mere organization simply because it is a Council of Churches. For the 
Church in the churches insists on asserting itself. Wherever two or three churches are gathered 
together, the Una Sancta is in the midst of them and demands to be manifested.”99 By providing 
a platform for churches from around the world to meet, the Council taught Christians to 
“[discover] the sickness” of their disunity and to find “something of that clarity and certainty of 
preaching and witness which characterized the New Testament Church, until they are truly 
‘becoming the Church’ and meet each other on the level of that metanoia.” What unity the 
churches might discover through the Council was not man-made but “received” from God, 
though “that does not mean that man’s role is purely passive. We are to look out for [unity] and 
be constantly ready to receive it.”100 God’s revelation of the unity of the church lay wholly with 
his initiative, but to be receptive to this initiative required action on the part of humans, in this 
case action of a specifically bureaucratic nature: preparing conferences and reports, executing 
projects, balancing budgets, and raising the funds that would allow the operation to continue its 
work of nurturing international contacts among churches. Visser’t Hooft thus rehashed a 
paradoxical theology of grace in the form of a mission statement: “The World Council,” Hooft 
summarized, “is not the Una Sancta, but a means and a method which have no other raison 
d’etre than to be used for the building of the Una Sancta.”101 
 
IV. From Ecumenical Dialogue to Political Rights  
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Late in life, Visser’t Hooft averred that the outbreak of World War II occurred “at the worst 
possible moment” for the ecumenical movement.102 It is a judgment that unsettles the claims of 
much recent scholarship, which has generally portrayed the early 1940s as the period of the 
movement’s greatest triumphs and international prestige.103 In the 1940s, ecumenical groups 
such the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace in the United States succeeded in making their 
way into mainstream political culture of the United States and enshrining the “personalist” 
theology that ecumenists had incubated in the 1930s as a founding principle of the postwar 
international order, above all in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
When the Universal Declaration stated that “full development of the human personality” was a 
guiding principle for the conduct of all countries,104 it did indeed embrace a theological morality 
that ecumenists, as well as Catholics, had authored and actively sought to popularize. But the 
political success of the movement’s ideas was only one part of the wartime story of the 
movement, and this success itself was an ambiguous development for those international church 
elites whose primary interest was the cultivation of world Christian unity. As groups like the 
Commission on a Just and Durable Peace in the US and its British counterpart, the Peace Aims 
Group, secured popular support and gained access to Washington and Westminster elites and 
postwar planning boards, ecumenical dialogue in the specific sense that we have been discussing 
here – focused on spiritual conversation among Christians from diverse nations and confessions 
– languished as a result of the disruption of international communication and travel. Further, the 
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shift in attention of theologians and churchmen in Allied countries from ecumenical dialogue to 
the advocacy of concrete political objectives – such as the creation of a new United Nations 
Organization and the legal provision for human rights – was a threat to the integrity of the 
movement, and it was recognized as such by Visser’t Hooft, Henry Van Dusen, and others. The 
war years witnessed, in other words, the emergence of a political movement based on ecumenical 
ideas but at odds with its defining practices as well as the ideology of anti-secularism itself. For 
American ecumenists like John Foster Dulles and O. Fredrick Nolde, the powers that mattered 
for extending Christian influence in the world were not bodies like the World Council in 
formation but Allied governments and the United Nations. Further, their and other ecumenists’ 
efforts to sell Christian-inspired – but “secular” – principles like human rights to a general public 
displaced the anti-secular ideology that had been so galvanizing in the preceding decade.105 
 
In this section we will counterpoint two stories: the formation of a robust ecumenical vision of 
postwar order and attenuation of ecumenical dialogue between 1939 and 1945. We will focus 
first on the formation of the ecumenical idea of human rights as a political principle, a 
development which furnished the main objective of ecumenists’ advocacy work for postwar 
order but which was absent – or at best, only implicitly present – in 1930s ecumenical discourse. 
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protecting personhood that he developed in cooperation with ecumenical thinkers that established the conditions in 
which the later strains in his relation with the movement took place.  
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We will then examine how the breakdown of international communication dealt a blow to the 
World Council-in-formation, and served to isolate groups like Dulles’s Commission on a Just 
and Durable Peace from the larger ecosystem of ecumenical critique. The purpose of this 
narrative is not to suggest that ecumenists opposed the coming of a postwar order that reflected 
their ideas – in the early 1940s, the accomplishments of Dulles and others in bringing the 
influence of the churches to bear on international affairs was celebrated by Visser’t Hooft and 
European theologians, even as they lamented how lopsidedly American the study and advocacy 
work on postwar order was. The point is rather to suggest that this period brought about a new 
relation of the movement to international politics, laying the foundation for the developments we 
will explore in the next chapter. The administration of ecumenical discourse was, of course, itself 
political, in the sense that institutional elites wielded powers to shape the agenda of the 
ecumenical discussion and select who was included in and excluded from these discussions. But 
in the 1940s in a new way state power and the power of secular institutions – like the UN – 
posed a challenge to ecumenical authorities, precisely when the former adopted theological 
concepts endorsed by the latter.106 
 
The outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1939 only confirmed what ecumenists had been arguing 
about the nature of modern civilization since 1914: that it was characterized by an essentially 
moral and spiritual, if not physical, struggle between nations, races, and classes. World War II 
did not challenge in any way ecumenists’ basic diagnosis of the crisis of modern civilization. But 
                                                
106 This argument attempts to historically locate the emergence of a distinction, first observed by James Kennedy, 
between the ecumenical program as envisioned by its principal architects and the efforts of John Foster Dulles and 
other Americans to maximize the political “impact” of ecumenical networks and ideas. See Kennedy, “Protestant 




it did affect the ideas and institutions of the movement. In particular, in the collapse of the 
existing international order, ecumenists saw – and seized – an opportunity to conceive and 
propagandize new political frameworks that would serve as the bases for a postwar order 
consonant with the ideas of community life and personal responsibility to God that they had 
developed in the 1930s. In fact, they began to envision a new international political order even 
before the existing one had actually collapsed, specifically, in July of 1939, six weeks before the 
Wehrmacht’s invasion of Poland. 
 
On July 14, 35 ecumenical theologians and laypersons gathered at the Beau Séjour Hotel in 
Geneva. The conference, organized by the World Council-in-formation, included a high caliber 
cast of theologians such as Emil Brunner and the German Rhineland Lutheran Wilhelm Menn as 
well as laypersons with experience in international affairs like the British classicist and political 
scientist Alfred Zimmern, the international lawyer and future Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, and Max Huber, the Swiss lawyer attached to the International Court at the Hague, and 
the Dutch jurist Frederick van Asbeck. Ostensibly, the meeting was convened to consider the 
role of the churches in halting Europe’s drift toward war. During the conversations, the 
American Congregationalist Alfred W. Palmer suggested that the churches hold a peace 
conference and arbitrate between Germany and other powers. But the proposal only lead to an 
acrimonious exchange between Palmer and van Asbeck, who felt that any approach to the 
“present German government” would be “a gross betrayal of Christianity and of the cultured 
races.”107 For van Asbeck – and, it turned out, for the majority of attendees – the more promising 
path seemed to lie in the long game. Needed were new kinds of international organizations that 
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would make ecumenical norms and principles operative in inter-state relations. Surveying the 
prospect of immanent war, the conversation turned to the specifics of international political 
organization in a way that earlier ecumenical discussions had not. 
 
The meeting began with a discussion of the role of Christian morality in interstate relations. 
Shaped by different theological and sociological backgrounds, Anglo-American and Continental 
churches had clashed over this question in the 1930s, and their disagreements flared up quickly 
at the meeting. Wilhelm Menn opened the conversation with a sustained defense of the position 
that the church could claim “no compelling power, even in the spiritual sense.” It represented 
rather a community of the redeemed, a body set apart from the world of nations which looked 
forward to and prefigured the harmonious society to come. Menn’s Lutheran pessimism drew 
fire from Alfred Zimmern, who contended that it left no room for a Christian understanding of 
“law” – the principle of a difference between the just or unjust use of force. William Paton 
similarly assailed Menn’s position for denying that what happens within the “small group and the 
individual soul” of Christians would not in some way “bubble up” to have a tangible effect even 
on international relations. And yet this was the difficulty: by what standards could the actions of 
states be judged to be in line with the Christian faith? Palmer put his finger on the problem when 
he observed that there was a categorical difference between the standards to which individuals 
and states ought to be held. “Our problem is that while we have to deal not only with 
individuals,” but with organized groups: 
 
these artificial persons, corporations, groups, etc., do not accept responsibilities which 
individuals composing them would often accept as their ethical responsibility… Though 
we do accept the Christian ethics as individuals, how far can we carry that Christian 
ethical standard over to the behaviour of our governments[?]108  
                                                




The answer given to this question at Beau Séjour differed in critical respects from any answer 
that movement advocates had given in the 1930s. In line with their emphasis on theological over 
political solutions to international disorder, ecumenical intellectuals had stressed that there could 
be no specifically political solution to the problem of sovereignty, since that problem was at root 
spiritual and not political. The 1937 Oxford Conference Report on “The Universal Church and 
the World of Nations” – which participants were asked to re-read before coming to Geneva in 
July – had identified the church’s “contribution” to international politics along these lines. 
Christians’ collective role was to not to advocate for this or that political form but to cultivate, 
through their preaching and witness, an ecumenical “ethos:” a pre-legal and pre-political sense of 
responsibility, a respect for lawfulness as such without which all legal regimes were destined to 
be empty formulae. But in 1939, with the destruction of existing political and legal institutions 
seemingly imminent, ecumenists showed a new willingness to take on the question of what a 
legal reflection of theological ethos would look like.  
 
Was there a way to enshrine “personal” moral responsibility in the conduct of impersonal states? 
Toward the end of the first session, Emil Brunner suggested that there might be. His proposal 
took the form of a via media between Menn’s eschatology and Paton’s qualified historicism. 
“What you want,” he said, addressing Paton, “is that something of the Christian Church should 
be manifested in the political world.” But “truly Christian standards” of selflessness and 
unconditional love were unrealizable where states deal with one another; by insisting on their 
application the churches merely guaranteed their own impotence. Like the philosopher returning 
to the cave, Brunner suggested that the church “go down to a level which is applicable to the 
political world.” What was needed was a set of standards that could apply specifically to 
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relations between states, thus ensuring that some residue of Christian ethics might seep up from 
the realm of personal to international relations. Brunner called these standards a “moral 
minimum,” contrasting them to the “ethical maximum” that applied to individual persons. “We 
have to fix as a principle this: We as Christians have a vital interest in the problem of a moral 
minimum. At present there is no ethics whatever recognized and the recognition of some 
standards is much more than speaking in general about the highest Christian ideals.”109  
 
The next day the idea was taken up by John Foster Dulles. A moral minimum, he argued, carried 
its nearest approximation in the idea of states’ responsibility to uphold certain individual 
“rights.” It was a term that had played little role in ecumenical thinking on international order up 
until that time. Churches had long seen as one of their common interests the protection of 
“religious liberty” and “rights of conscience,” but Dulles now was referring to a more capacious 
idea of rights and yoking it not just to missionary interests but to the very possibility of taming 
power politics. Dulles construed a regime of individual rights as the legal expression of 
Brunner’s concept of a minimum morality and hence the only possible way to bring international 
relations into line with Christian principles. If states could be made to protect the “dignity and 
worth of individual persons,”110 they could be harnessed to the Christian cause. Nor was it 
fantasy to believe that they could be so conscripted: to prove his point, Dulles pointed to the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States’ Constitution. Drawing a comparison 
between slavery in the antebellum American South and the contemporary Nazi persecution of 
Jews and other non-Aryans, Dulles argued that the crimes of both regimes lay in the fact that 
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while assuming a power over all the people within its jurisdiction, [the government] did 
not treat them all with equal worth and dignity… certain persons, because of racial 
characteristics, such as the Jews, or the Czechs, when incorporated [into the political 
order] were incorporated as subjects. That was a denial of the equal worth of the 
individual.111 
 
A state’s protection of its own citizens’ “worth and dignity” required establishing political and 
legal rights for all citizens. It was not only in the realm of racial justice that individual rights 
mattered. Since power was projected not only within states but also across international borders, 
responsibility also had a global dimension. In their pursuit of markets and natural resources in 
particular, states “exercise in fact an economic power that very far transcends their 
responsibility.” In Dulles vision states needed to be made responsible not only to those “who are 
subject to its laws,” but to the dignity and worth of all peoples, which by implication included 
the protection of certain economic rights (though he left these undeveloped).  
 
The Beau Séjour meeting would go on for another two days, but the basic framework of the 
report was set by the conjuncture Brunner’s demarcation of a distinct subcategory of Christian 
ethics and Dulles’s appeal to a concept of limited government. The report broadly followed 
Dulles’s formulation. Concretely that meant preserving a space for the claims of personal 
morality in what the report termed “the hard impersonal world of states.” The report argued that 
all human beings – even non-Christians – could subscribe to this vision of international relations 
based on certain “fundamental principles.”  
 
Among [these fundamental principles] must be included the equal dignity of all men, 
respect for human life, acknowledgement of the solidarity of good and evil of all nations 
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and races of the earth, respect for the plighted word, and the recognition that power of 
any kind, political or economic, must be co-extensive with responsibility.112 
 
The “moral minimum” of inter-state relations was to be realized, according to the first “Christian 
principle” enumerated in the report, in the idea that “power should always be exercised with a 
full sense of responsibility” for the equal worth and dignity of all human beings. From this it 
followed that all citizens deserve certain equal rights before the law, though the report, 
acknowledging that more “clarification on this point was needed,” contented itself with 
indicating the purpose of such rights rather than enumerating specific ones. “The ruling power 
should not deny essential rights to human beings on the ground of their race or class or religion 
or culture or any such distinguishing characteristic.” The purpose of these protections was not to 
liberate individuals from moral and ethical standards but – to the contrary – to safeguard a space 
in which persons could submit themselves to the ethical responsibilities of Christian love. “The 
function of the Christian ruler is to use his responsibility as to render those, under whom his 
power extends, themselves more fully responsible thereby adding to their human dignity and 
enabling them better to fulfill their social duties as men and Christians.”113 The responsible use 
of power also required cooperation among states. “If Christian principles of national conduct are 
to be made effective there must be some form of international organization which will provide 
the machinery of conference and cooperation.” This international organization was needed on the 
one hand to “prevent isolated outbreaks of violence and on the other to bring to bear the public 
opinion of all nations in order to make effective the principle of justice between individual 
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nations.”114 International cooperation would also redress economic inequalities: a short appendix 
to the report indicated that a particular area of concern was that power over colonies and 
mandated territories be used more responsibly – ie. in the economic interests of the 
inhabitants.115  
 
The fundamental principles of the Beau Séjour report reflected ecumenical theologies of 
personhood. Significantly, however, the report asserted that accepting these principles required 
only common moral sense, not personal faith. “While it is our Christian faith which urges us to 
adhere to these principles they are of such a character that many who do not profess the Christian 
faith, but are equally bewildered by the openly proclaimed moral anarchy, will respond with 
cordial assent.”116 The political inscription of theological personhood blunted the anti-secular 
polemic that produced the concept of personhood in the first place. The conference report 
evinced some discomfort with this realization, acknowledging, in a passage that Brunner drafted, 
that “the Church can never be satisfied with urging such directions upon all its members. It has a 
greater message for the world, the word of redemption and eternal life.” But the exigency of 
imminent war suggested now that the churches had a responsibility to lay down the foundations 
of a political order that, if it would not redeem the world, would at least rein in the chaos of 
international competition. The Christian message “will not be taken seriously if the Church does 
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not earnestly impress upon its members the standards of political conduct which are derived from 
Christianity.”117  
 
At least one participant was less sure. Max Huber, the international lawyer whose essay for 
Oxford had developed the concept of a pre-legal “ethos,” explicitly dissented from the report’s 
findings. Arriving two days after the conference began, there was little he could do about this but 
criticize drafts that were already written when he got there. The church, he said, “has to say to 
the world a specifically Christian word.” By advancing principles that could “win assent” from 
non-Christians, it had betrayed its vocation. “This specific Christian element is not represented in 
our message,” he declared, so emphatically that the minute-taker found fit to underline the 
statement. “Two-thirds of it could have could have been said as well by any well-intentioned 
non-Christian people. To a large extent [the report is] a secular message.”118 For Huber, the 
statement erased any pretense to be a message of the church, since it renounced the specificity 
and exclusivity of Christian truth in pursuit of principles that could become the basis of an 
overlapping consensus of Christian and non-Christian worldviews alike. Similar objections, as 
we’ll see, emerged from other quarters of the movement during the War.  
 
The Beau Séjour consensus furnished a concept of rights that churchmen made central to their 
proposals on postwar international order between 1940 and 1945, especially in the US and Great 
Britain. As the historian John Nurser has written, Dulles, as well as his colleague and friend 
Roswell Barnes, General Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches (FCC) and also a Beau 
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Séjour attendee, returned to New York with “clear indications of the directions in which the body 
of participants wished to move.”119 William Paton similarly took the Beau Séjour reports as a 
foundation for the ecumenical study on postwar order in Britain, where he formed the Peace 
Aims Group, which became the major conduit connecting churches and state officials involved 
in postwar planning. During the early 1940s, these groups became leading advocates of the idea 
that a postwar order must ensure that states were held accountable to and protected certain 
“rights” regardless of their internal political form. This is not the place to trace their activism – 
culminating in the success of John Foster Dulles, Charles Malik, and O. Fredrick Nolde in 
inserting a personalist language in the UN Charter in 1945 and, in 1948, drafting critical sections 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, including Article 18 on religious liberty – in 
detail, a task which in any case has already been taken up by other scholars.120 It must suffice 
here to note that the condition of possibility for their proposals was the innovation of a “moral 
minimum” of rights. The idea enabled a positive political program to take shape out of a 
discourse of anti-secular critique.  
 
When the Federal Council of Churches convened for its biennial meeting in December 1940, it 
condemned the outbreak of war in Europe while issuing a note of hope: after the hostilities “there 
will assuredly emerge the opportunity for a world order which, even though it be far from 
perfect, will at least be an improvement on that which preceded it.”121 That world order must be 
one “wherein the unit of value is not some body corporate or some personification of the nation, 
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race, or class, but the individual human being.” There followed an enumeration of “certain rights 
and duties” that had to be guaranteed to individual persons in keeping with their dignity, 
“including freedom of thought, of conscience, of worship and of expression, and an opportunity 
for livelihood, without which intellectual and spiritual freedoms have little practical content.” 
The 1940 meeting also formally established the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, which 
would go on to become the principal mouthpiece of American Protestantism on postwar order. 
The Commission’s “Six Pillars of Peace,” written by Dulles in 1943, declared, as its final and 
arguably most fundamental “political principle” that “the peace must establish in principle, and 
seek to achieve in practice, the right of individuals everywhere to religious and intellectual 
liberty.”  
 
In Britain, too, the Beau Séjour framework had a powerful impact on the churches thinking on 
postwar order. In his work The Church and the New Order (1941), Paton, organizer of the Peace 
Aims Group, outlined the church’s “consensus… with respect to postwar arrangements.” 
Reviewing key sections of the Beau Séjour report – a document which he observed “likely would 
not have gained won acceptance at the Oxford Conference”122 – and American and British 
utterances on postwar order, Paton wrote that they witnessed “remarkable agreement” on the 
proposition that “There are basic human rights and these lie deeper than political systems. It is 
therefore more important to fasten attention upon them than upon systems of government, 
important as the ethical grounds of democratic government may be held to be.”123 From 1940-
1943, the Peace Aims Group and Dulles’s Commission exchanged reports and sought consensus 
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in their recommendations for a postwar order. Despite disagreements over the shape of an 
international organization – the British churches favored early on a body under Great Power 
leadership while the Americans called for a general association of nations that would include 
smaller powers124 – the Atlantic Allies agreed on the importance of human rights with an 
emphasis on religious liberty. When Dulles released his Six Pillars of Peace, it was welcomed 
“unreservedly” by the Peace Aims Commission which largely concurred with its vision of world 
order.125 Most strikingly in Britain and the US, human rights had become the political language 
of ecumenical personalism. 
 
For our purposes, however, the significance of the idea of human rights as a consensus objective 
of the ecumenical movement lies how it enabled the institutionalization of forms of activism that 
diverged from the ecumenical practices that we have examined thus far in this chapter. The Beau 
Séjour conference and its successors did not present their findings as invitations to debate but as 
precisely the kind of theological (or moral) “minimum” that Keller had attacked in his work of 
the 1930s. As a principle of political organization, rights per se were not up for contestation. Nor 
were groups like the Dulles Commission or the Peace Aims group intended for or suited to 
promoting specifically theological discussion. They were founded as intermediary institutions, 
whose role would be to link ecumenical thinking to the world of political action and institution-
building. As Paton put it, the Peace Aims Group’s method was “to establish friendly confidential 
relations between those who know something of the Christian consensus and the experts who are 
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advising the government with respect to post-war arrangements.”126 In late 1939 and early 1940, 
Paton began to assemble a group of thinkers who would meet regularly throughout the war. 
Arnold Toynbee, director of studies at Chatham house, was a participant. John Hope Simpson 
and Alfred Zimmern, prominent figures of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, also took 
part in the group, as did William Temple (Archbishop of Canterbury after 1942), and George 
Bell, Bishop of Chichester. Following discussions at its first meeting in the winter of 1939, Paton 
wrote optimistically to Temple that the group offered a promising channel for the extension of 
church influence on British policy, highlighting the importance of Arnold Toynbee, and through 
him, Chatham House’s involvement in particular. 
 
The group were extremely keen that this should be done and again and again expressed 
their sense of its importance…. You know of course, that all these men are working 
under the aegis of the Chatham House, but in quite close contact with the Foreign Office. 
…I am quite clear that there is open to us a method of work whereby the results of 
informed Christian thinking would be taken into serious account at least by our own 
Government.127 
 
The Peace Aims group met regularly throughout the War, but its influence met with two 
obstacles. First, Winston Churchill resisted any formal declaration of peace aims until the war 
was won. Second, Paton, its major organizer, and Temple, its most prominent participating 
cleric, both died during the War, (the former in 1943, the latter in 1944), and without them the 
group struggled to sustain its work without a standing institutional structure.128 It was, in any 
case, by way of the United States that political principles derived from Beau Séjour would find 
their widest international impact. 
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The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace embraced a method similar to that of the Peace 
Aims Group. In comparison to its British counterpart, it was more focused on the work of 
mobilizing not just elite policy-makers but popular opinion as well. The FCC Executive 
Committee described its goals in January 1941 as follows: to establish the “foundations of an 
enduring peace,” ready ‘the people of our churches and of our nation’ to assume responsibility 
for this peace,” keep contact with the WCC’s Study Department, and consider proposals for a 
gathering of international church leaders following the conflict.129 In practice, the Commission 
proved effective in shaping national debate over the war, advocating for American support of 
Britain before Pearl Harbor, and mobilizing publics through events like “World Order Day” to 
accept American leadership in the world. This group’s study papers and statements were widely 
distributed to congregations and parishes and the media. It also occupied an important part in the 
semi-official think-tank world that clustered around James T. Shotwell’s Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, itself already active in the late 1930s. Dulles’s contacts in the Republican 
Party, with the White House, and with the State Department ensured that his Commission’s 
proposals received a hearing at the highest levels. As Michael Thompson has recently put it, 
Dulles’s priority in these activities was to make the churches “brokers” of public opinion. 
Toward this end, ecumenical study occupied a necessary, but secondary role. The major concern 
was not to for churchmen to arrive at the “mind of the church” through international dialogue but 
to impress one determination of this mind, in the form of specific recommendations or guidelines 
for a postwar order, in broader American and international publics, as well as governing elites.130 
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As the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace extended its publicity efforts and its contacts 
with the State Department postwar planning bodies, the economy of ecumenical intellectual 
exchange in which its vision of postwar order had been nurtured was grinding to halt by 1941-2. 
The War, which created opportunities for ecumenists to win a hearing with state actors, made 
international discussion among ecumenists in the North Atlantic difficult. Throughout the 1940s 
contact between US and UK study groups on international order remained intact. But Visser’t 
Hooft and Henry Van Dusen fretted over the isolation of Anglo-American church groups from 
Asia and the occupied European Continent. Beginning in 1939, Visser’t Hooft, Schönfeld, and 
Ehrenström of the WCC-in-formation Study Department initiated two new ecumenical study 
programs: one devoted to the “The Church’s Responsibility for International Order” – which was 
envisioned as an extension of the discussions held at Beau Séjour – and another devoted to the 
“Ethical Reality and Task of the Church,” a broader meditation on the function of the church in 
modern society. Memoranda outlining the two study programs, drafted by Ehrenström and 
Visser’t Hooft, were sent out to church leaders in the US, Europe, and Asia in 1939. But while 
theologians in the US, Britain, India and – thanks to copies smuggled into Germany, Hungary, 
France, Holland and Yugoslavia – the European Continent as well produced responses to these 
memoranda,131 these were written months, sometimes years apart, and Geneva found it 
impossible to circulate them broadly. An operation of Oxford-like efficiency was out of the 
question after 1940.  
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Van Dusen feared that the breakdown of communication was compromising American groups’ 
ability to represent a truly ecumenical perspective and threatening the ability of the movement to 
unite Churches to resist national mobilization and propaganda.  It was “crucial,” he wrote in a 
letter sent out to veterans of earlier ecumenical study programs in July of 1940, that the churches 
keep apprised of one another’s thinking on the conflict and on questions relating to the postwar 
situation: “[I]f non-Roman Christendom is to exert any important influence upon world events in 
the years immediately ahead, it must be prepared for by continuous ecumenical discussion 
now.”132 These efforts of coordination were persistently frustrated by disruptions of the post, 
especially between 1940 and 1942, when letters took any where from three weeks to four months 
to travel between New York and Geneva. Seven months later after Van Dusen’s circular 
announcing the need for coordinated thought during war time, he sent Visser’t Hooft a folio of 
American responses to the memo on “The Ethical Reality of the Church” for comment from 
European theologians. After a year of only intermittent communication with Geneva, during 
which he had received no written reflections on the American papers, Van Dusen wrote a 
distressed letter to Visser’t Hooft, fearing that the success of the study program – and with it the 
integrity of the movement as a whole – was on the line. “With regard to the American 
collaborators, we cannot too strongly stress the keen, indeed, almost bitter disappointment of our 
workers here over the failure to receive from Geneva any reaction to the Chicago Group’s 
memorandum on the Ethical Reality of the Church,” Visser’t Hooft, for his part, echoed Van 
Dusen’s concerns. While supportive of the Dulles Commissions’ efforts, Visser’t Hooft lamented 
in 1944 that the “the study of these questions continues to suffer from the fact that while the 
                                                
132 Van Dusen/Unlisted Recipients, July 10, 1940 (WCC 24.016/1) 
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Anglo-Saxon Churches are able to express themselves freely on these matters, and make 
excellent use of these opportunities, the churches in other countries cannot speak out.”133  
 
During the War there were a handful of responses to the American and British churches’ 
proposals for postwar order from the European Continent. Groups did convene in Switzerland, 
Holland, and Hungary to discuss documents produced by the Dulles Commissions, including 
“Six Pillars of Peace.”134 None of these documents expressed direct disagreements with the 
Commissions findings or proposals; indeed many of the groups supported the idea, hardly 
objectionable in itself, of a postwar order that would ensure rights of the person and limit 
“totalitarian” state power. But ecumenists did regularly note the concern that had animated 
Huber’s objection at Beau Séjour. Proposing political institutions, wrote Ehrenström in a critique 
of a precursor to the Dulles Commissions’ “Six Pillars of Peace,” ought to be secondary to the 
church’s distinctive task of proclaiming the Gospel.135 Moreover, he noted that apparent 
agreement on political proposals imperiled the ecumenical cause, since it obscured deeper 
disagreements between Christians. Christians may agree on principles, but they approach them 
from a different angle, so they have different implications “in the field of concrete policy,” he 
                                                
133  Visser’t Hooft, “Report on Activities During the Period July 1943-1944,” [unpublished memorandum], 8. 
(WCC, 994.2.10)  
134 For the response of Swiss study group [members no identified] to Dulles’ Commission, see “Comments on the 
‘Six Pillars of Peace’ of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America,” Nov, 1943 (WCC, 24.013); For 
a Dutch memorandum on postwar order, see “The Church and the International World,” December 1942 (WCC, 
301.1.03). For the Hungarian Oecumenical Council’s response to a WCC document analyzing of churches’ 
“agreements and disagreements” concerning postwar order, see “The Church and International Reconstruction,” Feb 
1944 [signed by A. Radvénsky, Laudislaus Ravas, and E. de Boér] (WCC, 24.014) 
135 The document was a report of the “Delaware Conference” of the Federal Council of Churches on “A Just and 
Durable Peace,” held March 3-5 1942 at Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio. See “Guiding Principles” of 
that report (pp. 4-9). For the an account of the significance of the meeting in the brokering of a compromise between 
American Protestant realists and pacifists, see David Hollinger, “The Realist-Pacifist Summit Meeting of March 




wrote.136 Ecumenical study ought to seek to excavate the disagreements that were masked by 
agreements on the level of principle. Visser’t Hooft himself regularly objected during the War 
that Dulles’s thinking on postwar order had too much a political slant too it; the American failed 
to grasp that as a result of the war Europeans had wholly lost a “common ethos” that was 
necessary to build a postwar order; in particular in Nazi Germany, the Christian morality that had 
formed the basis of the old order had been entirely whipped out. Far more important than 
proposing new political mechanisms was – as Huber had argued and as Dulles acknowledged but 
tended to soft-peddle – the churches’ work of the cultivation of a common ethos.137  
 
On one of the rare occasions when Continental churchmen had the opportunity to meet with 
members of the Dulles Commission – at a meeting in New York in 1941 – Adolf Keller echoed 
these concerns about his appraisal of the Americans efforts. At issue was the irony that principles 
claiming validity for all peoples, creeds, and nations always obscured hegemonic intentions. As 
he had written ten years before, Christian theology uniquely provided the idiom for a truly 
ecumenical understanding of others, one that penetrated further than tendentious claims 
concerning the universal validity of “rights.” “We must make an effort to understand the deeper 
nature and subconscious psychology of other nations. It is not enough to project our ‘imago’ of 
what they are, upon their inner deeper life and values. A constant attempt of a deeper translation 
                                                
136 N[ils]. E[hrenstroem], “Some Introductory Notes on the Delaware Report,” 2-3 (WCC, 24.013/2) 
137 See for instance Visser’t Hooft’s analysis of the Dulles Commission’s “Long Range Peace Objectives” in “Notes 
on ‘Long Range Peace Objectives’ from a Continental Standpoint,” [unpublished memorandum], 1941 (WCC, 
994.2.08). For Visser’t Hooft’s emphasis on the need for Christians to focus on the cultivation of an ethos over 
establishing political organizations (especially in Germany), see Visser’t Hooft, “Third Memorandum on the 
Reconstruction of Christian Institutions in Europe,” [unpublished memorandum], 1944 (WCC, 994.2.10), and 
Visser’t Hooft, “Germany and the West,” March 1940 [first draft] (WCC, 24.017) 
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of another life must therefore accompany our moral judgment and political activity.”138 That 
“deeper translation” was what the American project was lacking. 
 
Conclusion 
“It is true,” wrote Visser’t Hooft in a memorandum of May 1943, that “in spite of its provisional 
character, the Council has been able to function in different realms. But the uncertainty of its 
present position is nevertheless a real handicap.” The lack of ability to communicate among 
churches meant that, “as things are at present, the Council lacks the necessary authority to speak 
and to act. And if in spite of this lack of this lack of official authority it speaks or acts anyway, it 
remains unclear in whose name it does so.” It was understandable that the War had delayed the 
first assembly and official founding of the World Council. Visser’t Hooft noted too that the War 
had actually drawn the churches “spiritually” closer together; though separated and 
incommunicado, they felt themselves fortified by the idea of a Christian fellowship deeper than 
the lines of conflict. Nonetheless, without regular and direct exchange, the “mind” of the church 
was at risk of becoming divided within itself, even as the moral capital of the world church 
appreciated among broader publics in the US and Europe. This created a situation with hidden 
dangers. “A Council which is ‘forbidden to act in the name of the Churches except in so far as all 
or any of them have commissioned it to do so’ is in danger of making the wrong start if it does 
not associate its member churches as early as possible and as fully as possible with its planning 
and shaping of policy.”139 
 
                                                
138 Quoted in Thompson, 175. 
139 “Post-war Task of the World Council of Churches,” May 1943 [unpublished memorandum held in Burke Library, 
Union Theological Seminary, dated], 6 
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Visser’t Hooft was surveying the future of the movement from the perspective of the principles 
upon which it had been founded it in the 1930s. In that period, ecumenism emerged as a 
discursive practice that asserted Christianity’s superiority over secularism as a capacity to forge 
community from difference, unity within disagreement, a pluralistic order where secular 
assumptions only produced social disorder on the micro level of individual alienation or the 
macro level of conflicts between nations, races, and classes. Theology was the unique idiom that 
could “hold the world together,” as John MacKay had put it, and even as the efforts to organize a 
theological discourse inscribed exclusions and operated on a politics of its own, ecumenists 
carefully guarded the border between theological discourse and political discourse. During the 
War, however, seeing the collapse of existing order as an opportunity to formulate their own 
alternative, ecumenists began to imagine a legal and political framework that would not 
challenge but enshrine their vision of personal community. Their idea of a postwar order in 
which states would be held accountable to universal rights at once instantiated personalist 
theology and created obstacles for the ecumenical practices on which this theology was based. In 
the next chapter, we will see how the space for theological pluralism shrunk still further as the 











From Unity to Discord: The World Council of Churches in the Cold War  
 
Between 1940 and 1945, the ecumenical movement reached the apogee of its international 
prestige. During World War II, groups such as the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace in 
the United States and the Peace Aims Group in Great Britain had established “the churches” as 
serious players in Allied debates over postwar international order. Ecumenists’ vision of a world 
order based on the protection of human rights and religious liberty won backing from statesmen 
and publics and was written into the United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights. After 1945, the attention of the movement’s leadership shifted to preparations for 
the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches, begun in the late 1930s but delayed during 
the War. Even before hostilities had ceased, despite the disruption of international 
communication, requests for membership in the inchoate body flowed steadily into its Geneva 
headquarters. By 1939 – one year after the first invitations had been sent out – 55 churches had 
joined the “World Council in formation,” 90 had joined by 1946, and 147 had joined by the time 
of the Council’s inaugural Assembly in 1948.1 Consistent with its interwar position toward the 
Movement, the Roman Catholic Church declined membership, holding that Christian unity 
meant return to the true church. But for ecumenists the stalemate with Rome was a sideshow to 
dazzling new successes. In addition to all mainline Protestant Churches in the United States, all 
major state and free churches in Europe, Orthodox communions from Constantinople to Iraq and 
India, as well as numerous “younger churches” from Asia, Africa, and South America had 
                                                
1 Regular reports were prepared on churches that had accepted and rejected the invitation. See the document entitled 
“Churches that Have Accepted the Invitation,” July 1939 (UTS, William Adams Brown Ecumenical Library 
Collection, Series 1B, box 13, for 1946 numbers, see “Minutes of the Meeting of the Provisional Committee, 
Geneva, Feb 20-3, 1946” (WCC, 301.006). 
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agreed to send delegates to the Assembly. For the clerical and intellectual leadership of 
Protestant and much of the Eastern Orthodox Christendom, the ecumenical movement’s efforts 
to organize the activities and utterances of a “world church,” incorporating all denominations, 
nations, classes, and races, reflected a galvanizing vision of Christianity’s future. 
 
Among the greatest and most symbolic of the movement's postwar triumphs came in Germany. 
As we’ve seen in previous chapters, the split between German and Allied Protestants brought 
about by the First World War was a trauma that inspired many of the impassioned efforts to 
organize international Christian unity in the 1920s and 1930s. But in 1945 it seemed like a long 
struggle for Allied-German unity had finally come to an end. In October of that year, German 
bishops gathered in war-flattened Stuttgart to reconstitute the Evangelical Church in Germany, 
and promptly voted this body into the World Council. Led by veterans of the Confessing Church, 
the German churches also issued a statement acknowledging its complicity in the “endless 
suffering” Germany had inflicted upon the world.2 The Council’s General Secretary, Willem A. 
Visser’t Hooft, was ecstatic: “If the German church would speak this language,” he later wrote, 
“all obstacles to fellowship would be overcome.”3 The holding of the WCC’s inaugural assembly 
in Amsterdam in August 1948, a gathering widely hailed in the secular and religious press of the 
North Atlantic world as “the greatest gathering of churches since the Reformation,” only 
confirmed these hopes.4  
                                                
2 “Declaration of the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany” (WCC, 37.0004). For the original text and 
translation, see (http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/niem/StuttgartDeclaration.htm) 
3 Visser’t Hooft, Memoirs (London: SCM Press, 1973), 191 
4 “No Pentecost.” Time, no. 11 (September 13, 1948), 52. The personal reactions of those who attended echoed this 
line more ecstatically: Amsterdam was “the greatest event since the Reformation,” declared Dr. A. R. Wentz, 




But if the late 1940s marked a high point for the project of world Christian unity, the period also 
witnessed the emergence of new fault lines between and within the churches that ecumenists 
sought to mobilize. The Cold War, as the historian Dianne Kirby has argued, was a “religious 
war,” in which appeals to Christian values and responsibility in particular were central in 
defining the stakes of the struggle and in marshalling public opinion on both sides.5 To be sure, 
in this struggle, the West relied most heavily on the “spiritual weapons” furnished by the 
concepts, rhetoric, and rituals of the Christian faith. In the United States and Western Europe, 
religious and political leaders routinely cast their governments as the defenders of religious 
liberty and values as well as “Christian civilization” itself against the “godless” Soviet Union.6 
But in the Communist sphere as well, Eastern European and Chinese regimes sought out and 
found church leaders willing to lend their support to the new regime and to justify political 
allegiance to Communism on theological grounds. In the Soviet Union, the Russian Orthodox 
Church – systematically suppressed for two decades following the Revolution – was rehabilitated 
during the Patriotic War and became in the later 1940s an important ally of Soviet imperium in 
                                                
Gettysburg Times, Oct 4, 1948. See also a summary of secular and religious press coverage in H. Paul Douglass, 
“Some American Reactions to Amsterdam,” Ecumenical Review, vol. 1 no. 3 (Spring 1949).  
5 Dianne Kirby, Introduction, Religion and the Cold War ed Diane Kirby (New York: Palgrave, 2003). 
6 Kirby’s own work has prominent in emphasizing religion as a basis of ideological anti-communism. See Dianne 
Kirby “Harry S. Truman's International Religious Anti-Communist Front, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 
1948 Inaugural Assembly of the World Council of Churches” Contemporary British History (2001) 15 (4). 35-70. 
See also Jeremy Gunn, T., Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National Religion 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2009); Philip M. Coupland, Britannia, Europa and Christendom  : British 
Christians and European Integration (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jonathan P. Herzog, The Spiritual-
Industrial Complex: America’s Religious Battle Against Communism in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
 
 290 
the East.7 Not merely a war between “godless” communism and the “god-fearing and free,” the 
Cold War was a struggle pitting rival Christianities against one another. 
 
In this field of intra-Christian conflict, the World Council presented itself as a mediating body. 
Against attempts to align Christian interests with one side or the other, ecumenists argued that 
the world church’s unique concern lay in the reconciliation of peoples and nations in the East and 
the West through the discovery of their common faith. As Visser’t Hooft explained in 1949, “the 
first concern of the World Council,” in the area of international politics “must be that neither the 
ecumenical movement as a whole nor the churches individually shall identify themselves to such 
an extent with any social or political ideology that religion becomes exploited for purely secular, 
political ends.”8 Its task “must be,” he continued, to maintain unity among Christian churches 
“even though, and precisely when, they arrive at divergent solutions to their relation to the State 
and the social order.”9 In the years between 1945 and 1950, Visser’t Hooft and his colleagues in 
the Geneva office of the Council devoted their energies to promoting dialogue, cooperation, and 
common worship between church leaders in the East and the West. They assailed the anti-
Communist direction in US foreign policy and Eastern violations against “religious liberty” 
alike, while celebrating institutions such as the United Nations as a mechanism for the peaceful 
resolution of tensions between the West and the Soviet Union. International church 
organizations, according to their architects and leaders, were frameworks in which Christianity 
                                                
7 Daniela Kalkandjieva, The Russian Orthodox Church, 1917-1948: From Decline to Resurrection, (London  ; New 
York: Routledge, 2014). For a study of the epistemological dilemmas posed by religion’s persistence in the atheist 
Soviet Union, see Sonja Luehrmann, Religion in Secular Archives: Soviet Atheism and Historical Knowledge 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
8 Visser’t Hooft, “An Ecumenical Approach to the Soviet-Western Tensions,” Christian Responsibility in World 
Affairs, 1949, 16. 
9 Visser’t Hooft “Ecumenical Approach,” 16. 
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could be interpreted and practiced as a “non-political” third way in an era of geopolitical 
polarization. 
 
For some scholars, the position of the World Council in the Cold War seems to mark the 
recrudescence within the movement of a liberal idealism that rested faith in the power of 
morality to tame power politics.10 In fact, the position of movement in the Cold War reflected the 
continuing centrality of the anti-secular discourse whose origins and development we have traced 
in previous chapters. In this discourse, secularism was conceived as a worldview and way of life, 
premised on the rejection of God and modern man’s quest for “self-sufficiency,” that was 
responsible for a global breakdown of social and international order. Finding expression not only 
in the “totalitarian” regimes of Communism and Fascism, but also in the ideologies of 
nationalism, liberalism, and humanism in the West, secularism as ecumenists understood it was 
not concentrated in any area of the globe, political allegiance, social movement, nation, or class. 
In the postwar period, ecumenists read the conflict between Western powers and the Soviet 
Union as the latest instantiation of this global menace. As Martin Wight, the British international 
theorist, Anglican layman, and an editor of the WCC’s periodical the Ecumenical Review, put it, 
it was in the contemporary international sphere, above all in the competition between the West 
and the Soviet Union, “that the demonic concentrations of power of the modern neo-pagan world 
have their clearest expression.”11 While anti-communists in the West isolated the threat of 
secularism politically and geographically in the Soviet Union, ecumenists like Wight and 
                                                
10 This line of interpretation is especially marked in William Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-
1960: The Soul of Containment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Andrew Preston, “Peripheral 
visions: American mainline Protestants and the global Cold War,” Cold War History 13, no. 1 (2013): 109–30. 
11 Martin Wight, “The Church, Russia, and the West,” Ecumenical Review, vol. 1, no. 1 (1949), 30. 
 
 292 
Visser’t Hooft rejected the idea that Soviet Communism was the only, or even the primary, 
enemy of the faith. They wove polemic against “totalitarian” Communism within a broader 
critique that also attacked the materialistic tendencies of western capitalism and of geopolitical 
power struggle per se. At the Amsterdam Assembly, ecumenists gave this vision succinct 
expression when they stated, in one of the gathering’s most publicized reports, that “the Christian 
churches should reject the ideologies of both communism and capitalism, and should seek to 
draw men away from the false assumption that these extremes are the only alternatives.”12  
 
But if there is a conspicuous continuity between the ecumenical movement’s ideological 
program before and after World War II, there were stark differences in the impact of this 
program on the landscape of international Christian ideas and institutions. In the interwar period, 
ecumenical anti-secularism succeeded in fostering the global integration of Protestant and 
Eastern Orthodox intellectual life and a new sense of international solidarity among non-Roman 
churches. It enabled the formation of new organizations such as the World Council. In the period 
between 1945 and 1950, by contrast, the anti-secular ideology ecumenical advocates shared 
failed to produce greater harmony within the movement. Rather, it provided a minimum 
framework of shared assumptions that only served to underscore the obduracy of political 
disagreements between church leaders from Western and Communist states. Agreement on first 
principles proved insufficient for resolving movement loyalists’ divergent judgments on 
international events and crises – including the imprisonment of religious dissidents in Eastern 
Europe, the Communist Revolution in China, and above all, the Korean War. In the postwar 
period, these clashes moved to the foreground of ecumenical conversation. As a consequence, 
                                                
12 “The Church and the Disorder of Society,” Report of Section III of the Amsterdam Assembly, Man’s Disorder 
and God’s Design: The Amsterdam Assembly Series 4 vols. (Harper and Bros; New York, 1948), 195. 
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the discursive space of the movement shifted from a site of intellectual and practical integration 
to a site of conflict and antagonism.  
 
The concern of this chapter is to trace this transformation, showing how anti-secular ideology 
failed to secure a basis of ecumenical unity and how “politics” came to be conceived as a unique 
threat to the movement. The problem was not only that ecumenists saw their international 
activity as spiritual and not political in nature. The authority vested in ecumenical institutions 
was an authority to convene and promote debate, not to conclusively resolve disagreements. As 
discussed in the last chapter, the pronouncements of the World Council carried only the authority 
of their inherent “wisdom,” and the body lacked any power to impose its determinations on 
member churches. During the Cold War, “politics” emerged as precisely that space of 
disagreement that conversation, dialogue, and conferences could not resolve. These failures 
ended up threatening, even in the minds of erstwhile supporters, the very legitimacy of the World 
Council as an instrument of world Christian unity.  
 
The irony of this transformation was that it stemmed from the success of the movement in 
achieving many of its long-sought goals: in the face of Cold War polarization the movement won 
support from a constituency reaching across the divide, including clerics and theologians who 
both vehemently opposed and embraced Communist regimes. Ecumenical thinkers had also 
worked out a broadly shared understanding of the theological significance of Communism’s 
emergence as well as the relation between Communism and Christianity. With the formal 
establishment of the World Council of Churches, the movement possessed an institution that 
allowed church representatives to deliberate together and to project their views on pressing 
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international issues into the public sphere. Further, geopolitical conditions after 1945 made 
travel, conversation, and assembly of churches in general, including between church groups in 
the West and the Communist East, more possible and frequent than it had been in the 1930s, and 
especially the 1940s, when World War II had severely limited possibilities for contact.  
 
This chapter has four parts. The first will examine how and why Communist churchmen were 
integrated into the institutional authorities of the movement, as well as the surprising ways in 
which ecumenical ideology accommodated political allegiances to Communist as well as 
Western regimes during the Cold War. Part two will focus on the fallout from the movement 
leadership’s first major postwar initiative to “bridge” the Cold War divide: an effort, between 
1945 and 1948, to bring the Russian Orthodox Church into the World Council. We will see how 
this effort failed to allay suspicions of the World Council as a political organization among 
Russian churchmen while simultaneously antagonizing anti-Communists such as US President 
Harry Truman. The third part focuses on the Amsterdam Assembly itself, in particular the 
manner in which theological consensus – heralded by ecumenists since the 1930s as the major 
sign of growing unity among Christians – failed to prevent the flaring of political discord among 
ecumenists, evinced in the public clash between American statesman and Presbyterian John 
Foster Dulles and the Czech theologian Josef Hromadka. The fourth part shows how the formal 
establishment of the World Council and the creation of organs empowering the body to 
deliberate and pronounce upon specific international issues only exacerbated the political 
divisions within the movement, a dynamic that played out spectacularly in the aftermath of the 
outbreak of the Korean War. By 1951, political discord had eclipsed theological agreement as the 
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dominant and visible feature of international ecumenical culture, creating a crisis that a 
“common faith” seemed powerless to resolve. 
  
I. Foundations of the Cold War oikoumene: The Political Indeterminacy of Ecumenical 
Anti-Communism 
 
A decisive factor in the story we are tracing here was a political malleability of ecumenical 
ideology that made it compatible with political allegiance to both Western and Communist 
powers. Thus while Americans and Western Europeans dominated in the movement, church 
leaders from Communist countries were not only welcomed into it but assiduously courted to 
join ecumenical conferences and consultations as well as the institutional hierarchy of the World 
Council of Churches. The intellectual as well as the institutional trajectory of the movement in 
the postwar years was shaped by substantive agreement between Western and Eastern church 
leaders on a range of theoretical and theological problems, including an interpretation of the 
causes for the emergence of Communism as a political movement and cosmological system that 
challenged organized Christianity. It was also shaped by the opportunities for communication 
and direct personal contact that Communist regimes enabled by permitting church leaders to 
participate in the Council’s activities.  
 
Especially because most interpretations of the movement have emphasized the prominence of 
anti-totalitarianism in ecumenical discourse, the reasons for the inclusion of Communist-
sympathizers is worth examining in some detail. In their capacity to find a hearing within the 
movement, Communist-sympathizing churchmen differed from Nazi-sympathizing church 
leaders in the interwar period. Drawing out here the difference between will allow us later to see 
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more clearly the nature of the conflicts that did divide ecumenists during the Cold War, and why 
they proved so difficult to resolve. 
  
In the 1930s, ecumenists, along with Catholics, were the major architects of a conceptual 
synthesis that grouped Nazism, Fascism, and Communism together under the rubric of “political 
religions” or “totalitarianism.” As discussed in chapter 3, these movements, ecumenists believed, 
had emerged to meet a deep longing for spirituality and transcendence that secular modernity – 
based on technical and scientific mastery, and indifferent or hostile to God – was powerless to 
meet. Nazism, Communism, and Fascism imbued the state with God-like powers of 
omnipotence; in doing so they theologized politics, subordinating all areas of life within the state 
to central control while transfiguring international relations into a site of clashing fanaticisms. 
While opposing totalitarian states as “counter-churches,” however, ecumenists’ attitude toward 
totalitarianism was never as simple as univocal antagonism. Their polemic against totalitarianism 
was lodged within a narrative that explained the emergence of totalitarian regimes as a function 
of the corporate sins of organized Christianity. According to this narrative, it was, in part, the 
wrongs of the church itself that explained the international and spiritual disorder of the world – 
and consequently the rise of totalitarianism. Organized Christianity had erred in voluntarily 
withdrawing from the “vital streams” of modern life. Faith had become an appendage of 
bourgeoisie respectability; churches had failed to combat the disintegrating forces of nationalism, 
failed to address racial antagonisms, and failed to confront the inequities that led to the 
proletariat’s politicization in movements like Communism. The regimes that had grown in the 
spiritual vacuum of a post-Christian civilization were a judgment of God on the churches which, 
in their national and denominational divisions, all too clearly reflected the larger break-up of 
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modern civilization along national, racial, and class lines. By tracing the origins of 
totalitarianism to the failure of the church, ecumenists clarified their task: to “realize the church” 
as a universal community constituted by the give and take between Christian points of view from 
all “nations, races, classes, and denominations.” 
 
One consequence of this narrative was the political promiscuity it afforded to – even demanded 
of – the ecumenical project. While these churchmen condemned “totalitarianism” per se, they 
actively courted the participation of churches under Nazi and Communist regimes. Indeed the 
cultivation of these relationships was central to the anti-secular program of the movement. We 
have seen in the last chapter how, in the 1930s, the ecumenical movement courted members of 
the German Evangelical Church – which was prepared to accommodate the New Order of 
Hitler’s Germany – in the Oxford Conference of 1937. In the postwar world, the World Council 
embraced a similar policy toward church leaders who actively and vocally backed the 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Communist China. 
 
Driven by the same interest in consolidating the church as a supra-political and global 
community, the campaigns to recruit churches in the “totalitarian” regimes of Nazi Germany and 
Eastern Europe played out much differently. For one, Communist regimes proved much more 
open to their church leaders attending international church conferences than Nazi Germany did. 
Where the expansion of Nazi authority within Germany and outside of it cut off churches from 
one another, the establishment of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe coincided with a 
reversal of the regime’s anti-religious policy of the 1930s and the re-emergence of the Moscow 
Patriarchate to international prominence, a development which, as we will see, set the stage for a 
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protracted courtship between the WCC and the Russian Orthodox Church. While Hitler’s 
government refused passports to the German church delegation, preventing them from attending 
the Oxford Conference of 1937, Eastern European governments permitted church delegates 
considerable opportunities for participation in ecumenical events and bodies. Protestant 
Churches from Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia 
sent delegates to the Amsterdam conference of 1948. Numerous Eastern church leaders served in 
leadership positions of the Council. Franticek Bednar, professor at the John Hus Theology 
Faculty in Prague was on the Executive Committee of the Commission of the Churches and 
International Affairs; Alfred Bereczky, Bishop of the Reformed Church of Hungary, was a 
member of the World Council of Churches’ Executive Committee, and Josef Hromadka was a 
member of its Central Committee. All were vocal supporters of their nation’s Communist 
governments established after 1948. Similarly, the Council leadership featured Chinese 
ecumenists who backed the Mao government – among them T. C. Chao, one of the body’s five 
Presidents. By contrast, after 1937, virtually no Nazi-sympathizing German Protestants held 
leadership positions in ecumenical institutions.  
 
Outside of the Communist sphere, Communism as a political movement also enjoyed a level of 
sympathetic interest and engagement that Nazism never did. Support for Nazi ideology and 
loyalty to the German state, were largely confined to Germany. But Communism – with its 
vision of universal human equality and specifically internationalist orientation – accrued a body 
of sympathetic reflection in the ecumenical Anglo-Continental mainstream. We have 
encountered in previous chapters a number of these figures who, in the 1930s, combined 
condemnation of Communism as a pseudo-religion with admiration for Communism as a 
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political program that echoed of Christian principles. For the Reinhold Niebuhr of Moral Man 
and Immoral Society, Communism contained a vision of social equality in line with the 
brotherhood of man and advanced an understanding of the necessity of power politics that was 
closer to the Christian understanding than liberal pacifism. The Scottish theologian John 
Macmurray praised the materialist orientation of Marxian social thought as a corrective to a 
liberal Christian idealism that was at odds with the Incarnation and the church’s imperative to 
concern itself with the material and practical needs of human beings in society. Nicholas 
Berdyaev – who fled Soviet Russia in 1922 – praised the social concern of Communism, 
interpreting its success as evidence of the church’s servitude to its alliances with the old regime 
and with bourgeois Europe. The “Message” of the Oxford Conference of 1937 had argued that, 
while Communism’s “utopian expectations” and “godlessness” must be “unequivocally 
rejected,” the church must “recognize that Christians in their blindness to the challenging evils of 
economic order have been partly responsible for the anti-religious character of these 
movements.”13 In all of these accounts, the idea of communism as a judgment on the church was 
the basis of both ecumenical polemic and a qualified approbation. 
 
It is true, of course, that after 1945 figures like Niebuhr, Macmurray, and others became more 
reticent about the virtues of Communism and more vocal about its evils. But this was a shift in 
emphasis from one point to another within the logic of ecumenical anti-secularism, not a 
rejection of the entire system of thought. Thus John Macmurray in 1948 could attack Communist 
regimes but exhorted British university students in 1948, “let us realize that the triumph of Marx 
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is the measure of the failure of the Christian Church. The truth of Communism must be 
assimilated before its error can be overcome.”14 Niebuhr around the same time could argue that 
even as Communist and Fascist regimes resembled one another in practice, “Marxism… may 
well contain proximate solutions for the immediate problems of social justice in our day.”15 His 
Union Theological Seminary colleague John Bennett echoed the same point in his important 
book Christianity and Communism (1948). On the one hand, Communism in its contemporary 
form was “a threat to essential forms of personal and political freedom.” On the other hand, 
Bennett wrote, “the errors of Communism are in large part the result of the failure of Christians, 
and of Christian churches, to be true to the revolutionary implications of their own faith.”16 Any 
strategy for resisting the errors of communism must involve a critique of the social evils of 
capitalism. 
 
Among church leaders in postwar Eastern Europe, the margin for sympathy with Communist 
ideas and politics that ecumenical theology furnished the basis for a positive allegiance to 
Communist regimes. Without great strain or intellectual acrobatics, figures such as Hromadka, 
Bereczky, Chao, and his colleague and fellow philo-Communist T. Y. Wu could draw on a 
constellation of ecumenical themes – organized Christianity’s culpable disregard of the working 
classes, the need for a geographically and socially universal Christian ethic, and the possibility of 
distinguishing Communism as a political program from its cosmological claims – to offer robust 
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defenses of the view that, rather than representing a threat, the expansion of Communism in the 
postwar period was blessing that the church ought to greet with open arms.  
 
Though he had been an advocate of Masaryk’s liberal reforms in the 1930s, Hromadka, for 
instance, immediately declared his support for Klement Gottwald’s regime after the 1948 coup. 
Hromadka saw Communism as a revolt against an unjust social order but not necessarily a revolt 
against God. Properly understood, Communism “does not adhere to any metaphysic that would 
elevate an earthly reality (be it the class of the proletariat or the ultimate classless society) to the 
plane of an Absolute.”17 It offered, rather, a political program that channeled fundamentally 
Christian principles of social equality to combat an entrenched social order. Communism 
answered the demand of “the ‘Eastern’ masses,” he wrote, “for more human dignity, social 
equality, cultural progress, and a for a fair share in the political responsibility for the new world 
order.” Moreover, acknowledging the legitimacy of the Communist critique of organized 
Christianity – that it had been a tool of bourgeois power – would strengthen the credibility of the 
church’s resistance to the ideological atheism of orthodox Communism. With the collapse of the 
old order, the Church would be freed from an entanglement that had compromised the power of 
the Gospel among workers. He announced that the fruits of the Church’s new, more socially 
marginal position in Czechoslovakia were already becoming clear. Since February of 1948, “the 
Church of Christ” in Czechoslovakia had “become much more relevant. She has ceased to be a 
decoration of life, a relic from the past, a clerical institution or a club for religious refinement.”18 
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meeting” on August 25, 1948 during the Amsterdam conference, 3 (WCC 42.0039). 
 
 302 
In this view, the providential event of Communism was the midwife of a rebirth of Christianity 
that would purge it of its parochial spiritualism and liberate it from its traditional form as a 
bourgeois religion. 
 
Bereczky took a similar position. Like Hromadka a bitter opponent of the National Socialist 
regime, Bereczky became leading Bishop of the Reformed Church in Hungary in April 1948. He 
succeeded later that year in negotiating an agreement with the Communist government of Matyas 
Rakosi that allowed Reformed Churches to continue religious worship and control over religious 
education within state schools. It was an arrangement that Bereczky felt was not a compromise 
but a form of penance for the sins of the church in the past.19 Like Hromadka, Bereczky 
understood the Communist revolution as a judgment of God on the church. “In the face of the 
advance of this great Marxist revolution and the coming to power of the Communist Party in our 
country, it is our opinion that the Church is driven to self-examination.” Bereczky was entirely in 
line with the ecumenical view that held the church responsible for the emergence of 
Communism. Communists filled a spiritual vacuum left by Christianity’s lack of concern for the 
proletariat. “In a time of judgment,” he wrote in 1948, “our Church must proclaim to the people, 
to Church people as well as the entire Hungarian people, the message of repentance.20 Where 
Hromadka had distinguished between support for Communist politics and Communism as a 
religion, Bereczky emphasized the new evangelistic opportunities opened up by Eastern 
Europe’s political transformation. A pietistic strain in his thought led him to see the new regime 
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as a fresh opportunity for missionary action. “I do not think I misunderstand Paul… if I go to the 
Marxists as though I were a Marxist.” There was no “serious hindrance” facing the church in this 
field; on the contrary, by accommodating the regime and its social policies, the church had the 
opportunity to walk through doors that had previously been closed to it. “She can preach the 
Gospel freely to the working people in the factories, mines, and works of all kinds, whom she 
has tended more to forget and neglect than the peasants and the intelligentsia.”21 Consistently 
with this position, Bereczky assailed those who attacked the Communist government for 
pursuing “political ends.” Catholics were the worst purveyors of politics under the guise of 
Christian piety. When the Cardinal Joszef Mindszenty was imprisoned in 1949 for defying the 
Communist government, Bereczky took the side of the Hungarian State: “the Archbishop of 
Erztergom,” declared a statement Bereczky wrote along with other pro-Communist Reformed 
and Lutheran clerics, “has not been fighting for religious liberty, for the simple reason, because 
such a fight has not been necessary at all.” Mindszenty was fighting rather for a restoration of 
“the rule of the Habsburgs, a dynasty of most evil memories, and a feudalistic régime, a logical 
outcome of the former.”22 By permitting freedom of worship and control of religious education, 
the Communist regime not only posed no threat to the negative liberties of the churches. It also 
imbued the church with a new positive liberty: the opportunity to reinterpret the Christian Gospel 
in a way that would resonate with a group – the workers – who had for so long existed outside 
the church’s effective reach.  
 
                                                
21 Ibid, 13. 




In China, most foreign missionaries and many Chinese Christians – particular those who were 
Catholic or fundamentalist Protestants – were hostile to the Communists. Some, however, 
welcomed Mao Zedong’s regime, and this number included many who held prominent roles in 
the ecumenical movement.23 They drew on similar arguments to those put forward by Hromadka 
and Bereczky and like them appropriated the tropes of repentance and providential opportunity 
in the new political scene. Further, these Chinese Christian apologetics for Communism argued 
that the new regime was an opportunity to realize in practice the goal that western missionaries 
themselves had long heralded in theory: the formation of an autonomous Chinese church that 
would be understood, no longer as an extension of western missionary work but as an organic 
and integrated presence in Chinese society and culture. When the Communist government called 
for the immediate departure of all foreign missionaries after the fall of Beijing on October 1, 
1949, 19 Chinese Christians welcomed the move in a pamphlet entitled “Message from Chinese 
Christians to Mission Boards Abroad.” The Church would have its “due place” in a future 
Chinese society, the document asserted, but only through a “a purge,” in which “many of the 
withered branches will be amputated.” T. Y. Wu, head of the Chinese YMCA, and a speaker at 
Oxford Conference of 1937, was adept at recasting long-time ecumenical missionary objectives 
in a Marxist language of anti-imperialism. In May of 1950, Wu was one of the principal 
signatories of the “Christian Manifesto,” which called on Christians to “recognize clearly the 
evils that have been wrought in China by imperialism, recognize the fact that in the past 
imperialism has made use of Christianity, purge imperialistic influences from within Christianity 
itself, and be vigilant against imperialism, especially American imperialism, in its plot to use 
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religion in fostering the growth of reactionary forces.”24 Wu’s efforts to institutionalize the 
complementarity between the new regime and Christianity culminated in the “Three Self 
Movement,” which became the chief liaison body between the Communist state’s Religious 
Affairs Bureau and the Protestant churches in the early 1950s. The Three Self Movement rested 
on a concept originally espoused by western missionaries like Henry Venn and Rufus Anderson 
to name the goal of a Chinese church that would be “self-supporting, self-governing, and self-
propagating.”25 It was the PRC’s elimination of foreign missionaries that would allow the church 
in China finally to realize these goals – goals that Wu hoped would, in the long run, create a 
stronger international Christian solidarity. 
 
Wu’s vision was shared by T. C. Chao, a veteran of the World Student Christian Federation, a 
professor of theology at the Yenching University, and President of the WCC. Beginning in late 
1949 Chao became one of the Chinese Communism’s most important and vocal defenders for 
English-language audiences. In two articles in the Christian Century published in 1949-1950, 
Chao hailed “the destruction of feudalism in China,” and argued that Christians everywhere 
ought to rejoice in the new opportunities for social reform. “There is no reason why China 
cannot become a classless society and create a sort of ‘new democracy’ to suit her genius and 
temperament. The very thought of the possibility of such a creation gives hope and cheer.”26 
Like Wu Chao assailed the legacy of imperialism as the chief obstacle to Christianity’s future in 
China. For too long Christians had been hobbled in China by the perception that their religion 
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“stands on the side of the status quo, that it is connected with imperialistic and bourgeois 
aspirations; that it is the opiate of the people.”27 Christianity “as taught by Christ” was “none of 
these things,” and it would now – under conditions of Communism – have the opportunity to 
prove itself through an internal “reconversion and revitalization.”28 The real struggle for 
Christians in China, for Chao, was not against the external enemy of Communism but against a 
spiritual lethargy and egoism that compromised its message to the Chinese masses. Eschewing 
anti-Communism, the “Christian Church in China must understand that its real enemy is not on 
the outside and that its future is not to be determined by hostile forces external to itself. The 
Church “must… confess its sins and shortcomings in seeking to save its own life by occasionally 
siding with reactionary forces.” Chao pointed by name to Chiang Kai-shek, H. H. Kung, and 
James Sung – ministers of the Kuomintang – as “Judases of the Christian faith.”29  
 
As these cases show, theological defenses of Communism could take many forms. In China, 
ecumenical philo-Communists presented the political revolution as an opportunity to realize the 
long-sought goal of an authentically indigenous, self-sufficient Chinese church; for Bereczky and 
Hromadka the emphasis fell more on Christian support for Communist plans for rebuilding a 
society destroyed by war. But whatever these differences in emphasis, ecumenical Communists 
all converged around a single point: that Communism was a purifying chastisement of organized 
Christianity, which would, in the long run, enable the church to become more truly the universal 
society that it was by its nature. Western ecumenists did not disagree with this claim in principle, 
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even when they diverged dramatically from the political allegiances their co-religionists in the 
East derived from it. A real, if – as we will see – elusive consensus, in the East and the West, 
over the productiveness of a Christian engagement with Communist ideas and the source of 
Communist appeal, as well as possibilities of direct contact with and participation of Communist 
church leaders in ecumenical conferences and organizations set the terms for the movement’s 
trajectory in the Cold War. As tensions between the West and the Soviet Union deteriorated, 
observers and critics on both sides demanded that the Council clearly declare its political 
allegiance for one side or the other. The Council’s refusal to do this generated suspicion of the 
movement as a whole from critics on both sides of the Iron Curtain.   
 
II. Prelude to Fracture: The World Council Alienates anti-Communism and the Moscow 
Patriarchate 
 
The World Council’s courtship of the Russian Orthodox Church, which began in 1945 and ended 
in 1948,30 prefigured the dilemmas that would increasingly confront the movement during and 
after the Amsterdam Assembly. On the one hand, the ecumenical leadership’s determination to 
involve the Russian Orthodox Church antagonized anti-Communists in the West, who viewed 
the Moscow Patriarchate as an arm of the Soviet government. On the other hand, the Council’s 
advances met with skepticism by many Russian Orthodox leaders as well as the Soviet state, who 
suspected the ecumenists of covertly seeking to draw the Russian Orthodox Church into an anti-
Communist alliance. The Council leadership’s efforts to transcend Cold War politics only 
reinforced the perception that the WCC was a “political” organization – though the precise 
nature of these politics remained distressing unclear. Caught between the two camps, Visser’t 
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Hooft could only protest that both sides had “misunderstood” the true nature of the Council. By 
1948, the price of a clear explanation seemed to be a political determination that the movement 
refused to make.31 
  
Throughout the 1930s, the possibility of involving the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in ecumenical activities was so far out of the realm of possibility that the issue 
was not even discussed. Prime target of the Bolsheviks’ anti-religious policy in the two decades 
following 1917, the Moscow Patriarchate, once the center of a mighty ecclesiastical imperium 
stretching from Harbin to the Middle East and into Poland, was by 1939 on the verge of 
extinction. A mere 500 churches remained in the USSR, less than 1% of pre-Revolution 
number.32 Severed from Moscow, many Russian Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East had become “autocephalous” – self-governing – others had come under the 
jurisdiction of the other great center of Eastern Orthodoxy, the Patriarch of Constantinople. 
Those Russian Orthodox figures who participated in the ecumenical movement in the interwar 
period, such as Nicholas Berdyaev, George Florovsky, and A.A. Alexieff, were members of 
diasporic Russian Orthodox churches in London, Paris, and United States. 
 
Between 1943 and 1945, however, a conjuncture of factors propelled the Moscow Patriarchate to 
international prominence, and, so it seemed to Visser’t Hooft and the WCC for a period of 
tenuous hope between 1945 and mid 1948, potentially into the ecumenical movement’s orbit. 
Though Hitler had banked on the support of the Russian churches as a fifth column, many 
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Orthodox leaders in Russia rallied to the defense of “Holy Rus.” Stalin did not attempt to curtail 
the church’s activities, which reinforced his own appeals to the Patriotic War. Following a 
meeting in 1943 between Archbishop Sergei and Josef Stalin, the church won new rights 
domestically and the support of the Soviet State in reconsolidating its hold over Orthodox 
churches elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In the years that followed, an 
alliance with the Soviet state resurrected the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to international 
prominence and enabled its reassertion of control over religious life in the Eastern Soviet 
Union.33 During the War, it seemed that Christianity might even serve as a bridge between 
officially atheist Russia, and an Atlantic partnership whose political culture was becoming more 
steeped in religious rhetoric.34 Delegations of Anglicans and Russian Orthodox met in 1943 and 
1945, when the Metropolitan Nikolai announced “a common struggle against Fascism which 
“assumes a sacred significance as the defense of Christian principles from the barbaric foes of 
our Christian civilization.”35 Even once the war ended, meetings between Anglicans and 
Orthodox were frequent; the Archbishop of Canterbury attended the investment of Patriarch 
Alexi as Patriarch in 1945. 
 
It did not take long, however, for the enthusiasm of western politicians and religious leaders 
concerning the resurgence of the Moscow Patriarchate to cool. In particular, the Roman Catholic 
Church – which in 1948 declared the complete incompatibility of Christianity and Communism – 
saw the ROC and close ties with the Soviet State as grist to the mill of a centuries old 
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antagonism. Shared anti-Communism was, by 1946, drawing the Vatican into a closer alliance 
with the United States government that was cemented in part around containing the ecclesiastical 
empire of the Russian Orthodox Church. As Dianne Kirby and William Inboden has described in 
detail, between 1946 and 1948, a centerpiece of President Truman’s foreign policy of 
containment rested on building an alliance of religious leaders against Communism. One 
enthusiastic ally that Truman secured was Pope Pius XII – largely through the efforts of his 
Ambassador to the Vatican, the Episcopalian layman and industrialist Myron Taylor. Both 
Taylor and the Vatican agreed that there could be no place for the Russian Orthodox Church in 
an international front against Soviet Communism. Summarizing Rome’s assessment of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, Vatican Secretary of State Monsignor Domenico Tardini wrote in 
April of 1948 that it was nothing but “the vehicle of Soviet political activity and an arm of Soviet 
imperialism.” “In every country outside the area of Russian control the Orthodox Church is an 
instrument for propagandizing elements in sympathy with Orthodoxy and preparing their 
reconciliation with the Soviet regime.”36 The Moscow Patriarchate was seeking to use local 
churches in Eastern Europe “to bolster support of the Communist controlled government and the 
parties supporting these regimes.” Myron Taylor agreed, characterizing the church in Russia 
under Patriarch Alexi as “an arm of the state that could not be looked upon as an independent 
religious body.”37  
 
Ecumenists took a sharply different view. After a series of conversations with Anglicans and 
Russian Orthodox, Stefan Zankov, veteran ecumenist and Metropolitan of the Bulgarian 
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Orthodox Church, wrote Visser’t Hooft suggesting that the Moscow Patriarchate would be open 
to intensifying contacts with the ecumenical movement. “I have the impression that we must give 
the Russian Church time to get to know the Ecumenical Council, and that we must also allow the 
churches of the West time to gain understanding of the situation of the Russian Church.”38 At a 
meeting of the Provisional Committee of the World Council in February 1946, the decision was 
taken to write to the Patriarchate, proposing a meeting in Prague or Paris in the autumn of that 
year. Metropolitan Nikolai responded in July welcoming the idea in principle. Assured by the 
supportive words of Russian Orthodox clerics and monks now making more frequent visits West, 
the WCC assembled a delegation in the late summer for what Visser’t Hooft considered would 
be “one of the most historic events in ecumenical history.”39 In October, however, Nikolai wrote 
to Visser’t Hooft to postpone the meeting: the delegation could not secure the appropriate visas 
in time. But Nikolai remained optimistic that a future meeting would be possible.40 
 
Visser’t Hooft and the World Council leadership were well aware that the representatives of the 
Russian Orthodox Church were performing a delicate balance of ecclesial and political 
calculations. Professor L. Zander of the Institute for Orthodox Theology in Paris, wrote to Hooft 
assessing Metropolitan Nikolai after having met him in Paris: “One sees in him, on the one hand, 
the Orthodox hierarch with all the qualities and gifts which characterize our higher clergy; on the 
other hand, one recognizes quite clearly a dignitary of the Soviet State, who is bound by 
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obligations of which he pretends to be unaware.”41 Visser’t Hooft also perceived that any action 
the Moscow Patriarchate would be permitted to take toward the council would only be with the 
blessing of General Georgii Karpov, Head of the powerful State Committee for Orthodox Church 
Affairs.  
 
But in the two years leading up to Amsterdam, it seemed that the play of geopolitical and 
ecclesiastical politics would work out in the ecumenical movement’s favor. 42 By 1946, the ROC 
had decisively abandoned the idea of launching its own “international Christian Conference” – a 
possible competitor to the World Council. For the Moscow Patriarchate and the Soviet State 
alike, Rome – the seat of anti-communism and the Orthodox world’s oldest nemesis – was a 
common enemy in relation to whom the Protestant-dominated WCC might serve as an ally. The 
Patriarchate also perceived that the Council would erect no obstacle in pursuit of its attempt to 
re-consolidate control over Russian Orthodox churches in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, 
as well as confessions that had come under the dominance of the rival Patriarch of 
Constantinople after the Russian Churches dismemberment after 1917. Geneva’s approach to the 
Greek-Russian struggle sought to engage both sides in a strategy whose objective was to 
maximize the representation of Orthodox communions at the event. The Council promised the 
Orthodox churches together a generous 85 seats at the conference – enough to ensure that both 
Greek and Russian churches would hold enjoy proportionally greater representation than 
Protestant denominations. And it seemed, as late as July 1948 – a mere month before the 
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Amsterdam Assembly – that Council’s courtship of the Russians approach would bear fruit. Even 
as the Stalinst coup in Czechoslovakia in February of 1948 and the blockade of Berlin in April 
and May worsened relations between the Soviet Union and Western powers, Metropolitan 
Nikolai wrote hopeful letters to Geneva, acknowledging receipt of a packet with WCC 
constitution, conference reports from Oxford and Edinburgh Conferences, and documents 
relating to the history of the movement. He promised that the ROC would give its final answer to 
the invitation after consultations that would be held at a conference of Orthodox Churches in 
July. At this event, Hooft was confident that a strong bloc of pro-ecumenical voices – led by 
veterans of the Movement like the Bulgarian Metropolitan Zankov and the Romanian theologian 
Ioan Coman – would carry the day. 
 
When Taylor travelled to Geneva in 1948 to discuss the possibility of recruiting the WCC to join 
Truman’s anti-Communist spiritual front, he was surprised to find that Visser’t Hooft viewed the 
Moscow Patriarchate as an authentic Christian body – and that he was eagerly anticipating its 
attendance at the Amsterdam Assembly. The presence of a Russian delegation at Amsterdam, 
Taylor warned the WCC General Secretary, “would open Pandora’s box of sabotage and 
obstructionism similar to the Russian tactics at the United Nations.”43 To this, Visser’t Hooft 
explained that Taylor simply did not understand the purpose of the World Council, whose 
campaign to bring all churches together would not stop at the Iron Curtain. Taylor and Truman’s 
attitudes toward the World Council and ecumenism would become increasingly critical. Truman 
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saw ecumenists in the US as well as abroad as the chief obstacles to his campaign to unite the 
spiritual and moral forces of the world against the threat of godless Communism.44 
 
While exacerbating a rift with anti-Communists in the West, the campaign to draw the Russian 
Orthodox church into the Council ultimately failed. Just a few weeks before the opening of the 
WCC’s Assembly, Visser’t Hooft received a letter from Metropolitan Nikolai President of 
Moscow Patriarchate’s Foreign Church relations, summarizing the decision of the conference of 
Russian Orthodox Churches held in July: “While expressing to you its appreciation for the 
invitation which it received,” Nikolai wrote, the Moscow Patriarchate “declines to take part in 
the Ecumenical Movement with its present tendencies.”45 The letter was accompanied by 
conference resolution that portrayed Rome and Geneva competing for the cooperation of the 
Orthodox churches in a campaign to dominate one another. Both the Vatican and the Ecumenical 
Movement sought to extend their “worldly” influence and had “lost faith” with the cause of true 
Christian unity, which the Russian Orthodox Church alone represented. The document alleged 
that the intention of the ecumenical movement was to create “an Ecumenical Church as an 
international influence,” and that to join this church would be to “enter a political arena which 
was foreign to [the Orthodox church’s] purpose.” To accept the invitation would be “comparable 
to falling into the temptation which Christ refused in the desert.”46 The resolution had been based 
largely on testimonies prepared by the Russian Archpriest Razoumovsky, who presented a nearly 
100-page report tracing what he characterized as the growing influence of a worldly orientation 
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within the Movement in the years since 1937. Razoumovsky referred to a number of ecumenical 
documents that exposed, in his view, the political ambitions of the movement. One major piece 
of titular evidence for the Council’s true intentions came in Razoumovsky’s mind from a line 
from the Edinburgh report of 1937, which Razoumovsky possessed in the French translation: 
"Nous ne pensons pas que l'Eglise unie d'après les principes de l'œcuménicité puisse être une 
force internationale influente, sans aucun organe permanent sous forme de conférence ou de 
congrès.”47 Razoumovsky highlighted the words "une force internationale influente" in order to 
show that the primary aim of the planners of the World Council is to gain worldly influence.  
 
The ROC’s rejection placed Visser’t Hooft – and the ecumenical movement – in a complicated 
position. It was clear to him at the time that the Patriarchate’s rejection was the result of a 
perception that the Council was an instrument of the West, an estimation that recent research has 
supported by showing how seriously Russian Orthodox representatives and Soviet officials took 
the anti-Communist rhetoric of documents released by the World Council and antecedent 
institutions, as well as a 1946 resolution of the Council Provisional Committee, calling for a 
revision of the Potsdam Accords.48 But if Visser’t Hooft wished to retain the possibility of a 
future involvement of the ROC, he could hardly accuse the Russians themselves of acting on 
political motives. In a public response to the ROC’s rejection published after the Amsterdam 
conference, Visser’t Hooft’s instead took a defensive posture, arguing that the Russians had 
“profoundly misunderstood” the nature of the Ecumenical Movement. The article laid out the 
promising signs of Russian involvement as they had taken shape in 1946 and 1947 and quoted 
liberally from WCC statements abdicating any ambition for “political power.” Instead of 
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accusing Razoumovsky of ill will, Visser’t Hooft questioned the fairness of his reading of certain 
key ecumenical documents, attempting to keep their disagreements within the ambit of good 
faith. In particular he observed that the French translation of the Edinburgh Report had 
misconstrued the original, which had made no reference to “a force of international influence” 
but had spoken instead of the church as “an effective international community,” “communauté 
internationale effective.” Countering Cold War politics was a matter, in other words, of 
achieving precision and clear understanding of the ecumenical movement’s true aims. The reply 
inscribed both a strategy of church diplomacy and an ecumenical optimism: that political 
disagreements could be tamed and overcome through a theological conversation converging 
around “mutual understanding” and a common faith. 
 
The ROC’s rejection represented a challenge to the movement that it would face with increasing 
regularity in the years following 1948. Seeking to become a peace-maker between East and 
West, ecumenists were accused of objectively serving the interests of one side or the other. 
Against this rebuke, the Council could do little but assert that their true intentions had been 
“misunderstood.” In 1948, the ecumenical movement’s claim to be a space of transcendence – 
where political differences that divided peoples could be overcome through their common 
allegiance to the church – met its first serious rebuke. It would not be the last. 
 
 
III. A Third Way in Theory: The Responsible Society Between Communism and 
Capitalism 
 
Spurned by the Moscow Patriarchate and increasingly at odds with the dominant anti-
Communism of western political and religious leaders, the Council leadership stayed its middle 
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course. To the representatives of 147 churches assembled at Amsterdam, Visser’t Hooft 
explained the vocation of the church in a world “obsessed by politics:” 
 
We live in a world obsessed by politics and large masses of men cannot believe that any 
great undertaking of an international character should be free of political bias. Our task is 
to prove in word and deed that we serve a Lord Whose realm certainly includes politics 
but Whose saving purpose cuts across all political alignments and embraces men of all 
parties, all lands.49  
 
In its official statements, optics, symbolism, and rituals, the Assembly was a demonstration of 
the church as a supra-political body. Despite the absence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the 
Amsterdam Assembly did include Protestant Churches from Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Many of these representatives did not take active 
part in the Council proceedings, or else sought out roles in sections and subcommittees of the 
conference that dealt with ecclesiastical and doctrinal issues. But their presence was felt. Even 
where these church leaders from the East were not directly involved in the drafting of resolutions 
and debates, representatives from Western churches sought to articulate a conception of 
Christian social order explicitly critical of Western Capitalism, as well as the totalitarian 
impulses of Communism. This attempt to clarify a theoretical third way, however, failed to 
resolve the question of the position of the church in relation to Cold War politics, both for critics 
outside the movement and for ecumenists themselves.   
 
In session for three weeks at the end of August and early September in 1948, the conference was 
organized around a daily regimen of worship services, meals, plenary speeches, and working 
                                                
49 Visser’t Hooft, “Report of the Provisional Committee,” UTS William Adams Brown Ecumenical Library 
Collection, Series 1B, box 16, folder 8. 
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sessions of four “sectional committees,” each of which was charged with producing a report 
addressed to different aspects of the council’s theme, “Man’s Disorder and God’s Design.” The 
exposition of the theme reiterated the tropes of ecumenical anti-secularism as a trans-political 
and –ideological phenomenon. “Man’s disorder is inescapably manifest in every aspect of the 
world’s life today,” wrote Henry Van Dusen in the General Introduction to the study volumes 
prepared in advance of the conference. “The disappearance of common standards, the denial of a 
law of God above the wills of men and states, the disintegration of family life, the dissolution of 
community, loss of faith save the false faith in human wisdom and goodness, emptiness and 
meaninglessness in the souls of men” were all features of modern life in areas across the globe.50 
To a crisis of disorder that was equally present in Communist and Western societies, ecumenists 
presented the world church as a source of social and spiritual order that could harmonize social 
relations beneath and above the level of politics. 
 
The primary statement of the Council’s middle path emerged from the report of the Third 
Section, devoted to the theme of “The Church and the Disorder of Society.” This committee, 
which included a powerful line-up of theologians a laypersons including Reinhold Niebuhr, John 
Bennett, Emil Brunner, Joseph Oldham, the American lay businessman Charles Taft, and the 
Dutch politician Constantin Patijn, produced a statement articulating a vision of Christian social 
order that would stand as an alternative on the one hand to Soviet “Communism” and on the 
other to Western “Capitalism.”  
 
                                                




The origins of this vision had emerged in preparatory study for the Amsterdam conference. 
Beginning in 1947, Joseph Oldham and Visser’t Hooft began referring to the object of Christian 
commitment as “the responsible society.” The term appealed because it had not been 
appropriated as a slogan by either side in the conflict: Oldham, and Visser’t Hooft rejected “the 
free society” as too one sidedly in line with Western anti-Communism, and “democracy” was 
discarded because its meaning was too sharply contested between the Communist and Western 
powers.51 The idea of the “responsible society” positioned the church’s view of right social order 
as a critique of the organizing principles of western and communist societies and their practice. 
As developed in the Amsterdam report, this critique rested on the idea that the possibility of 
Christian life in modern society – in both East and West – was threatened by two entwined 
factors. First, under conditions of modern life there had emerged “vast concentrations of 
power—which are under capitalism mainly economic and under communism both economic and 
political.” These concentrations of power – in the state or in large private enterprise – reduced 
the sphere of personal responsibility to a vanishing point. “To find ways of realizing personal 
responsibility for collective action in the large aggregations of power in modern society is a task 
which has not yet been undertaken seriously.” It was not freedom per se that ecumenists looked 
to extend to individuals, only the freedom necessary to “act as moral and accountable beings” 
under modern conditions that subordinated all of life to the commands of the state or the logic of 
the market.52 
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The second threat to personal responsibility that ecumenists described was the hegemony of 
“technics.” In both Western and Eastern societies, the concentrations of power were achieved 
and perpetuated through a mastery of technologies of communication, propaganda, and social 
control that sought to harness the power of nature for the use of humanity. Technics were, on the 
one hand, merely technical: technologies served those who exercised the concentrations of 
economic and political power. But the irony of technics was that the more they promised mastery 
the more they enhanced the destructive effects of the human will to dominance. While 
technology “enables man the better to use nature” it was “controlled by a momentum of its own.” 
The drive to control nature and society de-humanized man, subjugating individuals and societies 
to forms of exploitation that were destructive of “the natural foundations of society in family, 
neighborhood, and craft.” The report called on Christians to seek to preserve areas of family life, 
local association, and meaningful vocation which would safeguard “a satisfying life for ‘little 
men in big societies.’” This was the “responsible society,” one in which humankind could take 
part in the relations of moral responsibility to himself and to God through which he became the 
kind of creature he was. Defining the features of social order that could applied modularly and 
ought to be the object of striving for Christians throughout the globe, the report offered the 
following summary: “A responsible society is one where freedom is the freedom of men who 
acknowledge responsibility to justice and public order, and where those who hold political 
authority and economic power are responsible for its exercise to God and to the people whose 
welfare is affected by it.”53 This view repudiated the dominant ideological alternatives of the age. 
Committing themselves to the cultivation of the “responsible society,” “The Christian churches 
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should reject the ideologies of both laissez-faire communism and capitalism, and should seek to 
draw men away from the false assumption that these extremes are the only alternatives.”54  
 
Of all the statements released by the Amsterdam Assembly, none attracted as much attention as 
that of the Third Section. And particularly in the US, virtually all of this attention – outside of the 
ecumenical church press and journals – was hostile. To some critics, it was unclear whether the 
report was intended to refer to the theories of Communism and Capitalism or the actual operation 
of both systems. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, averred that “laissez-faire” capitalism did 
not exist in any form in the modern world. By attacking it ecumenists had assailed a social 
system in which none of them had actually lived; they might as well have issued “a ringing 
resolution condemning the regime of Napoleon III.”55 The Los Angeles Times agreed: “Genuine 
laissez-faire capitalism never has existed anywhere; there have been always some restrictions.” If 
the authors of the report were referring to capitalism as it actually existed, they had woefully 
mischaracterized it. “The regime of free enterprise” had defects, but is “has demonstrably raised 
the material status of mankind to the highest level in the world’s history.” “Where there is free 
enterprise, the world is improving.”56  
 
More brutal criticisms attacked the report for playing into the hands of Communist propaganda. 
It was beyond comprehension that the moral leadership of Christian churches could suggest, as 
one critic put it, that capitalism and communism were “equally bad.”57 “It seems like a total 
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disregard of all ethical values to lump communism and capitalism in the same phrase and to 
indict them both equally. It is very much like saying that a man who is guilty of violating a 
parking ordinance is just as guilty as a man who cuts his neighbor’s throat,” wrote one 
commentator.58 Where the report had sought to define Christianity as an alternative to Cold War 
politics, critics saw only political confusion. “Where did these spokesmen stand?” asked Elmer 
T. Petersen of the Daily Oklahoman. “They are neither white nor red, but presumably pink or 
vaguely spotted, holding to some form of collectivism.” Even as he acknowledged the 
indeterminism of the statement, Petersen saw the report as a blow to the values of Western 
democracy and Christian faith. The “collectivism” that the churches advocated “essentially, 
means increasing dependence upon the political state, with corresponding loss of faith in 
personal regeneration as a cure for social ills. These leaders call their program a ‘social 
gospel….’ in practice they lean toward socialistic doctrines and depend heavily upon 
government to take charge in areas of good works hitherto concentrated in individual goodwill, 
thus proportionately relieving the individual of moral obligations to love and care for his fellow 
man.”59 George Peck, a syndicated journalist, wrote that the report had delivered the ecumenical 
movement into the hands of the Soviet Union. “Most certainly the Communists will take great 
comfort from this report,” he wrote. “Whether these church dignitaries are aware of it or not, 
they have allied themselves with the radical revolutionists who, first of all, would abolish private 
property and then, this having been accomplished would abolish the Christian and all other 
religions.”60 Just as Truman and Taylor could not understand the decision to court the Russian 
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Orthodox Church, so the Amsterdam report’s equilateral condemnation of laissez-faire 
capitalism and Soviet Communism seemed to many commentators as either incoherent or plainly 
inconsistent with fundamental precepts of the Christian faith. In the eyes of its critics, the 
document’s attempt to steer a middle way did not reflect the transcendence of politics but simply 
political confusion.  
 
While the statement generated significant criticism outside the conference, however, none of 
those delegates who attended the conference spoke out against it. In fact, the document was 
praised as an impressive synthesis of the widely divergent perspectives encompassed in the 
Council’s membership. Reinhold Niebuhr, for instance, called on American readers to recognize 
frankly that international Christian thinking encompassed a much wider range of opinion than 
was present in conventional American thinking.61  
 
Nonetheless, it was clear that whatever consensus the idea of the responsible society generated, it 
was not, in fact, a recipe for resolving all disagreements between delegates from Communist and 
Western nations. Consensus on the level of theory was one thing, but the political judgments of 
ecumenists in relation to the West and the Soviet Union’s societies and systems of rule were 
quite another, as became clear in discussions that occurred in the Section IV of the conference, 
addressing the theme of “The Church and the International Disorder.” In the plenary session 
devoted to this theme, John Foster Dulles, the Republican Party’s likely Secretary of State should 
Thomas Dewey win the election of 1948, and Josef Hromadka took turns affirming and 
denouncing the spread of communism. By the time they met in person in Amsterdam, their 
                                                




opposed and irreconcilable positions had already become clear in the essays they had written 
before the conference for inclusion in the Amsterdam study volumes. In his contribution, Dulles 
called on Christians to support the political arrangement of what he called “the free society,” 
founded on limited government and the rights of intellectual and religious freedom. World peace 
was contingent upon the creation “more areas of freedom” and the gradual adoption of universal 
moral law as the basis of international and social order. As Dulles frankly wrote, he was 
recommending a “political path,” which “leads from the West.”62 Hromadka sharply disagreed. 
Communism had rebuilt social order in the East and had taken over much of the social impetus 
of Christianity. Acknowledging the Soviet Union’s brutal tactics and the philosophy of historical 
materialism posed a potential threat to the “sacredness of human personality,”63 he nonetheless in 
denied that “free societies” as Dulles defined them were particularly in line with Christian 
principles. “Millions of European citizens are doubtful whether the ‘free democracies’ of the 
West are qualified to meet the needs of the present, and to organize effectively a new order on 
the basis of real social justice and equal opportunity… Is not a material, economic interest on the 
part of ‘big’ industries and financial concerns looming behind all the high-sounding slogans of a 
‘free democracy,’ behind all the efforts to protect ‘individual’ freedom,’ ‘free enterprise’ against 
any control by government, society and state?”64  
 
Dulles and Hromadka’s irreconcilable positions exposed a cleft that no amount of theological 
synthesizing could resolve. Yet as long as the World Council insisted on placing questions of 
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international politics on its agenda, such disagreements were unavoidable. As we will see, the 
formal establishment of the World Council at Amsterdam created conditions that ensured that 
these disagreements would come increasingly to the forefront of international ecumenical 
conversation. 
 
The Amsterdam Assembly ushered in a new phase of the ecumenical movement. Among the 
most significant outcomes of the event was the formal establishment of the World Council. 
When, on August 23, delegates unanimously ratified the WCC constitution, they brought into 
existence a constellation of international organs, including the WCC Assembly and two 
“governing bodies” – the Central Committee, comprised of 90 members whose denominational 
and geographical make-up reflected the Assembly as a whole and whose purpose was to carry 
out resolutions of the Assembly and to handle budgetary matters, and a smaller, 40-person 
Executive Committee.65 Whereas the Assembly as a whole would convene once every five years, 
the Central Committee and the Executive were constitutionally obligated to convene at least once 
a year. Through them the World Council possessed organs that could deliberate on a regular and 
ongoing basis, issuing statements on particular international events with greater frequency. This 
development was, on the one hand, widely viewed as a positive development: it enabled the 
Council and the movement to “declare the mind of Christ with regard to the great spiritual, social 
and political problems of our time” more regularly and with a higher public profile.66 On the 
other hand, this capacity created expectations that significantly complicated the task of 
maintaining harmony among the movement’s constituencies. Leading up to and during the 
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Amsterdam Assembly, the elucidation of an ecumenical “third way” in the Cold War had been a 
largely theoretical exercise, a matter of defining Christian social ethics in opposition to real 
existing conditions in East and West and competing ideologies. Now the Council would have a 
new test: could its leaders generate unanimity around statements issued in response to specific 
political events?   
 
On this question, the fate of the movement as a whole seemed to hang between 1948-1950. Its 
overshadowing significance transformed the central themes and problems of ecumenical 
discourse. The polemic against secularism, so critical to the formation of the movement and 
predominant up through 1948, became increasingly irrelevant. Where ecumenists once 
concerned themselves with assailing modernity’s rebellion against God and the social 
disintegration that resulted from it, the Council leadership in Geneva now became preoccupied 
with what Visser’t Hooft referred to as the “art of equilibristic:” a practice of delicate balance in 
commentary on international affairs seeking to demonstrate the political relevance of the 
churches’ “witness” while at the same time safeguarding its moral authority from charges of 
partisanship.67 This was not a task that held anything like the galvanizing appeal of anti-secular 
prophecy. In the years leading up to the summer of 1948, ecumenists had become increasingly 
isolated from blocs of anti-Communist opinion in the West and the Russian Orthodox Church. In 
the years following Amsterdam, the movement’s supporters themselves began to turn on the 
Council, in many cases coming to the same conclusion that the movement’s external critics had: 
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namely, that the Council had become a “political instrument,” for all its efforts to avoid precisely 
that fate. 
 
At the moment that formalization of the Council enabled it to issue statements on particular 
international events, the prospects for a Christian third way seemed dimmer than ever. The two 
years after Amsterdam witnessed a sharp deterioration of US-Soviet relations. In the last days of 
the Assembly, the Hungarian Lutheran Bishop Ordass was imprisoned by authorities in 
Budapest, prompting protests from the US government. Early in 1949, the Catholic Cardinal 
Jozef Mindszenty was imprisoned for treason and espionage. In March of 1949, three Protestant 
Pastors pleaded guilty to espionage in show trials in Sofia. Also in 1949, the Soviets detonated 
their first atomic bomb, and China fell to Mao Zedong’s communists. In 1950, Truman 
announced the United State’s determination to develop a hydrogen bomb, and war broke out on 
the Korean Peninsula. As Visser’t Hooft wrote at the time, “the international situation has 
developed in such a way that it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the position 
formulated at Amsterdam.” The possibility of standing between the rival blocs had evaporated. 
“There is even less ‘vital space’ for a third position.”68 
 
How would the Council respond to these events? Ecumenists developed two strategies. First, the 
Executive and Central Committees of the WCC generally followed a course that sought balance 
between public pronouncements criticizing Western powers on the one hand and the Soviet 
Union on the other. Thus in the summer of 1949, after the high profile trials of church leaders in 
Eastern Europe, the Central Committee, meeting in Chichester, England, issued a statement 
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asserting that the churches were “deeply disturbed by the increasing hindrances which many of 
its member churches encounter in giving their witness to Jesus Christ.”69 In February of 1950 it 
issued a statement condemning the hydrogen bomb as “the latest and most terrible step in the 
crescendo of warfare that has changed war from a fight between men and nations to a mass 
murder of human life.”70 Both of these statements eschewed specifically denouncing either 
Communist governments or the United States; they were rather attempts to abstract from the 
context of particular of political bodies and interests a set ethical and religious issues. The 
Chichester statement spoke in general terms about the threat of totalitarianism, characterizing it 
as a “false doctrine” which taught the “self-sufficiency of man” and the subordination of all 
human ends to political or economic objectives – while making no particular reference to Eastern 
European powers. Likewise the statement against the hydrogen bomb made no explicit reference 
to the United States, which had tested the weapon in January. Calling on every man – “be he 
statesman or scientist or ordinary citizen” – to “ponder in his conscience… how far his own 
action or attitude contributes to the danger of world suicide,” the document went on to demand 
“a gigantic new effort of peace” between the two “hostile camps.” “We urge the governments to 
enter into negotiations once again, and to do everything in their power to bring the present tragic 
deadlock to an end.”71 These statements were characterized not only by a generality intended to 
secure them from any danger of taint with power politics. They also evinced a broader policy of 
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establishing parity in the WCC’s public statements, balancing its warnings against the US and 
Communist powers.  
 
Parity and generality were not the only features of the ecumenical third way. The WCC also 
looked to the activities of the UN as means for churches to enter the political realm without 
becoming “political.” The UN served the movement as a kind of beacon, a framework of 
opportunities for action that would promote international reconciliation and peace. Ecumenists 
had worked to cultivate their influence in the UN since 1945, when Dulles and Fredrick Nolde 
travelled to San Francisco to write theological personalism into the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, as we saw in the last chapter. As Cold War tensions deepened, relations with the 
UN evolved. Ecumenists increasingly relied on the UN as a source of its agenda, latching onto 
the organization’s various humanitarian initiatives as means of asserting the church’s relevance 
in international politics along lines that could not easily be assailed as politically or ideologically 
partisan.  
 
As part of this strategy, the work of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs 
(CCIA), established in 1946 to serve as a liaison with the UN, became increasingly important 
between 1949 and 1950. Ecumenists had from the war years onward placed special emphasis on 
the international protection of “human rights” as an area of special Christian concern. Where 
ecumenists became involved in specific initiatives to promote human rights, they worked 
through the CCIA, which itself followed the lead of the United Nations.72 For instance in early 
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1950, weeks after the General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention, Frederick Nolde and 
his colleague Kenneth Grubb, CCIA Executive Director, wrote to church leaders encouraging 
them to lobby their governments to sign or ratify the Convention.73 In response to the trials of 
churchmen in Hungary and Bulgaria, the CCIA advised UN bodies in consultations with 
denominational representatives able to provide documentary evidence to the General Assembly, 
which charged these governments with violating obligations under the Paris Peace Treaties of 
1947 to “take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under (its) jurisdiction, without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious 
worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.” In its other forms of activism as well, the 
CCIA generally focused on mobilizing church opinion around issues that had already become 
concerns of UNO bodies. When the UN adopted a resolution in November of 1948 calling for 
the repatriation of Greek children in Eastern Europe, Grubb prepared a statement for the Central 
Committee expressing “concern over the inhuman abduction of many thousands of Greek 
children from their homes and fatherland.”74 In 1949 the CCIA supported referral of the legal 
status of South West Africa to the International Court of Justice.75  
 
The movement’s support of the UN and the channeling of its activism through issues taken up by 
UN bodies was a strategy of entering politics without becoming co-opted by political interests. 
But it relied implicitly on a broad acceptance in both East and the West of the UN itself as a 
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body that stood above politics, constituting, a “town hall for the world,” as Dulles put it in 1948. 
Here was an Achilles heel of the strategy of “equilibristic,” which stood exposed from late 1949 
onward and was struck hard by the outbreak of the Korean War.  
 
In October of 1949, Mao Zedong, having driven most of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces 
off of the Chinese mainland, declared the People’s Republic of China. China’s seat in the 
General Assembly and the Security Council remained occupied, however, by the Republic of 
China. In protest against the exclusion of the PRC, Stalin boycotted the Social Security Council 
beginning in early 1950. The consequence of this move was a Security Council dominated by the 
US and its allies for a critical seven months, during which war broke out on the Korean 
peninsula. As North Korean forces advanced toward Seoul in July, the United States convened a 
meeting of the Security Council, which voted, on the basis of evidence provided by UN 
observers on the peninsula, unanimously to condemn North Korea’s attack and called for an 
immediate cessation of hostilities. This was followed by a resolution enabling member nations to 
assist the South Korean Army in pushing the North back to the 38th parallel – and enabling the 
United States to intervene under the cover of UN approval.  
 
There was a parallel between the UN’s response to the Korea crisis and the World Council’s 
response to the UN’s resolution. In both cases, through the absence of Communist 
representatives, Western representatives dominated the deliberations. In the WCC’s case, this 
imbalance was due to a coincidence: in the summer of 1950, just as hostilities broke out on the 
Korean peninsula, the Central Committee of the WCC was preparing to meet in Toronto for its 
first gathering in North America. The location of the meeting made it difficult for Eastern 
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Europeans and Asians on the Committee to attend. Of the 96 theologians, laypersons and clerics 
who attended, most were from North America and Western Europe.76 The sole Chinese 
churchman – and one of only three Asians – among the Committee members present was the 
American seminary-educated Episcopalian minister Y. Y. Tsu, a staunch nationalist who had 
fled Shanghai soon after the Communists had taken over the city.77  
 
IV. The Korean Crisis and the Challenge to the World Council’s Authority 
A few days before the meeting in Canada, CCIA directors Kenneth Grubb and O. Fredrick Nolde 
drafted a statement commending the UN Security Council for “its prompt and forthright 
resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean 
armed forces to the thirty-eight parallel.” Pointing out that the UN resolution was based on “the 
most objective source available” – an observer commission of representatives from seven nations 
– Grubb and Nolde’s statement went on to support the police action of the UN to repel the armed 
attack and restore international peace and security in the area. At Toronto, the Central Committee 
worked from this resolution to draw up its own “Statement on the Korean Situation and World 
Order.” The crucial part reiterated the gist of the CCIA resolution: 
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An act of aggression has been committed. The United Nations’ Commission in Korea, the 
most objective witness available, asserts that ‘all evidence points to a calculated, 
coordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy’ by the North Korean troops. 
 
Armed attack as an instrument or national policy is wrong. We therefore commend the 
United Nations, an instrument of world order, for its prompt decision to meet this 
aggression and for authorizing a policy measure which every member nation should 
support. At the same time, governments must press individually and through the United 
Nations for a just settlement by negotiation and conciliation.78  
 
When the resolution was discussed on July 23, there were few dissenting voices. According to 
the meeting minutes, Martin Niemöller questioned whether a more general defense of the values 
of “freedom, independence, and unity” was preferable to the specific endorsement of military 
action in what might justifiably be considered a civil war. The only other dissenting comments 
on record came from American Quakers, who objected to the use of force in general. Among 
ecumenical Christianity’s major figures present – including Bishop George Bell, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Pierre Maury, and John MacKay – all supported the statement.79 Aside from the pacifist 
abstentions, the resolution passed unanimously, along with a more pastoral note extending 
“profound sympathy” with the people of Korea – in the North and the South – with their 
“ordeal.”80 When it was released on July 25, the resolution received a warm reception in Western 
countries. John Foster Dulles found in it evidence that, despite its penchant for moral equalizing, 
the Council could make the right decisions in exigencies of international crisis. He asked Edward 
Barret, US Assistant Secretary of State, to step up publicity of the Council’s resolution over the 
                                                
78 “Statement of the Central Committee on the Korean Situation and World Order, Toronto, Canada, July 1950,” The 
First Six Years 1948-1954, 119-20. 
79 See the records of the conversation in Minutes and reports of the Third Meeting of the Central Committee of the 
World Council of Churches Toronto (Canada) July 9-15, 1950 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, undated), 26-
7. 
80 “Letter of the Central Committee to Christians in Korea, Toronto, Canada, 1950,” The First Six Years, 121. 
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United Nations radio and Voice of America.81 In London, Ernest Bevin wrote to George Bell 
congratulating him and the Central Committee’s “admirable statement.”82  
 
The approbation from Western leaders was soon countered, however, by attacks on the statement 
from Eastern church leaders. In an open letter to Visser’t Hooft, the Hungarian Bishop Bereczky 
protested the statement as the culmination of the Council’s misconceived approach to 
international politics. Bereczky did not object to the intrusion of the church into the politics 
sphere; he took issue rather with what he viewed as a transparently partisan statement which 
aligned the Council with the Western powers. The Council was preoccupied, he wrote, with 
speaking against the “heathen” world while ignoring the dangers of “Pharisee-ism” – a 
hypocritical appropriation of Christian rhetoric and piety in the cause of worldly politics which 
he saw at the root of the Truman Administrations foreign policy. For Bereczky what was needed 
for the church to be “convincing” in the political sphere was a message of “repentance” from 
Western leaders for the implication of Christianity in a legacy of western imperialism whose 
continuity with contemporary American foreign policy was self-evident. “It took my breath 
away,” he wrote, that the statement contained no reference to imperialism or sufferings of 
colonized peoples in Asia. The legacy of western aggression was the deep cause of the “wildfire” 
spread of Communism in Asia and, Bereczky seemed to imply, the Korean conflict itself.83 He 
further took issue with the Council’s reliance on the United Nations for guidance, charging that a 
decision based on the supposed “objectivity” of the UN Observers Commission was no 
                                                
81 Dulles/Barret Jul 26, 1950. Dulles Papers, Box 51. 
82 Bevin/Bell, Jul 29, 1950. WCC, 428.16.2.9.1. 
83 Albert Bereczky, “Offener Brief an den Generalsekretär des Weltkirchenrates Dr. W. A. Visser’t Hooft,” Aug 9, 
1950 (WCC, 42.009/3). 
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replacement for Christian conscience. Further, to consider the United Nations “non-partisan” 
when the Soviet Union and China were not represented in it was clearly itself a partisan move. 
“You have warned the World Council against entering the political sphere,” Bereczky reminded 
Hooft, “and here you nonetheless accept the ‘non-partisan objectivity’ of a political element.” 
Indeed, in accepting the UN’s version of the facts, Hooft had clearly condemned the other side in 
the conflict.84 Characteristically for the committed ecumenist he was, Bereczky closed his seven 
page attack on the Council’s Korea statement with a plea for dialogue: it was precisely because 
he wished to remain in the Council that he had lodged his complaints in a public forum. But 
between his attack and the overwhelming support of Western ecumenists for the action, it was 
difficult to see where the World Council could find a common ground.  
 
In September Visser’t Hooft received a second attack from the East. Josef Hromadka and the 
Czech Brethen Bishop Victor Hajek, in another letter of public protest, echoed many of 
Bereczky’s complaints. Hajek and Hromadka asserted even more forthrightly than the Hungarian 
Bishop that the Korean statement had jeopardized the World Council’s authority as an 
instrument of Christian unity. “We are really disturbed by the fact that, in one of the most 
decisive and tragic moments of world history, the World Council… has identified itself, self-
assuredly, with one side” in the conflict. Why had the Council had not condemned other 
international aggression, including the exclusion of “Democratic China” from the UN and the 
bloody suppression of the peoples of Vietnam and Malaya fighting for their political freedom 
                                                
84 Ibid, 5. The complete quotation reads as follows: “Sie haben den Weltrat vor einem Eintritt in die politische 
Sphaere gewarnt – und zwar selbstverständlich auch in der Kenntnis der politischen Verantwortung der Kirche – 
und heir nehmen sie dennoch die ‘unparteiische Sachlichkeit’ eines politischen Faktors an, ja Sie nehmen sogar 
dessen Feststellung die Tatsachen an, offensichlicht verurteilen Sie zugleich den Tatsachenbefund der anderen Seite 
und auch das, wenn man ihm Glauben schenkt.” 
 
 336 
and social self-determination? At stake in the Council’s interventions in political affairs was the 
question of whether the Council was capable of serving the function its architects had 
envisioned. “We are increasingly disturbed…” they wrote, “lest the Ecumenical movement 
hitherto represented, with such a dignity, by the World Council of Churches become an 
instrument of one power-group.” Like Bereczky, Hromdka and Hajek called on Western nations 
in the Council to be especially on guard against the motives that led their interventions in world 
affairs, suggesting even that it was the “traditionally Christian” character of these societies that 
made unchristian policies in Eastern Asia especially culpable. “A vast majority of the Christians 
organized in the World Council of Churches comes from the traditionally Christian countries... It 
is precisely for this fact that they should carefully watch the motives of their own nations in 
international politics.”85  
 
Appended to the end of the open letter was a handwritten note from Hromadka to Visser’t Hooft, 
in which Hromadka threatened to boycott preparations for the second Assembly pending the 
General Secretary’s response. Noting that his involvement in the preparations would itself be a 
“rare privilege,” he stated that his decision in the matter would depend “on the result of our 
discussion which may follow the letter you have before you.” “We mean it in all earnest,” he 
continued, “and pray that some way might be found to understand one another more adequately 
and fruitfully.”86  
 
                                                
85 “Letter from Prof. Josef L. Hromadka and Dr. Viktor Hajek to Dr. W. A. Visser’t Hooft” Nov 30, 1950, (WCC, 
37.0003). 
86 Handwritten note appended to a personal copy of the Hromadka/Hajek letter of protest, (WCC, 42.0039). 
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Opposition to the statement did not only come from Eastern European churches. The French 
YMCA attacked the Korea Statement as well, along the same lines of Bereczky and Hromadka’s 
critique, assailing it as proof that the Council had taken sides in the conflict. In a statement 
following taking much the same line as Bereczky and the Hromadka-Hajek letter, the journal 
Réforme published a statement of the French Student Christian Federation attacking the Korean 
statement as an indication that the World Council had tilted dangerously to the right, and risked 
becoming an agent of the power politics it claimed to transcend.87  
 
At the Geneva headquarters, the WCC staff in late 1950 and early 1951 devoted themselves to 
damage control. Bishop George Bell convened an emergency meeting of the Executive 
Committee for January 1951. As he acknowledged, there was no possibility of retracting the 
statement without re-convening of the Central Committee: in any case, such a move would 
undoubtedly fail to win the support of western church leaders, who remained firmly in favor of 
the UN resolution and America’s role in the peacekeeping action in Korea. Bell himself had 
voted for the resolution, and remained convinced of the justice of the peacekeeping mission and 
the duty of the churches to support it, even as he saw the existential threat the movement 
confronted. It was imperative to involve Eastern Europeans in the meeting, which was sure to be 
divisive. “We shall certainly have big problems on our hands at the Executive,” Bell wrote to 
Hooft, while stating that the meeting must provide an opportunity for the airing of grievances. 
“We must let the various, and no doubt competing, views have full expression.”88  
 
                                                
87 “Les Eglises et la Guerre de Corée,” Réform (Nov 1950), 2.  
88 Bell/Visser’t Hooft Jan 18, 1951, (WCC, 37.0003). 
 
 338 
Meanwhile, Visser’t Hooft sought to placate the statement’s critics. His defense of the Korea 
statement, however, did little more reiterate the position that he had taken since the breakdown 
of the Council’s courtship of the Moscow Patriarchate: attacks on the World Council as a 
“political instrument” were simply based on a “misunderstanding” of the ontological status of 
Council and its utterances. As Visser’t Hooft put it to Bereczky when the latter visited him in 
person in Geneva in late 1950, “No resolution of a World Council Body,” Visser’t Hooft 
explained, “ever commits all the member churches.”89 The pronouncements of the Council were 
not attempts to impose an “official line” on the churches; rather, they were statements made to 
member churches, and invitations to response. He reiterated that line in a memorandum 
composed for the emergency meeting of the Executive Committee. The Council “is not 
authorized to speak for the Churches,” but only “to the churches.” 90 Pronouncements from the 
Council’s organs left each member church “the right to define its own position with regard to 
such pronouncements, that is to reject of confirm them.” Correctly understanding the economy of 
ecumenical dialogue was, for Visser’t Hooft, the Movement’s response to the challenge of 
political polarization. Those who saw the alignment of the WCC with the West had – like the 
Russian Orthodox Church – fallen victim to a misunderstanding.91 This line of defense was a 
strategy for domesticating dissent: in fact, Visser’t Hooft was suggesting, the conflict that the 
Korea statement had set off simply showed that the Council’s design was working as it was 
supposed to.  
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90 Visser’t Hooft, “The World Council of Churches and International Conflict,” Memo Prepared for the Executive 
Committee of the WCC in preparation for its meeting in Bièvres, Jan 30-Feb 1, 1951, 1. (WCC 37.0003). 
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Bereczky, for one, was unconvinced. To him, the Korea statement brought to light the disconnect 
between the World Council’s self-understanding and the reality of its functioning in a politically 
polarized environment. There could be no space outside of politics in which ecumenical 
conversation could take place: in theory ecumenical discourse might claim to exist in a sphere 
“above” politics, but in reality all such discourse carried a political valence. What was important 
was not just the intentions behind the statement but the impression it left. For his part, Bereczky 
believed that it was only through embracing Communism that the churches could effectively 
secure a vital, prophetic space, apart from a capitalist order that had compromised the 
authenticity of its Gospel in the modern age. This was an extreme position: even Hromadka had 
never argued that the Council needed to make a corporate statement in favor of Communism. But 
the premise of Bereczky’s objection – that there could be no purification of ecumenical 
conversation in a politically polarized age – was echoed by churchmen who in no way shared the 
Hungarian Bishop’s politics. As Henrik Kraemer, now director of the Ecumenical Institute and 
certainly no friend of the Soviet Union and Eastern European regimes, wrote to Visser’t Hooft: 
“The pronouncement of Toronto was essentially wrong because, although it was not intended to 
be so, it was a political statement and not a word of the Church to the Churches.” Kraemer made 
clear that he “did not agree with the arguments” of the statement’s critics: Bereczky and 
Hromadka were no less “political” in their protests against the statement than the authors of the 
statement had been.92 The only solution, in Kraemer’s mind, was that the Council become much 
more reticent in its pronouncements on pressing international affairs: retreat, in his mind, seemed 
to be the only way for the church to retain its supra-political position.  
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That proposal was surely more practical than Bereczky’s call for an ecumenical turn to Moscow, 
but it too was an option that few movement leaders were willing to take seriously. Visser’t Hooft 
rejected it as at odds with the Council’s duty to assert the message of the Christian faith in 
international affairs. As he put it at the time, one of the central tasks of the World Council “is to 
render concrete witness to the Lordship of Christ and to the implications of this Lordship for 
national and international life.”93 The Council seemed caught in a dilemma: securing the unity of 
churches in the Council required a turn away from internationally contentious issues that 
representatives on both sides of the conflict were unwilling to take. 
 
When it gathered in Bièvres outside of Paris on January 21, 1951, the Executive took an 
intermediary path. The frank conversation between church leaders from the West and Eastern 
Europe failed to materialize: Bereczky and Hromadka were unable to attend (possibly because 
Hungarian and Czech authorities were freshly suspicious of the Council after its Korea 
statement). The gathering drafted a ruminative document, released in February, that neither 
endorsed the American-led police action nor repudiated the Toronto statement. Noting the 
absence of “churchmen from Eastern Europe,” the document began by asserting that the 
Executive Committee had given “much thought to the grave situation caused by the international 
crisis” in Korea – a euphemistic characterization of the debates that saw two critical WCC 
officers threaten to resign. The statement settled into a posture of ethical abstraction, 
condemning political conflict and declaring that its “victim is man. Often he is treated no better 
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than an object, or at best a tool, rather than a responsible person.”94 Extending prayers to the 
Korean people on both sides, the statement seemed unobjectionable. 
 
Three months after the Bièvres statement, however, the fallout from the episode worsened still 
further. In China – though ecumenists seemed not to be aware of the fact until much later – the 
Toronto statement had played a role in a new crackdown on Protestant churches by the 
Communist government. In mid-April, Lu Ting-I, Director of the CPC’s Central Propaganda 
Department, presided over a show trial of numerous Chinese pastors. In his opening remarks – 
according to a transcript of the trials delivered to George Bell by British missionaries who had 
left China but remained in touch with sources there – Lu Ting-I assailed the movement as an 
organization “created with the direct support of American imperialism,” funded by John 
Rockefeller Jr. and headed by the “famous war-monger John Foster Dulles.”95 Y. Y. Tsu, who 
had endorsed the Toronto statement, was attacked as a “counter-revolutionary degenerate”96 by 
Chinese Anglicans who were sympathetic to the Communist regime. The Presbyterian minister 
and WCC President T. C. Chao – who was himself, as we saw earlier, a supporter of the 
Communists – found himself saddled with what had become an unacceptable foreign 
entanglement. On April 28, 1951 – ten months after the outbreak of war – Chao took the step that 
Hromadka and Bereczky had threatened and tendered his resignation from the WCC Presidium. 
The Korea statement, he explained in a letter to the WCC, had placed him in “an impossible 
situation.” “As a patriotic Chinese I must protest against the Toronto message, which sounds so 
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much like the voice of Wall Street, and as a president I should endorse the statement. I can no 
longer be one of the presidents of the World Council,” Chao added, indicating that “in doing so I 
want to say that I have complete freedom to affirm my faith in and my loyalty to Jesus Christ.”97 
That Chao’s letter was coerced went without saying to Visser’t Hooft and Bell, but, as ever, their 
concern was primarily to avoid reinforcing the impression of the Council that reigned in China 
and other Communist nations. Visser’t Hooft recommended holding off publishing a statement 
on Chao’s resignation, lest simply announcing “the fact that we have lost our Asian President… 
might seem to indicate that we have become a purely western body.”98   
 
Conclusion 
The presence of pro-Communist church leaders in ecumenical institutions and the World Council 
bureaucracy reflected and reinforced the determination of the body to chart a “non-political” 
third way in the conflict. The challenge of defining Christianity as an alternative to the West and 
Communism increasingly marginalized the anti-secular discourse that had originally galvanized 
ecumenists in the 1930s. Between 1945 and 1950, ecumenists continued to embrace anti-
secularism, attempting to frame the Cold War, not as a struggle of Christian civilization against 
godless atheism but a conflict of the rival materialisms of capitalism and communism. But the 
attempt for forge unity through a Christian vision and practice of social order – the “responsible 
society” – revealed the limit of a shared theological and intellectual orientation in the face of 
mounting political polarization. Shared spiritual commitment to the transcendent neutrality of the 
church proved politically ineffective, not just in meliorating the conflict between the US and the 
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USSR but in generating cohesion within the polyglot constituency of the World Council. Up 
until 1948, the movement’s efforts to court Communist churchmen alienated it from critics in the 
West; after 1948, these same efforts to trace a third way began to create a split within the 
movement itself. Increasingly, the common commitments of ecumenical thinking only provided 
the occasion for bitter clashes between churches that took sharply opposed positions on the major 
events of the day. 
 
Was their any hope for world Christian unity in a world where theology had come to seem like 
politics in disguise? By early 1951, repeatedly frustrated in their efforts to “transcend” the Cold 
War, ecumenists were ready to give up on the conflict altogether. In the deliberations that led to 
the Executive Committee’s follow-up statement on Korea, released from Bièvres, some 
participants argued the way out of the vortex of political antagonism led not from the West – as 
Dulles had argued at Amsterdam – or from the East – as Bereczky was now insisting – but from 
the South. For Stephen C. Neill, a Scottish-born former missionary and Anglican Bishop in 
Tirunelveli in South India in the early 1940s, now a member of the Executive Committee, the 
whole approach of Toronto and Bièvres “does not take nearly enough account of the passionate 
desire of S[outh] E[ast] Asia and Africa to keep out of the present conflict, which it regards 
merely as a conflict between two western materialistic ideologies.” For Neill, the struggles of the 
“new nations” for a place in the postwar international order resonated with the frustrated aims of 
the ecumenical movement. “Whether India and other countries can keep out of the battle, and 
whether they will really be able to discover a third way remains to be seen.” But Neill was 
hopeful. In particular, he had been impressed with the leadership Jawaharlal Nehru had shown in 
the fall of 1950, when he sought to broker negotiations between Beijing, Moscow, and 
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Washington and proposed a peace resolution that would bring Communist China into the UN 
while removing North Korean forces from the South. “The recent intense activity of the Indian 
delegation at U.N.O.,” Neill wrote, was “good evidence… of the conviction of some of these 
countries that the world scene is not to be interpreted in the light of the one at present most 
prominent conflict.”99 To Neill, the incipient “non-aligned” movement represented a worldly 
instrumentality whose political aims – meliorating the East-West conflict and building a new 
social order that would serve as an alternative to Soviet Communism and Western Capitalism – 
resonated with ecumenists’ sense of their spiritual vocation in the world. As we will see in the 
next chapter, he was not alone in perceiving an alignment of concerns between the churches and 
what was coming to be called the Third World. By 1951, in fact, a younger generation of 
ecumenists – led by an Asian theologian – had already worked out a new ecumenical theology 
that took the political struggles of the decolonizing world as a basis for revolutionizing the 
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Ecumenical Revolutionaries:  
M. M. Thomas and the Transcendence of Politics in the Third World 
 
 
In the 1930s, ecumenical thinkers had struggled to disentangle theology from politics. The crisis 
of secularism, they believed, had reached an apotheosis in the emergence of the “political 
religions” of Nazism and Communism. Forsaking religion in its traditional forms, modern 
humanity had turned to false idols, investing nations, races, and classes with aspects of divinity. 
Not only in Europe, but in all parts of the world touched by the spread of “secular civilization,” 
parties, movements, leaders had become instruments of salvation, transforming politics into a 
site of clashing fanaticisms whose secular frames of reference concealed their religious 
character. So, at least, went the logic of ecumenical polemic.  
 
In response to the spiritual and social “disorder” of secular modernity, ecumenists sought to 
establish a world community on the basis of true faith. Their effort to realize the universal church 
as a global unity of believers from all corners of the “inhabitable earth” (oikoumene) was a 
campaign to put politics in its place, in theory and practice. The theology ecumenists expounded 
in international study groups, journals, and conferences rested on a categorical distinction 
between “political” and “personal” relationships: in the former, conflicts for power and 
domination enacted the fall and humanity’s alienation from the divine; in the later, God’s grace 
brought humanity together in relations of love and mutual responsibility. Ecumenists sought to 
parochialize politics in practice by creating and participating in international institutions and 
networks that would enable Christians, by gathering, debating, and enacting their common faith, 
to transcend the political divisions that separated nation-states and empires. For the movement’s 
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supporters, the inaugural conference of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948 in 
Amsterdam was a triumph of the personal over the political. In common worship, in theological 
consensus, in schemes for cooperation in service and relief projects, participants caught a 
glimpse of the universal church as a historical reality.  
 
But at the moment that clerics, theologians, and church leaders assembled at Amsterdam, a 
competing vision of the relation between ecumenism and politics was emerging within the youth 
wing of the movement. In 1951, the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF) published The 
Christian in the World Struggle, a study guide intended to stimulate reflection on the political 
aims and responsibilities of Christians in all parts of the globe.1 Largely the work of a young 
Indian theologian and Marxist, M. M. Thomas, the book seemed to utterly reverse the anti-
political theology that had interwar ecumenists had advanced. Thomas and his co-author, the 
British theologian Davis McCaughey, argued that the church would become a historical reality 
not outside of, but rather through its participation in politics. The work evoked a world in the 
throes of a “social revolution on an unprecedented scale,” defined by the struggle of “submerged 
classes, nations, [and] races seeking power and responsibility which was previously denied 
them.”2 To understand the struggle from a Christian perspective, Thomas and McCaughey wrote, 
was to perceive the need of siding with the revolutionaries. “Behind and within the social 
revolution of our day, and in spite of everything that protagonists and antagonists say about it, 
the Christian sees by faith the righteous hand of God.”3 For Thomas and McCaughey, the 
                                                
1 Printed on cheap paper, the 200 page work, complete with study questions, bibliography, and appendices, was 
distributed to SCM chapters in Europe, North America, South America, and Asia. 
2 M. M. Thomas and J. D. McCaughey, The Christian in the World Struggle (Geneva: World Student Christian 
Federation, 1951), 16-7. 
3 Ibid, 40. 
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“personal” and the “political” were not distinct but rather coterminous spheres of existence. The 
authors called on student Christians to find God in the “technicalities of politics.”4 In their 
theology, there was no space beyond politics where the church could safely plant its community: 
to remain aloof was to decide for the counterrevolution. Christians became the world community 
that Christ made them only when they entered together the world struggle in solidarity with the 
oppressed and marginalized.  
 
For the ecumenical movement, The Christian in the World Struggle was an indication of things 
to come. From 1928 to 1968, ecumenists went from the front lines of the “church struggle” – 
whose flashpoint was Nazi Germany – to a “world struggle” – played out in the global Third 
World. It was a shift in the ways in which the movement understood and articulated its purpose: 
in the 1930s, movement leaders were concerned primarily with protecting the church from 
contamination by secularized ideologies and modes of thought; in the postwar period, they were 
primarily concerned with defining and carrying out the church’s responsibility within the secular 
realm. Thomas’s book advanced, for the first time, the theological innovations on which this 
shift in orientation would be based as it played out first within the WSCF and then WCC in the 
postwar period.5 From the late 1950s onward, what seemed to virtually all observers and 
participants to be the conspicuous feature of the movement was its valorization and theological 
justification of “radical” political engagement. In these years, movement theologians like 
                                                
4 Thomas and McCaughey, The Christian in the World Struggle, 8. 
5 Thomas’s career within ecumenical institutions reflects the prominence of his ideas. After serving as a Secretary of 
the World Student Christian Federation in the period discussed in this chapter, he became secretary of the East Asian 
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Responsibility Toward Areas of Rapid Social Change, established to develop a theology and practice of ecumenism 
in the Third World. He chaired the Central Committee of the World Council from 1968 to 1971 and was elected a 
WCC president from 1983-91.  
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Richard Shaull, H. D. Wendland, Kyaw Than, and Emilio Castro proclaimed "theologies of 
revolution" at international conferences; church leaders marched against the Vietnam War and 
the World Council of Churches embarked on controversial programs of aid and activism in the 
global South, including the "Program to Combat Racism," which funneled church funds to 
support Marxist guerrillas in southern Africa.  
 
What caused this seemingly dramatic shift in the ecumenical appraisal of politics? The question 
has hardly been addressed in scholarship on the movement, which has perceived no real 
transformation in ecumenical attitudes toward politics in the 1940s. Scholars have tended to 
either approach ecumenical actors as political actors – addressing their theology to the extent it 
informs their political actions and allegiances – or looked to the 1960s as the moment at which 
the movement became, for the first time, “politicized.” The former approach has generally 
emphasized political progressivism and liberal internationalism as constitutive, if contested, 
agendas of the movement from its inception. In these accounts, the radicalization of international 
ecumenism in the 1960s was continuous with Anglo-American Social Gospel Protestantism of 
the late nineteenth century. Transnational ecumenical elites, including not only North Americans 
but Europeans, Asians, and Africans, thought and acted within a tradition whose principle feature 
was the priority of social reform in search of the Kingdom of God over individual conversion 
and whose intellectual foundations were already in place by the time of Walter Rauschenbusch. 
One major shortcoming of this approach is that it fails to reckon with the repudiation of liberal 
theology that defined ecumenical consensus in the 1930s, when neo-orthodoxy became an 
international idiom. More seriously, it fails to account in any way for the international practice of 
ecumenical Christianity and the impact of contacts and exchanges among theologians, clerics, 
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and laypersons from the various theological and confessional traditions within the North Atlantic 
and between Europeans and North Americans on the one hand and non-western church leaders 
on the other. As a result, in these historical accounts, the ecumenical movement becomes the 
echo chamber of an Anglo-American political-theological imagination.6  
 
A second historiographical approach attempts to take seriously the international contacts, 
exchanges, and debates that ecumenical institutions and networks enabled. In doing so, these 
scholars see a major break occurring within the movement’s history in the postwar era, as church 
leaders and theologians from the Third World asserted greater control over the movement 
beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s.7 But this approach fails to explain why these leaders 
from the non-European world, after years of being marginalized within the movement, should 
have finally achieved the positions of bureaucratic and intellectual leadership previously denied 
them. Both accounts make little of what was the peculiar feature of ecumenical discourse of the 
                                                
6 This approach has been dominant in most recent work on ecumenical Christianity, especially in the United States. 
See David Hollinger, After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History (Princeton: 
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(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1975), esp Part I, and David L. Edwards, “Signs of Radicalism in the Ecumenical 
Movement,” A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1948-1968 ed. Harold Fey (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 
1968), 373-410 for early accounts of the ecumenical embrace of political radicalism in the 1960s. More recently, Jill 
K. Gill (Embattled Ecumenism: The National Council of Churches, the Vietnam War, and the Trials of the 
Protestant Left (Dekalb, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2011)) has chronicled ecumenical involvement in the 
anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States. Many of the essays in Die Politisierung des Protestantismus: ed. 




1940s: the first emergence of “politics” as a field invested with a peculiar theological 
significance for the cause of world Christian unity. 
 
In this chapter, I will address the ecumenical “discovery” of politics in a new way. My approach 
offers a history of the World Student Christian Federation’s “Political Commission,” the 
intellectual and institutional milieu in which Thomas developed the ideas he advanced of The 
Christian in the World Struggle. The name of the body itself announced its novelty: in keeping 
with interwar ecumenists’ suspicion of politics, there had never been a “political” commission in 
the WCC or indeed in any other ecumenical organization. Founded in 1946, the Commission was 
first a product and then the locus of a series of discussions around the specifically “political” 
responsibilities of Christian students. As we’ll see in the first part of this chapter, these 
conversations began at a moment during World War II when it became apparent to the 
Federation leadership that, for young Christians across the world mobilized in the armed forces, 
in the European Resistance, or displaced by violent conflict, there could be no escape from 
politics, which permeated all aspects of life in a “total war.” At first, the political activation of 
youth looked like it might pay ecumenical dividends, as Allied victory presented an opportunity 
for ecumenical Christians to help write the terms of a postwar order. But hopes that student 
Christians could reach a consensus around their political objectives were shortly upset by 
disagreements over the appropriate attitude toward Communism. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Cold War brought the cause of church unity to an impasse 
in the North Atlantic world. But for ecumenists from the colonized regions of Asia, long 
marginalized in the movement, the East-West conflict presented an opportunity. The second part 
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of this chapter examines how Thomas, while an organizer of youth student Christian groups 
collaborating with Communist Party actions against British rule in the early 1940s, developed 
concept of ecumenical dialogue which would enact, rather than attempt to transcend, political 
conflicts. The third part shows how Thomas’s theology, developed at the intersection of 
international ecumenism and anti-colonial struggle, was adopted by Federation leaders as the 
antidote to Cold War divisions on an international global scale. These sections emphasize the 
central role of the Marxian idea of ideological critique in Thomas’s ecumenical theology. Years 
before Communism threatened ecumenical unity, Thomas appropriated Marx to diagnose 
theological debate among Christians as political combat in disguise. But, he claimed, the 
presence of politics in the oikoumene did not discredit the integrity of the movement; rather, it 
pointed toward a deeper apprehension of “unity in Christ,” established through the recognition of 
political disagreement as an expression of original sin.  
 
The story of the ecumenical discovery of politics then, is also the story of a renegotiation of 
authority within the movement, as Christians from the Third World began, for the first time, to 
play a significant part in shaping the intellectual and practical agendas of international 
ecumenical institutions. Thomas’s case shows in detail how this renegotiation took place, and 
why what he and his North Atlantic colleagues called “the Asian point of view” held so much 
promise: by defining the struggle of “submerged nations, races, and classes” in theological and 
not political terms, Thomas offered a strategy for consolidating the ecumenical community 
outside the impasse the East-West conflict. For all its insistence on participation in political 
struggle, his theology of “revolution,” succeeded because it promised the transcendence of 
politics that ecumenists had sought since 1914 but in the postwar period seemed increasingly 
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unable to achieve. In an age when ecumenists were attacked as both instruments of western 
imperialism by churches in the Eastern bloc and agents of world Communism by Western 
religious conservatives, the expansive possibilities of the Third World promised movement elites 
a new source unifying purpose.  
  
The theologies developed in the Federation’s Political Commission saved the ecumenical 
movement from fracture. But political ecumenism could not entice American evangelicals, the 
Russian Orthodox clerisy, or any of the other counter-ecumenical Christianities whose 
emergence we examined in the last chapter back into the movement. Indeed, to ecumenism’s 
most vocal critics – religious anti-Communists in the US – the theology of revolution seemed to 
exemplify precisely the “politicization” of Christianity it sought to circumvent. Thomas’s ascent, 
then, brings into focus the ironic denouement of the movement whose history we have traced 
throughout this dissertation. In the interwar period, ecumenists’ campaign to overcome politics 
had posited the world church as the foundation of social order. Christianity’s universal truth 
transfigured national, racial, and class conflict into godly diversity, redeeming humanity from the 
chaos of contemporary secular civilization. The postwar history of the WSCF we will examine 
here shows how, in order to salvage a global remnant in an age when the Cold War and 
decolonization rent Protestant and Orthodox churches, ecumenists found it necessary to abandon 
the idea of Christianity as the foundation of social order. Preserving the unity of a cross-section 
of international church elites required mobilizing around a new vocation, that of a revolutionary 
avant guarde, whose mission in the contemporary world was not to secure social order but to 
overturn it, through political struggle and transformation. After the early 1950s, Christians could 
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embrace either the cause of ecumenical solidarity or that of religious social stability and 
harmony. They could not embrace both. 
 
I. Conceiving a Theological Dialogue on “Politics:” Origins of the WSCF Political 
Commission, 1942-46 
It was within the constellation of student Christian groups – representing a constituency that was, 
for the most part, under the age of the thirty five – that the political turn in ecumenical thought 
first took place. It began with a conflict that was, in a phrase repeated in numerous Federation 
conferences and articles in the Federation’s journal Student World, a “total war.” The phrase did 
not only denote the intrusion of violence into the civilian sphere; it encapsulated a new 
understanding about the relation between “theological” and “political” praxis. After 1939, even 
followers of Karl Barth – who had throughout the 1930s argued relentlessly against all efforts to 
derive a political program from the absolute demands of the Gospel – conceded that it was 
impossible for Christians to remain incognizant of religious responsibilities that could be 
fulfilled only through political action. In Barth’s Confessing Church, Christian obedience 
required partisan opposition to a Nazi regime that had become a “secular religion.”8 In and 
outside of occupied Europe, the war drew student Christian groups into the arena of “politics” in 
various ways. Conscripted into the military, imprisoned, resisting occupying powers (or 
collaborating with them), displaced, and forced to immigrate, young Christians in the 1930s were 
swept dramatically into the force fields of power politics. As Robert Mackie in 1942 had put it, 
                                                
8 Philippe Maury, a Secretary of the Federation who will be discussed shortly, was a Barthian in the French 
Resistance and argued that at the moment of resistance to totalitarianism the churches action was at once theological 
and political. Consider also the reflection of the New Zealand student Christian leader Alexander Miller (who spent 
the war years in Scotland) on the churches’ relation to Nazism: ““Not to resist Nazism was to acquiesce in it. There 
was no living alternative at all.” (“Is Everything Permitted,” Student World (4th Quarter, 1945), 288. 
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“political issues have invaded the sanctum of the university… Consequently any action has 
become political action, and faith is directly expressed by daily affirmation and resistance.”9   
 
Why was it that there was no recognition of “politics” as an issue of ecumenical concern among 
the older milieu of the World Council of Churches-in-formation? The occlusion was due in part 
to differences in the membership and aims of the WCC and the WSCF. The WCC was a Council 
of churches. The various schemes of postwar international order advanced in WCC-connected 
groups such as the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace and the British Peace Aims Group 
aspired to speak with the authority of the universal church, a divine community whose interests 
ecumenists jealously distinguished from all specifically political programs. But if they denied the 
political authority of the church per se, ecumenists were equally agreed that individual Christians 
had a responsibility to enter the realm of political action, acting according to conscience in light 
of Christian principles and teaching. The WSCF was structurally more open to conversations 
about individual students political decisions because it was an organization comprised not of 
member churches but of voluntary institutions – the so-called Student Christian Movements, 
organized nationally and regionally across the world – which were themselves constituted not by 
member churches but by individuals. This constitutional difference created the room in which 
Federation leaders could frame conversations around political issues as matters confronting the 
individual Christian conscience, even as they hewed to the consensus position that the church as 
such remained above politics.  
 
                                                
9 Robert Mackie, Editorial, Student World, (4th Quarter, 1942), 248. 
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In 1942, as fighting raged in Europe and Asia and international communication became more 
difficult, the Federation initiated a new series in the Student World, entitled “Thinking Ahead as 
Christians.” Its aim was to stimulate collective reflections among its constituencies on questions 
of “political” responsibility. The series featured essays, personal correspondence, and documents 
pertaining to debates over war aims and postwar order that would help, in the words of a 
Federation resolution of 1942, student Christians to reflect on their “responsibility in the political 
realm.” The idea was to circulate reflections stimulating readers to reach a deeper understanding 
of their faith by connecting it with the concrete ethical and political decisions that the war had 
forced upon them. “We agreed that that our particular responsibility for clear thinking as 
members of the Federation lay not in the realms of political ‘blue-prints’ or theological 
restatement, but in the area where these crossed and overlapped, in the area where had to seek to 
live our lives as Christians,” read the resolution of a 1942 conference held by the Federation in 
Poughkeepsie, New York, where a small gathering of Federation staff and representatives from 
the student ecumenical diaspora had gathered.10 “Thinking Ahead as Christians” was a 
conversation framed for participants in what the Poughkeepsie meeting called an “international 
civil war.”11 From 1942 to 1946, the series published pieces ranging from correspondence of 
SCM members in the armed forces, reflections by political prisoners in Germany and China, 
participants in the resistance, and documents produced by the Peace Aims Group, the 
Commission on Just and Durable Peace, and other organizations devoted to world order.12   
                                                
10 Mackie, “Thinking Ahead as Christians” Student World, (3rd Quarter, 1942), 147. 
11 Ibid, 193. 
12 See for instance the articles in Student World (3rd Quarter, 1942) for a study guide featuring “Questions for 
Thinking Ahead,” focusing on issues of the Christian attitude toward communism, postwar international 
organization, imperialism, and “Anglo-American leadership” of world order. Staged dialogues between Christian 




The mass mobilization in wartime of youth was a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a 
conversation on Christian political responsibility. There was a second factor as well, the full 
implications of which the Federation leadership shied away from discussing explicitly. The war 
had not only brought Christian students into the political arena; it had generated a Christian 
student community homogenous enough in its political loyalties to make the prospect of a 
conversation about politics appear promising as an exercise of inclusion, a practice through 
which Christians could discover common ground rather than conflict. Up until the late 1930s, the 
Federation had sought to maintain a broad representation of student Christian groups – including 
those who were sympathetic or at least not outwardly opposed to Nazism – in the name of 
bearing witness to a church unity transcending political boundaries. The ecumenical project 
valorized theology as the idiom of ecumenical consensus – a language in which the unity of 
Christians could be discovered in spite of political loyalties and convictions dividing it. But 
during the war, largely as a consequence of the difficulties of communication across belligerent 
lines, the reach of the Federation’s network all but completely excluded Christian groups 
opposed to the Allied cause. The students whose writings appeared in the pages of the 
Federations Student World, who attended its occasional conferences, and whom the Federation 
imagined itself to speak for and to included, occasionally, German or Japanese Christians. But 
these were either resistors – whose works were published anonymously – or refugees who had 
made their way to Allied countries. Already by the late 1930s, Nazi-sympathizing Protestants 
had begun to slip out of the ecumenical orbit, distressed by the majority’s mobilization of the 
                                                
political questions were a feature of the 4th Quarter 1943 issue. The issue in the 3rd Quarter of 1945 highlighted 
accounts of Christians who had served in the resistance and/or been imprisoned in concentration or POW camps. 
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rhetoric of “totalitarianism” to attack the Hitler regime. The war made the break complete, loping 
off the limbs of the body that had reached substantially different political judgments.  
 
“The Rediscovery of Politics,” a memo outlining a proposal for the Political Commission written 
in early 1946, observed that the “Thinking Ahead as Christians” series “had shown conclusively 
that Christian students who started from a common faith frequently reached similar conclusions 
about political facts and events, even though the impossibility of correspondence between them 
prevented the interchange of ideas.”13 The consensus included “students in occupied Europe as 
well as in Anglo Saxon countries, in the neutral countries no less than in Japanese-occupied 
Asia.”14 The document celebrated this risorgimento of the oikoumene without mentioning that it 
had been achieved through the destruction of fascist political programs ecumenists had once 
sought to accommodate.  
 
Tantalized by the possibility of advancing a new stage along the path of Christian unity, the 
Federation leadership was caught up short when, after the war, political solidarity among 
Christians began to unwind along with the wartime alliance between the Western powers and the 
Soviet Union. The first signs of this unwinding registered in 1946. Seeking to further stimulate 
discussions initiated in the “Thinking Ahead as Christians” series, Philippe Maury, a Secretary of 
the Federation, a veteran of the French Resistance, circulated a “political questionnaire” to SCMs 
in Europe, North and South America, and Asia that spring. Part one addressed the attitudes of 
university students in general. “What political doctrines are fashionable today among students?” 
                                                




it asked. “To what extent are they really accepted as a rule of thought and action? What 
proportion of the student body is touched by them?” It then inquired as to whether communism 
was “active in your universities? If so, is it in its ideological aspect, as a doctrine of history, of 
society, of the world and of men, or as a purely political force (‘the party’ or Russia)?” “What is 
the attitude of students to capitalism?” “To the different socialist solutions? To class-war? to 
plans for social security?” Following these questions, a second part of the questionnaire inquired 
into the political attitudes of Christian students: “Are members of your SCM concerned about 
politics?” it asked. “Does this concern lead them to concrete action?” “Are Christian students 
aware of any specifically Christian attitude to politics? If so, what foundation can they find?” 15 
 
The capacious range of questions posed here served multiple purposes. Gathering information 
about the political thinking of both Christians and non-Christians allowed the Federation to 
frame a dialogue germane to the wider landscape of student opinion and ideas. It recalled the 
earlier organizing strategies of pre-World War I missionary surveys, whose function of 
categorizing religious beliefs and practices we examined in chapter one. Likewise, the dialogue 
on politics initiated in 1946 replicated the conversational form that emerged under Oldham’s 
supervision beginning in the years following the Jerusalem Conference of 1928, examined in 
chapter three. That conversation, however, had eschewed discussion of political attitudes, since it 
construed politics as a field in which Christians might legitimately disagree, even as they could 
unite around a theological affirmation of faith. But in the wake of its wartime experience, the 
Federation sought to expand the scope of discussion where Oldham and other earlier church 
leaders had feared to tread.  
                                                




In the uncharted territory of politics, it remained unclear where the appropriate boundaries of 
ecumenical concern lay. Drawing on the findings from the questionnaire, “Rediscovery of 
Politics” sought a middle ground between theoretical formulation and the prescription of specific 
political decisions and allegiances. On the one hand, the discussion of politics could draw on a 
body of what ecumenists in the interwar period had called “social thought,” particularly as it had 
been gathered in the study volumes compiled in preparation for the Oxford Conference. But talk 
of a political message expressed an impulse for greater specificity and the need for practical 
guidance in the application of social thought in concrete situations. Such recommendations, 
however, would have to be made without “politicizing” the gospel – that is, without aligning the 
“cause of Christ” with any specifically political party, state, interest or ideology. An ecumenical 
politics would have to be explicitly political and supra-partisan at once. The anonymous authors 
of the “Rediscovery of Politics” memo summarized the difficulty without offering the solution: 
“On the whole the tendency among [Christian students] is to relate the Christian point of view to 
a sort of socialistic democracy which will combine social justice and individual liberty. But they 
never go the length of confusing Christianity with any particular political ideology, past or 
present.” At the time the political questionnaire was distributed, this question of the relation 
between theory and practice was not only unresolved, it was also not yet pressing. “It seems as if 
Christians students all were aware of serious lacuna which marks the thought of their churches in 
political matters. Everywhere they make an effort to study this type of question in the light of the 
Bible.”16 
 
                                                
16 “Rediscovery of Politics,” 5-6. 
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In the spring of 1946, as Maury collected responses to his questionnaire, he and the Federation 
staff assembled a vision of a postwar world that was not only politically divided but divided over 
the value of politics itself. In most countries, according to the responses of the SCMs, students 
were indifferent, exhausted from the war and disillusioned by the peace. But two groups still had 
“faith in political ideas.” The larger of these “aspires toward a unifying society, whether it be to a 
conservatism that clings to order and tradition or rather to a liberalism which admits of the 
harmonious development of personality, a humanistic socialism which guarantees in peace and 
freedom the establishment of a satisfying social justice.” A smaller group “attracted by the 
communist dynamic,… makes its appeal to violence and although dependent upon its own 
strength and unsupported by general sympathy, proves itself as the only group which regards 
political activity as vital.” In Asia – mentioned as a footnote, though Maury had received 
responses from India, China, and Burma – nationalism clouded the opposition, uniting students 
in “quasi-unanimity” around the cause of independence from European rule.17 
 
These conclusions effectively centered the debate over politics in the WSCF around the question 
of the relation between Christianity and Communism, “the essential force by which students 
measure their reactions today.”18 As Robert Mackie put it in a Student World editorial in 1946, 
Communism was “the most dynamic theory of world political organization, which young people 
are meeting today. You may distrust it or dislike it, react from it or condemn it, but it remains the 
most serious claimant upon the political enthusiasms of youth.”19 The principal alternative to 
                                                
17 Over a dozen local chapters responded to the questionnaire. The responses can be found in WCC archives (WCC, 
213.13.24). 
18 Ibid, 4. 
19 Robert Mackie, “Youth’s Dilemma and Christian Hope (Editorial)” (3rd Quarter, 1946), 195. 
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Communism was withdrawal from the political realm altogether. Between these two extremes – 
one denying politics’ value, the other placing ultimate hope in political action – the Federation 
hoped to distill the Christian’s concern with politics, rather than define a political program. “In 
so far as fascism is discredited, or suppressed vast numbers of young people today must 
apparently choose between communist faith or a belief in hopelessness,” Mackie continued. 
“That is why it is so important for Christians to discover whether they have anything to say, in 
the political realm, which will attract and hold the most virile and idealistic minds…. What is the 
hope that we can hold out, as Christians, to a student world which has lost political confidence, 
or is placing it in false solutions?”20  
 
In the summer of 1946, the difficulties of expressing Christian “hope” in political terms became 
acutely clear around the question of how Student Christian Movements ought to respond to two 
student organizations formed in the immediate aftermath of the war. In 1945, over 500 youth 
groups from countries around the world, gathered in London for the inaugural meeting of the 
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), which passed resolutions committing itself to 
the pursuit of “peace” and “democracy” and elimination of “fascism” in the postwar world. The 
following year in Prague, the International Union of Students (IUS) convened 600 delegates 
from student organizations of various political and religious affiliations who similarly 
proclaimed lofty visions of postwar peace and democratic order. It was no secret to anyone in the 
SCM network that the organizations had emerged from Kremlin drawing boards.21 That didn’t 
stop SCMs from Britain to Indonesia from sending delegations, however – many of which 
                                                
20 Ibid, 195. 
21 For an account of the origins of the WFDY and IUS and their ties to the Communist Party, see Joël Kotek, 
Students and the Cold War, trns. Ralph Blumenau (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 
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participated actively in the proceedings.22 Penry Jones, for instance, a Secretary for the British 
SCM, became a Vice President of the WFDY. For others student Christian groups, however, the 
organizations were simply “fronts.” One anti-communist from the United Student Christian 
Council of the United States averred that Jones “was the most dangerous person in the whole 
WFDY,” because his participation “gave the stamp of approval of western Christians on a show 
that was actually controlled by communists.”23  
 
Facing these sharp disagreements within its constituency, the Federation put ecumenical unity to 
the political test. At its first conference since the outbreak of the war, held in Bossey, 
Switzerland in 1946, a subcommittee was assigned to formulate a policy of action for SCMs with 
regard to the IUS and WFDY. Chaired by Jones and Maury, the committee agreed that the 
Federation should not forthrightly condemn the organizations. Participation should be 
encouraged. The report failed to clarify, however, the objective of this participation. The minutes 
record contradictory recommendations. On the one hand, the WFDY and the IUS were 
interpreted as spaces for evangelization, where Christians bring the gospel to “politically-
conscious youth” and transform the organizations from within, from “political” bodies to “truly 
universal ones.”24 In this mode, Christians and Communists would be ideological competitors, 
competing for the allegiance of young “people of good will yet lacking in criteria for 
judgment…” The following recommendation, by contrast, emphasized that, whatever their 
opposition to Communism as a rival, ersatz-religious system of thought, Christians ought seek 
                                                
22 For Kotek’s discussion of Jones’s participation, see Students and the Cold War, 80 and 111. A. J. Coleman, “Two 
World Movements,” Student World (1st Quarter, 1947), 38 refers to participation by Christian groups from Indonesia 
as well as Holland and France.   
23 Quoted in Coleman, “Two World Movements,” 38. 
24 “Report of Section III: SCM Members and Political Aims,” 3 (WCC, 213.13.1). 
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out opportunities to cooperate with Communists around specific political and international 
objectives. Precisely by engaging with Communists and other groups, Christians could become 
adept at “political technique,” learning to advance their cause through parliamentary procedures, 
the drafting of resolutions, and campaigning for spaces on representative councils. The 
committee also stressed that, since Communism embraced certain broad visions of social 
equality and “democratic world order” in line with Christian teaching, the opportunities for 
cooperation should be possible to find.  
 
As some Federation staff members themselves acknowledged, the Commission’s 
recommendations were “unsatisfactory.”25 Agreeing that “engagement” with Communists in the 
IUS and WFDY was necessary, the findings seemed to counsel two conflicting courses of action. 
Would the “engagement” with Communism in the IUS and the WFDY prioritize confrontation or 
cooperation? Were these international student organizations to serve as theaters of Christian-
Communist combat, where SCMs could counter Communist influence on students? Or did they 
present opportunities for Christians to cooperate with Communists in pursuit of circumscribed 
objectives and learn the arts of political maneuver? The Political Commission had essentially 
stated that the IUS and the WFDY ought to be both. Intending to provide a framework to guide 
the conduct of SCMs in the IUS and the WFDY, Jones and Maury advised that contrary lines of 
action were admissible, indeed advisable.  
 
The contradictory messages of the proposals were not simply products of the confused thinking. 
They reflected the difficulty of translating a theological appraisal of Communism that ecumenists 
                                                
25 Coleman, “Two World Movements,” 35. 
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had broadly shared throughout the 1930s and 1940s into a program of political action. As we’ve 
seen in previous chapters, the common ecumenical appraisal of Communism insisted on the 
value and insight of Communist “ideals” of universal human equality and assailed the atheistic 
framework within which these ideals were embedded as a “demonic” secularization of Christian 
teaching. Had the Committee been content to issue a statement of theological principles, its 
dialectical “yes” and “no” to the ideology of Communism might have posed no problem. But the 
Political Commission courted political definition at the same time that it resisted it. As they 
sought to translate a common faith into collective action, the nuance of their theological 
appraisal of Communism collapsed into incoherence. Put in another way: the divisions that rent 
the ecumenical community were not theoretical but lay in the field of practical action; they 
concerned whether Communism as a political movement ought to be opposed or approached. 
Here, the Federation was helpless to facilitate the “Christian hope” it sought to carry into the 
political realm. It found help from an unlikely source. 
 
II. Peripheries Toward Centers: Thomas Moves to Geneva, the Church Moves into Politics 
Up to the late 1940s, Christians from the “younger churches” of Asia and Africa were marginal 
to the major ecumenical institutions, welcomed as specimens of the church’s world-wide 
extension but rarely afforded the opportunity to shape the agenda of ecumenical conferences or 
study programs. It was the problems confronted within the Federation’s Political Commission – 
in particular, the inability of its North Atlantic leadership to present a coherent political response 
to Soviet Communism – which ushered theologians from the emerging “Third World” into 
positions of leadership within the movement. The case of M. M. Thomas, who became the chief 
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author of the theological framework for an ecumenical conversation about politics in the late 
1940s, shows how this shift took place.  
 
Thomas first elaborated a theology of politics during the early 1940s, contemporaneously with 
the Federation’s efforts to stimulate the broader international conversation on political questions 
in the “Thinking Ahead as Christians” series. But Thomas’s wartime experience, and his 
theological conclusions drawn from it, were at odds with the dominant story about emerging 
political consensus that the Federation celebrated through and up to the end of the war. In 
contrast to North Atlantic leaders of the Federation, Thomas believed that a Christian consensus 
regarding politics inscribed an imperialist vision that divided the church and betrayed its 
vocation as a supra-political community. In his view, the SCM network was not a site of 
converging political judgments but an arena of political struggle that centered around the 
independence of subject peoples. 
 
Thomas’s position cannot be explained as a consequence of his Indian identity alone, or even of 
his status as a colonial subject. In fact, the majority of Indian student Christian groups shared 
western ecumenists’ assumption that the war had created new opportunities for concerted 
international political action – in particular on questions of Indian self-rule. The issue was not 
that “Indians” saw conflict while “Europeans” imagined unity. Rather, as the case of Thomas 
shows, the emergence of Marxian social analysis furnished the categories through which it 
became possible to conceive of a politically rent church. He was not the first to attempt to 
combine Marx and ecumenical theology; many Western ecumenical theologians had turned to 
Marx to re-imagine the social witness of the church in the 1930s. But in the context of colonized 
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India, his engagement led to a new vision of the ecumenical project’s relation to politics – and 
consequently of the overall aims of the movement. This vision made him an outlier both on the 
international level and within the Indian SCM network during the early 1940s. But after the war, 
as Thomas’s preoccupations with the relation between Communism and Christianity and the 
problem of intra-Christian political conflict moved to the center of the international agenda of 
the Federation, that body took a profound interest in Thomas’s ideas.  
 
Thomas was born in 1916 in Travancore, in southern India, into the Mar Thomite church, a 
Syrian Orthodox communion that traced its roots to the purported arrival of the apostle St. 
Thomas to the subcontinent in the first century AD. Like many young Indian Christians – Mar 
Thomites as well as members of recently established Protestant Churches by European 
missionaries – he became involved in the local chapter of the Student Christian Movement. In 
the late 1920s and 1930s, the Indian SCM network was embroiled in debates over reconciling 
Christian faith with the Indian national movement.26 For many of these young men and women, 
the teachings of Gandhi held great appeal. In the concepts of satyagraha and ahimsa – not unlike 
many western missionaries – they found a social and religious teaching reconcilable with 
Christian ethics of the beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount. “Gandhism” lit the path for the 
emergence of an “indigenous” form of Christianity, through which it could assume Indian culture 
                                                
26 For relations between Christian communities and the national movement in India see Jeffrey Cox, Imperial Fault 
Lines: Christianity and Colonial Power in India, 1818-1940 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), especially 
chpt 9 and D. Arthur Jeyakumar, Christians and the National Movement: The Memoranda of 1919 and the National 
Movement, (Bangalore: Centre for Contemporary Christianity, 2009), especially chpts 3-4, which emphasizes the 
broad support of Indian church leaders for the national movement though does not elaborate in much detail the 
arguments mobilized for this end or the specific vision of a post-colonial social order embraced in Christian circles. 
For missionary and local Asian Christian communities support for national movements and anti-imperial sentiment, 
Andrew Porter, Religion versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700-1914 (New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2004). 
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and spirituality. He offered an Indian politics, too, showing Indian Christians how they could 
play a role in the movement for self-rule.  
 
Thomas embraced a different prophet. He was one of a minority of Indian student Christians who 
turned to Marx as a source of political and theological inspiration. This group was concentrated 
in the Keralan regions of Madras, Travancore, and Cochin, where the Communist Party of India 
mobilized significant support, especially following its legalization in 1942.27 While the Party’s 
presence in the local political environment surely helped Thomas to think of Marx as an 
interlocutor, his encounters with European theologians and their works furnished him with a 
model of how a Christian dialogue with Marx might proceed. A crucial encounter occurred in the 
summer of 1940, when, at a study retreat at the Christavashram in Manganam, Thomas heard the 
Anglo-Catholic and SPG missionary Fr. Leonard Schiff deliver a history of Christian social 
thought.28 Schiff articulated the elective affinities between Marxian concepts and practice and 
Christianity, from the primitive communism of the apostles to the twentieth-century traditions of 
Marxian theologies. Thomas later wrote that Schiff’s exposition of Marx was “so appeal and 
challenging, so that for the next few years I was struggling to relate my understanding of the 
ultimacy of Jesus Christ in the light of Marxian insights.”29  
                                                
27 For a short history of the Communist Party in these regions, see Sreedhara Menon A Survey of Kerala History, 
(Kottayam: Sahitya Pravathaka Co-operative Society, 1967); for an exhaustive (if dated) survey of Communist Party 
organization in India see Gene D. Overstreet, Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). 
The Communist Party was legalized in India after Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union altered the party line from 
condemnation of a “capitalists’ war” to support for the Allies in a “war against fascism.” 
28 Later published, Schiff, The Christian in Society, The Christian Student’s Library, No. 21, (Madras: CLS for the 
Senate of Serampore College, 1960). Thomas mentions the encounter with Schiff in his unpublished memoirs, Faith 
Seeking Understanding, (manuscript held in United Theological College, Bangalore (Thomas Papers, Box  38)), 11. 
See also George M. John,  Youth Council of Christian Action 1938-1954 (Madras: The Christian Institute for the 
Study of Religion and Society, 1972), 17. 
29 “Schiff’s own mixture of Anglo-Catholicism, Barthianism, and Marxism,” Thomas continued, “was interesting, 




Schiff pointed Thomas in the direction of ecumenical thinkers who sought to combine Marx and 
with neo-orthodox theology. In 1940-1, Thomas made a close study of socially progressive 
Reports of the Oxford Conference, the Tambaram Conference, and the Malvern conference, 
presided over by the (now) Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple. In a notebook preserved 
in Thomas archives, he also took careful notes on the writings of John Macmurray, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, and, at great length, Nicholas Berdyaev – the most important Orthodox theologian in 
the ecumenical ferment of the late 1930s.30 It is significant that no extensive notes on Marx’s 
own writings survive in Thomas’s records. Alongside accounts of his readings of ecumenical 
theologians in his archives, there is no mention of reading Marx’s works, though he later made 
reference in his memoirs to having devoted a portion of 1942 to the study of Capital.31 His 
concern, to judge both from archival records, his published writings, and his later testimony, was 
not with understanding or practicing Marxism “on its own terms.” Rather, from his first serious 
encounters with Marxism, his concern was to subtend Marx within a Christian theological 
framework.32 His primary interlocutors were those theologians who had sought to appraise Marx 
from a “Christian point of view.” 
 
                                                
me once that integration has to be worked out by every person in his own way.” (Faith Seeking, 54 ) This effort to 
Thomas’s own mind became the red thread of his early intellectual biography, which he later called, in the title of a 
collection of his early writings, an “ideological quest within Christian commitment.” 
30 The notebook, entitled “Christianity and the Science of History” is held in United Theological College, Bangalore 
(Thomas Papers, Box 2). 
31 Thomas, Faith Seeking, 16. 
32 The record gives little evidence that Marx without Christ was not an option Thomas openly weighed. This is not 
to say of course that he did not consider abandoning his faith. Thomas’s friend and fellow SCMer A. V. Thampy 
was one close associate in the NCYA who did eventually leave the fold, becoming an active organizer of 
Communist student federations in Tranvancore, Alleppey, and Cochin. 
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Up to a point, Thomas’s early intellectual biography folds into an account of the global 
“circulation” of theological ideas first propounded in the North Atlantic world. Debates between 
Gandhians and Marxists in the Indian SCM, for instance, may be viewed as one site of a global 
quarrel between liberal and neo-orthodox theological blocs that played out around the same time 
in the US, Europe, Britain, China, and Japan. Where Gandhian student Christians embraced 
theological liberalism to establish the continuity of Christ’s presence in Indian culture and Hindu 
spirituality, Marxists embraced neo-orthodoxy, asserting the radical discontinuity of existing 
social and cultural forms with the Kingdom of God. Where Gandhians were pacifist, Marxists 
were Christian realists, believing violent struggle to be a constitutive part of historical existence 
in a fallen world.33 Moreover, most of Thomas’s own early writings adopted a style of reading 
Marx “against the grain” learned directly from Macmurray, Niebuhr, Berdyaev and other 
ecumenical thinkers. Like his western counterparts, Thomas was preoccupied with the problem 
of “secularism” as the source code of modernity’s ills, and he read Marx as a symptom of the 
virus. Marx’s vision of class conflict, his concept of human equality, and his account of a coming 
communist society were for Thomas, as they were for Western theologians, secularized versions 
of Christian theological concepts of original sin, imago Dei, and the Kingdom of Heaven, 
respectively. His first two mature essays, published in the Madras Guardian in 1941 and 1942, 
respectively, held up Nicholas Berdyaev as the disabuser of first Gandhi then Marx: Gandhian 
non-violence, premised on an assumption of the “inherent goodness of man,” Thomas found 
wanting before Berdyaev’s grasp of “the tragic depths of man and society,”34 while Thomas 
                                                
33 For a summary of these orientations, see George, chpts 2-4. 
34 Thomas, “Varna and Christianity,” Guardian, March 5 1942 and “Democracy Must Conquer itself,” Guardian, 
May 7, 1942. Excerpts from both essays are printed under the title “Gandhi, Marx, and Nicolas [sic] Berdyaev’s 
Neo-Orthodox Critique of Modern Civilization,” in an anthology of Thomas’s younger writings, Ideological Quest 
Within Christian Commitment (Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1983), 39-60. 
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followed Berdyaev in endorsing the “social truth” of Marx while exposing his “spiritual error.”35 
“The Human Person,” which Thomas published in the Indian SCM publication Student Outlook 
in 1944, reiterated a narrative of western civilization’s de-Christianization – embodied in its 
myth of an eschatological “end of history” through progress, proletarian revolution, or racial 
utopia, that was commonplace in North Atlantic theological literature.36 “A Social Manifesto for 
the Church,” authored mostly by Thomas in 1941 and adopted by the Mar Thomite Student’s 
Conference in 1943, was largely pastiche, weaving quotations from the Oxford, Malvern, and 
Tambaram conferences.37 To the extent that student Christian groups in India organized 
themselves around a response to the worldwide crisis of secularism, they participated in a global 
ecumenical discourse whose concepts, as we have seen in chapters three and four, first emerged 
in the North Atlantic. 
 
But Thomas’s use of Marx differed from Europeans’. Niebuhr and Macmurray, though they at 
various points espoused class politics, never actively took part in the Communist Party. For his 
part Berdyaev was a target of the Party, having been imprisoned and then expelled from the 
USSR in 1922. Thomas, on the other hand, embraced political collaboration with Indian 
Communists as a live and appealing option. In the 1940s, Thomas’s brother Cheriyan moved into 
a Communist collective and Thomas himself applied for Party membership in 1943. His 
application was rejected when he refused to desist in his efforts to evangelize his comrades.38 He 
                                                
35 Ibid, 40-1. 
36 “The Human Person” Student Outlook, (Nov-Dec 1944), 31-47. 
37 “Social Manifesto of the Church, Guardian, May 21 1942, 8; also in Thomas, Ideological Quest, 62. 
38 For Thomas’s account of these events, see My Ecumenical Journey, 18-19. 
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emerged from that experience determined to contribute to the Communist cause on his own 
terms. In 1943, he formed a para-Communist Christian youth organization – the National 
Christian Youth Council; its goal, in the words of its charter, was to “to combine evangelism 
with social action,” on the basis of commitment to both “the Catholic Christian Faith and 
Marxian Scientific Socialism.”39 The NCYC collaborated with Communist student federations to 
demand constitutional reforms to the State Congress and protest the suppression of labor strikes 
by the State Dewan Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Iyer.40 This kind of direct anti-colonial action was 
largely unknown in Europe. European theologians denounced “imperialism” in theological 
terms; they interpreted it as an expression of original sin in the form of a prideful will to 
dominate. For Thomas, theological anti-colonialism was a guide to explicitly anti-colonial 
political praxis. Europeans denounced “imperialism” in the abstract as an expression of the 
original sin of pride; Thomas took to the streets. 
 
This difference in practice was also reflected in theoretical emphasis. Ecumenists in the West 
imagined themselves as spokespersons of church institutions which, however embattled in a 
secular age, were heir to a dominant position within their societies. The assumption of 
Christianity’s cultural capital was woven into ecumenical discourse in the West, even – indeed 
especially – among those neo-orthodox thinkers who found the fusion of Christ and culture 
anathema. By contrast, Christians in India were a minority, at times stained with suspicion by 
                                                
39 Thomas, “Catholic Christian Faith and Marxian Scientific Socialism” Ideological Quest, 75. For an account of the 
origins of the NCYA and the Youth Christian Council of Action, another Christian youth organization with which 
Thomas was involved and which organized political actions in Kerala, see George, Youth Christian Council of 
Action. 
40 “M. M. Thomas is organizing cells of Christian young men here to work side by side with the Communist 




their association with the occupying power. This peculiar status of the church within Indian 
society oriented Thomas’s theology from the very beginning around the need for cooperation of 
Christians with non-Christians in a struggle whose objectives were defined in secular terms.41 He 
thought of the church not as an institution that needed to vindicate its dominant position in 
society but as one institution among others – some religious, some not – in a political coalition 
seeking Indian independence. As the Social Manifesto that Thomas wrote for the Mar Thomite 
student conference put it: “The Church forms only a part of the community therefore, it should 
be the policy of the churches, wherever possible, to give their willing co-operation to and seek 
the co-operation of all men of goodwill, Christian or Non-Christian, in ethical and social action. 
The co-operation, here referred to, should be real, through shared responsibility in planning and 
execution.”42 [italics original] This idea of the church relation to other religious and secular 
groupings simply did not figure prominently in Western ecumenical discourse. Those neo-
orthodox voices in Europe and the US who championed a prophetic, socially marginal role for 
the church stressed the singularity of its witness and the exclusivity and finality of its truth; they 
had little to say about other religions at all, and generally scorn for “secular” organizations, 
parties, and movements. Those who welcomed a more socially dominant role for the church 
imagined it not as one player among many in civil society but the overarching, inclusive loyalty 
of all parties, nations, races, and classes. It was in the colonial world that the idea of a delimited 
social role for the church in a religiously pluralistic society was first articulated. And it emerged 
in the idea and practice of theological Marxism as Thomas advanced it. 
                                                
41 Indian Liberals stressed the need for this cooperation with non-Christians – other religious groups like Hindus and 
Muslims as well as secularists – too. Significantly, however, as we’ll see, it was Thomas and not any of India’s 
liberal theologians who ascended within the international movement. Thomas’s neo-orthodoxy and Communist 
commitments made him attractive to Geneva in a way that Gandhian liberals like K. K. Chandy and K. P. Philip 
never were. 




Thomas’s political mobilization of Marxian neo-orthodoxy in the context wartime India 
exemplifies what Shruti Kapila has called the “rupture” that defines the transmission of concepts 
across colonial divides.43 This rupture also emerged in Thomas’s interventions into international 
ecumenical discourse. In fact, what makes Thomas’s early intellectual development especially 
significant for our story is the way in which his appropriations of European theologians doubled 
back on the community from which they came, fundamentally challenging it. Marx furnished 
Thomas not only with a “political technique” for his participation in Indian politics; it also 
provided him with a new interpretation of ecumenical conversation itself and its entanglements 
with the political interests it sought to transcend.  
 
This critique, which formed the basis of Thomas’s subsequent efforts to revise the ecumenical 
project in the postwar period, emerged first in a short article, “The British SCM and the Indian 
Political Situation,” which marked Thomas’s first sustained effort to directly address a European 
audience. In the summer of 1942, shortly after the collapse of a series of negotiations to set the 
terms for the colony’s independence after the war, the Indian National Congress passed a 
resolution demanding immediate independence in return for Indian support of the British war 
effort. British authorities reacted swiftly to the so-called “Quit India” resolution, repressing a 
wave of popular protests and jailing the Congress leadership, including Gandhi. Early the 
following year, Augustine Ralla Ram, General Secretary of the India SCM, cabled his 
counterpart in Britain, Rev. William Greer, requesting the British SCM to lobby for Gandhi’s 
release. One result of this exchange was a “questionnaire” issued in April 1943 to its counterpart 
                                                
43 Shruti Kapila, “Global Intellectual History and the Indian Political,” Rethinking Modern European Intellectual 
History. eds. McMahon, Darrin M. and Moyn, Samuel. (Oxford University Press, New York, 2014), 254-74. 
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on the subcontinent, “so that you may understand our hesitations and by your answers [to help 
us] see more clearly.”44 The questionnaire probed Indian opinion on three points: whether 
Hinduism provided an adequate basis of “progressive government” in an independent India; 
whether the withdrawal of the British would lead to civil war, and whether “the one party nature 
of the Congress machine” would make the development of “democratic government” unlikely. 
Virtually all responses worked to correct what the Indians characterized generously as British 
“misunderstandings” of politics. The tenor was cooperative, but by the time the conversation 
drew to a close in 1945, the opportunity for action on the part of the British SCM had long 
passed. But both sides agreed that it had been, in the words of Ralla Ram, an “epoch-making” 
exchange that extended the ecumenical unity into the realm of “political judgments.”45 Highlights 
were published in the Federation’s “Thinking Ahead as Christians” series in the Student World 
and a separate booklet put out by the SCM press.46 
 
Thomas had a less charitable approach to the exchange. His reply, “The British SCM and the 
Indian Political Situation,” published in the Madras Guardian in May 1943 focused on the 
questionnaire’s first prompt, which inquired into Indian Christians’ views of Gandhian non-
violence and claimed that the pacifist ideology “remains influential in the country and the 
Congress Party.”47 Although the British SCM acknowledged pacifism among its members, “as a 
political policy,” “many of us regard [pacifism] as an illusion dangerous to the order and peace 
                                                
44 Deadlock in India eds. William Greer and Augustine Ralla Ram (London: SCM Press, 1946), 6. 
45 Ibid, 8. 
46 “Thinking Ahead as Christians,” Student World (3rd Quarter, 1944), 233-5. Deadlock in India (London: SCM 
Press, 1946). 
47 Thomas, Guardian Dec 16 1943, 6. 
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of a fallen world.”48 Thomas’s reply began with an emphatic endorsement of the majority British 
opinion that non-violence, as “a political policy,” was essentially non-Christian. It had its origins 
in a “Hindu conception of the divinity of man,” which countered the doctrine of original sin and 
denied “the contradiction between Law and Grace,” seeing “no essential conflict between the 
two corresponding orders of the World and the Church.”49 “Pacifism as a political doctrine” was 
Pelagianism, pure and simple. But that was not the real issue.   
 
The real issue was the British SCMs “blindness to political facts.” Gandhian non-violence was 
not the pervasive ideology of the Congress that the questionnaire insinuated it was. Echoing 
other Indian responses, Thomas explained that the Congress had repeatedly asserted its readiness 
to use force in the political arena – beginning with its promise to aid the Allies in the fight 
against fascism. But Thomas’s reply then took a novel turn. In the assumption that the Indian 
political leadership was all pacifist, the British SCM had become a conduit of imperial 
“propaganda” to discredit the Indian demand for Independence. “It does not require so acute a 
capacity of analysis to show that the Britisher’s blindness to the real facts of the Indian situation, 
whether conscious as in Amery and Co. or unconscious as in the British SCM hides a real 
imperialistic unwillingness to part with power.”  
 
In Thomas’s view the questionnaire took part in an ideological project to shape Indian 
consciousness in conformity with the political and economic interests of British capitalism. The 
questionnaire, Thomas wrote, left “a tragic feeling of unhappiness at the thought that the British 
                                                
48 M. M. Thomas “British SCM and the Indian Political Situation” Ideological Quest, 78 
49 Ibid, 79. 
 
 376 
SCM has not thought it sacrilege to invoke the name of a Christian Movement to give a halo of 
supranational disinterestedness to the oft-repeated die-hard imperialist’s question whether we 
Indians have the capacity to govern ourselves.”50 Thomas here linked his theological critique of 
Gandhism with an ideological critique of the British SCM. Both, he wrote, were blind to the 
movements of original sin, expressed in Gandhism in the form of a belief in the perfectibility of 
man and in the questionnaire in the presumption of an impartial conversation about political 
questions. This was a fundamentally new way of combining Marx and neo-orthodoxy; rather 
than incorporating Marxian insights into a neo-orthodox framework, Thomas proposed a more 
dialectical relation between the two in which both systems undid one another’s presumptions to 
finality. It was one thing to accept the theological proposition that man was a sinner and power-
politics a necessary tragedy; these views were the common stuff of European and North 
American ecumenical pronouncement. It was quite another to expose, concretely, the political 
interests served precisely in the ecumenical effort to establish a supra-political community based 
on common faith and theological outlook.  
 
Yet for Thomas the point of this exercise was not to discredit the British SCM. Exposing the 
political program enshrined in the British questionnaire, Thomas wrote, was an exercise no less 
Christian for being Marxist: “the Christian conception of man states that all human values are not 
only imperfect but also perverted by human pride, that there is no absolute disinterestedness in 
the world; that all doctrines and questionnaires, ideas and ideals, programmes and moralities of 
man are ideology. Christianity is quite in agreement with the Marxist conception of ideology; 
                                                
50 Ibid, 84. 
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only the concept should be enlarged to include all who are in the world, including Marxists and 
Christians.”51 
 
Insofar as intra-Christian conversation was “ideological” it could not be “ecumenical.” It 
expressed human passions – the passion for power – instead of the divine love that constituted 
the fellowship of the church. As Thomas saw it, ideological critique served an explicitly 
ecumenical function in that it pointed to the obstacles remaining in the way of the movement’s 
project of building an international Christian community transcending politics. For him, the path 
upward toward the perspective of eternity must be taken with one’s eyes fixed downward, on the 
material, ideological, and political interests that kept the Christian as much as anyone tethered to 
earth. The unveiling of ideology in theological conversation served a dialectical purpose, 
revealing the source of Christian unity in a power beyond human control. “The word of 
reconciliation is not in us,” Thomas concluded, “but must come from the Order of Grace, where 
in greater response to the divine reconciliation given in Christ, we may more fully overcome the 
perversity of our partial values, that we may find ourselves growing in the realization of the 
oneness of the Catholic Church, the elect nation wherein alone is realized the destiny of the 
world.”52 
 
Thomas’s reconciliation of Marx and neo-orthodox theology drew much from European thinkers, 
but it broke new ground. The political conflict between colonized and colonizer Christians was 
not to be bracketed as an obstacle to Christian unity but understood within an economy of grace 
                                                
51 Ibid, 84. 
52 Ibid, 84. 
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working to uncover the source of a deeper Christian fellowship. This paradoxical position – 
which acknowledged the depth of intra-Christian conflict only to show the way beyond it – helps 
to explain what made Thomas’s thinking so important to the North Atlantic leadership of the 
Federation in the postwar period. As the Cold War threatened ecumenical unity, Thomas’s 
strategy for domesticating political oppositions within the oikoumene found an international 
audience at the highest levels.  
*** 
Thomas’s “The British Questionnaire” elicited relatively little attention in 1943. It was not 
included among the selections of the British-Indian exchange published in the “Thinking Ahead 
as Christians” series in the Student World. Nor, in fact, were any of Thomas’s writings published 
outside of India during the War. Considering Thomas’s obscurity on the international level, it 
may seem strange that, in 1946, he should have been chosen to join the WSCF staff in Geneva at 
all. But the Federation’s postwar “discovery” of Thomas makes sense when viewed in relation to 
the new geopolitical configuration of the postwar period. Thomas became an Asian of interest to 
the Federation as the very question that had preoccupied him in the war years – in particular, 
relation between Communism and ecumenical unity – moved to the center of the Federation’s 
international agenda, in particular, its efforts to promote a common approach to Cold War 
politics.  
 
In 1945, T. Z. Koo, the long-serving Asian Secretary of the World Student Christian Federation, 
announced his retirement. When it met in the summer of 1946, the Federation’s Executive 
Committee decided to offer Thomas a staff position as Koo’s effective replacement. In his letter 
to Thomas inviting him aboard, Robert Mackie explained that the Committee was eager “to have, 
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working from our headquarters here in Europe, some leader from an Asian country.”53 In general, 
the decision to appoint Thomas is unclear and negotiations between British authorities and the 
INC in 1946 may well have convinced the committee that Koo’s Asian replacement ought to be 
an Indian.54 But one clue to Thomas’s appeal comes from the first article published with his 
name in the byline in the Student World, in the summer of 1946. Co-written with his friend, 
Malcolm Adesisiah – a fellow Indian Marxist and Secretary of the Madras SCM – the article, 
“The Social Revolution India,” placed the Indian situation in the context of the debate over 
Christianity and Communism. Communism, the article claimed, was a “sane” guide to Indian 
politics: it provided a theoretical apparatus which placed the Indian struggle in international 
terms and framed the essential issues in terms of universal social justice, while the Communist 
party exemplified an approach to Indian independence that balanced the national cause with 
international consciousness. Communism, the authors concluded, was Christian “realism” in 
action in Asia – though they stressed that cooperation with the Communists in politics in no way 
meant tolerance for their atheism.55 
 
Regardless of how many student Christian leaders agreed with their contention that Communist 
politics was Christian politics in colonial India, the article succeeded in inserting the Indian case 
                                                
53 Robert Mackie/M. M. Thomas, August 28, 1946. (WCC, 213.13.145) 
54 We might see the Federation’s move – as Thomas himself did in his memoirs – as an effort to stay ahead of the 
curve of decolonization, ensuring that nationalities poised to gain greater autonomy from European nations would be 
represented in international Christian organizations. The point is valid, as far as it goes. The YMCA and YWCA, as 
well as the International Student Service – an outgrowth of the WSCF – had recently hired additional Asian staff. 
Ecumenists shied away from political challenges to European empires, but they responded to their retreat by making 
the accommodations necessary to ensure Christianity would have a future in newly independent nations. The 
negotiations between British authorities and the INC in 1946 may well have convinced the committee that Koo’s 
Asian replacement ought to be an Indian. But that consideration alone does not explain why Thomas in particular, of 
all possible all Indian candidates, was chosen.  
55 Malcolm Adesisiah and M. M. Thomas, “Social Revolution in India,” Student World (3rd Quarter, 1946), 223-35. 
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study into the Federation’s dominant network of questions – about Christian political 
responsibility, about Communism and “revolution,” and about the Federation’s role in a 
geopolitical context defined by ideological rivalry. After receiving Thomas’s acceptance of a 
WSCF position, Mackie wrote to C. P. Ramaswamy Iyer that Thomas would be of great service 
“in the task of creating a sense of fellowship and solidarity between the students of East and 
West. Out of a number of names which have been suggested to us that of Mr. Thomas has been 
chosen because of his peculiar fitness for the task.”56 What made him “peculiarly fit” for 
ecumenical work was his ability to bridge two “East-West” oppositions, showing how the 
political situation in India related to parallel divide of the Cold War. Before the East-West 
tension even became the “Cold War,” Thomas demonstrated that it was a global phenomenon. 
 
III. Thomas in the Federation: Making the Personal Political 
When Thomas arrived in Geneva in February of 1947, he was asked by Robert Mackie to outline 
how he might best serve the Federation. Noting his experience in India as an organizer of 
movements “in Christian political action” and in the “evangelization of the more ethically 
conscious participants of consciously atheistic and secular movements,” Thomas wrote, “I shall 
be thankful if I am allowed to pull my weight in the Political Commission of the Federation.” He 
then noted the Federation’s ginger relations with the IUS and the WFDY, which raised, he 
believed, questions at the core of the Commission’s work:  
 
The question of the relation between the Federation and the two new world Movements, 
the I.U.S. and the W.F.D.Y. was discussed by the General Committee at its last 
meeting… [This question] raises the whole problem of Christianity and politics in the 
university community… [since] the theological implications of such co-operation and 
participation remain rather vague still. The Political Commission has to set itself the task 
                                                
56 Mackie/Iyer, Oct [undated, likely 1st], 1941 (WCC, 213.13.145) 
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of answering some questions like the following: …What are the aims of Christians 
participating in these Movements – to achieve a natural end or to proclaim the Gospel?... 
Are we right in pursuing a common natural end without being able effectively to 
proclaim the word of God’s judgment and redemption of all nature? Or to attempt to 
evangelise to the detriment of the unity necessary for the realization of the natural end? 
How may we keep up this tension?57 
 
Thomas defined the Commission’s task. It was, first, to examine the bases of efforts by 
organizations like the IUS and WFDY to unite students and youth on the “natural plane” in 
relation to “natural ends,” that is, the achievement of concrete political objectives. What did it 
mean for students to unite around “democracy” and “anti-fascism,” and how could they do so 
while fulfilling their responsibility to evangelize? The evangelical imperative threatened to limit 
the possibilities of non-Christian contact; the imperative for political cooperation risked 
forfeiting the responsibility to “proclaim the Gospel.” But the Christian had to live between these 
two possibilities, maintaining a constructive tension between them. 
 
Framing the issue in this way, Thomas highlighted his own skill for the task: his work in India 
had combined cooperation with “atheistic and secular” movements and evangelization of their 
members. And he proceeded to indicate explicitly the procedure by which the creative tension of 
these two imperatives could be maintained. Immediately following the lines quoted above, 
Thomas continued: 
 
It is necessary to see whether we of the Federation are harping on the theological 
difference out of a political fear, and in this connection, though we know the Federation 
owes its life to an act of God beyond politics, it would only be a recognition of the fact of 
sin, to be suspicious of oneself and examine whether the Federation itself is allied with 
any group of material and political interests.58 
 
                                                
57 Thomas/Mackie, February 27, 1947 (WCC, 213.13.125) 
58 Thomas/Mackie,  February 27, 1947 (WCC, 213.13.125) 
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The constructive “tension” between evangelistic and natural objectives was to be achieved, 
Thomas contended here, through an ecumenics of suspicion. Working toward an inclusive, 
“ecumenical” politics entailed first interrogating the political and economic interests that 
conditioned the ecumenical community’s thought and action. For Thomas, to be “suspicious of 
one’s self” as a member of the Christian community meant to expose the political entanglements 
of institutional ecumenism: the “alliance of the Federation with a group of material and political 
interests.” Such expressions of suspicion would affirm the student Christian community’s unity 
in faith around a doctrine of original sin that prevented a perfectly transcendent political praxis. 
In effect, Thomas’s proposal was to turn the extant approach of the Political Commission inside 
out: rather than try to produce a political consensus, his strategy was to excavate and include the 
variety of political alternatives at play within the movement, and, by doing so, make them the 
recognized objects of debate. Rather than conceiving the Federation as a body that might first 
settle on a principle for guiding Christians’ political activities, Thomas envisioned a body whose 
objective entanglement with geopolitical interests undermined its stated ambition to be a 
universal community. 
 
Thomas’s call for an ecumenics of suspicion was, at first, neither welcome nor well understood 
among the Federation staff. Philippe Maury, who was overseeing the work of the Political 
Commission when Thomas arrived and who imagined himself as a leading architect of the 
Federation’s thinking on politics, replied to his new colleague’s vision with some confusion: “I 
don’t see clearly what you mean when you say ‘to be suspicious of oneself and examine whether 
the Federation itself is allied with any group of material and political interests.’ If we have to be 
very careful we have also not to be afraid of the devil, and in a way to take our stand on the 
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ground of our faith and without bothering about what it would look like; if the Communists are 
happy, all right; if the reactionaries are happy, all right also. I take care to be faithful to Jesus 
Christ and not to support the point of view of anybody.”59 Behind Maury’s rebuke was an 
understanding of Christian political responsibility that he developed in articles in the Student 
World and in internal memos to the Federation staff. Maury claimed that his approach was an 
application of lessons he had learned while serving in the French Resistance to the postwar 
situation. In this view, the aim of the Christian in politics was to protect a space within the social 
order in which the freedom of the church could be preserved from state interference. Challenges 
to the existing social order were permissible only under circumstances in which that order 
threatened the freedom of Christians to live a life of spontaneous obedience to Christ; otherwise, 
the state’s divine commission was to preserve a minimum of order, holding back a pull toward 
chaos that was the ineluctable consequence of original sin. The purpose of politics was to create 
the institutional and legal frameworks that would direct attention beyond them, to man’s destiny 
in eternity. 
 
In an article in the spring 1945 issue of Student World, for instance, Maury sketched out a 
political ethics that assailed all political systems – including parliamentary democracy, socialism, 
and liberalism – in the name of what he called a higher Christian “realism.”60 Commitment to 
one political form or another, Maury argued, must be casuistic, guided by a calculation of 
whether it was likely preserve a space for Christians to obey a divine authority which not only 
transcended worldly authorities but which stood in permanent, eschatological tension all worldly 
                                                
59 Ph. Maury/Thomas March 19, 1947 213.13.162. 
60 Ph. Maury, “The Political Realism of a Christian,” Student World (4th Quarter 1945), 295-301. 
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authorities. The experience of the War completed a disillusionment with political ideologies that 
had begun in the 1930s. This stance toward political form (and reform) was not, of course, 
shared by all western theologians. It stood at the extreme Barthian end of the spectrum of 
positions embraced within the movement, and many SCM leaders – including Ronald Preston, 
discussed below – embraced a more optimistic, Niebuhrian appraisal of the capability of the 
state, whose role was not only to ward off social chaos but promote a more positive “democratic” 
program that would struggle to bring social conditions toward the ideals of human equality 
inscribed in the Kingdom of God, even if a final realization of these was impossible under 
conditions of the fallen world.  
 
Significantly, Maury first identified Thomas as a theological ally against Niebuhrians, appraising 
from Thomas’s letter to Mackie and his article in the Student World a hard-core neo-orthodox 
thinker who asserted radical discontinuity between the order of grace and social order. We are 
starting, he wrote to Thomas, “on similar theological bases – similar, it seems to me, if not 
identical.”61 This made it perplexing to Maury that “we reach totally different practical 
positions.” In a series exchanges between March and May of 1947, Thomas argued that, viewed 
from the standpoint of a colonized people, Maury’s approach denied precisely the freedom of the 
church it sought to protect. For Thomas, the problem with Maury’s approach to religious 
freedom was that it did not really ensure the “freedom” of the church at all. “When I speak of 
religious freedom I mean something more than a legal freedom of religion,” he explained. 
“Religious freedom should be defined as the right of the Church not only legally but really to be 
beyond the political and economic orders; and at the same time to be in the political and 
                                                
61 Ph Maury/Thomas March 14, 1947 (WCC, 213.13.162). 
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economic orders.” Transcendence was a matter of practice. It was the church’s prophetic 
capacity, not its legal protection, that vouchsafed Christian freedom. “If I accept your proposition 
that in our political choice I must choose that State which helps the missionary and evangelistic 
movements most in India, I have to keep supporting British power in India, though I know that 
Indian nationalism alone can bring that order which will mean tolerable living conditions to the 
peoples of India.”62 In the colonial context, legal protections of religious liberty served too much 
the interests of state power to be credibly in the interest of the church as well. Paradoxically, 
legal religious liberty in these contexts marked the servitude of the church, its imprisonment 
within political ideology. 
The question is whether the Church is allowed to maintain by the State and the economic 
order a reality beyond itself; and whether the tension is reality. This determines to my 
mind whether a society is totalitarian or not in the religious sense. There are states which 
give religious freedom legally but where we find that the churches are either satisfied 
with taking a place as the Department of State without any tension with the state, or by 
being under the state as conscious of unconscious agents of the State. When the Church 
becomes a political instrument for the American ideology or of the Russian ideology I 
cannot think that the Church maintains religious freedom.63 
 
For Thomas it was essential to distinguish one’s “theological” and “political” loyalties. “You 
seem to think that a theological fight means also a political fight,” Thomas wrote to Maury. An 
opposition to Communism on theological grounds was not only justifiable but necessary, insofar 
as “Communism” constituted a set of claims about the ultimate nature and destiny of humankind 
that were at odds with Christianity, which foreclosed the horizon to transcendence and the 
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63 Thomas/Ph. Maury, Apr 2, 1947, 2-3 (WCC, 213.13.1620) 
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“personal responsibility” of humankind before its creator. To endorse a “political” struggle 
against Communism, however, one had to define the specifically “political” alternative one was 
struggling for. “If you want to fight communism politically you have to do it in the name of 
another political end: you can do so only in the name of individualism today and you have to 
justify it politically.” In trying to justify this fight theologically, Maury was making a category 
mistake. It was not the teachings of Christ but Maury’s “Anglo-Saxon ideology… of 
individualism” which was the real and unacknowledged basis of his political opposition to 
Communism. To mobilize the ecumenical community around such an ideology was to forfeit its 
obedience to Christ in the name of serving a “power bloc.” Without a clear distinction between 
the political fight and the theological fight against Communism, “true ecumenism,” Thomas 
feared, would vanish. Were Maury’s political ethic to prevail in the ecumenical movement, “I 
have my fear that [the World Council and the Federation] may become a power-show against 
communism; based not on the gratitude for the redemption of God but the fear of losing political 
power.”64  
 
As Maury and Thomas debated the relation between evangelism and politics, they also 
exchanged letters pertaining to the practical activities of the Political Commission. Maury’s 
presence in New Haven, as well as his frequent visits to SCM groups across North and South 
America, made coordinating the Commission’s work a complicated feat of trans-Atlantic 
communication. Thomas, in closer personal contact with Mackie and the rest of the Federation 
staff, began to assume a greater role both in directing the day-to-day work of the Commission 
and in defining its intellectual foundations. Thomas acquired new authority as a consequence of 
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Maury’s absence, but the fact that the Federation staff allowed this to happen spoke to their 
willingness to give Thomas latitude in shaping the Commission work.  
 
One way Thomas exerted his influence was in the development of a strategy for “sharing of 
information” on topics of political concern among SCMs.65 The General Assembly had 
mandated that the Federation serve as a conduit for the circulation of news items and political 
analysis but left open the mechanisms it would employ to do so. At a meeting in March 1946, 
shortly after the Truman Administration had announced its decision to aid the governments of 
Greece and Turkey to contain Communist advances in Eastern Europe, the Federation met in 
Geneva to discuss this aspect of the Commission’s work. Mackie and the rest of the staff had 
initially had the idea of asking a member of the Greek SCM to write an analysis of the situation. 
But this raised difficulties: with Greece in the middle of a civil war between pro- and anti-
Communist groups, the Greek SCM itself, noted Francis House, a Federation staffer who had 
recently visited the region, comprised starkly divided positions: “It would be very difficult to get 
true facts about Greece from Greece itself in the present situation—because… passion rules both 
sides. It would be unwise to ask anybody to write on this.” In view of the likelihood that any 
contribution from Greece would be hopelessly partisan, Thomas suggested an alternative 
approach: getting various student leaders from outside of Greece who stood on different sides of 
the issue to contribute their own reactions to the Truman Administration’s actions. Rather than 
seeking a single “authoritative” interpretation of the situation in Greece, in other words, the 
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Commission would initiate a “Federation-wide discussion,” that would represent different points 
of view on an issue which, Thomas observed, “sharply divided the Federation.”66  
 
The episode illustrates how Cold War polarization created room for Thomas to shape the terms 
of ecumenical conversation toward a model of intra-Christian debate that had emerged first in the 
Indian context. In a world where “true facts” on political situations were elusive, accommodating 
ecumenical conversation to intra-Christian political conflicts – the achievement of Thomas’s 
early work in the British-Indian SCM discussions in colonized India – seemed like the best way 
forward for the movement as a whole.  
 
In April of 1947, Thomas, with Mackie’s support, worked to organize this political conversation. 
In mid April he wrote to Ronald Preston, who had taken over from Greer the chairmanship of the 
British SCM in 1945, asking Preston to produce “a long letter giving your reactions to the 
present American foreign [policy] revealed in the decision to aid Greece, and to the implications 
of that policy in the European and Asiatic world.”67 Thomas, however, took the prerogative of 
the first salvo. No sooner had he requested Preston’s statement than he launched into his own 
take on the decision to aid Greece and Turkey and the disastrous effects he believed it was 
already having on the cause of ecumenical unity. “I am very much frightened at people making 
Anti-Communism the norm of their politics,” he wrote. As American Protestants like Reinhold 
Niebuhr and John Foster Dulles lined up in support of the campaign to block Russian influence 
in Eastern Europe, they threatened to collapse the ecumenical church into a political power bloc. 
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Thomas, who had recently met Niebuhr and delivered a sharp critique of his draft essay for the 
WCC Amsterdam study volume series, opened the vents of his frustration with Niebuhr and 
other American churchmen in his letter to Preston.  
 
John Foster Dulles[‘s] statement makes it very clear... what the New American Century is 
going to mean for the Asiatic freedom movements. He has gone all out against them 
saying they are ‘communist inspired!’… The tragedy to my mind lies in the fact that the 
Church in America seems to be so fully behind the State Department… [T]he theologians 
are all out for anti-communism with a little criticism of America at the tail end. They 
have all ceased to be prophets in my mind... The other day at Bossey I met Reinhold 
Niebuhr to whom I owe a lot of my theology of politics. Hence I felt that he had betrayed 
me personally. He is going about sent by the State Dept justifying the ways of the New 
America to man. I had to challenge him to think out… his politics in relation to the 
Asiatic freedom movements, which he had not done. I do not think he had ever done that. 
It is true of most of these Christian thinkers…. When Dulles says that the best way to 
fight Russia is to fill the Churches and be armed to the teeth, I wonder what that concern 
for church means.68  
 
Thomas’s point here was similar to the one he had made to Maury: in the US, Christian 
enthusiasm for the campaign against the Soviet Union had erased any tension between the 
perceived ends of the church and the political aims of the state. Totalitarianism was equally 
present in the East and the West. But the tone of the letter – “passionate,” as Thomas put it at the 
end – was distinct from the more stayed exchange with Maury. Attacking Niebuhr and Dulles, 
Thomas spoke not of the deficiencies of their theology but of their political decisions. These 
were acts of personal betrayal: for Thomas politics was personal. 
 
“You talk very wildly about R. Niebuhr,” Preston wrote in his reply to Thomas. To say he was 
sent by the State Department was, in Preston’s words, “hysterical nonsense.” Preston also 
announced his full support for the decision to aid Greece and Turkey, surmising that the majority 
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of British Christian student opinion was behind him.69 The line Thomas took failed to understand 
the realities of “power politics.” “If India is weak and divided on its own Russia moves in unless 
Britain keeps control of the Indian Ocean (or the USA). In China sooner or later the USA will be 
forced to take more drastic steps or let Russia in. This is not to say that Asiatic freedom 
movements are Communist inspired, but that the word ‘freedom’ can be very sentimentally 
used.” Playing power politics on the international level was necessary in order to preserve the 
prospects for “social democracy,” “the fine flower of the western tradition…. To be striven for 
mightily.” In contrast to Maury’s political agnosticism, Preston forthrightly declared his political 
allegiances in his defense of democracy as a form of government in line with the moral precepts 
of Christianity. But he acknowledged that his position applied more to Europe than to Asia. “The 
moral values associated with Russian power may well be more suited to the historical situation 
of some countries – China? E. Europe?” “The point is,” that Communism was “a false God for 
the west.” Preserving what remained of Christian civilization in the form of social democracy 
required keeping Russian encroachment at bay.  
 
Thomas’s long response to Preston amounted to an attack on the latter’s attempt to bracket the 
Asian case – to apply to power political calculation narrowly within the parameters of 
superpower conflict. The problem was not that he – Thomas – was being insufficiently realist  
(“I do not think, Ronald, that there is any necessity to tell a citizen of a subject nation like India 
that there is no other politics than power politics”); it was that Preston was being insufficiently 
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“ecumenical” in his outlook. “It is all right for you to uphold one side of power-politics, but if 
you want also to exploit the ecumenical movement for your power-politics than certainly to my 
mind it is the death of true ecumenism. True ecumenism to my mind depends upon whether the 
Church knows enough of the power of the pardon of God to deny power-politics, at least to such 
an extent, that it is able to unite within it people playing and supporting different power 
politics.”70 Preston could not be “ecumenical” in his Christian faith and think only of European 
societies in his political calculations. What was at stake in ecumenicity was the right to introduce 
into the political conversation a different framing of the significance of the Truman doctrine – 
and the East-West struggle generally. Thomas went on to advance a framing of the issue that 
accounted for Asian independence movements. From that perspective, the conduct of the Soviet 
Union took on a much different cast: rather than the boogey of social democracy, Moscow’s 
vocal support for independence of subject peoples and its challenge to the Western powers and 
their empires in all parts of the globe made them a force for the very values that Preston was 
celebrating. “Russian power-politics is a force for Liberalism in world politics,” Thomas 
explained. “If we have to choose between power politics – as you and I believe we have to do – 
we in India choose the Soviet to the Anglo-American power. We believe that what you might 
call Soviet Imperialism means much more freedom for us in Asia than the Anglo-American so-
called democracy.”71  
 
Preston’s reply began by conceding, implicitly, Thomas’s central point: that an discussion about 
politics could not be, as he had put it, “truly ecumenical” without incorporating Thomas and his 
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shooting critique of “Anglo-Saxon so-called democracy.” “First of all,” Preston wrote, “may I 
say the most important thing: we are very anxious you should come to our annual staff Reading 
Party,” referring to an upcoming gathering for local chapters of the British SCM. The topic of 
conversation would the Marxist perspective a variety of theological themes, including the 
concept of the person and the Church’s role in international politics72 – “and your view would of 
course be very valuable for that,” Preston indicated. That same issue that had brought Thomas 
from India to Geneva – the international saliency of Marxism as a challenge to Western 
ecumenism – would bring him now to London, as a guest speaker to one of the largest and most 
internationally influential SCMs. Of course, the inclusion of Thomas was for the sake of 
continuing debate: Preston was not backing down on his critique of Thomas’s position; he went 
on in the letter to argue that Thomas’s support for Russian geopolitics actually collapsed the 
tension between power politics and normative ordering of society. “While I was talking about 
power and morals both being necessary, I notice you take up the first and ignore the second, and 
write about preferring Russian power politics; this is revealing, because Marxism repudiates the 
whole tension between power and morals which I think is vital.” It was one thing to expose 
European parochialism, but Thomas had yet to explain the positive connection between his 
support of Russia’s geopolitics and his Christian faith. His approach was at risk of “produc[ing] a 
Marxist political analysis plus a transcendent Christian faith which are in different dimensions 
and never meet.”73 Thomas made no direct reply to the charge at this point, but, as we’ll see, 
Preston had hit upon a critique that Thomas would take increasingly seriously after 1948, when 
the Prague coup and the resistance of the Communist Party in India to the post-Independence 
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government led him to reconsider whether the Soviet Union was indeed the best “political ally” 
against Western imperialism. 
 
In June 1947, after three rounds of exchanges, with the prospect of Thomas’s immanent visit to 
the UK, the correspondence drew to a close. Thomas and Preston began editing the letters in 
preparation for their publication and circulation to SCM groups as what would become the first 
of a series of “Federation dialogues.” “I ought to end this correspondence,” Thomas wrote in his 
last letter to Preston, “by asking you for your forgiveness for the lack of charity I revealed in our 
political discussion. I am sorry about it.” This was anything but a casual courtesy. For Thomas it 
was a theological statement central to his understanding of what an ecumenical conversation 
about politics was and how it served its function within the larger framework of Christian unity. 
Political argument required forgiveness because it was an enactment of sin, the conflict between 
rival points of view reflecting the fallen condition of humanity. A political conversation such as 
Thomas imagined always ended, if it went rightly, with contrition: before one’s neighbor and 
before God.  
 
By June 1947, Thomas had been in Geneva for five months and had succeeded in introducing 
political dialogue as a new institutional practice that would become the central feature of the 
Political Commissions work in the coming three years. In all, between 1947 and 1951, the 
Federation would produce ten such dialogues, based on exchanges and reflections from 
theologians, missionaries, and student youth Christian leaders from around the world, on topics 
ranging from Communism in China to Bulgarian politics to South African Apartheid. Some of 
these documents – like the Preston-Thomas exchange – were redacted versions of conversations 
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among Federation and SCM staff. On Maury’s suggestion, his exchange with Thomas was added 
to the series, as was a correspondence Thomas conducted in the Spring of 1947 with Kenrick 
Baker, an American missionary in Cairo, concerning Christian and Communist cooperation. 
Other circulated documents were single-author overviews of a political event or question: 
Malcolm Adesisiah, for instance, produced a report on the political situation in Bulgaria after a 
visit there on International Student Service business. Written as personal reflections rather than 
impartial briefings, these texts sought to accentuate and not efface the partial, engaged 
perspective of the author. As Maury later reflected on the positive feedback from SCMs who had 
received these statements: “it is obvious that most of the documents we publish in our Sharing 
information scheme tend automatically to become Dialogues which is I think the best sign of 
their usefulness and of the vitality and relevance of the P[olitical] C[ommission] as a whole.”74 
 
The emergence of this new institutional practice illustrated an intellectual shift. The Federation 
dialogues articulated a new way of thinking about ecumenical community and the modalities 
through which it would be realized. The shift emerged clearly in the brief statement appended to 
the cover page of Federation dialogues. It read in part: 
The Federation is primarily a personal community, and therefore personal dialogues are 
truer to its essential character than any other method for exchange of convictions on 
topics of vital concern, on which there are bound to be deep differences. The Political 
Commission has therefore decided to initiate Federation dialogues as a means of 
discussion of political convictions within the life of the Federation.75 
 
Previously interwar ecumenists had categorically distinguished personal from political relations: 
the one was constituted by competition between rival wills to power, the other enlivened and 
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touched by God’s presence. This distinction, however, collapses in the Federation dialogues. For 
the first time a major ecumenical organization in its official statements indicated it was precisely 
through debate and conflict between individuals with “deep differences” on political questions 
that personal relations between Christians – and contact with the divine – would be established. 
A theology of political debate would expose for all parties a deeper dimension of common faith. 
In the Federation Dialogues, the personal would become political. Thomas had not only outlined 
the parameters of how a conversation about politics should take place in the ecumenical 
community; he had also plotted a new understanding of the ecumenical project itself.  
*** 
I have emphasized thus far the reasons for the North Atlantic ecumenical elite’s promotion of 
Thomas to a position of intellectual leadership within the Federation. At the moment when 
conflicting political positions toward Communism threatened to divide the world Christian 
community, Thomas presented political conflict as the medium of the “personal relations” that 
constituted Christian understanding. If ecumenists could not reach a consensus on political 
questions, their debates could at least become the site of a new consciousness of the church, 
activated at the moment that Christians enacted their political disagreements. 
 
As Thomas provided the Federation with a new approach to politics, the course of world events 
in the late 1940s were transforming his own political orientation. Up until the end of 1947, 
Thomas remained committed to the Communist Party as an ally of Asian independence 
movements and the most promising anti-imperial force in geopolitics. As late as November of 
that year, he travelled to visit French and Czechoslovakian SCM chapters, in order, he wrote, to 
see how student Christians were “trying to face the realistic political issues of the relation 
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between communism and Christianity in a positive way.”76 He heralded the efforts of student 
Christians to reach the sort of constructive reconciliation of Communism and Christianity that he 
himself had worked out, believing that the “evangelistic aim” of the Federation depended on the 
emergence of a strong bloc of ecumenists committed to Communist politics.  
 
Beginning in 1948, however, he moved away from his commitment to Communist revolution. A 
number of factors contributed to this. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, a mere four 
months after Thomas had visited the country, and the decision of the Communist Party of India 
to oppose Nehru’s government after Independence were disillusioning experiences. Thomas did 
not publish any responses to these events, but they led him to question whether Communism was 
in fact the anti-imperial force that he had imagined it to be. He began to absorb Preston’s 
warning about the danger of a Communist politics that occluded all moral considerations in a 
realist calculus of power. Especially after the assassination of Gandhi on January 30, 1948, he 
revised his earlier, dismissive views of Gandhism: it now seemed to Thomas that non-violence 
offered Christians in India the best strategy for maintaining the tension between political 
participation and witness to the perfect love of Christ. But this was a least bad option. In a letter 
to Mackie written in early 1948 – one of his few explicit discussions of his political evolution at 
the time – he wrote that his year in Europe had left him “not really hopeful” about the political 
situation, in India or the world. 
…[e]specially since my coming to Europe has given me new perspectives to look at 
Indian nationalism. That coupled with the assassination of Gandhiji by Hindu fanaticism 
and the rejection by the Communist Party of India of their united front policy and their 
leadership of the people’s movement and their acceptance of war against the national 
government and complete alliance with Russia have led to a radical rethinking in me. So 
you may rest assured that I have been very open to the challenges that have to me in 
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Europe and this impact has been real, though of course I may not see entirely eye to eye 
with all of you… [due] to the international situation and its tensions… the Christian may 
have no option but to say No to all politics or to concern himself with such ineffective 
politics as Gandhism in which alone both the concerns for justice and charity can be 
combined in some small measure.77  
 
Thomas’s chastening took him down a path much different than the one travelled by so many 
Western intellectuals who turned from left radicalism to liberalism and conservatism in the years 
following 1945. To say he moved to the right is to flatten and misunderstand a far more 
interesting and significant development – one that makes sense only once we appreciate 
Thomas’s commitment to the ecumenical project of organizing, stimulating, and deepening the 
community of personal dialogue and encounter. His disillusionment with Communism did not 
express itself in any clearly defined new political program or allegiance to a new party. The 
CPI’s anti-Nehru stance and the Soviet action in Prague made him, he later wrote “appreciative 
of the insights of Liberal Democracy.” But we get little purchase on what is significant about 
Thomas’s evolution to the extent that we consider him after 1948 a “liberal democrat” – or a 
“Gandhian,” for that matter. What was significant was that no new, coherent ideological 
commitment replaced his early faith in Communism. His intellectual exertions, rather, focused 
increasingly around the problem of constructing a theological framework to accommodate and 
guide political debate within the Federation.  
 
In tracing this shift in the coming section, it is important again to follow the conjuncture of 
institutional practices and intellectual production. At the moment that Thomas’s political 
allegiances were unsettled, the Federation was preparing for the second meeting of its Central 
Committee since World War II, held in Whitby, Canada, in 1949. The bureaucratic imperatives 
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surrounding this event – the concrete tasks of organizing an agenda and producing reports – 
clarified dominant ecumenical ideas and in doing so concretized the locus of authority in the 
Federation. In this way the event itself clarified the triumph of Thomas’s framing of the Political 
Commission’s task. Three years before, at the Bossey conference in 1946, the challenge of 
formulating a Christian position on international communism had prompted the Federation’s 
decision to bring Thomas onto its staff. There he had remained, throughout 1947, a self-styled 
critic, a voice from the margin of a Western-dominated ecumenical movement. At Whitby, he 
was thrust into a different role. On the first day, the Central Committee voted to appoint Thomas 
alongside Davis McCaughey, a young British theologian, as co-secretaries of Section III, 
devoted to a discussion of the SCMs and political concerns. Over the next week, Thomas took 
the lead in drafting the Section’s report on this theme, and later turning this report into a 
Federation “Grey Book,” a study guide circulated to SCM chapters around the world as a 
framework and basis for conversation and debate. No longer at the margins, Thomas would at 
Whitby assume the role of leading architect of a terminology on which political conversation 
would be carried out on the international level within the Federation. 
 
IV. “A Common Approach to the World Struggle” – and its Price 
Before examining this episode in Thomas’s career it is worth summarizing where we have come 
thus far. Marx informed Thomas’s view of the ecumenical community from the vantage point of 
colonial India. Marxian ideological critique gave Thomas a set of critical resources for exposing 
the unfinished business of the ecumenical movement’s efforts to transcend politics in their 
witness to a Lord whose kingdom was not of this world. Guided by Marx the Indian/Asian 
perspective, he found power politics – the struggle for power between nations, states, and 
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peoples and economic groups and classes – present, though unacknowledged, and largely 
invisible from a western point of view, in the activities and utterances of the church. Thomas’s 
critical contributions along these lines were welcomed – or at very least, not easily dismissible – 
by western ecumenists because they offered a solution to a crisis of ecumenical identity: Thomas 
showed political conflicts within the North Atlantic community over Communism, could be 
reinterpreted, not as threats to ecumenical unity but as steps toward its fulfillment. Marxian 
categories such as “ideology” deployed within the framework of a neo-orthodox theology 
provided a strategy of domesticating political conflict within the oikoumene.  
 
The Federation Dialogues series provided the clearest expression of how Thomas’s theology 
would work as a method of organizing and conceptualizing political debate within the student 
Christian community. But the Dialogues also raised a question. Could the ecumenical movement 
move beyond critical self-awareness of the political conflicts it contained toward a consensus 
among Christians around political aims? Thomas himself had raised this issue in his letter to 
Mackie shortly after arriving in the Federation, when he asked whether it would be possible for 
the SCMs to discover a source of unity on the “natural plane.” Having called for and practiced an 
ecumenics of suspicion as a preliminary step toward the achievement of this goal until 1948, 
Thomas’s efforts after that year focused on positive construction over deconstruction of 
ecumenical consensus. Between 1949 and 1952, he devoted himself to articulating the basis of a 
Christian political praxis, grounded in an understanding of what was at stake for Christians, as 




The Christian in the World Struggle was the first fruit of this effort. Based largely on ideas 
Thomas first developed in an early draft of the Whitby report, it was revised and amended in the 
years that followed both by McCaughey and Thomas, drawing on input from Federation staff as 
well as numerous theologians and SCM members. “It can be said,” according to Philip Potter and 
Thomas Wieser in their history of the WSCF, that in the years between 1949 and 1951, the 
writing and production of the Thomas-McCaughey report “dominated the work… of the 
Federation.”78 In 1950, a study conference devoted exclusively to a consideration of the draft 
was held in Bièvres, outside Paris.  
 
The focus of this section is an analysis of the final form the document took. Though a delineation 
of Thomas and McCaughey’s individual contributions is possible on some points, the final 
product was a collaborative effort and individual authorship is difficult to distinguish. Both men 
expressed satisfaction with the final product.79 The congruence of their thinking marked the 
emergence of a new postcolonial ecumenical regime which sought to provincialize the West and 
turn to the political, economic, religious and social transformations of the Third World as the 
inspiration for a new ecumenical theology. It also marked the denouement of Thomas’s 
disillusionment with Communism, even as his writing remained reliant on Marxist categories 
and insisted on the need for ecumenists to enter the political struggle as “revolutionaries.” More 
important than its significance within Thomas’s trajectory, however, is the significance of this 
document in the history of the ecumenical project. In order to establish the political unity of 
Christians, the document repudiated the assumption on which interwar ecumenism was based, 
                                                
78 Philip Potter and Thomas Wieser, Seeking and Serving the Truth (London, SCM Press, 1997), 171. 
79 McCaughey/Bridston June 12, 1950 (WCC, 213.13.25). 
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namely, the idea of the church as a foundation and allegiance that would provide a foundation of 
social order. Instead the document advanced for the first time a vision of the church as a 
disruptive, revolutionary force, whose political effect was not to harmonize social relations but to 
transform them. 
 
That this work reflected Thomas’s disillusionment with politics was not obvious on first 
encounter with the text. Sounding revolutionary themes, it placed itself immediately in a socialist 
tradition of thought. “We are in the presence of a social revolution on an unprecedented, one 
might say, on a world scale,” the document announced in its opening gambit.80 Thinkers “from 
Saint-Simon to Stalin” had foretold the coming of this revolution, which the authors defined as 
the “rise submerged classes, nations, and races demanding not simply the amelioration of their 
lot, but participation in the total life of society.” Touching all areas of life – family structures, 
cultural production, and economic relations, as well as forms of government – the revolution also 
extended to all regions of the globe. Its effects were most evident in Eastern Europe, Asia, South 
America, and Africa, where revolution took the form of “a revolt against the enslaving 
penetration of a West European and North American world.” The West, too, was a theater of 
conflict, led by the “industrial working classes.” What defined these upheavals was the struggle 
on the part of oppressed groups for “power and responsibility which was previously denied 
them.”81 The Christian’s attitude toward this revolution was unambiguous. “Since power is 
essential to responsibility, the Christian welcomes this revolution.”82  
                                                
80 Thomas and McCaughey, The Christian in the World Struggle, 15.  
81 Ibid, 16. 




Evoking a revolutionary oikoumene, the text departed in fundamental ways from the interwar 
ecumenical thinking. Just to conceive of social change under the rubric of revolution was 
revolutionary: traditionally, ecumenists understood contemporary society as a site of “disorder” 
in which the rise of secularism had brought nations, races, and classes into conflict. Now Thomas 
and McCaughey were arguing that these conflicts did not express modern humanity’s 
abandonment of God but rather constituted sites of his providential action in the world. Further, 
while the older generation of western ecumenists had associated “personality” with 
“responsibility” – to God and to one’s fellow humans – Thomas and McCaughey took the novel 
step of insisting that there could be no “responsibility” without “power.” If the dignity of persons 
was achieved in and through revolutionary action, the church stood for a set of principles much 
different than interwar ecumenists had suspected. Religious liberty and social “order” would no 
longer do foundations of the good society. Prioritizing either left Christians with “too narrow a 
perspective,” for “it is the human race, and not just religious groups within it, which is the object 
of God’s love and judgment.”83 At the same time, not law and order as such but only specific 
laws that “minister to the human person” were defensible in their own right. “In a world where 
law is considered and used as an instrument of arbitrary power to the detriment of human 
personality, we render ourselves incapable of distinguishing between totalitarianism and 
democracy.”84 As an alternative either to religious liberty or “order,” Thomas offered a new 
locus of the Christian political concerns: “our concern,” they wrote, “is for social justice.”85  
                                                
83 Ibid, 12 
84 Ibid, 14. 




As much as it sought to insert the Federation into a political struggle, however, the document 
reiterated the ecumenical anathema of “politicizing” the church. Chasing every exhortation to 
political struggle was a warning against absolutizing political objectives. The Christian’s “yes” 
to the basic urge for justice dialectically entailed a “no” to the demonic elements present in all 
revolutionary movements, which tended to mistake their utopias for the Kingdom of God. 
Revolution, Thomas and McCaughey stated repeatedly, was not without risk. Because it “springs 
from an urge for power,” the revolution carried with it the possibility that power might become 
an end in itself.86  
 
In that vein of qualification, the document offered significant leeway for interpreting what 
“revolutionary action” might mean in particular national and local contexts. In some countries, it 
might take the form of resistance to the capitalist system or colonial government; in others, it 
might entail resistance to “totalitarian” government; elsewhere, it might mean working through 
parliamentary structures to promote progressive social reforms. These were decisions only the 
conscience of individual Christians could make. In this broad interpretation of revolution, the 
struggle might be violent here but not there; require cooperation with the Communists in China 
but necessitate opposing them Western Europe. 
 
Despite these variations, however, there was one class of political arrangements that most 
reliably ensured the preservation and flourishing of “personal” existence in the contemporary 
world. “Where social democracy is an alternative… the ‘yes’ which [student Christians] say to 
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the revolution can be expressed through the support of a genuinely revolutionary, but non-
totalitarian party.”87 Here Thomas’s “appreciation for Liberal Democracy” showed its face. He 
and McCaughey privileged “the political methods which we call democracy developed in 
Western Europe in a society which was at least subconsciously Christian.”88 Two features of 
“democratic procedures” and institutions were most valuable from a Christian point of view. 
First, the system gave “expression to the conviction that the State is a morally responsible 
entity.” Social democracies subordinated the power of the state, in principle, to the authority of 
law, itself responsible to the collective will of the people. Popular sovereignty ensured a space of 
debate and the liberty to criticize government, which reflected the Christian idea that “there is no 
finality in politics.”89 In endorsing “social democratic” procedures, the writers reiterated that 
they were not “necessarily advocating support of parties with the title Social Democrat; nor were 
they endorsing socialist democracy. Rather, they were advocating on theological principle 
“political techniques whereby power is checked by power” in an arrangement that allow for a 
“permanent revolution in society.”90 To be “permanent” the revolution must be controlled. 
 
Taken together, these qualifications may lead us to wonder whether Thomas, at the moment he 
attained the authority to frame the ecumenical conversation about politics, actually advanced a 
vision that differed substantively from the one which was imagined before he even arrived at the 
Federation, in the period when Maury had circulated his political questionnaire. In one crucial 
                                                
87 Ibid, 63. 
88 Ibid, 70. 
89 Ibid 74. Quoted from a statement of the British Council of Churches, “The Era of Atomic Power” (SCM Press, 
London, 1946), 36. 
90 Ibid, 63. 
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respect, the premise of the Political Commission’s work was the same as it had been before 
Thomas arrived: Christian faith entailed responsibilities in the political realm that could not be 
defined in political terms. Had Thomas’s disillusionment with political Communism landed him 
in a position different perhaps in emphasis, but essentially similar, to Maury’s political 
agnosticism?  
 
In its ultimate refusal of politics, The Christian in the World Struggle did indeed echo Maury, as 
well as the interwar tradition of ecumenical thinking more broadly. But it also marked a 
significant shift, not in the content of its theological claims but in its understanding of the 
broader role of the church in society. Maury, along with the older generation of ecumenical 
leaders, understood the church as the site of “true community,” where God’s will reigned as the 
logos of conversation, exchange, and cooperation among Christians from different churches and 
nations. By locating God in the technicalities of political action, Thomas and McCaughey had re-
enchanted a historical process playing out outside the church, in the secular realm. Still more, the 
text denied that God’s presence could be in the church absent the church’s involvement in that 
historical process of revolution. It was no longer in the actualization of the church per se but in 
the political activation of Christians that God’s will became visible within history. No longer the 
node of social order, the church comprised a group of social “outsiders” working to transform 
society from the margins. “The coincidence of youth and the intellectual classes in ‘outsider’ 
position is of the greatest interest to student Christian groups: it is what puts them… at the point 
of articulation, or of greatest self-consciousness, in the revolutionary ferment.”91  
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To be sure, Thomas and McCaughey insisted that a dialogue within the church was still 
necessary in order to “illuminate for members of different national movements their own 
political analyses and decisions.” But their account of contemporary church and society 
summoned a world in many ways closer to that of fin de siècle missionaries such as John Mott 
than interwar ecumenical champions like Joseph Oldham. What they understood under the rubric 
of “politics” resembled what pre-ecumenical Protestant missionaries had understood under the 
rubric of “religion.” In fact, Thomas and McCaughey made the comparison explicit. “In that our 
task is to help one another to receive the Gospel of judgment and mercy in our political lives, the 
technique of approach will not be unlike that of the missionary,” they wrote.92 A reference to one 
of the most prominent missionaries of the pre-1914 age in an earlier draft of the document 
revealed clearly the extent to which political ecumenism would drew on earlier missiological 
strategies. “A. G. Hogg,” Thomas wrote, “speaking about the Christian message to the Hindu 
says, ‘in the modes of presentation adopted there must always be challenging relevancy.”93 This 
search for the “challenging relevancy” of the gospel – the phrase was changed to “disturbing 
illumination” in the final draft – was the old missionary challenge of placing the stumbling block 
of Christ in the pathways of the religious thought and practice of non-Christians. In the mission 
fields of Asia and Africa the gospel had to be formulated in such a way as to both locate its 
recipient in the contemporary social, religious, cultural scene in which he or she found him or 
herself, and to dislocate him or her by providing a “message of judgment and redemption.” “The 
same thing might be said about our starting point in this political conversation.”94 Here the 
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94 Thomas and McCaughey, The Christian in the World Struggle, 5. 
 
 407 
language the gospel spoke was not that of Hindu religiosity but of political thought and practice. 
To enter the arena required mastering a political vocabulary of terms such as “’justice,’ 
‘personality,’ responsibility’” – “words,” Thomas and McCaughey wrote, “which already 
preoccupy many and form the basic slogans for all parties in the political struggle of our day.”95 
The semantic range of these terms, evinced in the contests over their meaning between rival 
political programs, were the fissures of secular consciousness which Christians would need to 
exploit. “However much we may regret the confusion introduced into language by giving 
contrary definitions to the same words, if the Christian wants to enter into the thick of the fight, 
with his understanding of the meaning and end of the struggle, he must also catch hold of the 
same concerns and give them a new dimension of meaning. This is the point at which the 
fundamental concern is felt by many in politics, and therefore the point at which the Christian 
Gospel can become most relevant and challenging.” As missionaries had sought to 
conceptualize, categorize, and reinterpret the spiritual concepts of other religions in order to 
fulfill their true meaning in light of the new dispensation, so ecumenical revolutionaries would 
engage in the same act of apologetic redefinition. The desecularization of political into 
theological concepts was missionary praxis for a revolutionary world.96 
 
As it found contemporary resonance with a pre-ecumenical past, The Christian in the World 
Struggle pointed toward a future dramatically unlike any that interwar ecumenical Christians had 
anticipated. At the center of the ecumenical project was a supposition with a still longer tradition 
                                                
95 Ibid, 11. 
96 Though none of Thomas nor McCaughey works suggest a familiarity with the political theology of Carl Schmitt, 
their inversion of Schmitt’s aetiology of “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state” (Schmitt, 
Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 36) 
underscores their abiding commitment to reversing secularization. In this sense, too, they remained true to the 
central aim of the interwar ecumenical project, even as they revolutionized its methods. 
 
 408 
in Christian thought, namely that Christianity constituted a basis of community and a model of 
social harmony under God’s rule. By envisioning contemporary society as a politicized space in 
which the Christian was an outsider – as missionaries had been in the “foreign fields” of the pre-
1914 Protestant imagination – Thomas and McCaughey repositioned the church to the margins. 
For the first time, a major ecumenical text had presented the church, not as a locus of social 
harmony, but as the locus of political struggle. For student Christian leaders, that repositioning 
salvaged the international unity of Christians at a time when the Cold War threatened to split the 
movement. But post-colonial global unity – epitomized in the partnership of the Briton 
McCaughey and the Indian Thomas – required a new role for the church, no longer as the 
adhesive of social order but as its solvent. In the conclusion that follows, we will consider how 
this shift in ecumenical consciousness illuminates a larger transformation in Christianity’s place 













This dissertation has traced the history of Protestant-led efforts to realize the “ecumenical” unity 
of Christians and churches. Rather than seeing these efforts as parts of a single, continuous 
campaign culminating stretching from the 19th century to the 1948 formation of the World 
Council of Churches, I have emphasized shifts in of the meaning of ecumenicity that occurred 
over the first half of the 20th century, as a result of geopolitical upheavals that divided church 
leaders committed to the program of world Christian unity. In particular, I have argued that there 
were three ecumenical projects that arose between 1900 and 1952: the first oriented around 
building the Kingdom of God on earth (1900-1925), the second seeking the realize the 
worldwide church as the basis of universal community (1930-1950), and the third mobilizing 
Christians for political revolution (1946-1952). The caesuras dividing these programs – World 
War I and the early Cold War – were moments when the possibility of international and inter-
church cooperation seemed to collapse altogether, because it became impossible for Protestants 
and Orthodox church leaders to credit one another’s motives as authentically Christian rather 
than “political.” While the programs of the Kingdom and the church abstracted political conflict 
as a function of incomplete Christianization or secularism, revolutionary ecumenism embraced 
political conflict as an expression of Christian obedience. For precisely this reason, revolutionary 
ecumenism offers today an illuminating point of departure to reconsider contemporary debates 
over the relation of religion and the secular in the public sphere. 
 
Before addressing these debates, it is worth summarizing the argument I have laid out in the 
preceding chapters. Until the 1930s, all attempts to organize “ecumenical” conferences among 
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missionaries or an “ecumenical” council of churches were grounded in a theologically liberal 
program that sought to realize the Kingdom of God on earth. World War I and its aftermath 
upended this program, not because the horrors of war made the Kingdom an implausible or 
unconscionable aim, but because Allied and German Protestants could not agree over the 
practical initiatives necessary to bring about this beatific ideal. While Allies saw the Kingdom 
coming into existence through the League of Nations and Wilsoninan internationalism, Germans 
viewed such arguments as attempts to conceal the victors’ political interests under a halo of 
Christian piety. In the 1930s, a self-conscious ecumenical movement displaced the program of 
the Kingdom and succeeded in fostering wide international participation – including Nazi-
sympathizing churches – around opposition to “secularism.” Secularism, as ecumenists defined 
it, cast social and international disorder – as well as conflicts among churches themselves – as 
the consequence of man’s rebellion against God. The only social order capable of worldwide 
integration was the ecumenical church, constituted as the public of God’s address. Ecumenists 
conceived the World Council of Churches as an instrument for realizing this community “of 
acquaintance, of conversation, of mutual aid, of witness and of the search for full unity” among 
Christians of all nations, races, and classes.1 But the godly community of the interwar 
imagination became itself a scene of bitter recrimination in the Cold War. As the program of the 
Kingdom had collapsed under the weight of its political contradictions after 1914, so the 
program of the church collapsed for the same reasons after 1948. While Eastern European church 
leaders attacked the World Council as a front for Western imperialism, critics in the West 
attacked the Council as an agent or stooge of Soviet Communism. The path beyond the 
                                                
1 Visser’t Hooft, “Report of the Provisional Committee,” (address delivered at the Amsterdam Assembly of the 
World Council of Churches,” July, 1948), 3 (UTS, William Adams Brown Ecumenical Library Collection, Series 
1B box 16 fld 6) 
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ideological divisions of the Cold War lay in a new politics of Third World revolution. 
Ecumenists turned to the global South to consolidate the global unity of their movement that 
eluded church leaders in the East and the West, and M. M. Thomas, along with Davis 
McCaughey, Robert Mackie, and others in the World Student Christian Federation, led the way. 
 
These shifts in ecumenical thought and practice responded to the dynamics of integration and 
fracture generated by Protestants’ activation in the public sphere between 1900 and 1952. By the 
turn of the century, much of the clerical and lay leadership of Protestantism had come to view 
voluntary association – through missionary societies and church organizations promoting social 
reform – as necessary in order extend the influence of the Christian faith over industrial 
civilization at home and foreign populations abroad. Their mobilizations generated a new kind of 
discourse for distinguishing piety from impiety. The basic commitment of the ecumenical 
projects we have analyzed here was that authentic faith expressed itself through international 
consensus among individual Christians and churches. Hence the cause of Christian unity – 
pursued through the founding of councils and conferences, the maintenance of personal 
networks, and the international coordination of humanitarian and social work – was not merely 
an efflux of religious idealism; its aim was to secure the viability of Christian faith in an age of 
global interconnection. When the interwar strategy for abstracting political divisions through the 
concept of secularism foundered during the Cold War, the movement embraced a paradoxical 
conclusion: that it was only through political struggle, through the creative destruction of social 
bonds, that Christianity could realize the universal fellowship it sought. The church had become, 




This surprising denouement suggests a 20th century Christian trajectory at odds with dominant 
versions of secularization, which tend to stress either the decline of belief, the institutional 
separation of spheres from religious authority, or the attempt to “substitute” secularly grounded 
moral or political concepts originally derived from religious sources.2 In the remainder of this 
conclusion, I will clarify the distinction between these common stories and the history I have 
presented here by showing how the ecumenical movement’s course in the 1950s and 1960s 
diverged from the phenomenon of “Post-Protestantism,” focusing on the latter’s manifestations 
in the United States. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the program of revolutionary ecumenism first put forth in systematic 
form in The Christian in the World Struggle was institutionalized across the ecumenical 
movement as a whole. In December 1949, Thomas co-authored the report of an Eastern Asia 
Christian Conference held under the auspices of the World Council and the International 
Missionary Council in Bangkok. “The struggle for, and the attainment of, political freedom has 
awakened the hitherto submerged peoples of East Asia to a new sense of dignity and historical 
mission,” declared that report, borrowing language taken from the World Student Christian 
Federation’s Political Commission examined in chapter 6.3 The Bangkok conference was 
followed in 1953 by another Asian summit – in Lucknow, India – where theologians and clerics 
from the West, Asia, and South America discussed papers in preparation for the Second 
Assembly of the World Council, held in Evanston, Illinois, the following year. In 1955, the 
                                                
2 For useful overviews of prevailing conceptions of secularization theory in the social sciences, see Charles Taylor, 
A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), Introduction and José Casanova, Public Religions 
in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chpt 1. 
3 Quoted in Paul Abrecht, “The Development of Ecumenical Social Thought and Action,” A History of the 
Ecumenical Movement vol 2 (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1968), 247. 
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World Council of Churches began a program on “The Church in Areas of Rapid Social Change,” 
under the direction of the American Baptist Paul Abrecht and the Dutch Reformed economist 
Egbert de Vries. This program convened theologians and lay activists to consider the 
responsibilities of the church in countries emerging from colonial rule and seeking rapid social 
and economic development. It became a nexus for thinkers interested in developing theologies of 
revolution. M. M. Thomas and John Karefa-Smart, a Methodist Elder and university professor 
from Sierra Leone (and between 1961-1964, the newly independent country’s first Foreign 
Minister), served as staff consultants for the Rapid Social Change initiative, along with the 
Burmese theologian U Kyaw Than.4 
 
By the 1960s, the movement was poised to greet the rise of student protests, New Left politics, 
accelerating decolonization in Africa with its blessings. In 1962, Abrecht, and de Vries began 
preparations for a conference on “Church and Society,” envisioned as a sequel to the Oxford 
Conference of 1937. Thomas was appointed Chairman. The purpose of this gathering was to 
rethink the interwar tradition ecumenical social thought in light of what Abrecht termed “the 
revolutionary realities which shape the modern world.”5 In one of the most influential 
preparatory papers, the Princeton Theological Seminary Professor Richard Shaull argued that the 
ecumenical church must “provide a context in which people are set free for and encouraged to 
accept revolutionary commitment, and are helped to work out a theological perspective on and 
an ethic for revolution.”6 Essays by the German theologian H. G. Wendland, the Uruguayan 
                                                
4 For a general overview of the Rapid Social Change Program, see Abrecht, 235-59 and Margaret Nash, Ecumenical 
Movement in the 1960s (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1975), chpts 1-4. 
5 Abrecht, 251. 
6 Richard Shaull, “The Revolutionary Challenge to Church and Theology” [paper prepared for the World Council of 
Churches’s Church and Society Conference held in Geneva, July 12-26, 1966] (WCC, 243.02.8). 
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theologian Emilio Castro (future General Secretary of the World Council from 1985 to 1992), U 
Kyaw Than, and others all argued that Christian mission must begin with solidarity with the poor 
and opposition to racism, focusing on flashpoints including Apartheid South Africa, South 
America, and the American South. The conference agenda, which featured addresses by 
Margaret Mead, Kwame Nkrumah, and Martin Luther King, Jr., solidified the place of the 
ecumenical movement in the global left.7 Participants embraced a vision of social liberation 
centered on the extrication of the Gospel from its captivity in western cultural forms and its 
mobilization in resistance to global economic inequality and racism.8 
 
As the ecumenical institutions embraced the radical politics of Third World liberation, they 
hemorrhaged the cultural capital of Christianity in the West. Especially in the United States, this 
capital was claimed by Christians willing to rally unequivocally to the cause of anti-
Communism, and later by evangelical Protestants securing a political position for themselves 
within postwar conservatism. Meanwhile, many of the concepts advanced within ecumenical 
theology in the 1930s and 1940s were developed in explicitly secular directions by thinkers who 
drifted out of the remit of ecumenical conversation – and in many cases away from Christian 
faith altogether. We saw in Chapter 4 how the idea of human rights abstracted the theological 
concept of personhood from the practices of ecumenical dialogue originally deemed necessary to 
its realization. Dulles and Nolde had sought to translate personhood into a legal idiom that could 
command ascent “by people of goodwill,” Christian or non-Christian. In the United States in 
                                                
7 Martin Luther King, Jr. did not attend the event due to his participation in the Chicago Freedom Movement in July. 
The text of his Geneva speech, “A Knock at Midnight,” was delivered in absentia. For the text of the speech see 
WCC, 243.08. 
8 For a selection of papers prepared for the event, see The Church Amid Revolution, ed. Harvey Cox (New York: 
Association Press, 1967). 
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particular, cognate programs of translation emerged from a younger generation of philosophers, 
most notably John Rawls.  
 
As the historian Mackenzie Bok has recently shown, the “ethical motivations” of Rawls’s theory 
of liberalism – developed later in A Theory of Justice (1971) – extended a program first 
developed in his undergraduate thesis, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith (1942).9 
While a Princeton undergraduate, deeply influenced by his reading of Emil Brunner and by 
classes with the philosopher George F. Thomas – a member of the “Theological Discussion 
Group” convened as a part of the post-Jerusalem study program examined in chapter 4 – Rawls 
characterized “personal recognition” linking human beings to each other through their 
recognition of God as the basis of authentic community life.10 In the 1950s and 1960s, Rawls 
moved away from theological interlocutors of his thesis, and from the faith of his youth. Seeking 
to generate a more universalistic basis for the ethics of personal recognition, he sought to ground 
an ethical vantage point first achieved through religious transformation on rational, “naturalistic” 
grounds. 
 
Bok and others have focused on tracing out the legacy of ecumenical ideas in the career of “Post-
Protestants” like Rawls.11 Their work remains within a debate over the relation of secular 
concepts to theological origins, and the “legitimacy” of attempts to establish the autonomy of a 
                                                
9 Mackenzie Bok, “To the Mountaintop Again: The Early Rawls and Post-Protestant Ethics in Postwar America” 
Modern Intellectual History (August 2015), 1-33, 5. For other accounts of Rawls’s connection with neo-
orthodox/dialectical theology, see Eric Gregory, “Before the Original Position: The Neo-Orthodox Theology of the 
Young John Rawls,” Journal of Religious Ethics 35, 2 (2007), 179-206. 
10 Bok, esp 5-8. Tracing this trajectory has been central to David Hollinger’s recent work. See the essays in After 
Cloven Tongues of Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).  
11 “Post-Protestant” is a term of David Hollinger’s which Bok adopts. See Bok, 3. 
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secular ethics.12 Here I have tried to draw attention to a different trajectory, focused not on the 
figures that left the ecumenical faith but those who remained in it and attempted to work out, not 
secular re-founding of theological ethics, but a new defense of theology’s task in the postwar 
world. Focus on this group shows that ecumenical Christianity was not just a mid-century gasp 
of Protestant establishment awaiting its secularization. Whatever sources of inspiration 
ecumenical theology provided for “Post-Protestantism” in its various exertions in ethics, 
philosophy, and politics, ecumenical Christianity remained after 1950 an institutionalized effort 
to foster world solidarity on the basis of a common faith. And in this undertaking, and the 
redefinition of Christian faith in relation to politics that it demanded, we can see an alternative to 
dominant accounts of secularization. 
 
Surveying the history of ecumenism in the 1950s and 1960s, what stands out is not a capitulation 
to secularism but rather a de-emphasizing of the anti-secularist polemic that was so central to the 
interwar ecumenists. No voices in the movement ever argued that Christian faith was merely a 
private matter. Thomas and his colleagues and successors never repudiated the critique of 
secularism as modern man’s rebellion against god in the name of “self-sufficiency.” They did, 
however, argue that the meaning of this polemic could only be understood by specifying its 
political significance. Such a specification was necessary in order to avoid the impression that 
the movement was allied to one or the other Cold War bloc.  
 
Theologians of revolution specified their politics by identifying the church with the poor, the 
non-white, the “submerged classes.” For Thomas and McCaughey, as discussed in chapter 6, 
                                                
12 For the classic statement of this problem, see Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1983). 
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Christ’s universal fellowship was found in solidarity with the “outsider.” One might argue that 
this valorization of Christian marginality was simply an ex post facto justification of the church’s 
slipping cultural control brought on by exogenous forces. But the fact that this argument was 
advanced already in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when Christians in Europe and North 
America still enjoyed a position of dominance in their respective societies,13 militates against 
such an argument. Moreover, there is no evidence that revolutionary ecumenism rose to 
prominence in the movement as a strategy of adjustment to the “decline of Christendom” in the 
West. Its ascent was due, rather, to its capacity to furnish a basis for practical cooperation within 
a constituency threatened with internal fracture. Ecumenists re-located themselves to the 
society’s margins in order to secure the worldwide integration of Christian community that had 
been their goal from the very beginning.  
 
Focus on ecumenical Christians’ cultural defeat in the West, then, comes at the cost of 
discounting the culture that matter most to them: namely, that of their own movement, the global 
life of the oikoumene. More significantly, such a focus overlooks the movement’s subtle account 
of religion’s relation to politics – an account that offers and illuminating alternative to prevailing 
contemporary versions within both Christian and secular scholarship. Much contemporary work 
on religion in the public sphere has focused on defending or critiquing the program of 
                                                
13 Most current scholarship on transwar Christianity now stresses its cultural dominance, above all in the ways that it 
shaped framings of the Cold War, Christian Democracy in Europe, and political culture in the US during a time that 
saw God inscribed into the pledge of allegiance and “In God We Trust” printed on the dollar bill. Moyn, for 
instance, calls the transwar period “Christianity’s last golden age” on the European content.” Samuel Moyn, 
Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 110. On Christian Democracy’s 
intellectual origins and postwar dominance, see Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European 
Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) and James Chappel, Slaying the Leviathan: Catholicism and 
the Rebirth of European Conservatism: 1920-1950 (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 2012) and for the 
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“translating” the contents of religious discourse into the terms of rational argument. Rawls 
himself advanced such a program of translation in his famous “proviso,” insisting that religious 
actors furnish “properly political reasons” for their comprehensive doctrines as the price of their 
entry into public discourse.14 More recently, Jürgen Habermas has offered a revision of this 
argument (and also of his own prior position), that eschews Rawls’s call for religious actors to 
police their own arguments, but insists on an “institutional filter” for buffering “informal 
communication in the public arena” – where religious appeals need not undergo translation – and 
the “collectively binding decisions” of states and other political bodies.15 Critics of Habermas 
such as Peter Gordon have underscored that even his updated program subverts its stated 
intention: “translating” theological claims into secular language strips them of precisely the 
content that is meant to be translated. Figured as a source of “values” or “normative 
imaginaries,” religious discourse loses the object that made it meaningful in the first place.16 The 
question at stake in these debates is what a public that accommodates theological discourse while 
resisting its exclusions would look like.   
 
Thomas and the revolutionary ecumenical tradition envisioned such a public. For them, this 
public did not entail unidirectional translation – from theological into political reason – but an 
ongoing practice of reciprocal translation necessary to irrigate two fields of meaning. In The 
Christian and the World Struggle, Thomas and McCaughey called for a “translation” of political 
                                                
14 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer 1997), 783. 
15 Jürgen Habermas, “’The Political:’ The Rational Meaning of Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,” The 
Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, ed Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (New York: Columbai 
University Press, 2011), 15-33, 26.  
16 Peter Gordon, “Between Christian Democracy and Critical Theory: Habermas, Böckenförde, and the Dialectics of 
Secularization in Postwar Germany” Social Research vol 80, 1 (2013), 173-202. 
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concepts such as “justice” and “responsibility” into theological terms. This translation was 
necessary, they believed, in order for Christians to make the Gospel comprehensible in a world 
where political thought and practice was the dominant vernacular. But the reverse was also true: 
only by specifying political aims could Christians understand the meaning of their own faith. 
Political participation furnished the only standpoint from which the eternal truths of the Gospel 
could be understood. The circular translations of theological and political discourse were for 
these authors – and, by the 1960s, for the ecumenical movement as a whole – the basis of 
Christian participation in modern society. Their mission was not to Christianize this society but 
to apprehend and obey God’s will in its revolutionary transformation. Such a program required 
the autonomy of politics – exactly in order to reveal the object of faith.  
 
Resolving the ecumenical movement’s Cold War crisis, then, confronted its theologians with 
questions of translation that are today at center of contemporary debates over religion in the 
public sphere. Their solution bears little resemblance to theoretical programs currently advanced 
by either secular and Christian commentators. It reveals a deep familiarity with a tradition of 
missiology dating back to the 19th century that was central to Protestant internationalism from its 
origins, but has fallen since into oblivion – the result as much of ecumenical Christianity’s 
marginalization as evangelical Protestantism’s ascent. It goes without saying that Thomas’s 
solution has no standing as a model for non-Christian religious traditions. Nor does the unique 
vector of revolutionary ecumenism neutralize the missiological tradition it drew from of its 
(historically dominant) Christian chauvinism. But recovering ecumenism’s twentieth-century re-
inventions is a critical reminder that its relation to the secular public sphere is not one of linear 
progression. Rather, it was one of contestation over the terms of Christian engagement in 
 
 420 
politics. For that reason, this history holds insights alike for Christian and secular scholars 
attentive to the resistance between their respective projects, yet hopeful that this resistance is an 
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